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I would like to thank also Professor Colin Crouch and Professor Anke Hassel, who agreed to serve as 
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This thesis is an empirical study of the role of organized business in the formation of market-
correcting industrial relations and welfare state institutions, relying on a historical-diachronic case 
study of welfare state development in Germany from the 1880s to the 1990s. How did the formation of 
the “German model” become possible in the face of employers’ structural power? The thesis confronts 
two alternative theoretical perspectives for explaining employers’ acceptance of market-correcting 
institutions: an economic-functionalist explanation (“cross-class coalition thesis”) and a political-
strategic explanation (“political accommodation thesis”). The first one focuses on economic benefits 
derived by specific types of firms from welfare state nd industrial relations institutions, the second  
political constraints and changes in the political power structure, and employers’ strategic responses to 
them. The thesis finds that the political accommodati n thesis has greater explanatory power and 
challenges business interest-based explanations of welfare state development. 
The empirical analysis in the thesis traces the preferences (interest perceptions), strategic 
considerations, and resulting policy positions of the national employer federations in Germany during 
three different political regimes: the Wilhelmine Empire (1871-1918), the inter-war Weimar Republic 
(1918-1933), and the post-war Federal Republic (1949-1990s). The analysis focuses on those 
historical reform events that, in retrospect, came to shape welfare state and industrial relations 
institutions in Germany. Process analysis based on historical sources and diachronic comparison are 
used as methods to reconstruct (i) the motivations of employers for supporting or opposing specific 
policy options, and (ii) the socio-political and institutional environment within which employers 
formed their preferences and strategies. The thesis use  Germany as a crucial case study because of 
the paradigmatic character of this country as a type of non-liberal capitalism that is often understood t  
benefit certain types of firms today.  
Empirically, the thesis finds that employers tended to play a constraining role in the development of 
industrial relations and welfare state institutions and often accepted specific reform options for 
political-strategic reasons, rather than because of any perceived economic interests in them. The thesis 
identifies two dominant employer strategies in welfare state politics (a) pacification of radicalized 
elements within labor, and (b) containment of expansionary reform projects. Moreover, the thesis finds 
that employers consistently preferred conservative ypes of social policies to universalist (social 
democratic) alternatives, and explains this as a result of differential impacts on work incentives. The 
deliberate formation of cross-class coalitions is found to have been rare and to have happened only 
under conditions of extraordinary political and economic uncertainty. Issues of skill formation are 
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In capitalist societies, business has structural power due to its control over production and 
investments on which societal prosperity depends. Given this structurally privileged position 
of business, how did capitalist societies manage to stablish policies and institutions that 
constrain entrepreneurial freedom and impose high costs on firms, such as welfare state 
programmes? Conventionally, the uneasy coexistence of a capitalist economy and welfare 
state institutions has been explained in the comparative political economy literature as the 
product of a social compromise that resulted from class conflicts and the political power 
resources of labor. Michael Shalev, for instance, argued that “the welfare state is a class issue. 
Logically and historically, its principal proponents and defenders are movements of the 
working class” (Shalev 1983: 319). In a similar way, Huber and Stephens argued that the 
“struggle over welfare states is a struggle over distribution, and thus the organizational power 
of those standing to benefit from redistribution, the working and lower middle classes, is 
crucial” (Huber and Stephens 2001: 17) development (for general overviews of different 
theories of welfare state development see Hicks and Esping-Andersen 2005; van Kersbergen 
and Manow 2008; and Huber and Stephens 2005: 552-5). 
 More recently, from the 1990s onwards, this perspectiv  has been challenged by a new 
theoretical perspective that intends to “bring capital back in” (Swenson 1991) to the analysis 
of welfare states and political economies. As Kathleen Thelen has remarked, the earlier focus 
on the political role of organized labor and its political allies has “by and large been replaced 
by a concern with uncovering the role that employers have played in generating and 
sustaining such institutions” (2002: 380). This strand of research focuses on the interests and 
preferences of business, rather than labor, for explaining welfare state development, trying to 
provide a so-called employer-centred explanation for the historical formation and expansion 
of modern welfare states. 
 Inspired by a specific type of economic functionalism, employer-centred explanations 
often assume that employers held a genuine economic interest in the formation of welfare 
state programmes and other market-correcting institutions. According to this perspective, 
benefits in terms of economic competitiveness or economic productivity motivated specific 
types of firms to back welfare state formation.  These interest perceptions led to a congruence 
of policy preferences between parts of capital and parts of labor and to the formation of cross-
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class alliances. According to this view, cross-class lliances are the political foundations on 
which welfare state formation rests (Mares 2003a, 2003b; Swenson 1991, 2002). I refer to this 
new argument as the “cross-class coalition thesis”. This argument – if correct - puts into 
question the traditional  “power resource” explanation of welfare state development, which  
highlights the importance of class struggle and the political power resources of the labor 
movement and its political allies. It challenges the centrality of labor strength as an 
explanatory variable of welfare state development by highlighting the importance of business 
interest in the process of welfare state-making. 
 At the center of the cross-class coalition approach re three closely related claims: (a) 
employers (or dominant groups among them) had actively supported the construction of 
modern welfare states; (b) they had done so because they had genuine economic interests in 
welfare state policies, as these policies benefited th ir modes of industrial production; and (c) 
a convergence in the preferences of capital and labor resulted in the formation of cross-class 
alliances. According to this argument, cross-class lliances are the political settlement on 
which the institutions of the modern welfare state rest. Major labor market and social policies 
have been constructed not as policies against employers, but instead as policies upporting 
employer interests (for a general introduction to the debate see Thelen 2002: 377-82). If this 
new employer-centred explanation of welfare state development is correct, traditional labor-
centred explanations need to be reconsidered. Peter Sw nson points out that if employer 
interests regarding social policy are strikingly more positive where labor is strong, than the 
“political power of labor…is indeed spurious if conceived exclusively as ‘power against 
capital and its interests’” (Swenson 2002: 10). 
The subject of this thesis is the evaluation of employers’ contribution to welfare state 
development in light of this controversy, relying on an in-depth analysis of the German case. 
The basic research questions that this thesis tries to answer are the following: What was the 
role of industrial employers in the construction of the German welfare state? To what extent 
and under what conditions did employers accept or endorse reforms introducing or extending 
welfare state and industrial relations institutions? What motivated their decisions to support or 
oppose specific reform projects? 
The argument made in this thesis highlights the importance of political conflict and 
strategic adaptation for motivating employers to accept specific welfare state policies, and, by 
doing so, takes issue with existing employer-centred explanations. The thesis tries to show 
that employers accepted the introduction of specific welfare state programmes and industrial 
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relations institutions as lesser evils, where the maintenance of unregulated markets became 
politically unviable, rather than because they thought that these policies would benefit the 
competitiveness or productivity of their firms. A positive association between the social 
policy stances of business and labor power may indicate that labor power is a spurious 
variable, as Swenson plausibly suggests, but it mayalso indicate, I suggest, that employers 
adjusted their positions in response to labor streng h or other constraints coming from the 
political context. The argument presented in this tesis thus pulls us back to the importance of 
political conflict and balance of power, emphasized by the traditional “power resource” 
explanations. 
 To preview the main argument of the thesis, I argue that  employers’ had no genuine 
economic interests in the introduction of welfare state programmes and institutions of class 
compromise but were, nevertheless, sometimes compelled by political constraints to support 
their introduction. Their motivations for accepting or endorsing specific policies and 
institutions have been twofold: First, employers accepted or supported specific reforms to 
contain the rise of the labor movement or radical elem nts within it. Employers used social 
policies and institutions for class compromise as tools of social pacification. Social policies 
were the lesser evil compared to revolution and colle tivization of industry. When the 
revolutionary dangers waned, employers’ interest in pacification waned as well. Second, 
employers tried to limit the scope and generosity of welfare state programmes by what I call 
the politics of containment. In order to prevent far-reaching reform plans from 
implementation, they endorsed and supported more moderate alternatives. In both cases, 
containing political challenges motivated employers to go along with welfare state reformers. 
The formation of the modern welfare state was not relentlessly opposed by industrialists, but 
it is unlikely they would have accepted it in the absence of formidable political challenges. 
 On a theoretical level, the thesis challenges a specific type of economic-functionalist 
thinking in political economy that assumes that the behavior of political actors can be inferred 
directly from their stipulated material interests. Political actors are embedded in a specific 
historical political context and this context shapes their goals and positions. Their policy 
stances are not determined by their objective material interests alone. They are also, in part, 
the result of strategic considerations, the result of an accommodation to political constraints. 
They are calculations of what is the best that can be achieved in a given context. If their best 
option is politically unviable, employers may, for instance, support the policy that is their 
second-best option in order to prevent implementation of a different option that they consider 
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to be even worse. In this case their position does not reflect a genuine or first-order 
preference but an accommodation to the political context.  
An analysis of the role of employers in welfare state development, I suggest, needs to 
take into account how employers accommodate to the political context they are embedded in, 
in order to understand their true causal relevance for welfare state development. Before 
turning to the question of how political context shapes employer preferences and strategies, 
the following section reviews the key arguments in the controversy over employers’ role in 
welfare state development in more detail. 
1.I Theory: Class Alliances and Class Conflicts in Political Context 
Much of the recently thriving literature on the role of employers in welfare state development 
emphasizes the supportive role of employers in welfar  state development and their pivotal 
role in the formation of so called “cross-class alliances”. The emphasis on the importance of 
political alliances among social groups is not distinctive of the cross-class coalition approach 
or of employer-centred explanations. As one political group usually does not possess 
sufficient power to implement a desired political goal without the support from other groups, 
the formation of alliances is a pervasive phenomenon i  politics. What makes the cross-class 
coalition approach distinctive and innovative, however, is the claim that the political alliances 
that shaped welfare state development brought together segments of capital and labor, that is, 
the claim that political alliances in welfare state d velopment bridge the class divide, rather 
than following it. 
 In the comparative and historical analysis of welfare state development, the formation 
of alliances between different social groups has been mphasized as an important factor by 
several scholars, but, unlike in the cross-class coalition approach, these scholars did not 
emphasize alliances that include employers as pivotal actors, but instead alliances forged by 
the working class with other social groups. The distinctive element of the cross-class coalition 
approach, as understood here, is that it claims the importance of employer-centred alliances. 
This section will first discuss some important examples of the study of political alliances in 
welfare state development and political economy more generally and show how theoretical 
arguments made in some of these studies have inspired the cross-class coalition thesis. The 
second part of the section analyzes the core arguments made by proponents of the cross-class 
coalition thesis and employer-centred explanations n more detail. 
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Precursors to the cross-class coalition approach 
Barrington Moore’s analysis of the transitions from feudalism to industrial society in Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy emphasizes the importance of alliances and conflicts 
between different social classes in explaining different pathways to industrial modernity 
(Moore 1966). Moore identifies “three main historical routes from the preindustrial to the 
modern world” (Moore 1966: xii), which differ in the social forces and their relations to each 
other that have underpinned this transition. Moore tries to understand, in particular, “the role 
of the landed upper classes and the peasants in thebourgeois revolutions leading to capitalist 
democracy, the abortive bourgeois revolutions leading to fascism, and the peasant revolutions 
leading to communism” (Moore 1966: xiv). To put it s mply, Moore argues that different 
configurations of alliances and cleavages between large social forces are the most important 
factor explaining differences in the outcomes of historical regime transformations. His work 
constitutes a seminal example of the empirical analysis of class cleavages and alliances. 
 In the field of welfare state research, Esping-Andersen’s Politics against Markets has 
pointed out the important role of class alliances. Unlike the cross-class coalition approach, as 
understood here, his analysis does, however, not focus n alliances involving employers, but 
on electoral alliances forged by social democratic reformers aiming to sustain popular support 
for their welfare state projects. According to Esping-Andersen, social democratic reformers in 
Denmark and Sweden constructed universal social policies with the intention of “supplanting 
narrow group identities or individualism with broad social solidarity” (Esping-Andersen 
1985: 33). He argues that the success of Scandinavia  social democrats in constructing a 
generous and comprehensive welfare state cannot be explained solely by the strength of the 
social democratic labor movement, but by its exceptional ability to forge alliances with other 
social classes.1 Social democratic parties “conceived as strictly working-class movements, are 
and always have been, doomed to fail.” Instead, social democratic power “depends on a 
combination of two historical forces: the pattern of class coalitions and the party’s conduct of 
class mobilization through reformist practice” (Esping-Andersen 1985: xv). 
 Esping-Andersen argues that Nordic social democracy has been more successful in 
engineering such class alliances than their continetal European counterparts, which explains 
differences in character and generosity between Nordic and continental European welfare 
state regimes. He identifies two types of class alliances: in the first half of the 20th century, a 
                                                
1 A similar argument is made by Adam Przeworski, who stresses the “electoral dilemma” between maintaining a 
homogenous class base and struggles for electoral succe s (Przeworski 1985: 102).  
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popular alliance between peasants and industrial blue-collar workers (“red-green alliance”) 
led to the introduction of egalitarian, universal social citizenship policies. During the post-war 
decades an alliance between industrial blue-collar workers and white-collar workers (“wage-
earner alliance”) was responsible for the construction of earnings-related social insurance 
policies. As mentioned, employers do n t figure as pivotal actors, either in the first or in the 
second type of alliance. Esping-Andersen’s analysis constitutes a modified version of, rather 
than a fundamental departure from, the labor mobilizat on thesis. The pivotal actors are 
reformist social democrats trying to engineer popular support for their policies (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 17-8). 
 A related argument is made by Peter Baldwin (1990). Baldwin challenges the labor 
mobilization thesis by arguing that it neglects the role of the middle classes. Through 
historical analysis of important reform projects in Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany and 
the UK, Baldwin shows that middle class groups, like white-collar employees or independent 
artisans, often supported social policies for self-interested reasons. They wanted social 
protection, but insisted on privileged treatment, better benefit conditions and earnings-related 
benefits in order to maintain status distinctions to lower classes. Like in Esping-Andersen’s 
account, industrial employers do not figure as pivotal supporters of welfare state development 
in Baldwin’s work. 
 Employers were brought into the analysis of political alliances, initially, by studies 
dealing with foreign economic policies and foreign trade. Peter Gourevitch’s study of foreign 
economic policy-making has played a seminal role in developing the notion of cross-class 
alliances (Gourevitch 1986, 1989). In Politics in Hard Times, Gourevitch’s goal is to analyze 
“the patterns of support which have formed around the various programs of economic policy 
that countries have adopted in response to severe disruptions in the international economy" 
(Gourevitch 1986: 20). His key assumption is that the foreign economic policy preferences of 
political actors will be determined by their position in the international economy: “Societal 
actors divide and combine over time in ways that relate to their changing situations in the 
international division of labor” (Gourevitch 1986: 32). The basic policy choices at stake are 
free trade vs. protectionism, whereby different social groups are likely to benefit from either 
the former, or the latter, depending on the internatio l economic context. 
 Gourevitch makes the observation that different sec ors of the economy are positioned 
differently in the international economy, which he makes the basis for an analysis of political 
alliances that stresses cross-sectoral cleavages, rather than cross-class cleavages. Gourevitch 
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shows that on some issues industrial employers had been divided, due to the different 
international economic situation they faced, which in some cases led to sectoral cross-class 
alignments. Dynamic, competitive sectors have tended to favor free trade, sectors facing stiff 
international competition tended to favor protectionism. These disagreements “have been 
strong enough to break through common ‘class’ positions and assert ‘sectoral’ ones. At times 
these conflicts have led business leaders to make common cause with ‘class’ enemies 
(‘labor’) or sectoral ones (‘agriculture’)” (Gourevitch 1989: 97). “The move for free trade,” in 
particular, “was one of the prime elements leading business to seek labor allies” (Gourevitch 
1989: 98). Gourevitch shows convincingly that the sectoral conflicts over the issue of free 
trade can motivate groups of industrial employers to forge a sectoral cross-class alliance. 
Although his analysis does not focus on social policy issues, concessions by industrialists on 
social policy issues may potentially have played a role in engineering such “free trade 
alliances”. 
 Sectoral conflicts over issues of foreign economic policy are also analyzed in the work 
of Jeff Frieden (Frieden 1991; Frieden 1988). Frieden assumes that economic openness and 
integration creates winners and losers, and therefore has distributive consequences that will 
matter in domestic politics. In an analysis of the US foreign economic policy during the inter-
war period, Frieden shows that this policy was closely linked to conflicts of interests and, thus 
different preferences, between firms that saw free t ade as an opportunity for expansion and 
firms which saw free trade as a competitive threat (Frieden 1988). In a similar way, Frieden 
has theoretically modeled the preferences of different producer groups concerning exchange 
rate policy, emphasizing that different sectors will be affected differently by international 
capital mobility and will thus have different preferences with respect to exchange rate policies 
(Frieden 1991). Neither Frieden nor Gourevitch have pplied their propositions to the field of 
welfare state development, but, as we shall see below, the logic of their cross-sectoral 
cleavage arguments came to inform the theoretical basis of the cross-class coalition approach 
in welfare state research. 
 Like Frieden and Gourevitch, also Ronald Rogowski has focused on the role of the 
international economy in explaining domestic patterns of political cleavages and alliances. 
Different to Frieden and Gourevitch, however, he assumes cleavages between the factors of 
production rather than between sectors. Rogowski tries to explain different cleavage and 
alliance patterns across countries with the differential effects of exposure to international 
trade on different social groups. Rogowksi uses a basic three factor model (land, capital and 
labor) and builds on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, according to which abundant factors will 
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benefit from international trade, while scarce factors will lose. From this assumption he 
derives a model of alliance formation, which, put in simplified terms, suggests that those 
factors benefiting from international trade will ally against those losing from international 
trade. He hypothesizes that “changes in exposure to international trade” will “profoundly 
affect nations’ internal political cleavages” (Rogowski 1989: 20). The modeled results will be 
either a “red-green alliance” (land and labor vs. capital), a class alliance (labor vs. capital and 
land) or an “urban-rural alliance” (capital and labor vs. land) (Rogowski 1989: 4-16). To sum 
up, this section has shown that the notion of cross-cla s alliances is rooted in studies of 
foreign economic policy-making. 
The cross-class coalition thesis: economic interests and employer politics 
The notion of cross-sectoral cleavages of interests developed by Frieden and by Gourevitch 
has been applied to welfare state analysis by scholars using the cross-class coalition approach. 
This approach challenges the class mobilization thesis by arguing that the latter has 
overlooked the pro-active role of employers in welfare state development. The core argument 
of the cross-class coalition thesis is that employers in specific sectors had supported certain 
labor market and social policies because they perceived these policies to be in their own 
interest. This argument rests on the assumption that employers in different sectors of the 
economy have different interests with respect to labor market and social policies. Instead of 
being the outcome of class conflicts, major welfare state programmes are seen as the outcome 
of conflicts between different sectors of the economy. Employers in specific sectors have 
actively advocated labor market and social policies, usually in alliance with labor unions in 
the same sector, or sometimes also in a different sctor. Thus, different welfare state models 
are seen as being as much the outcome of struggles within as between classes. 
 Peter Swenson is one of the most outspoken protagonists of this argument. He has 
analyzed the role of employer organizations in the construction of wage bargaining systems 
and welfare state programmes on the basis of detailed historical case studies. His studies 
compare Germany and Sweden (Swenson 1989), Denmark and Sweden (Swenson 1991), and 
the USA and Sweden (Swenson 2002). “In Sweden, as in the United States” Swenson argues 
employers quietly endorsed the main components of the welfare state, not out of resignation but 
out of self-interest. In Sweden, the historical facts suggest, the enduring political success of the 
Social Democratic labor movement and the durability of its famous social and labor market 
policy reforms would not have been possible had they b en imposed against the interests of 
capital (Swenson 2002: 293). 
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 Swenson claims that employers’ acceptance of major welfare state programmes 
reflects their genuine interest in these policies, rather than a strategic decision to 
accommodate to an unfavorable political context. In his view, Swedish employers had an 
economic interest in state regulation, because of the kind of production strategy they pursued 
(Swenson 2002: 12). Similarly, with regard to Germany, he argues that “because of their 
managerial interests—not a desire to suppress sociali m—the leadership of German industry 
supported the building and maintenance of the world’s first welfare state” (Swenson 2005: 
196). Swenson, thus, rejects the argument that employers’ acceptance of social policies 
reflects strategic or lower-order preferences, and insists, instead, that their position  reflect 
genuine or first-order preferences: “[T]he interests that employers expressed” in Sweden, 
Swenson claims: 
were not ... the “strategic” preferences of a capitalist class that was, at heart, antagonistic to 
social and labor market legislation. Organized employers were not merely resigned to 
hegemonic Social Democrats and hoping to appease them for special consideration on particular 
details, for nicer treatment in other domains, or to avoid public disfavor. They knew what they 
wanted. Sometimes they liked best what they got and got what they liked best (Swenson 2002: 
11). 
 Initially, Swenson developed his theoretical arguments about the importance of 
employers in welfare state development on the basis of a comparative-historical analysis of 
the centralization of wage bargaining in Denmark and Sweden (Swenson 1991). In this study, 
Swenson shows convincingly that employers in the trade-exposed metalworking sector, where 
wages were low, favored a centralization of wage bargaining in order to rein in the exorbitant 
wage growth in the construction sector, which was sheltered from international competition 
and characterized by militant unions. By centralizing wage bargaining, employers and labor 
unions in the metalworking sector intended to tame th  militant construction unions and 
reduce the inter-sectoral wage gap (Swenson 1991: 52 -523). Swenson argues that the 
centralization of wage bargaining in Sweden was “more the product of a cross-class, inter-
factional coalition of interests than an armistice between classes at war, for there were to be 
losers in each camp" (Swenson 1989: 34). The integral role played by Swedish employers in 
centralizing wage bargaining has also been documented by other scholars, in particular in 
studies by James Fulcher (1991: 67-81: 190-3), Axel Hadenius (1976: 194) and Geoffrey 
Ingham (1974: 23; see also Crouch 1994: 107; and Scharpf 1987: 182). 
 Swenson, however, extends the scope of his argument by claiming that Scandinavian 
employers had formed a cross-class alliance with social democratic reformers to jointly 
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construct comprehensive welfare state programmes. H claims that the “political domination 
of social democrats” in Denmark and Sweden:  
was stabilized by the absence of intense political opposition by capital to policies and programs 
aggressively opposed by business elsewhere in the world. This quiescence was not a symptom 
of weakness or dependency. Instead, it was a product of the class-intersecting, cross-class 
alliance behind institutions of centralized conflict resolution that routinely served mutual 
interests of sectoral groupings that dominated employer and union confederations. In class-
divisive, cross-class alliances these groups mutually reinforced each other’s power to control 
intramural competitors and opponents (Swenson 1991: 514, my emphasis). 
 This claim goes far beyond the empirically documented pro-active role of SAF in the 
centralization of industrial relations in Sweden. Swenson’s analysis does, however, not 
present convincing empirical evidence for the claim that welfare state development in 
Denmark and Sweden rests on a political settlement characterized by “class-divisive, cross-
class alliances.” Niklas Stenlås has shown that even during the 1940s, at the time during 
which Swenson’s cross-class alliance crystallized, dominant groups within Swedish industry 
provided substantial financial support to the Conservatives and the Liberals and their 
affiliated newspapers (Stenlås 1998: Ch.5 and 6). According to Stenlås, Swedish industrialists 
eventually “choose to cooperate with Social Democracy rather than fight it” after they had 
unsuccessfully spent “considerable amounts of money a d resources in attempts to vie for … 
[their] position and influence political ideology in Sweden” (Stenlås 1998: 363)2. Organized 
in the so-called “Directors’ Club”, they tried to strengthen the bourgeois parties before the 
1936 elections in order to prevent a Social Democratic government (s.a. Söderpalm 1976: 31-
6). 
 Swenson acknowledges that employers had rarely been ag nda-setters for welfare state 
reforms. Instead, they had often decided to back reforms only once the reform process had 
been initiated by other actors. He argues that this initial hesitation to back reforms was 
motivated by strategic considerations, while their final acceptance of reforms reflected their 
genuine interests. Referring to the New Deal reforms in the US, he argues:  
[E]mployers were rarely the initiating or driving force ... There were good reasons for this de 
facto political division of labor ... individual capitalists had to consider the entirely avoidable 
business or social costs of taking progressive political stands for their relations with buyers, 
suppliers, stockholders, and fellow country club memb rs when reactionary organizations set 
the tone of debate. Most, of course, had neither th time nor inclination to devote resources to 
studying the advantages or disadvantages of social legislation. ... For those businessmen with 
progressive tendencies … it was probably better to lie low and wait for outside forces to push 
for change. The added advantage was that they could blame a force majeure for the reformist 
course of events they supported once reform was under way and justify their participation by 
                                                
2 A similar argument is also made by Korpi (2006). 
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saying that if they did not go along, worse things could happen (Swenson 2002: 13, emphasis in 
original). 
 Swenson, thus, suggests that progressive industrialists held covert sympathies for 
social policy reforms, but hesitated to take a clear st nce because of fears of reprisals from 
conservative industrialists. If we assume that this is true, this argument raises the question of 
how progressive employers managed to have a crucial influence on the shape of the New Deal 
reforms, considering that they hesitated to take a cle r stance. Swenson suggests that New 
Deal reformers paid close attention to what was acceptable to important groups of 
industrialists, even though these industrialists had not been outspoken advocates of the New 
Deal reforms. This interpretation has been challenged by other scholars.  Hacker and Pierson, 
for instance, find that “most employers strongly opp sed the enactment of a national system 
of social insurance” and that “only a sharp decline in business power made the SSA possible” 
(Hacker and Pierson 2002: 298). 
 A partly related argument is made by Colin Gordon. Gordon analyzes the role of 
business in the origins of the social policy legislation of the New Deal era in the US (ca.1933-
37) (Gordon 1991, 1994). He highlights the primacy of business interests in the formulation 
of New Deal social policy legislation. He argues that “the New Deal was a creature of 
business demands” (Gordon 1994:4) and reflected the privileged position of business in the 
political system of the US: “Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s...U.S. welfare policy has 
been, in large part, a business measure in progressive clothing” (Gordon 1991:167). 
Gordon relates the New Deal legislation to experiments by US firms in the 1920s with 
company welfare schemes and collective bargaining and the inadequacies of state-level social 
policies. During the 1920s many firms established company welfare schemes in order to 
reduce labor turnover and forestall unionization by binding worker interests to the individual 
firm. Due to intensifying cost competition from firms that did not have such schemes and 
initial underestimation of the program costs by firms, many of these “welfare capitalists” over 
time began to seek ways of escaping the costs associ ted with these programs. At the same 
time, a disparate patchwork of social policies at the state level had developed during the 
1920s, which meant higher labor costs for firms located in “welfare” states. These happened 
mainly in northern states, while few southern state had established welfare programs. These 
private and state-level social policy innovations re ulted in competitive disadvantages for 
firms and states with larger welfare burdens (Gordon 1991: 171-9). 
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According to Gordon, firms with company welfare schemes and firms in the welfarist 
northern states lobbied for federal welfare legislation in order to create a level playing field 
with regard to labor costs. These employers intended to socialize the costs of social protection 
and to standardize labor costs by spreading the cost burden to low cost competitors. In 
contrast, small firms without company welfare schemes and employers in the southern states 
opposed federal social policies as targeted against them. In short, Gordon argues that “federal 
social security was largely an effort...to "even out" the competitive disparities resulting from 
two decades of private and state-level experimentatio  with work benefits” (Gordon 1994: 4).  
In his  view, important business groups did thus try to overcome the “competitive federalism” 
of the US system by deliberately pushing for nationally uniform labor standards and social 
policy legislation in order to mute inter-state competition. Gordon concludes that: 
Federal welfare law, although a long-standing goal of academic and social reformers, was 
largely the product of business anxieties and demands. The SSA, of course, also counted many 
business opponents...By and large, however, the passage of the Act reflected a scramble for 
competitive or political advantage among business and regional interests. (Gordon 1994: 241) 
Gordon makes a similar argument with respect to unionization and collective 
bargaining in the 1920s. While acknowledging that most US industries were strictly anti-
unionist, some industries relied on what he calls “regulatory unionism”. These industries 
relied on sectoral collective bargaining and the enforcement of standard wage rates by 
industry unions in order to regulate wage competition within the industry. He argues that in 
the 1920s US “[e]mployers often accepted industrial unions in exchange for the cost those 
unions could force on competitors and just as often resisted them in order to maintain the 
advantage of open-shop wages” (Gordon 1994: 127). Similarly, he argues that the Wagner 
Act of 1935, which established nationwide labor rights, was tacitly accepted by some business 
groups and claims that without that “there is little likelihood that it would have passed” 
(Gordon 1994: 205). Gordon argues that 
the progressive turn of the "second New Deal" was part and parcel of two decades of business 
strategy and two years of business-driven recovery politics. In historical memory, of course, 
the New Deal is virtually synonymous with a transformation of labor relations and labor law. 
Yet the emergence of industrial unionism and a "comm n law" of labor relations was not (as it 
is commonly portrayed) simply the product of an emboldened labor movement, an enlightened 
state, or a momentarily weakened business community. (Gordon 1994: 2) 
 
 Similarly to Swenson, Gordon claims that important business groups favored the New 
Deal reforms and played an important role in shaping its legislation. Different from Swenson, 
though, Gordon does not argue that business support for social policies resulted from 
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invariable economic interests of specific types of firms. Instead, he highlights specific 
historical experiences made by US business during the 1920s and the inconsistencies and 
deficiencies of state social policies to explain business support for federal social policies. He 
also notes that soon after the passing of the Social Security Act in 1935 business groups 
originally supportive of SSA turned into vocal opponents as they realized that the Act failed 
to standardize labor costs across states. The argument ade by Gordon does thus not imply 
that specific types of firms would be generally supportive of social policies and does, instead, 
emphasize effects of political institutions on competitive dynamics in federalist systems. 
 The interpretation of business involvement in the New Deal offered by Gordon and by 
Swenson is in sharp contrast to the one presented i a study by Hacker and Pierson (Hacker 
and Pierson 2002). These authors explain the passing of the Social Security Act as a result of 
a temporary political weakness of business, caused by the Great Depression and the shift of 
social policy-making from the state to the federal level during the Roosevelt administration. 
Building on the assumption that the structural power of business derives from its capacity to 
relocate production, Hacker and Pierson argue that “[w]ith the shift of political action to 
Washington, the structural power of business declind dramatically.” (Hacker and Pierson 
2002:305). 
  According to Hacker and Pierson, business benefited politically from the federated 
nature of the US polity. During the 1920s, the scope and content of social policy initiatives at 
state level had been limited primarily because of fear of business opposition and the 
relocation of capital to other states: “fear of busine s disapproval was the principle obstacle to 
reform” (Hacker and Pierson 2002: 290). This situaton of competitive federalism was 
exploited by employers to constrain reform initiatives: “Employers did act, with considerable 
success, to water down bills wherever possible. Similarly, they fought successfully to block 
national legislation, out of fear that it would open the door to federal intervention on other 
social policy issues.” (Hacker and Pierson 2002: 292). The outcome of this situation was that 
very few and limited reforms were passed in the pre-New Deal era that significantly raised 
labor costs for firms engaged in inter-state competition (293).  
The shift of policy-making from state capitals to Washington during the New Deal-era 
fundamentally altered the balance of power and made the passing of federal welfare laws 
possible, argue Hacker and Pierson. Some business groups accommodated to this change in 
the balance of power and decided to support federal social legislation for strategic reasons: 
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impetus for the SSA came largely from outside the business community and … most 
employers strongly opposed the enactment of a national system of social insurance. ....Even 
within the small faction of employers who supported he SSA, whether quietly or vocally,  
many did so only because they feared that the altern tive would be worse. In other words, 
support for the SSA often represented a strategic response to a loss of political power. Once 
one attends to the significance of anticipated reactions, it becomes clearer that only a sharp 
decline in business power made the SSA possible (Hacker and Pierson 2002: 298).
 The interpretations by Gordon and by Hacker and Pierson do thus contrast sharply 
with respect to the assumed relationship between business interests and federalist institutions. 
While the analysis by Gordon suggests that important business groups tried to overcome 
federated social policy legislation by lobbying fornationally uniform regulation, the analysis 
by Hacker and Pierson stresses that the shift from state to federal regulation resulted not from 
the active efforts of business groups, but, to the contrary, from a temporary political 
weakening of business. The contrasting claims made by these and other scholars suggest that 
further research on the role of business interests in social policy development is necessary. 
While the studies by Gordon and by Hacker and Pierson focus on the role of federalist 
political institutions in shaping employer attitudes and strategies with respect to welfare state 
development, other studies have focused on economic interests of firms, i.e. interests 
generated by the industrial production process itself, rather than by the political environment.  
Of particular importance in this respect is the extensive work on employers by Isabela Mares. 
Mares analyzes the role of employers in the historical construction of welfare state 
programmes in France and Germany, focusing on work injury insurance, unemployment 
insurance and early retirement (Mares 2003a, 2003b, 1997). Her main goal is “to understand 
how the welfare state…generates benefits, opportunities or institutional advantages to firms” 
(Mares 1999: 17).She finds that “[t]he empirical evid nce disconfirming the proposition that 
the welfare state has been enacted against the opposition of employers is simply 
overwhelming”. To the contrary, she argues, “most social policy outc mes were supported by 
broad cross-class alliances that comprised both trade unions and representatives of the 
business community” (Mares 2003a: 260, emphasis in original).  
 Mares presents a theoretical model that builds on conflicts between different types of 
firms on the economic utility of different types ofsocial policies. According to her model, 
inter-sectoral conflicts within the business community will, under certain conditions, lead to 
the deliberate formation of cross-class alliances in favor of public social policies. Such cross-
class alliances constitute a deliberate and strategically motivated collaboration between 
segments of the business community and representatives of the labor movement. The 
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theoretical model specifies two particular reasons why important segments of the business 
community may support social policies. One is the interest of certain types of firms in 
protecting skill investments, and the other the interests of certain types of firms in 
redistributing social risks across sectors:  
The preoccupation of firms with social policies has been shaped by two underlying 
considerations. On the one hand, employers have attemp ed to institutionalize guarantees that 
the investment in the skills of their employees canbe maintained during interruptions of the 
employment relationship: sickness, disability, unemployment. On the other hand, firms have 
attempted to share (or offset) the costs associated with the incidence of these risks, by 
supporting the formation of highly redistributive risk pools. The cause of inter-sectoral 
disagreement among employers has its origin in the diff rent priorities attached by firms to 
these two objectives - guarantees to their investment in skills and risk redistribution (Mares 
1999: 58). 
According to Mares, these two motivations, skill investments and risk redistribution, 
explain why dominant groups of employers supported the formation of social policies in the 
two countries studied, France and Germany. For instance, the interest in skill investments 
motivated firms relying on skilled labor to favor acontribution-based system of 
unemployment insurance, while firms not relying on skilled labor opposed unemployment 
insurance, according to Mares (Mares 1999: 398-9). Similarly, sectors with a high risk of 
work accidents pushed for a public scheme of work accident insurance, in order to share the 
costs of compensating injured workers with other, low-risk, sectors, thereby redistributing the 
risk across the economy. Therefore, Mares argues, that “under some conditions, social 
policies provide distinct institutional advantages to firms” (Mares 2003a: 23). The finding that 
specific types of employers had supported specific social policies leads Mares to question the 
importance of class conflicts as a driving force of s cial policy development:  
These propositions, showing that even profit-maximizing firms have (under specific 
circumstances) an interest in the provision of social insurance, allow us to reject a class-based 
perspective on the development of the modern welfare state, according to which labor favors 
and employers oppose the introduction of social insurance (Mares 2003a: 62, emphasis added 
by TP). 
 Like Swenson, also Mares tends to de-emphasize the importance of political 
constraints in shaping employers’ positions and strategies. Mares acknowledges that 
employers did not act as agenda setters in welfare st t development (Mares 2003a: 259) and 
that their support for certain social policies often reflected a strategic response to political 
constraints (Mares 1999: 58; 2003a: 50-62). However, these acknowledgements are at odds 
with the gist of her theoretical model, which builds on the pre-strategic (genuine) preferences 
of employers, rather than on strategic preferences. The tension between an explanation based 
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on pre-strategic preferences, and an explanation based on strategic preferences remains under-
explored. In short, the limitations of this strand of research warrant further research to find out 
whether employers’ acceptance of specific social policies was based on pre-strategic or 
strategic preferences. 
 Moreover, the approach taken by Mares runs the risk of taking the positions and 
demands issued by various employer organizations during the reform process as valid 
expressions of their non-strategic preferences, rathe  than as a complex outcome shaped by 
non-strategic preferences and strategic adjustments to the political context alike. The 
underlying assumption seems to be that the political behavior of employer organizations is an 
unproblematic indicator of the economic interests of the firms they represent. This approach, 
however, lacks a systematic analysis of the broader political context. Differences in the 
broader political context, such as the balance of power among the political actors, policy 
legacies or the kind of polity employers operated in, are not systematically analyzed or 
controlled for3. 
Employer-centred explanations and the VoC approach 
 Employer interests in skill investments play an important role also in the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach, which the cross-class coalition thesis is partly informed by. The primary 
intention of the VoC approach appears to be to explain the continued cross-national 
divergence in political-economic institutions, rather than the historical origins of distinct 
national models. Nevertheless some scholars, like Isabela Mares, draw on elements of the 
VoC approach, to support their arguments about employer preferences.4 
 The VoC approach highlights the importance of social policies for skill formation 
(Hall and Soskice 2001: 50-51). Social protection may serve as a solution to market failures in 
skill formation (Iversen 2005: 9). The VoC approach distinguishes between general skills, 
                                                
3 Mares claims to control for differences in political variables: “The six cases analyzed in this dissertation allow 
for a broad variation across a broad number of crucial independent variables – such as the sectoral bal nce of 
power among employers, the influence of employers in the policy-making process, labor strength, relative 
autonomy of bureaucratic elites, etc.”(Mares 1999: 63-4). In fact, it is however not evident how her analysis does 
so. There is a remarkable absence of any systematic discussion of these variables in the empirical anaysis. 
4 To clarify, I do not intend to imply that an employer-centred explanation of welfare state development would 
be essential for the VoC approach. While employer-centred explanations do, in part, rely on the VoC approach, 
the core tenets of the VoC approach do not necessarily require an employer-centred explanation. Core 
components of the VoC framework, including institutional complementarities, may also have emerged through 
mechanisms other than purposive political actions by employers. They may also have emerged the unintended 
consequences or by-products of past distributive confli ts. This latter interpretation, I believe, is compatible with 
the core tenets of the VoC framework. I thank my co-supervisor, Prof. Martin Rhodes, for pointing out this 
distinction to me. 
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which are transferable across firms and sectors, and asset-specific skills, which are tied to 
specific firms or sectors (Estévez-Abe et al. 2001: 148; Iversen 2005: 10-11). According to 
the VoC approach, investing in asset-specific skill exposes workers to higher risks of 
unemployment and potential income loss, as these skills cannot be transferred to other firms 
or sectors. Social policies serve to protect investm nts in specific skills by protecting workers 
with such skills from income losses due to unemployment. In the absence of social policies 
protecting specific skills, workers will face strong incentives to invest in general skills, rather 
than asset-specific skills, resulting in an underinvestment in specific skills. Employment 
protection, unemployment insurance and collective wage bargaining are seen therefore as 
policies relevant for the protection of specific skill  (Estévez-Abe et al. 2001: 150). 
 Torben Iversen builds on this insight to construct a theory of welfare state 
development that tries to explain cross-national differences with the help of different skill 
profiles existing in these countries (Iversen 2005). According to the explanation he presents, 
demand for social insurance stems from the asset specificity of skills. To simplify, Iversen 
argues that in economies that rely on asset-specific skills demand for social protection from 
workers, and also employers, will be strong. In economies that rely on general skills, instead, 
there will be very little demand for social protection, neither from employers, nor from 
workers, because workers can easily switch to different jobs and therefore do not depend on 
social protection. Iversen suggests that “employers who are pursuing product market 
strategies that require specific skills also have a vested interest in social policies that reduce 
the risk of acquiring those skills” (Iversen 2005: 12). This assumed interest leads him and his 
collaborators to the hypothesis that “social protection often stems from the strength rather 
than the weakness of employers” (Estévez-Abe et al. 2001: 181) . 
 Extending this argument, Iversen, Cusack and Soskice (2007) argue that differences in 
national skill profiles may even explain why different countries have adopted different 
electoral institutions. Noting that most coordinated market economies have proportional 
representation (PR) systems, while most liberal market economies have majoritarian electoral 
systems, they propose that the adoption of different electoral systems may have been a result 
of differences in economic organization and skill profiles. In countries that relied on asset-
specific skills, employers and workers both had an interest in institutions that facilitated and 
regulated cooperation and coordination,  whereby the PR system is one such institution. These 
scholars thus put forward the proposition that “PR was adopted to ensure a political system 
that protected investments in co-specific assets in locally coordinated economies around 1900, 
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while majoritarian systems undermined such protection” (Cusack et al. 2007: 388). In short, 
as the title of their article suggests, economic interests explain the origins of electoral systems. 
 To sum up, skill formation thesis builds on the assumption that issues of skill 
formation are of decisive importance for the way employers view social policies and political 
institutions. Iversen is cautious not to present the welfare state as the straightforward outcome 
of employer demands and, instead, builds his model primarily on the effects of national skill 
profiles on electoral politics (2005: 12-14). However, other scholars, like Mares, do rely on 
the proactive role of employers to link skill profiles to welfare state construction (Mares 
2003b: 39). She argues that employers have an interest in social policies, because “social 
policies play an important role for the labor market strategies of firms: they reduce the 
reluctance of workers to invest in skills” (Mares 2003a: 9). The skill formation thesis 
attributes pivotal importance to the issue of skill investments in order to understand the way 
business perceives the welfare state. Firms’ need for productive efficiency is seen as the 
principal component of an explanation of welfare state development based on purposive 
action. 
While arguments derived from the VoC approach do, in part, inspire economic-
functionalist explanations of employers’ role in welfare state development, as shown in this 
section, the overlap between employer-centred explanations and the VoC approach is only a 
partial one. Some proponents of the VoC approach do not endorse employer-centred 
explanations. In a defense of the VoC perspective on institutional change, Hall and Thelen, 
for instance, point out that they “think it dangerous to assume that the institutions of the 
political economy were originally created to serve th interests they advance at much later 
periods of time” (Hall and Thelen 2009: 14). In a similar vein, Hancké et al point out that 
“capital may indeed be crucial in capitalist economies, but, paraphrasing Marx, it does not 
choose the conditions under which it operates” (Hancké et al. 2007: 19). Rather than 
endorsing employer-centred explanations of welfare state development, these proponents of 
the VoC approach put forward a model of employer behavior that emphasizes changes in 
employer preferences in response to institutional adjustment, as we will see in more detail 
below. 
Vice versa, not all proponents of employer-centred explanatios are inspired by the 
VoC approach, as the work by Colin Gordon, discussed above, shows (Gordon 1991, 1994). 
Gordon emphasizes specific historical experiences made by US firms, as well as unwelcome 
disparities in competitive conditions created by the federated nature of the US polity, rather 
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than hard-wired economic interests, to explain support by American industrialists for the New 
Deal legislation. The work by Gordon thus provides a non-functionalist version of an 
employer-centred explanation. 
Organizational approaches to employer politics 
 A different approach to employers’ role in social po icy-making is applied by scholars 
focusing on the organizational characteristics of employer associations, rather than on 
characteristics of individual firms. This approach builds on research about corporatist forms 
of interest representation and the role of economic interest groups in public policy making and 
policy administration (Crouch 1994; Traxler 1986; Schmitter and Streeck 1981; Streeck and 
Schmitter 1985). Inspired by this work on the role f corporatist institutions, some scholars 
have analyzed the impact of the organizational characte istics of employer associations on 
their social policy positions. Of particular importance in this respect is the work by Cathie Jo 
Martin and Duane Swank (Martin 1995, 2000; Swank and Martin 2001; Martin and Swank 
2004; Martin 2004, 2006). 
 Martin and Swank have analyzed, for instance, the correlation between spending on 
active labor market policy and the way employers are organized in various countries. They 
find that “the centralization of representational power, coordination across [associational] 
units, and integration of associations in corporatist policy-making forums result in greater 
employer support for and participation in social policy formation and implementation” 
(Martin and Swank 2004: 594). Moreover, in a different study, they conclude that “the 
organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of cross-national and 
temporal variations in total social welfare effort. Where employers are centralized, cohesive, 
and economically coordinated, social welfare effort is greater.” (Swank and Martin 2001: 
890). 
 Like Mares and Swenson, Martin and Swank also emphasize that employer 
organizations had a positive, rather than a constrai ing or retarding effect on welfare state 
development. Martin and Swank do, however, take a different theoretical approach. They do 
not root employers’ support or participation in social policy formulation in fixed economic 
interests, but, instead, in characteristics of the institutional environment and organizational 
features of these associations. Their work constitutes a valuable theoretical advancement in 
embedding employer politics in political context. Nevertheless, the validity of their findings is 
limited by their strong reliance on statistical correlations. Although Martin and Swank rely on 
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a sophisticated combination of qualitative and quantit tive methods, their argument rests 
strongly on their findings of significant statistical correlations between organizational-
institutional variables and social expenditures.  
 The causal mechanisms creating the correlation between the two sets of variables 
require more detailed empirical investigation to check whether these correlations are non-
spurious and correctly specified. Employer organization and social spending may, for 
instance, be the joint outcome of a third variable or background condition. Historical process-
tracing analysis is necessary, I argue, to identify the real impact of employer organizations on 
welfare state development as well as the motivations f r employer organizations to support 
specific policies. 
Critics of the cross-class coalition thesis 
Several studies have criticized the cross-class coalition thesis for neglecting the importance of 
structural constraints compelling employers to accept welfare state programmes and 
institutions. Through historical case studies of several countries, Huber and Stephens have 
found that employers consented to labor market and social policies only in the context of 
hegemonic labor movements (Huber and Stephens 2001). Their study finds that business 
acceptance of social democratic social policies “was limited to the period in which the social 
democratic parties and the associated labor movements were near hegemonic and their social 
policy initiatives in particular enjoyed broad popular support” (Huber and Stephens 2001: 9). 
Huber and Stephens point out that “the constraints of the larger power distribution and the 
institutional context shape the preferences and strategies of these actors to begin with” (Huber 
and Stephens 2001: 33). 
 Similarly, Hacker and Pierson, in their study discussed above, argue that shifts in the 
political balance of power motivated US business groups to accommodate to existing 
constraints and collaborate with government policy-makers in drafting social legislation. 
Hacker and Pierson find that the influence of busine s on social policy making varied greatly 
across time and institutional contexts, whereby changes in institutions also changed “the 
scope and character of business power” (Hacker and Pierson 2002: 315). Hacker and Pierson 
criticize existing research supporting the cross-class coalition thesis for failing to deal with 
three types of theoretical and methodological challenges: a failure to distinguish between 
multiple mechanisms of business influence, misspecification of the genuine preferences of 
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business groups, and the inference of business influence from an ex post correlation between 
the stated business preferences and political outcomes (Hacker and Pierson 2002: 278). 
 In an analysis of the Swedish case, Korpi finds that employers had not been 
protagonists of welfare state development in this country. Instead, social democratic 
dominance had shifted the feasible range of policy options for employers in such a way that 
they decided to consent to some policies (Korpi 2006: 186-193). The alternative view of 
business as antagonistic to social policies, which emerges from his historical analysis, leads 
Korpi to reject the employer-centred explanation of the welfare state as empirically 
unfounded:  
Employer-centered scholars … have apparently misinterpreted employer consent to reform 
proposals from the left as evidence of their first-order preferences for welfare state expansion. 
Crucially, employer-centered research has not yet pr sented empirical evidence indicating that 
employers have been protagonists with first-order preferences for major reforms extending 
social citizenship rights (Korpi 2006: 202). 
  The analytical approach adopted in this thesis bulds on the arguments made in these 
studies. These studies are all informed by what I call the “political accommodation” 
approach. This approach emphasizes the way political constraints shape business positions 
and influence in welfare state development. Rather t an taking stated business preferences as 
an independent causal factor driving welfare state development, these studies endogenize 
stated preferences in the political context. Thereby they are able to challenge the economic 
efficiency-based explanations provided by the cross-cla s coalition thesis. They argue that 
employers had accepted social policies not because they expected to gain economic efficiency 
benefits, but because they decided to adapt to changing political contexts. Moreover, while 
the cross-class coalition approach tends to see employers as active supporters of welfare state 
development, these studies see employers as mere passive consenters. In short, the cross-class 
coalition approach and the political accommodation approach provide very different 
explanations and understandings of the role of employers in welfare state development, and 
thereby also of its driving forces. 
 
1.II Case Selection: Germany as a Crucial Case 
The thesis relies on a historical within-case analysis of the German case. Germany constitutes 
a crucial case for the testing of the two alternative arguments of this thesis. A case is crucial 
if “it is most, or least, likely to fulfill a theoretical prediction” as John Gerring reminds us 
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(2007: 115). Germany is a crucial case in this sense because its institutional setting benefits 
the production strategies of predominant types of firms in various ways. Studies in 
comparative political economy, dealing with cross-national diversities in production regimes, 
have identified Germany as a paradigmatic case of a type of market economy that is 
characterized by an  institutional configuration that generates higher productivity and 
competitive advantages for firms5 (e.g. Thelen 2001; Hassel 2007; Dore 2000; Hall 2007; 
Streeck 1992; Hall and Soskice 2001).  
For this reason it appears plausible that German employers may also be more 
supportive of institutions of social compromise and social protection than their counterparts in 
other countries. Moreover, because of the economic advantages to firms provided by its 
institutional setting, Germany arguably provides a most likely case for explanations that 
attribute employers a crucial role in the historical formation of this  model.  If economic-
functionalist models of employer preferences in social policies are valid, the evidence in their 
favor should be the strongest in the German case. Germany is thus a case, I argue, where also 
the cross-class coalition thesis should be most likely to hold. If, in contrast, the cross-class 
coalition thesis does not hold in this country, it is even less likely to hold in countries where 
the efficiency effects and competitive advantages of the institutional setting are less 
pronounced. 
 The variegated ways in which firms in advanced welfar  states make use of existing 
policies and institutions have been studied widely, such as, for instance, the usage of early 
retirement schemes for workforce restructuring (Ebbinghaus 2001, 2006; Trampusch 2005) 
and advantages with respect to skill formation (Estévez-Abe et al. 2001). Other scholars have 
focused on how industrial relations institutions are used by firms to benefit their production 
strategies. Wolfgang Streeck, in particular, argued that Germany’s industrial relations 
institutions have facilitated the pursuit of a strategy of so-called “diversified quality 
production” by German firms (Streeck 1992: 4-10). Streeck conceptualizes institutions as 
constraints as well as resources for firms. They operate by “imposing enforceable social 
constraints on rational market participants, as well as offering them effective opportunities to 
restructure towards higher product diversity and quality” (Streeck 1992: 4). Co-determination 
is one important institution analyzed by Streeck. He argues that co-determination “has 
significantly changed the way in which employers utilize labor as a factor of production” 
                                                
5 To clarify, this thesis is not concerned with the question of whether labor market and social policies actually 
create economic efficiency benefits, but with the qu stion of whether expectations of such economic eff i ncy 
benefits have motivated employers to support these policies. 
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(1992: 137) and, because of this, “has not merely posed a problem for enterprises but has also 
offered a solution” (1992: 160). 
  While these studies are interested primarily in the consequences of institutions and 
their usage by individual firms, rather than in their political origins, they clearly have 
implications also for the study of employers’ role in policy-making. In principle, one can 
think of two alternative types of explanations for the emergence of institutions and policies 
that turned out as beneficial for specific types of firms. One possibility is that institutions that 
have turned out to be beneficial for firms may have be n initially imposed upon firms that 
were unaware about their future economic advantages. Thi  perspective is implied in some of 
the work by Streeck. He emphasizes in particular the importance of ongoing processes of 
piecemeal improvisation and experimentation within institutional constraints, over time 
possibly leading to “institutional fit” (Streeck 2001: 31). Alternatively, one may argue that 
far-sighted employers have played a constitutive rol in the construction of these institutions, 
trying to deliberately engineer institutional solutions to problems created by the production 
process. This perspective is suggested, for instance, by some scholars relying on the VoC 
approach6 (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001: 50-1; Cusack et al. 2007). 
  As mentioned, Germany constitutes a most likely case for the second hypothesis, given 
that the existence of competitive advantages and institutional efficiency effects has been most 
extensively researched and documented for this country. If expectations of economic 
efficiency benefits have been an important reason for employers to support the construction of 
labor market and social policies, we can expect that Germany is where this is most likely to be 
the case. If, to the contrary, we find that expectations of economic efficiency benefits played 
only a marginal or no role at all for employers, this would also reduce the probability that 
such benefits are able to explain employer behavior in other countries, where economic 
efficiency benefits will presumably be likely to be l ss pronounced. Therefore, I claim, 
Germany attains the status of a crucial case. 
The choice of “policy cases” 
The thesis focuses on the role of industrial employers in the construction of those policies and 
institutions that, in retrospect, came to characterize the German model of political economy. 
Thereby, the thesis focuses on those “unsettled moments” of history during which these 
                                                
6 As mentioned above, this second perspective is not shared by all scholars using the VoC framework (Hall and 
Thelen 2009: 14) (Hancké et al. 2007: 19). 
 24 
policies have been constructed, rather than on the day-to-day policy making during more 
settled times, because we can assume that it is during these moments of policy construction 
that the preferences of political actors are likely to matter most. 
The empirical analysis focuses on a set of “policy cases” that are central to the 
German model of political economy, in particular, the policies of the Bismarckian welfare 
state, sectoral wage bargaining and co-determinatio. The rationale behind the selection of 
these “policy cases” has been to choose policies that provide plausible and relevant test cases 
for both of the two alternative theoretical perspectiv s that are at the center of the thesis, the 
economic-functionalist perspective of the cross-clas coalition thesis and the political-
strategic perspective of the political accommodation thesis. This means that I have chosen 
such policies that arguably are labor-friendly and at the same time are associated with 
economic benefits for firms, therefore being of relevance for the testing of the relative role of 
economic interests and strategic accommodation.7 
I chose to focus on the formation of the Bismarckian social programmes of the 
German welfare state (chapters 3, 5 and 7), because this type of  social policies is at the center 
of arguments about the importance of social policy to firms. The employment-based social 
insurance schemes of the Bismarckian welfare state upport corporate strategies of German 
firms in various ways, in particular by reassuring workers that their skill investments are 
protected against economic volatilities, as argued, for instance, by Estevez-Abe et al (2001; 
s.a. Hall and Soskice 2001: 50-1). Understandably, proponents of employer-centred 
explanations of welfare state development have thusoften focused their analysis on social 
insurance programmes, in particular, the extensive work by Isabela Mares (Mares 2003a, 
2003b, 2001, 1999, 1997). Means-tested or universal types of social policy8, like social 
assistance or social housing, are not analyzed in the thesis, not only because they are 
comparatively under-developed in the German case, but, more importantly, because they 
would not provide a relevant test case for the economic-functionalist argument. 
In addition to social insurance policies, I chose to focus on the domain of industrial 
relations, as another institutional domain that supports specific corporate strategies. In chapter 
2, the thesis looks at the motivations of firms to form employer associations and to start with 
                                                
7 To clarify, the selection of “policy cases” is based on their general relevance for the two theoretical 
perspectives, rather than on whether individual proponents of either of the two approaches have actually made 
empirical claims about these specific cases. 
8 Welfare state research distinguishes between different types of social policy. Other types of social po icy 
programmes are, in particular, means-tested programmes and universal, flat-rate benefit programmes. See, in 
particular, Esping-Andersen (1990) and Titmuss (1958).  
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collective bargaining in the late 19th century. I chose this case because today employer 
associations and sectoral bargaining provide firms with important resources for coordination 
and for cooperation with organized labor. Sectoral b rgaining not only secures industrial 
peace, it also prevents firms relying on skilled labor from labor poaching by other firms, as 
pointed out by Hall and Soskice (Hall and Soskice 2001: 24-5). Following an economic-
functionalist perspective we should thus expect that employers may also have played a role in 
the historical formation of sectoral bargaining institutions.  
The Stinnes-Legien agreement (chapter 4) is included because this agreement between 
capital and labor institutionalized sectoral bargaining and works councils, and, thus, became 
the founding charter of the German model of industrial relations. As shown, for instance, by 
Kathleen Thelen, in the Federal Republic German firms managed to use works councils as an 
instrument for securing cooperative labor relations at the workplace (Thelen 1991). Therefore, 
also the Stinnes-Legien agreement provides a plausible test case for the two alternative 
theoretical perspectives. For a similar reason, the thesis includes also the case of co-
determination in the supervisory boards (chapter 8), a core element of the German model, and 
often seen as facilitating cooperative labor relations and employee loyalty to the firm. 
The choice of organizations 
The empirical focus of the thesis is on the peak-level federations representing German 
employers9, rather than on their sector-level associations. These federations are the CDI 
(Central Association of German Industry) during the German Empire, the VDA (Federation 
of German Employer Associations) in the Weimar Republic, and the BDA (Confederation of 
German Employer Associations) in the Federal Republic. These three organizations acted as 
the principal political representatives of industrial employers in the development of  the 
welfare state and industrial relations in Germany. The reason for the choice of peak-level 
organizations, rather than sectoral ones, is that in Germany the social policy interests of 
employers are represented in the political sphere predominantly by their peak-level federation, 
rather than by their sectoral associations.  
 The emphasis by the cross-class coalition thesis on cr ss-sectoral conflicts would 
suggest a focus on sectoral employer associations, rather than on the peak-level federations. 
                                                
9 Business interests are represented in the German polity by three types of organizations: a) employer 
organizations, which represent the labor market interests of firms; b) sectoral trade and industry associations, 
which represent the product market interests of their m mbers; and c) the chamber of commerce, which deal, 
inter alia, with organizing vocational training and the licensing of firms 
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However, due to the way sectoral interests are aggregated within the German system of 
interest representation, hypotheses building on sectoral cleavages are empirically difficult to 
test. A division of labor between peak-level and sectoral associations mandates sectoral 
associations with the task of collective bargaining with unions, and the peak-level federation 
with the task of representing employer interests vis-à-vis the government, other political 
actors and the public in general (see e.g. Grote et al. 2007: table 8.5). Sectoral interests and 
preferences are aggregated internally by the employer associations and are then represented in 
the policy-making process by the peak-level. Sectoral associations do not normally issue 
policy statements on those issues covered by the peak-level or do so only in order to second 
the peak-level. This means that potential sectoral differences cannot normally be observed in 
the policy-making process, although such differences may still exist and lead to tensions 
within the employer camp, occasionally even preventing the peak-level to take a clear stance. 
The intransparency of employer associations’ internal decision-making  does, however, make 
it difficult to analyze such potential intra-business differences in a systematic way. 
 The empirical analysis in this thesis suggests that in welfare state development sectoral 
conflicts tended to be subordinate to class conflicts. As mentioned above, this is in part the 
result of the way sectoral interests are aggregated by the peak-level federation. More 
importantly, though, the existence of a common opponent, a reformist government or an 
assertive labor movement, often united employers and allowed the peak-level federation to 
contain potential internal differences in favor of the articulation of a common stance in 
policy-making, though the capacity of the peak-leve f deration to do so declined 
considerably recently (for the reasons of this see chapter 9). Where they are observable, 
sectoral differences tend to concern specific policy details, rather than positions towards a 
social policy as such. To mention a characteristic example, the introduction of work injury 
insurance in the early 1880s was generally supported by industrialists as an important means 
of pacifying a discontent working class. Still, sectoral differences existed concerning the 
question of how the costs should be spread across sector  (see chapter 3.II). Moreover, where 
intra-business differences are found to matter, their reasons are diverse and difficult to 
generalize. 
1.III The Argument in Brief 
The argument put forward in this thesis provides an alternative to economic-functionalist 
explanations of employers’ role in welfare state development by building on insights from 
historical institutionalism and the power resource approach. The thesis shows, first, that 
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employers were often quite reluctant to accept the introduction of new social policies or the 
expansion of existing ones. Second, the thesis show that when employers accepted social 
reforms they typically did so not because they expected benefits in terms of economic 
efficiency or competitiveness but for strategic reasons, in order to prevent even less favorable 
outcomes.  The thesis thus presents an explanation of employers’ role in welfare state 
development that is complementary to labor-centered xplanations, rather than in opposition 
to the latter. 
 The main argument advanced in this thesis is that poli ical constraints compelled 
industrial employers to accept certain social policies as options reflecting lesser evils. While 
the economic interest of employers was to prevent the formation of social policies, political-
strategic considerations sometimes turned employers into supporters of certain social policies. 
Their embeddedness in a specific historical political context shaped what employers thought 
is the best they could achieve in a given situation. Policy positions thus need to be linked to 
political context. They need to be seen as endogenous to politics, rather than be taken as given 
or exogenous to our theories. The embeddedness in the political context produces strategically 
motivated behavior and political accommodation. As Hacker and Pierson have aptly pointed 
out: 
a group's actions often will not reveal its preferences but rather its strategic calculations of what 
is the best that can be accomplished given existing circumstances. An actor's expressed policy 
preferences may in fact be “induced” or “strategic” - that is, they reflect accommodations to 
circumstances that constrain what can be achieved (Hacker and Pierson 2002: 283). 
 To analyze the importance of the political context, I identify three broad historical 
periods, which are characterized by different patterns of political behavior by employers 
towards welfare state policies and institutions of s cial compromise. The first period is the 
period of the Wilhelmine German Empire (1871-1918) During this period industrial 
employers in Germany pursued strategy of s cial pacification. This period was characterized 
by a rapid growth of the labor movement, which was opposed by a close alliance made up of 
industry, agriculture and government. Employers’ political behavior during this period was 
shaped by the goal of regaining the consent of the working class to the existing political-
economic regime and to suppress the socialist labor m vement. Employers supported the 
Bismarckian social reforms during the 1880s and made far-reaching concessions to labor 
union leaders in the Stinnes-Legien agreement in 1918 with the goal of crushing the socialist 
labor movement or radical elements within it, respectiv ly. 
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 During the second period, the Weimar Republic, German employers pursued a 
strategy of contention, attacking existing unwelcome policies and institutions, while at the 
same time cooperating in the construction of new policies to replace older ones, where 
political majorities made outright dismantling of unwelcome social policies an unviable 
strategy. In particular, employers focused their attacks on the eight hour working day, which 
they had already previously accepted, and forms of tate intervention in industrial relations. 
They tried to get rid of the unemployment assistance programme by replacing it with a more 
restrictive programme of unemployment insurance, which allowed more control over benefit 
recipients. The resurgence of class warfare, which gained momentum with the start of the 
world economic crisis in 1929, contributed to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Industrial 
employers had lost trust in the problem-solving capacities of democratic institutions and 
pinned their hopes on authoritarian solutions. 
 In the third period, the Federal Republic (since 1949), the political behavior of 
employers became shaped by a politics of containment. This period was characterized by 
rising economic prosperity (the “economic miracle”) and an expansion of welfare state 
policies driven by electoral competition. In this context, employers tried to limit the scope and 
generosity of existing social policy programmes, while at the same time accepting the need 
for social compromise. At the same time, they tried to prevent more thorough-going reforms 
in the organization of the economy, which were demanded by the labor unions and threatened 
to curtail entrepreneurial control over investments and decisively shift power in the economy 
to organized labor. More recently, during the 1990s, employers shifted away from social 
compromise and political accommodation, prioritizing welfare state retrenchment and lower 
tax burdens. The secular rise in payroll taxes, interacting with the internationalization of the 
economy, had eroded employers’ willingness to comprise. 
 Linking political behavior to periodisation, as I do here, allows us to understand how 
large-scale historical changes have changed the goals and strategies of employer 
organizations. Clearly, this periodisation of goals nd strategies involves some simplification. 
In each period we can find a combination of motivations shaping employers’ political 
behavior, rather than just a single one. Cost containment has always been a concern of 
employers throughout history, and not only in the post-war period. To give an example, 
employers supported the introduction of social insurance in the 1880s in order to pacify the 
working class, but their participation in the policy-making process was, at the same time, also 
motivated by a concern to avoid an undue increase in labor costs as a result of the new 
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programmes. Cost containment had not been employers’ main concern during this period, 
however, because protective tariffs shielded the dominant sectors from international 
competition. Similarly, social pacification continues to play a role also in the post-war Federal 
Republic, evident, for instance, in the use of early retirement for the purpose of peaceful labor 
shedding.  Yet, the importance of this goal for defining employers’ policy positions has 
greatly declined compared to the German Empire. While each period involves a combination 
of different goals, we can nevertheless identify a dominant pattern in each period. 
 The types of challenges that employers responded to in their policy positions changed 
over time. The thesis highlights two types of challenges: (i) threats of social and an associated 
collectivization of industry; and (ii) unfavorable policy proposals on the political agenda. 
Employers responded to the first with a politics of labor pacification, and to the latter with a 
politics of containment. First, employers’ support for social policies was motivated by the 
goal of pacifying the working class in the context of widespread political discontent among 
workers, which made them susceptible to revolutionary agitation. This goal crystallized in the 
context of a rising and militant labor movement, seen by employers as a revolutionary 
menace, determined to expropriate the industrialists. In this context, industrialists aligned with 
the authoritarian government of Bismarck to introduce social programmes that were intended 
to tie the interests of the working class to the existing political-economic order and cut off 
their support to the opposition Social Democrats and the labor unions. Similarly, after the 
collapse of the Wilhelmine Empire in 1918, the goal f warding off a Soviet-style social 
revolution motivated industrialists to make far-reaching concessions to moderate union 
leaders. Social protection and institutions for social ompromise served as means to prevent a 
socialist revolution. 
 The second reason for employers to  consent to labor market and social policies was 
strategic in nature. To avoid becoming irrelevant bystanders to ambitious reform initiatives 
that appeared likely to succeed, they decided to cooperate, often with the motive of taking the 
edge off the planed policy. Often such behavior involved the strategic endorsement of more 
moderate policy proposals. Exercising effective influence on reform outcomes requires 
accommodating to the goals of reformers. When reform projects apparently cannot be stopped 
entirely, trying to gain some influence over the design of important details of the proposed 
legislation is a more promising strategy for influencing the outcome, compared to 
fundamental opposition. Therefore, employers often directed their opposition not against a 
planned policy as such, but against specific details, for instance, the mode of financing or the 
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mode of benefit calculation, in order to prevent an u due rise in social expenditures. 
Employers often decided to cooperate in the drafting of social legislation as a way of 
influencing the proposed policy, because this appeared as a more promising strategy of 
influence compared to fundamental opposition, even if, at heart, they remained indifferent to 
the goals of the proposed policy.  
 Strategic accommodation is a response to political onstraints. Two types of 
constraints are of particular importance: policy legacies and the balance of power among the 
relevant political actors. They reflect the past and the present balance of power among the 
actors, respectively. First, policy legacies are a powerful constraint on what actors can expect 
to be able to achieve. Policy legacies are the result of policies adopted in the past. They 
constitute the policy status quo against which political actors need to evaluate the value of 
any alternative policy options. Political actors do not evaluate concrete policy options against 
the background of a “clean slate,” but against the background of the existing policy status 
quo. Is the alternative policy option likely to constitute an improvement or a deterioration 
compared to the status quo? The formulation of policy preferences and positions is thus likely 
to be strongly influenced by policy legacies. Decision  made in the past also constrain the 
range of options that are on the agenda in the present, by precluding certain options. 
 Second, the balance of power among political actors in the present limits the range of 
policy options that are politically viable. Political majorities in favor or against their own 
policy preferences define the extent to which political actors are likely to accommodate to the 
political context. Political majorities against an ctor’s own first-order preferences will induce 
an actor to deviate from this ideal point and adjust its positions to bring them more in line 
with the politically viable policy options. In such a situation, an actor’s expressed stance 
reflects its second-best option and is intended to prevent the adoption of a policy option that, 
from the view of this actor, would be even worse. 
 Employers have often decided to support specific social policy choices in order to 
either prevent or dismantle other policies that they considered to be even less beneficial. 
Disliked policy legacies have motivated employers to support policy alternatives that helped 
them to do away with the disliked policy, in contexts where demanding the entire dismantling 
of the existing policy without replacement would have been politically not viable. In addition, 
the prospect of influencing important details of proposed legislation compelled them to 
cooperate. Exercising influence on government policy-making is linked to a willingness to 
cooperate and to go along with the broad political objectives of social reformers. German 
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employer organizations have been and continue to be well aware of this. Moreover, their 
decisions to participate in the design of new social policies is also intended to maintain good 
relations with government, in addition to influencig the design of the specific policy at hand, 
as good relations facilitate influence. 
 The theoretical argument presented in this thesis builds on microfoundations different 
from the ones of the cross-class coalition thesis. According to the cross-class coalition thesis, 
business support for social policy formation was the result not only of strategic 
considerations, but, more importantly, of genuine it rests of important segments of business 
(see e.g.  Mares 1999: 58-60; Swenson 2002: 11). As elaborated in section I above, the cross-
class coalition thesis supplies microfoundations to its argument by building on the importance 
of skill investments. In contrast, the microfoundations of the argument advanced in this thesis 
build on the decommodification thesis developed by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 22). According to this thesis, social policies r duce workers’ dependence on market 
income by providing alternative sources of income, a policy effect that is called 
decommodification. Decommodification reduces the dependence of workers on gainful 
employment and, thus, also on their employer. In Esping-Andersen’s typology, welfare state 
regimes differ in the extent to which they decommodify workers, whereby "the Scandinavian 
welfare states tend to be the most de-commodifying, the Anglo-Saxon the least" (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 23), with the Continental welfare states lying in between. 
 Employers can be expected to oppose decommodification because it reduces work 
incentives and is likely to diminish work effort and work discipline. Decommodification 
reduces work incentives by raising workers’ reservation wage. As argued by Esping-
Andersen, decommodification “strengthens the worker and weakens the absolute authority of 
the employer. It is for exactly this reason that employers have always opposed 
decommodification”  (1990: 22). As subsequent chapters will show (3,5 and 7), employers’ 
interest in limiting decommodification translated into a preference for tying benefit 
entitlements closely to employment, given a context where the complete absence of social 
policy was politically not feasible. Opposition to decommodification made employers prefer 
Bismarckian social insurance policies to universal ocial policies, as the latter are more 
decommodifying. A genuine economic interest in limit ng decommodification combined with 
political-strategic considerations to make employers ndorse Bismarckian social insurance 
programmes, perceived as a lesser evil to universalist alternatives. 
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Preference formation and political context 
The approach to preference formation adopted in thesis is broadly informed by an “historical 
institutionalist” approach. Like many scholars in historical institutionalism, this thesis takes 
“the question of how individuals and groups define th ir self-interest as problematical” 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 8) (s.a. Immergut 1998: 20). It is concerned with how the way 
employers, and other actors, are embedded in the political context shapes the way they 
understand what is best for them in a given situation. This perspective differs from a 
perspective that sees political behavior as determined by material interests alone. As Peter 
Hall critically remarks “many works in political economy explain political outcomes as a 
direct result of the material interests of the relevant actors defined more or less directly in 
terms of the economic benefits economic theory predicts will ensue” (Hall 2005: 130). 
 Theoretically assumed material interests do not translate directly into political action, 
because actors need to conduct a process of preference and strategy formation that is shaped 
in complex ways by the existing political context. There is often an observable gap between 
the material interests, as stipulated by theory, and the concrete courses of action political 
actors choose. The strength of material interest-baed explanations is that they point us to 
important dimensions of conflict in politics. Their weakness lies in their lack of attention to 
the empirical processes by which preferences and strategies are actually formed to produce 
specific courses of political action. No relevant theory of preference formation can do 
completely without material interests, but an analytically useful understanding of preference 
formation also has to go beyond imputed material interests and focus on the empirical 
processes by which actors define and change their preferences. 
 Rational choice theory commonly uses a distinction between first-order preferences 
and lower-order preferences to incorporate the roleof political interaction and external 
constraints into the study of political action. First-order preferences (or genuine preferences) 
are preferences that are understood to be exogenous to the policy-making context. They are 
‘genuine’ in the sense that they are unalterable by political interaction. They are typically 
imputed by theory, and not identified by empirical observation. Lower-order preferences (or 
strategic preferences) constitute a ranking of alternative choices that actors are assumed to 
prefer in case their first-order preference is unattainable. Constraints emerging from the 
policy-making process will motivate actors to endorse lower-order preferences to allow them 
to influence outcomes even in situations where their first-order preference appears 
 
33 
unattainable. Induced by the political context, lower-order preferences may then become the 
publicly stated positions. 
  This way of conceptualizing preferences is analytically useful for capturing the 
importance of strategic interaction and political accommodation and it is therefore also 
applied it in this thesis. This conceptualization is however unable, I argue, to capture fully the 
ways in which political context influences preferenc s, because this influence is not limited to 
strategic interaction in the policy-making process it elf. The ways in which the historical 
political context shapes actors’ stances and goals goe  far beyond the importance of strategic 
interaction with other actors in the context of the policy-making process. The more 
fundamental importance of the historical political context lies in the differing types of 
political challenges it confronts actors with, which frames what actors consider to be 
meaningful choices. Often the political goals and policy stances of industrialists have been a 
response to challenges coming from the political sphere itself, rather than a response to 
problems created by the industrial production process. 
 To understand how actors’ embeddedness in the political context influences their 
formation of preferences, it is useful to apply Giovanni Sartori’s notion of a “ladder of 
abstraction” (Sartori 1984: 44-46). By ladder of abstraction Sartori means a way of ordering 
concepts using a dimension that ranges from a very small number of defining characteristics 
(a high level of abstraction) to a very large number of defining characteristics (a low level of 
abstraction). Different scholars use the concept of preferences at different levels of 
abstraction, which can create confusion about what is ctually meant. By arranging different 
definitions of preferences according to their level of abstraction this confusion can be clarified 
and preferences can be linked to empirical observation. 10 
 At the highest level of abstraction the content of preferences can be defined as 
universal human needs; material and immaterial ones; such as the need for food, housing, 
happiness, social relations, human dignity, et cetera. Preferences, understood in this way, are 
inscribed by human nature, or by the defining characteristics of human existence. This is a 
conception of preferences that underlies the classic rational choice approach to human 
                                                
10 A very similar conceptualisation of interests and preferences is proposed by Woll (2008: 33-35). Woll 
organizes different concepts of interests along a dimension from the general to the specific, similar to as I do 
here, distinguishing between basic interests, role-specific interests, means preferences and policy preferences 
(Table 2.1). I believe that the two conceptualisations are essentially identical in their purpose, i.e. to clarify how 
preferences relate to historical context (Woll 2008). 
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behavior, embodied, for instance, in the seminal work by Gary Becker (1976). At this level of 
abstraction preferences are universal. They are not subject to alteration by historical context, 
by the cultural, economic, political or social circumstances that shape a specific period of 
time. However, a concept of preferences that is located at such a high level of abstraction is of 
low utility in political analysis because it is unable to accurately specify the content of actors’ 
policy preferences, unless we integrate knowledge about the social and political context. 
 Descending the ladder of abstraction, we can define the content of preferences as 
general material outcomes, such as preferences to maximize income or profits, to protect 
property rights, or to maximize entrepreneurial freedom. To define preferences at this level of 
abstraction already requires that we make some assumptions about the existing economic 
system, about the mechanisms for the distribution of economic resources and the role 
positions of individuals within this system. At this level of abstraction, preferences are not 
universal anymore, but change with the social role of the actor. At this level of abstraction, 
preferences can also be preferences over specific pol y outcomes, such as, for instance, 
higher profits or lower labor costs. But even this level of abstraction is too high to specify the 
positions and demands of political actors in policy-making.  
 To analyze preferences in the context of policy-making we need to descend the ladder 
of abstraction even further. If we do so, we can define preferences as policy preferences, as 
preferences over specific policy options, or “policy outputs”. Preferences, understood in this 
way, can be preferences, for instance, over different modes of financing of a specific social 
policy or different institutional rules. At this lev l of abstraction, preferences are shaped by 
the political context. This the concept of preferenc s applied in this thesis. In other words, I 
refer to preferences in the sense of p licy preferences. 
 The ladder of abstraction relates the concept of preferences to its different 
understanding by different approaches. While rationl choice theory tends towards a “thin” 
conceptualization of preferences, operating on a high level of abstraction, historical 
institutionalist theory tends towards a “thick” understanding of preferences, operating on a 
lower level of conceptual abstraction. This means that he further we descend on the ladder of 
abstraction the more we need to include properties of the political and social context in order 
to specify the content of preferences accurately. As Steinmo and Thelen have pointed out 
“unless something is known about the context, broad assumptions about ‘self-interested 
behavior’ are empty” (1992: 9).  
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These differing conceptualizations of preferences are related to alternative 
understandings of preferences as being either universal or historically contingent. These two 
alternative understandings of preferences are not mutually exclusive or contradictory, though, 
as long as the two understandings are used as referring to two different levels of conceptual 
abstraction. Not all types of preferences are subject to contextual formation, but some are, 
depending on how we conceptualize the term. Preferenc s for such general goods as 
happiness or material well-being, for instance, can be assumed not to be contextually induced, 
but universal, while preferences over specific policy choices are induced in part also by the 
political context. 
 Descending the ladder of abstraction, making the conception of the content of 
preferences more specific to concrete historical situations, also links preferences to what can 
be termed macrofoundations. Ira Katznelson pointed out that “[m]icrobehavior...requires 
historical macrofoundations” (2003: 272). While theemphasis in the rational choice literature 
on microfoundations illuminates the way interests and preferences at the individual level 
shape and constrain the behavior of collective actors, he emphasis on microfoundations often 
neglects the impact of macrofoundations for shaping preferences and collective political 
action. With respect to employer associations this means that, while their policy positions will 
certainly be shaped, in broad strokes, by the way their members perceive their interests, they 
will be more than the mere aggregation of their memb rs’ preferences. They will also be a 
response to the political context, which requires them to accommodate and may sometimes 
even define their genuine preferences. Ronald Bunn, an expert on German employer 
organizations, pointed out in the 1950s that:  
the propaganda of an interest group serves at least a dual function. Not only is the propaganda 
intended to reflect the sentiments of its members but it must also attempt to influence the 
thinking of persons outside the group. In pursuing this second objective the propaganda of the 
group may sometimes contain slogans and ideals which, to a degree, are not actually shared by 
the members of the group. (Bunn 1959: 379) 
 A similar argument underpins the model of conflicting logics in collective action 
developed by Philip Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (Schmitter and Streeck 1981, 1999; see 
also Schneider and Grote 2005: 4-10). According to this model, employer organizations, like 
other interest organizations, need to balance two different logics, a “logic of membership”, 
which is governed by the values, identities and interest perceptions of the group they 
represent, and a “logic of influence”, which is governed by the properties of the political 
context, political institutions and characteristics of other political actors. Employer 
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organizations need to mediate between their members and the political target structure and, in 
doing so, have to try to strike a balance between th  two conflicting logics. For instance, they 
need to be able to compromise and ensure member compliance, while at the same time they 
need to satisfy the preferences of their members.  
Although this thesis does not try to explain the inter al organizational structures and 
processes of employer organizations, as Schmitter and Streeck aim to, their two logics model 
also helps to understand employers’ role in welfare state development. The two logics model 
can be understood as an effort to balance micro- and macrofoundations and, thereby, 
represents an important corrective to a microfoundation l reductionism in the study of 
collective action. As the empirical analysis in thesis shows, employer organizations’ role 
in welfare state development has been shaped as much by a “logic of influence”, as by a 
“logic of membership”, though the relative importance of the two logics varied with changing 
historical context. 
Methodology and preference analysis 
To understand how political context shapes and limits the political goals and strategies of 
employers this thesis makes use of two specific methods: process tracing and the analysis of 
diachronic variation. First, a detailed process tracing of employers’ actions and positions in 
specific policy reforms shows how their goals and strategies were motivated by challenges 
coming from the political sphere. Through the detail d analysis of the processes that led to 
specific policy outputs, the thesis endeavors to disentangle the complex set of causes that may 
have motivated employers to accept or not to accept specific policies.  
 The focus on timing and sequencing that process tracing allows facilitates the 
identification of the potentially strategic nature of political action. When, and at which point 
in the policy-making process, did business change its m nd? Was it committed to the policy 
from the very start or did it come to support the policy only in the course of the policy-making 
process? What were the antecedents that preceded a change in position? How did employer 
representatives themselves justify the change? A change in position that happens in the course 
of the policy-making process is likely to be motivaed by strategic interaction. In contrast, a 
position consistently taken over longer time periods is likely to reflect genuine preferences. 
One of the strengths of the method of process tracing is its ability to analyze questions of 
timing (George and Bennett 2005: 206-16; Gerring 2007: 172-85; Hall 2003: 391-5; Mahoney 
2003: 363-5). Applying process tracing to the analysis of policy positions helps to identify 
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whether a specific position reflects a genuine preference, or a grudging acceptance in the light 
of unfavorable circumstances. 
 Secondly, the thesis relies on diachronic variation to analyze the importance of 
temporal changes in political context. Although thesis is not an attempt to write a history 
of long durée,11 it nevertheless tries to cover at least a somewhat longer durée than is 
commonly the case in the empirical study of welfare states and political economies. To 
analyze the relevance of broad structural factors on the way employers define their interests 
and preferences, we need variation in these factors. T  analyze only a single policy during a 
very limited period of time clearly means to keep important aspects of the political context 
constant: the broader balance of power, the institutional setting, and the policy legacies that 
possibly shape the way employers perceive their interes s will remain without significant 
change, if the analysis is limited to a short time period. 
 Major structural changes that have transformative eff cts often take the form of long-
term processes and take place in a slow-moving and incremental manner, as pointed out, for 
instance, by Paul Pierson (2003: 181-9) and by Wolfgang Streeck (Streeck 2009: 16-21). The 
analysis of slow, transformative changes requires the study of long time periods. The 
relevance of the political rise of the labor movement and its reformist transformation, for 
instance, are processes that become evident only in the very long run. Equally, the changes in 
the broader political goals and strategies of German employers become only visible in the 
long-term. To understand the long-term shift by employers from a politics of pacification to a 
politics of containment requires attention also to the different political-economic regimes they 
are embedded in. 
 Powerful changes in political context are, however, not limited to long-term changes. 
They can also happen very rapidly, taking the form of a critical juncture, a moment in a 
country’s history that is characterized by a high level of institutional indeterminacy and 
fundamental changes that may set the country on a specific path of development (see Thelen 
1999: 387-8). It is especially during such moments of indeterminacy that political agency 
matters, as existing constraints disappear and the previous balance of power is upset 
(Katznelson 2003: 283-4). For this reason, the thesis focuses primarily on fundamental 
reforms that often happened during such critical junct re moments, rather than on the day-to-
                                                
11 As done e.g. by scholars tracing modern forms of democratic governance to pre-modern structures, like Robert 
Putnam (1993) or Bengt Flyvbjerg (1998). 
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day policy-making during more settled times, when the potential for political actors to shape 
outcomes is more limited. 
  Critical junctures have asymmetric effects on the power resources of political actors. 
Those actors that benefited from the old order stand o lose, while those actors disadvantaged 
by the old order face a window of opportunity for crrecting that situation. A critical juncture 
shifts the balance of power among political actors wards previously disadvantaged groups. 
In modern German history two such critical junctures have decisively shifted the balance of 
power from capital to labor and have compelled employers to change their strategies and 
attitudes towards organized labor in response. These two critical junctures were the aftermath 
periods of World War I and to World War II. Both events were characterized by the collapse 
of the old political regime. Both changed the political context of German employers 
drastically and made them re-evaluate their relations t  organized labor. After World War I, 
employers lost their erstwhile ally, the Bismarckian state, and were confronted with a 
revolutionary challenge. The previously powerful industrialists were in a situation of political 
weakness that convinced them to collaborate and make concessions to labor that put the 
German system of industrial relations on a track towards institutionalised cooperation.  
 After World War II, the political clout of industrial employers was again weakened by 
the moral and political de-legitimization of the old order and the emergence of a new 
momentum for economic re-organization. This momentum was carried by the labor 
movement and, in part, by the Western Allies; as well as by the formation of a communist 
regime on east German territory. In response to these new situations, industrialists came to 
endorse social partnership and the notion of a “social market economy” as ways of containing 
programmatic challenges from a strengthened left. 
 These two critical junctures demarcate the three historical political-economic regimes 
that this thesis covers: the Wilhelmine Empire (1871-1918), the Weimar Republic (1919-
1933) and the West German Federal Republic (1949-). The period of the Nazi era was 
excluded from the analysis, because no autonomous frm of interest representation was 
allowed during the Nazi regime. Autonomous labor unions an employer organizations had 
been banned and the existing organizations dismantled by the Nazis. We do therefore not 
know what the positions of employer associations would have been towards specific Nazi 
policies, even though we know that some big industrialists had funded Hitlers’ rise to power 
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and some industry representatives had fulfilled official functions within the system of NS 
organizations (Hallgarten 1955; Turner 1985). 
 To summarize the empirical argument of this thesis, industrial employers in Germany 
did not accept institutions of social protection and social compromise because they wanted to 
create institutions that supported economic efficien y and competitiveness, but because they 
responded to challenges coming from the political context.12 During the Wilhelmine period, 
the rise of the socialist labor movement motivated dominant groups of industrialists to support 
Bismarck’s social insurance reforms as a tool for pacifying the working class. Their genuine 
preference for the maintenance of their political and economic power led them to support 
Bismarck’s politics of social pacification. With the transformation of social democracy from a 
revolutionary to a reformist force and the abandoning of its more radical goals, employers’ 
preferences for pacifying policies waned. Instead,  more pragmatic and strategically 
motivated acceptance of specific policy options emerged that intended to contain the 
expansion of social policies or dismantle disliked policy legacies by supplanting them with 
more favorable policies.  
This thesis does not make any claims concerning the actual economic efficiency 
effects of labor market and social policies in Germany. The policies and institutions of the 
German political economy may or may not be economically efficient, but the economic 
efficiency benefits they potentially produce are a by-product of historical conflicts over power 
and authority in politics and in firms, rather than the result of deliberate institutional design. 
The functional efficiency of institutions cannot serve as the main component of an 
explanation of their origins. As Jack Knight, a scholar who uses a rational choice framework 
but drops the assumption of efficient institutions, otes: “institutions may or may not be 
socially efficient: It depends on whether or not the institutional form that favors the actors 
capable of asserting their strategic advantage is socially efficient” (Knight 1992: 40). 
                                                
12 This thesis does not make any claims concerning the economic efficiency of labor market and social 
policies in Germany. The policies and institutions f the German political economy may or may not be 
economically efficient, but the economic efficiency benefits they potentially produce are a by-product 
of historical conflicts over power and authority in politics and in firms. They cannot serve as the main 
component of an explanation of their origins based on purposive action. As Jack Knight, a scholar who 
uses a rational choice framework but drops the assumption of efficient institutions, notes: “institutions 
may or may not be socially efficient: It depends on whether or not the institutional form that favors the
actors capable of asserting their strategic advantage is socially efficient” (Knight 1992: 40). 
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 On a theoretical level, the thesis challenges models that claim to explain business 
support for specific social policies solely by refer nce to material interests. Such models fail 
to take into account the extent to which policy positi ns are endogenous to the political 
context. As an alternative, this thesis suggests a perspective according to which political 
actors form their goals and positions in interaction with the political environment. 
Endogenously produced political challenges, rather t an exogenously given material interests, 
motivated employers to accept the formation and expansion of the modern welfare state. 
Summary of the main propositions 
This chapter has outlined two alternative explanations for employers’ acceptance of welfare 
state and industrial relations institutions: the cross-class coalition thesis (H1) and the political 
accommodation thesis (H2). The following chapters confront these two alternative 
explanations with the empirical evidence, whereby I intend to show that political 
accommodation (H2) better explains employers’ role in welfare state development than 
economic interests (H1). Peter Hall has argued that social science advances best as a “three-
cornered fight” between theory, alternative theory and empirical observations (Hall 2006: 27). 
Engaging in this three-cornered fight is the model that this thesis follows. Although the 
emphasis in the thesis is on empirical analysis, it  not intended as mere descriptive narrative. 
The two “theoretical corners” are pivotal building blocks for the argument of the thesis. At 
this point, I will thus briefly summarize these two “theoretical corners”.  
The cross-class coalition thesis (H1) contends that important segments of employers 
perceived welfare state and industrial relations policies to be in their own economic interest 
and therefore supported their adoption, often by deliberately forming an alliance with 
segments of labor. Employers’ support was crucial for the adoption of these policies. Without 
employers’ support these policies would either have be n less likely to be adopted or the 
adopted policies would have been significantly different ones. If confirmed, this hypothesis 
puts into question the explanatory power of conventional labor-centred explanations. We can 
break down this thesis into four specific propositins:  
1a. Industrial employers, or  a dominant segment among them, have actively 
supported the construction of welfare state and industrial relations policies. 
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1b. They did so because they considered these policies to be in their own economic 
interest. They expected benefits, in particular, in terms of skill formation and labor 
productivity. 
1c. The preferences of the dominant segment of employers converged with the 
preferences of labor, resulting in the formation of cross-class alliances, issue-
specific coalitions for the construction of new policies or the defense of existing 
ones. 
1d. The primary cleavages of interest in welfare state development were sectoral 
cleavages. Class cleavages were of subordinate importance. 
In contrast, the political accommodation thesis (H2), presented in this thesis, contends that 
employers perceived welfare state and industrial rel tions policies to be at odds with their 
economic interests, but that political constraints motivated them to accept or endorse the 
adoption of certain policies. Employers accepted the formation of these policies only in the 
context of political challenges that made the complete absence of social policy unfeasible and 
changed what policies employers thought to be worth aiming for. If confirmed, this thesis puts 
into question the causal centrality of employer interests in welfare state development and re-
asserts the relevance of labor-centred and institutional explanations. We can break down this 
thesis into four specific propositions, which are equivalent to the propositions of the cross-
class coalition thesis: 
2a. The dominant segments of industrial employers were r luctant to accept the 
construction of welfare state and industrial relations policies. 
2b. When industrial employers accepted the construction of welfare state and 
industrial relations policies, they did so because th y perceived these policies as 
lesser evils. They did so (i) ) because they decided to accommodate to political 
constraints for strategic reasons, or (ii) because political challenges led them to 
change their genuine preferences. 
2c. Capital and labor only rarely formed alliances to promote social policies, 
because the genuine preferences of capital and labor often were too different. 
2d. The primary cleavages of interest in welfare state development were class 
cleavages. Sectoral cleavages were of subordinate importance. 
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In addition to the two alternative theoretical positi ns at the center of this thesis, we 
can discern a third position related to employer politics. This position can be seen as a hybrid 
between H1 and H2 and I label it the “VoC thesis”, because it builds on the theoretical 
framework by Hall and Soskice (Hall and Soskice 2001). The “VoC thesis” contends that 
employers in coordinated market economies, irrespective of their original positions on the 
formation of welfare state and industrial relations policies, did over time change their 
positions and come to favor existing policies. This change occurred because, over time, firms 
adjusted their production strategies to existing institutions, thereby managing to make use of 
them in their own interest. Having turned institutions from constraints into resources, 
employers became dependent on their continuation and therefore are likely to fight for their 
survival (Thelen 2001: 73; Hassel 2007: 253-55; Hall and Thelen 2009: 20-1). Hall and 
Thelen, for instance, argue that “[i]f firms decide to support the regulatory regimes that 
sustain the comparative institutional advantages of the nation, it is because they also underpin 
the competitive advantages of the firm” (Hall and Thelen 2009: 20-1). 
 In this thesis, I deal with this argument only at the margins. The goal of the thesis is to 
explain and understand the role of employers in welfar  state development, that is, their 
contribution to the formation of institutions that today constitute core components of the 
German model. To do so, the thesis focuses on those crucial moments that resulted in the 
formation of these institutions, rather than on theusage and day-to-day implementation of 
these institutions during more settled times. Nevertheless, the empirical analysis, I believe, 
does allow some tentative statements on the validity of the VoC thesis. I will return to this 
question in chapters 9  (Germany Today) and 10.V (Social Policies and Economic 
Accommodation). 
 
1.IV A Preview of the Thesis 
The thesis proceeds in a broadly chronological order. Chapter two starts with the historical 
origins of employer organizations in the Wilhelmine Empire. What motivated the formation 
of employer organizations? What was their attitude towards the emerging labor unions? The 
formative period of German employer associations had been the two decades around the turn 
of the century. In 1918, the basic organizational structure of the German system of employer 
organizations, as it exists today, has already beenin place. The chapter shows the relationship 
between the emergence of labor unions and emergence of employer organization and analyzes 
the goals and the range of activities of the early employer organizations. The chapter shows 
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that employers started to organize to counter strike threats and how they developed 
mechanisms of coordination toward that purpose. Moreover, the chapter analyzes sectoral 
differences between the heavy industry and manufacturing industries in their relations to 
organized labor and discusses explanations for why some sectors were willing to bargain with 
unions, while others were not.  
 Chapter three analyzes the role of industrial employers in Bismarck’s social reforms 
during the 1880s, which included the introduction of programmes for work injury insurance, 
health insurance, and disability and old-age pension insurance. Industry had in general 
supported these reforms. The chapter analyzes what motivated employers to support these 
reforms and how employers had tried to influence important details of the planned legislation. 
The chapter shows that employers had evaluated the planned social legislation primarily in 
terms of its political consequences, and less in terms of its consequences on labor costs and on 
labor productivity. The chapter shows how employers and government intended the reforms 
to contribute to the destruction of social democracy nd the protection of business power in 
state and in the economy. The chapter focuses in particul r on the policy of work injury 
insurance, which industry had taken a particular interest in, a d shows that this interest 
derived primarily from the aggravation of class conflict and the existence of a problematic 
policy legacy in this field, rather than from the effect of work injuries on labor productivity. 
Moreover, the chapter critically evaluates the importance of intra-business differences in 
regard to the attitudes towards social insurance. 
 Chapter four focuses on the first critical juncture, World War I, and its domestic 
consequences in Germany. The chapter analyzes how te re-organization of the economy 
during the war and the domestic consequences of Germany’s defeat and the collapse of the 
old regime after the war led to a sudden change in class relations and an attempt by some 
industrial leaders to institutionalize cross-class cooperation. The chapter analyzes what 
motivated these employers, who in the past had rejected any cooperation with unions, to sign 
an agreement with union leaders that intended to pu industrial relations on an entirely new 
institutional basis and that involved far-reaching concessions to the union side. The chapter 
shows how the radically altered political circumstances and the intense political uncertainty of 
that moment led employers to re-evaluate their approach towards organized labor and to seek 
cross-class collaboration. Moreover, the chapter analyzes the reasons for the subsequent 
crumbling and eventual failure of the agreement.  
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 Chapter five turns to the introduction of unemployment insurance in 1927, the most 
far-reaching social policy reform in the Weimar Republic. German employers had been 
fundamentally opposed to any form of unemployment insurance before the war, but had 
changed their mind after the war and eventually, after some wavering, decided to accept the 
introduction of unemployment insurance and cooperate in the drafting of the legislation. The 
chapter shows how this employer U-turn came about and what motivated it. The chapter 
evaluates the empirical importance of alternative motivations, including skill formation, 
control over the workforce and work incentives, and strategic adjustment to changing political 
realities. The chapter shows how an unfavorable policy legacy (unemployment assistance) 
had motivated employers to change their preferences with regard to unemployment insurance. 
 Chapters seven and eight deal with social reforms following World War II. These two 
chapters are preceded by a brief digression (chapter six) on how the experiences of the past, in 
the Weimar Republic and the Nazi regime, had induce a paradigm shift among German 
employers in their general relations to organized labor. Social partnership and a stronger 
emphasis on market competition became the new l itmotivs for German employer 
associations. This is encapsulated in their endorsement of the “social market economy” as a 
programmatic alternative to challenges from the left. However, while today the concept of 
social market economy has become almost synonymous to the welfare state, during the 1950s 
it meant well-nigh the opposite for German employers. 
 Chapter seven deals with three key social reform projects during the post-war period: 
the failed attempt in the late 1940s to transform the Bismarckian social insurance system into 
a universal and unitary insurance system; the conflict over the institutional distribution of 
power between capital and labor in social insurance administration; and finally, the landmark 
reform of the pension system in 1957, which resulted in a substantial increase in pension 
benefits and the automatic wage indexation of pensions. The chapter shows how employers 
tried to prevent far-reaching reforms that would involve higher social expenditures and a shift 
in power to labor. The chapter shows why employers had consistently backed the existing 
Bismarckian social insurance system against more egalitarian alternatives and why, at the 
same time, they had tried to prevent the expansion of the generosity of the Bismarckian 
system. Employers and their parliamentary allies had succeeded in preventing a universalist 
transformation of the German welfare state, but failed to prevent the “dynamisation” of 
pensions in the 1957 reform. The chapter shows how t e character of electoral competition 
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had sidelined employer interests and compelled them to accommodate to the new political 
realities. 
 Chapter eight analyzes the institutionalization of firm-level codetermination in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, as well as the resurgence of the conflict in the 1970s. The chapter 
analyzes why industrial employers had been so strongly opposed to codetermination in their 
firms and why the introduction of codetermination succeeded nevertheless. It shows that 
employers evaluated the codetermination proposals by the unions, first and foremost, in terms 
of their consequences on the balance of power between the two sides and in terms of control 
over private investments, rather than in terms of their effects on labor productivity and worker 
motivation. The chapter also demonstrates how the way that the unions had framed their 
entirely reformist goal of codetermination had evoked fears of collectivization and centralized 
economic planning among industrialists, which induced a strong opposition to 
codetermination among them. 
 Chapter nine analyzes the shift of German employers away from scial compromise, 
characteristic of the post-war period, and towards  more assertive stance, which has occurred 
from the early 1990s on. Employers have strongly intensified their politics of containment by 
initiating public campaigns that promote welfare state retrenchment, policies to lower the 
reservation wages for the unemployed and decentralization in industrial relations. Industrial 
employers have become more assertive in demanding the curtailing of redistributive policies 
and a refocusing of social policy to its basic insurance functions. The chapter discusses the 
reasons for this shift, analyzing the importance of d mestic and international factors in 
explaining why the willingness of employers to seek domestic political accommodation has 
declined.  
Chapter ten concludes and summarizes the main themes of the thesis.  
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2 The Origins of Employer Associations: Coordinating against Organized 
Labor 
 
“Unite firmly and unshakably. Get used to the thought that an immensely difficult battle is 
foisted upon you; that, in order to win it, you will have to bring enormous sacrifices and that 
the outcome of this battle will have to be the abolition and destruction of the social democratic 
…labor unions” (Henry Axel Büeck, executive director of the Central Association of German 
Industry, 1911, quoted in Berg and BDI 1956: 40)  
 
Today, the ‘German model’ of political economy is often identified with a very dense 
organization of private employers and a close cooperation between the organizations of 
capital and labor. Today, employer associations form a pillar of social partnership (see e.g. 
Thelen 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2003). At the time they were founded they intended to 
destroy and defeat the organized labor movement, as illustrated by the epigraph to this 
chapter. They were founded in response to the growing capacity of the labor unions to launch 
strikes; they were intended as anti-strike organizations. The role of German employer 
organizations in industrial relations today does therefore differ diametrically from the role 
they played during their formative years in the late 19th century. To understand this 
extraordinary transformation from defeating labor to cooperating with labor, and to be able to 
appreciate the relevance of this transformation, we need to go back to its origins.13 
The first associations representing employer interes s merged during the period of the 
German Empire (1871-1918), a period of rapid industrialization and labor union growth. The 
most important reason for the formation of these associations was the perceived need to 
                                                
13 A note on sources: this and the following chapter, which cover the period of the Wilhelmine Empire and 
World War I and its aftermath respectively, draw, among other sources, on several publications by former 
presidents and executive directors of German employer associations that tell the story of the evolution of their 
association and its politics from their personal pers ctive or tend to have the character of historical association 
chronicles. The most important ones used are by Gerhard Erdmann (Erdmann 1966b), long-time executive 
director of the VDA (Weimar Republic) and the BDA (Federal Republic), by Henry Axel Bueck (Bueck 1905a, 
1905b), the long-time executive director of the Central Association of German Industrialists (CVDI) who was 
highly instrumental in the formation of German business politics during the Wilhelmine Empire, by Fritz Tänzler 
(Tänzler 1929, 1907), the first executive director of the VDA (National Association of German Employer 
Associations) after World War I, and by Ernst von Borsig (Borsig 1924), the first president of the VDA after 
World War I. Articles published in the two main organs of German employer associations, Der Arbeitgeber 
(founded 1910), and Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung (founded 1901) were consulted for the latter parts of the 
period covered in this chapter. 
Scholarly publications on the historical evolution f German employer associations are relatively rare. Th  most 
authoritative and in-depth scholarly piece available has been written by the German historian Roswitha 
Leckebusch (Leckebusch 1966) upon which this chapter also draws. Also the work by Kessler (Kessler 1907a), 
an intellectual that seems to have been affiliated with the bourgeois social reform movement, and by Braun 
(Braun 1922) have been particularly useful. 
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collectively confront the challenge posed by the emerging organizations of the labor 
movement. As the very raison d’etre of firms is to make profit through engaging in market 
competition, there is, in the context of a union-free economy, no a priori need for firms to 
collectively organize to represent their employer interests. The default mode of firms to 
achieve their preferences is individual action, notc llective action. Capital can thus be 
expected to prefer an institutional environment that constrains entrepreneurial freedom as 
little as possible, in order to allow the unconstrained pursuit of entrepreneurial profit interests 
through the market. We can expect that this holds also for the relations of firms to the labor 
market, where firms can be expected to prefer to operate within the self-regulating 
mechanisms of demand and supply. 
The formation of the first employer associations followed the formation of labor 
unions. While firms organized and cooperated already long before the emergence of labor 
unions - for instance by building price cartels or in the form of medieval guilds - the 
formation of employer organizations, as organizations representing the employer interests of 
firms, was a response to the threat posed by organized labor. I argue in this chapter that the 
need for employer interests to be represented collectively emerged because the entrepreneurial 
freedom in the labor market was threatened by organized labor. In the absence of effective 
labor unions there is little reason for firms to collectively represent their labor market 
interests. Crouch has aptly summarized this argument in the following way:  
Many commentators have observed that employers have organized in response to employees, 
that is, that unions take the lead in the organization of the labor market; while employers find 
it easier to organize than labor, they have less need to do so if an individualized labor market 
is working well for them. Capitalists being per definitionem competitive, they combine only 
under exceptional circumstances (Crouch 1994: 334, emphasis in original). 
 
The interaction between unions and employer associati ns was originally one of 
‘attack and defense’. The unions were attacking by raising demands, underpinned by strikes, 
while the employer associations were trying to ward off these demands. Early employer 
associations tended thus to be reactive organizations, f cused on defeating strikes, but without 
trying to actively shape institutions and policies. One academic observer had succinctly 
remarked at the beginning of the 20th century that:  
The labor union is everywhere the primary phenomenon, the employer association the 
secondary phenomenon. By its nature, the labor union attacks; the employer association fends 
off (…). The labor union is…primarily a strike association; the employer association an anti-
strike association (Kessler 1907a: 20, translated from German by TP). 
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This chapter examines the formative period of employer associations in Germany, the 
period of the Wilhelmine Empire (1871-1918). The chapter demonstrates how employer 
associations during this period tried to repress and disarm the labor movement. After giving a 
brief overview of the political context within which the formation of employer organizations 
took place and the main organizations that emerged, the chapter analyzes why German 
industrialists decided to represent their employer interests collectively. For which purposes 
have employer associations been formed? What was their relationship to organized labor? 
Next, two key aspects of their subsequent development are analyzed: the centralization of 
associations and the sectoral differentiation in their relationship to organized labor. The 
analysis demonstrates that both processes have been a r sponse to growing union strength. 
2.I Organizational Origins in the Wilhelmine Empire 
Labor unions and employer organizations both started to emerge in Germany in the course of 
industrialization, which gained speed quickly from about the middle of the 19th century on. 
Industrialization in Germany started late and was characterized very much by the features that 
Gerschenkron had ascribed to late industrializing countries: Technological development was 
fast and industrialization concentrated on large factories and large heavy industry combines 
(Gerschenkron 1962). With the emergence of an impoverished and politically discontent 
industrial working class came also the emergence of the so-called “worker question” 
(“Arbeiterfrage”), the concern by the authoritarian state and the industry elites regarding the 
revolutionary potential created by the radicalization of the working class. Initially, the 
response chosen by German employers was to try to destroy the labor movement by 
repressing its organizations. Thereby, employers could rely on the state as a firm ally. 
Anti-socialist legislation: the state as a business ally 
The Wilhelmine Empire rested on a political alliance between the aristocratic landowners 
(Junkers), heavy industry, and the army. Together ty backed the newly created nation state 
(the Reich). One of the most important threats to the political stability of this regime was the 
socialist labor movement. The government, headed by Bismarck, tried to quell this threat by 
repressing the organizations of the labor movement with the so-called ‘Anti-Socialist Laws’ 
(“Sozialistengesetze”), adopted in 1878. Otto von Bismarck initiated these laws in order to 
curb the strength of the social democratic labor movement. For Bismarck, a conservative 
aristocratic landowner, the paramount objective was to secure and extend the political 
stability of the newly created Empire. The anti-socialist laws were passed in the Reichstag 
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with the votes of the conservatives and most of the national liberal deputies. The laws were 
ostensibly legitimated by two failed attempts to assassinate the Emperor, for which the 
government wrongly laid the blame on the social democrats.  
The legislation effectively banned the Social Democrati  Party (SPD) and 
organizations affiliated with the party, including the social democratic unions, from all 
political activities outside the Reichstag. The German Social Democratic Party 
(“Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands”) was founded in 1875 as a merger of 
two competing socialist factions. The party in this early stage was revolutionary Marxist in 
orientation and aimed at overthrowing the existing political and economic order (Carr 1979: 
140). In response to the anti-socialist legislation, the party went underground. The party 
continued to operate but was forced to do so from outside of Germany (Carr 1979: 140). The 
laws eventually failed to achieve their goal of arresting the growth of the party. The SPD 
managed to circumvent the laws by nominating ‘independent candidates’ and experienced a 
massive boost in electoral support during the 1880s.14 In view of their failure to curb the 
strength of the SPD, the anti-socialist legislation was finally abolished in 1890 (Lidtke 1966). 
Industry regretted the abolition. In 1906, the CDI executive director still insisted that ‘social 
democracy needs to be fought by legal means’ (CDI executive director H.A. Bueck at the CDI 
general assembly in Nuremberg, June 20th, 1906 quoted in Kessler 1907b: 224). 
Repression of the socialist labor movement continued in various forms also after the 
abolition of the anti-socialist legislation, though the state became gradually more hesitant to 
use repression. Public employees were not allowed to join a social democratic union and 
employers often dismissed workers identified as union members (Raumer 1954: 426). 
Employers could rely on the support from the military, the police and courts to keep strikes 
and worker riots under control (Ullmann 1981: 203). The labor repressive policies of the state 
had allowed employers to ignore organized labor for some time, though this policy ultimately 
failed to stop the growth of the labor movement. The abolition of the anti-socialist legislation 
in 1890 increased the need for employers to confront organized labor on their own. 
The formation of the first employer associations 
As the anti-socialist legislation had temporarily diminished the need for employers to counter 
the labor challenge, it is likely to have had a reta ding effect on the organization of employers 
in Germany. The two decades following the abolition of the anti-socialist legislation, from 
about 1890 on to the start of World War I, were characterized by a rapid growth in union 
                                                
14 In 1881 the SPD received 312.000 votes, in 1890 1.4 million 
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strength (Schönhoven 1987: 179-210). This was also the period that became the formative 
years of German employer associations. Out of 154 employer associations that existed in the 
year 1900, 125 were founded after 189015 (Weber 1959: 40; 1954: 98; Kessler 1907b: 239).  
Before the abolition of the anti-socialist legislation, the formation of employer 
associations had been a relatively isolated phenomen and remained limited to local 
associations covering a narrow branch of craft or industry. Associations of employers had 
already sporadically been formed from the 1840s on as spontaneous initiatives to ward off 
strikes. These groups, however, remained short-lived and were normally dismantled after the 
strike that caused their formation had been put down (Leckebusch 1966: 33-34).  
The first permanent associations dealing specifically with employer interests started to 
emerge from the 1870s onwards. One of the first larger sectors to organize were the 
typographers, who formed their own national employer association in 1869 (‘Deutscher 
Buchdruckerverein’), in response to the formation of a national typographic worker union in 
1866 (‘Deutscher Buchdruckerverband’). This association represented the interests of their
members not only in relation to the union, but on scial and economic policy issues more 
generally as well (Weber 1954: 100-101). In contrast to most of the employer associations to 
be formed in the following decades, the typographer association was prepared to negotiate 
collective wage agreements with its union counterpart (Erdmann 1966b: 53-54; Leckebusch 
1966: 34). The vast majority of employers and employer associations in the 19th century were 
fundamentally opposed to any form of collective bargaining and refused to recognize unions 
as legitimate representatives of the workforce or as bargaining partners (Erdmann 1966b: 54). 
As noted, employer organizations have historically not been the first forms of business 
interest groups, though they have been the first to represent the interests of firms vi -à-vis the 
working class. Already in the middle ages guilds and corporations existed in Germany to 
coordinate and regulate the activities of firms in the product markets and to organize 
vocational training. In modern times, the oldest business interest groups in Germany are the 
                                                
15 In the year 1890 alone 29 employer associations were formed. The first multi-sectoral, local employer 
association, the association Hamburg-Altona, was formed in 1890. Its purpose was to counter mayday rallies by 
dismissing workers participating in them (Weber 1954: 101). In 1887, the first major nationwide sectoral 
employer organization was formed: the Association of German Metalworking Industrialists (“Gesamtverband 
Deutscher Metallindustrieller”), which is the predecessor of today’s top metalworking employer association 
(“Gesamtmetall”) (Leckebusch 1966: 36; Tänzler 1929: 12). The organization’s statutes from 1891 mentioned as 
the organizations goals to foster the welfare of the workers in the German metalworking industry (§ 1.1), to 
jointly ward off ‘unjustified plans by workers that re aiming at unilaterally dictating the working conditions 
and, in particular, strikes planned or organized to this purpose” and to compensate for the damages cau ed by 
strike action (anti-strike funds) (§ 1.2) (own translation from German, quoted in Erdmann 1966: 55). These 
formulation of associational purposes was characteristic for many employer founded during that period. 
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Chambers for Industry and Commerce, which emerged in the first half of the 19th century, 
following the tradition of the medieval guilds. Chambers were locally based organizations 
with compulsory membership and carried out certain dministrative tasks, such as the 
certification of merchants (Schulz 1961: 138). In 186 , the local chamber organizations united 
to form a national umbrella organization, the German Diet for Industry and Trade (DIHT) 
(Schroeder 2003b: 645; Braunthal 1965: 26). In addition to the chambers, trade associations 
had also already emerged before the formation of the first employer associations. Trade 
associations are associations representing the product market interests of a specific sector, in 
particular in relation to trade policy and economic policy more generally. In 1876, these 
associations decided to form their own national peak-l vel federation: the Central Association 
of German Industry (CDI). 
The CDI: The political voice of German industry 
The Central Association of German Industry (CDI, Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller) 
became the main organization representing the interests of German industry in the political 
arena. Employer associations, in contrast, played vry little role in the articulation of 
industry’s views on broader economic and social policy issues. This is for two reasons: First, 
the widespread formation of employer associations, as associations representing specifically 
the labor market interests of firms, did not occur before the abolition of the anti-socialist 
legislation in 1890. Secondly, the early employer associations limited their activities to 
defeating strikes and labor unions and did not engage in broader political debates. The CDI, 
together with some larger industry associations, carried out this function instead. 
The CDI was founded to represent the interests of protectionist sectors in the conflict 
over trade policy in the 1870s. The CDI was founded as a pressure group for trade 
protectionism and united those sectors that were facing fierce international competition. The 
federation was founded in 1876 upon the initiative of the associations of the North German 
heavy industry16 and the Association of the South German cotton industry (Kaelble 1967: 4; 
Ullmann 1979: 594-595). This organization subsequently developed into the most powerful 
political organization of German industry during the Wilhelmine Empire and constitutes one 
of the predecessors of today’s Federation of German Industry (BDI). Initially the CDI 
intended to be a mere pressure group in favor of a shift to protectionism. 
                                                
16 The Association of the German Iron and Steel Industry (VDESI), founded 1873, and the so-called Langnam 
Verein, founded 1871, the full name of which was “Association for the Protection of the Common Economic 
Interests of Rhineland and Westphalia”). 
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The CDI succeeded in convincing Bismarck of a shift to protectionism. An 
international economic crisis that began in 1873 had affected the German heavy industry 
particularly badly.17 In response, the heavy industry began to call for a shift in foreign trade 
policy from free trade18 to protectionism. A strong coalition in favor of free trade, consisting 
of the aristocratic landowners (the Junkers), the merchant bourgeoisie, the National Liberal 
Party and senior civil servants; resulted in a parliamentary defeat of the protectionists in 1875 
(Lambi 1962: 62-63; Böhme 1967: 220; 1966: 389). Thereupon, in December 1875, the 
protectionist industries decided to unite in a new industry federation, with the purpose of 
lobbying more effectively for their cause and in order to seek a protectionist alliance with 
agriculture (Böhme 1966: 391). Under the impact of falling grain prices, agriculture 
eventually changed sides and turned to protectionism a  well, resulting in an ‘iron and rye’ 
coalition (Lambi 1962: 67). Bismarck, motivated by plans to build an alliance with the heavy 
industry in order to consolidate power, eventually decided to accommodate industry with 
protectionist tariffs. As a result, Germany adopted a comprehensive protectionist tariffs policy 
in 1879, covering in particular iron and corn (Lambi 1962: 60 and 69) (Braunthal 1965: 5-6). 
Having achieved its original goal, the CDI subsequently turned to representing 
industry’s interests on broader social and economic policy issues (Ullmann 1977: 171-2). The 
CDI played a particularly influential role in shaping Bismarck’s social insurance reforms 
during the 1880s (see chapter 3). Moreover, the CDI was also instrumental in the 
centralization of German employer associations (seebelow). Despite this prominent role, the 
CDI was, however, far from representative for the German business community as a whole 
and its politics was in practice dominated by the associations of the North German heavy 
industry19 (Leckebusch 1966: 36-37; Böhme 1967: 231). According to an estimate made by 
Ullmann, the CDI during the 1880s organized about 2 per cent of all German firms, which 
employed about one third of all German workers (Ullmann 1979: 594, and Fn47).  
                                                
17 Between 1873 and 1878 prices for iron slumped by about 50 to 60 per cent (Böhme 1966: 354). Large-scale 
layoffs and plant closures were the consequence (Lambi 1962: 59) 
18 In 1873 tariffs on pig iron, raw steel and ships had been abolished. For 1877 a repeal of further tariffs was 
planned (Lambi 1962: 59-60) 
19 The composition of the general assembly of the CDIhelps to illustrate the dominance of the heavy industry 
within the federation. The general assembly was made up of 300 representatives, of which 67 votes were h ld by 
the Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists (VDESI), 38 belonged to the Rhenish-Westphalian coal 
mine syndicate and 10 votes belonged to the heavy industry firm Krupp. To compare, the Association of German 
Metal Industrialists only held 4 votes (Ullmann 1977: 176). 
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The manufacturing industries felt marginalized within the CDI due to the dominance 
of the heavy industry and did not see their positions n economic policy issues20 represented 
well within the CDI. They decided in 1895 to form a separate peak-level federation:21 the 
League of Industry (BdI, Bund der Industrie) (Ullmann 1976; Braunthal 1965: 6). Up to 1904, 
these two federations dealt with a broad range of ec nomic and social policy issues and hence 
served as all-purpose interest organizations for industry. In response to a major strike in 
1903/1904, the proponents of a functional division of tasks won out and separate national 
employer federations were founded. From that time on, the two industry federations dealt 
predominantly with economic policy interests, while th  newly created employer federations 
were to focus on labor market interests. 
2.II Why did Employers Decide to Organize? 
The main motivation for the formation of separate employer associations was to repress the 
organized labor movement and its demands, to prevent and defeat strikes and to collectively 
compensate firms for the costs of strikes. Only with the strengthening of the German labor 
unions and their growing capacity to organize strikes did employers start to organize as well. 
As shown below, the subsequent centralization of employer associations was intended to 
improve the effectiveness of anti-strike action. The following quote by Henry Axel Bueck, the 
highly influential executive director of the CDI, from the year 1890 illustrates the radical 
opposition of German industrialists to unions at tht time: 
Under no circumstances … will German employers negotiate with the representatives of the 
unions … on equal terms. …. Any interference of union representatives in business affairs will 
be firmly rejected by employers. Negotiations with the above-mentioned are rejected for now 
and forever. (CDI executive director Henry Axel Büeck speaking at a meeting of the Verein 
für Socialpolitik. Quoted in Kessler 1907a: 194 , own translation from German by TP). 
The CDI, as the leading representative of German industry at that time pursued ‘class 
warfare from above’. Employers in Germany did not ini ially organize with the purpose of 
cooperating with organized labor, but with the purpose of destroying the latter. Initially, 
though, the formation of employer organizations hadto overcome significant resistance from 
within. For various reasons, many employers considered collective action not to be expedient. 
                                                
20 The differences between heavy industry and manufacturing industries centred on economic policy, in 
particular foreign trade. While the heavy industry advocated protectionism in order to ward off cheap im orts of 
iron, the manufacturing industries, which were benefiti g from cheap iron imports did not support a 
comprehensive protectionist tariffs policy. Furthermo e the issue of cartel protection had split these two 
segments of industry. The heavy industry, were cartels and syndicates were widespread demanded the legal 
protection of cartels, the manufacturing industries, l s capable to form cartels due to smaller firms and higher 
fragmentation, resented cartels (Nipperdey 1961: 265) .  
21 The association of the chemical industry left the CDI in 1883 but did not join the BdI and decided to, instead, 
remain unaffiliated with any of the two federations (Braunthal 1965: 6). 
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Some thought that employer associations would merely intensify the unwelcome class 
struggle, something the unions would already be looking forward to. From their view, the best 
way to get rid of the labor unions was not to provide them with any organizational opponent. 
This way, the unions would be forced to dissolve again, allowing employers to solve 
industrial conflicts by dealing only with their own workforce, instead of having to deal with 
the unions. Some also considered the conditions in their sector to be so specific that a 
balancing of interests within a larger association appeared not feasible to them. Others 
thought that they would be immune against strikes or that joining an employer association 
would even encourage their workers to organize or to strike (Tänzler 1929: 27; Ullmann 
1981: 195). 
Recognition of the necessity of collective action emerged only slowly among German 
employers. Collective action is only possible if a common interest is identified. Being 
competitors on the market, however, German employers initially had a hard time realizing 
that they shared common interests as employers. Instead, a competitive and particularistic 
mentality initially prevailed in many sectors and obstructed the formation of employer 
associations. One observer of the German timber industry noted in 1912 that competition in 
this industry was so harsh that employers were gloating if a competitor was devastated by 
radical union demands and strikes (Carlsson 1912: 1). To realize that such a situation is 
unsatisfactory and to overcome competitive mentalities was clearly a prerequisite for 
employer organizations to develop.  
Organized anti-strike strategies: repression and coordination 
To promote their central goals to defy and disarm oganized labor, employer organizations 
developed two types of measures: first, measures to repress the labor movement in order to 
prevent strikes, and second, measures to defeat strikes in case they could not be avoided.22 
First, employer associations targeted measures against the labor unions as such. 
Employers initially perceived the socialist labor movement to be a phenomenon of temporary 
character, a small group of agitators that would enjoy only weak support within the working 
class at large. Repression was considered the most effec ive strategy against this movement. 
The simplest ways of repressing the socialist labor unions were to dismiss organized or 
striking workers and to hire only non-organized workers (Kessler 1907a: 143-150). Without 
any coordination among employers, however, workers that had been dismissed could easily 
                                                
22 This subsection relies in particular upon the work by Kessler, who describes the anti-union and anti-strike 
measures of employer associations in detail (Kessler 1907a: 137-307) 
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try to find employment in a competing firm, thereby turning any sanctioning by the individual 
employer ineffective. German employer associations therefore developed a variety of 
coordination measures to sanction organized or striking workers. When recruiting new 
workers care was taken to avoid hiring organized workers. A basic form, which did not 
require employers to coordinate, was to demand that new workers declare that they do not 
belong to any union. More sophisticated anti-union strategies, however, were dependent on 
employers coordinating among each other. This section discusses the most important 
coordination measures used by employers. 
Blacklisting. The blacklisting of organized or striking workers was one of the main 
forms of coordination against strikes, used in particular in the large heavy industry firms 
(Ullmann 1981: 199). The mining employer association (“Zechenverband”), founded 1908, 
for instance, banned its members from employing workers that had been found participating 
in strikes for a period of up to 6 months after thestrike (Weber 1954: 180). In sectors 
dominated by smaller firms, where the administration of black lists would have been much 
more complicated, so-called ‘dismissal certificates’ (“Entlassungsscheine”) were used instead. 
These certificates were issued by the dismissing employer. They were needed by unemployed 
workers in order to find new employment and were usd to identify organized workers. If an 
employer refused to issue a dismissal certificate, th  dismissed worker would face difficulties 
finding a new job (Kessler 1907a: 143-179).  
Labor exchanges. In addition, the operation of labor exchanges by the associations 
(“Arbeitgebernachweise”) was used to repress unionization (Ullmann 1981: 200). Employer 
labor exchanges were widespread in particular in small firm sectors dependent on skilled 
labor, like metalworking (Faust 1986: 181). They served first of all the purpose of placing 
workers with specific skills, but were also used to identify and reprimand striking workers 
(Leckebusch 1966: 123). The associations’ labor exchanges were also used to provide firms 
stroke against with strike-breakers. In contrast to public labor exchanges, the associations’ 
labor exchanges refused to place striking workers (Faust 1986: 91; Tänzler 1929: 80-83).23 
Coordinated lockouts. In addition to these preventative and repressive measures, 
employer associations also coordinated actions during industrial conflicts. Since the late 
                                                
23 Unions responded to the employer-run labor exchange services by establishing their own services, thoug 
these union services were rather unsuccessful becaus  of a lack of employer cooperation. In the year 1912, 33 
per cent of all job placements were mediated by the employer-run services, 36 per cent by municipal job 
placement services, while only 11 per cent were mediat  by the union-run services. Job placement services that 
were run jointly by unions and employer associations accounted for only 4 per cent of job placements (Erdmann 
1966b: 60).  
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1880s, the lockout had become the employers’ main weapon (Weber 1954: 182). The 
coordination of lockouts was the main strategy to defeat strikes. The coordination of lockouts 
was intended to improve the effectiveness of the measure and reduce the costs of the lockout 
to the individual firm. For employers, the principal motivation to lock out workers is to inflict 
additional costs to the striking union by increasing the number of workers the union has to 
support. However, if a single employer locks out a large share of workers, this will obstruct 
the production process, thereby incurring a profit l ss to the employer by reducing production 
output. A lockout only by the firm against which the strike is directed would therefore either 
be ineffective, if only a small share of workers is locked out, or, alternatively, would cause 
costly breakdowns in production, in case a larger share of workers is locked out. For 
employers, lockouts are therefore a double-edged sword. To confront this problem, employer 
associations started to coordinate lockouts. During an industrial conflict, associations 
distributed lockouts over the whole sector or region, involving both, firms struck against and 
firms not struck against (Kessler 1907a: 239-240). Through this form of employer solidarity, 
industrial conflict could be made more costly to the unions, while at the same time reducing 
the damage to the production of any single firm (Leckebusch 1966: 123; Ullmann 1981: 201). 
Solidaristic employer behavior in the form of coordinated lockouts could not be 
achieved without compelling those firms not affected by the strike to participate in the 
lockout. Those firms unaffected by the strike had no material interest in participating in the 
lockout as compliance with the lockout meant the obstruction of production and hence a loss 
in profits, without giving any rewards in return. To ensure compliance by individual firms, 
employer associations had thus to oblige their members to follow their lockout orders (Weber 
1954: 183). Such compulsion presupposed that employers generally agreed on the adequacy 
of coordination as a tool for defeating strikes. 
 Organization of strike breaker supply. The provision and allocation of strike breakers 
was another activity coordinated by employer associations. To provide labor to strikebound 
firms, associations were organizing the deployment of workers from other firms and set up 
strike-breaker programmes. These programmes were administrated by the associations’ labor 
exchanges. Some of them offered jobs only to those workers who would declare to be willing 
to work as strike-breakers (Kessler 1907a: 218-219). Employer associations also obliged 
members not to dismiss strike breakers during a strike (Leckebusch 1966: 128). 
Anti-strike funds. In addition to these measures intended to defeat strikes, employer 
associations compensated members for part of the financ al costs incurred to them by strikes 
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and lockouts. To do so, employer associations operated their own strike insurance schemes 
and anti-strike funds,24 which were financed by member fees (Leckebusch 1966: 123) 
(Ullmann 1981: 202). The creation of such compensation funds was a matter of strategic 
credibility for employer associations. Resolute oppsition to union demands was only credible 
if firms could be protected from the damages resulting from industrial conflict. Without the 
protection offered by the strike insurance funds, individual employers would have been less 
likely to resist union demands in case of massive strikes.25 The strike insurance funds operated 
by the employer associations did not provide full compensation for losses caused by industrial 
conflict, though. By letting the individual firm share a part of the financial risk of industrial 
conflict, the employer associations intended to encourage responsible behavior by firms 
(Tänzler 1929: 67; Erdmann 1966b: 83). Moreover, memb rs found by the associations to pay 
wages substantially below sector average were excluded from compensation payments. The 
creation of strike insurance funds enabled German employer associations to continue their 
strategy of union confrontation and contributed to their ability to defy union demands for 
collective bargaining and protectionist labor market policies (Kessler 1907a: 289-307). 
Occupational social benefits. More generally, individual employers were also trying to 
weaken the appeal of the labor unions by trying to tie their workforce to the firm. The main 
instruments to achieve this were the provision of occupational welfare benefits and the 
funding and promotion so-called ‘yellow unions’ (Kessler 1907a: 180-182). A wide range of 
occupational social benefits, such as company flats, Christmas and firm anniversary presents, 
and sport and amusement events, were provided to workers by many larger firms. The heavy 
industry firm Krupp maintained a particularly generous programme of occupational social 
benefits, a firm that had been particularly hostile to labor unions. Employers established such 
benefit schemes in order to weaken the appeal of the labor unions (Weber 1954: 187-191). 
Some firms also used occupational benefits to sanction s riking workers by threatening them 
with the withdrawal of benefits; for instance, by can eling striking workers’ rental contract 
for the company flat (a specific example is documented in Weber 1954: 191). 
Sponsoring company unions. Secondly, employers tried to split the working class by 
fostering collaborative worker organizations, the so-called ‘yellow unions’. Yellow unions 
were company unions (‘Werkvereine’). They were non-c frontationist and employer-
                                                
24 The difference between anti-strike funds and strike-insurance schemes lies in the way benefit eligibity is 
determined. Anti-strike funds were providing compensation payments on the basis of discretionary decisions by 
the association, while strike insurance schemes involved benefit entitlements on the basis of contribuion 
payments. Attempts to provide strike insurance servic s on a commercial basis failed (Tänzler 1929: 66). 
25 In 1906, the two newly created peak-level federations (see below) both created their own re-insurance funds 
for the strike compensation schemes of their member associations. In 1910, the Verein der Arbeitgeberverbände 
established a central strike insurance scheme for associations that did not have their own strike insurance fund. 
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dependent, they rejected strikes and collaborated with the employer.26 Their political ideology 
was usually national-liberal or nationalist. Workers that joined a yellow union were not 
allowed to be a member in any other union. In the deca es before World War I, some 
individual employers funded, and sometimes even initiated, these class-collaborationist 
worker organizations with the hope of gaining a political foothold within the workforce and 
promoting peaceful labor relations (Weber 1954: 191- 3; Ullmann 1981: 202). Sometimes, 
eligibility for occupational social benefits was made dependent on membership in the 
‘Werkverein’ of the firm. Financial support by the employer allowed the yellow unions to 
provide social benefits to their members. The yellow unions were most widespread in the 
large heavy industry firms,27 whereas for the smaller firms in the manufacturing sectors the 
tending of yellow unions was less practicable (Weber 1954: 193). Support for the yellow 
unions was in general weak among the workers. In 1913, 85 per cent of all organized workers 
belonged to one of the social democratic unions, while only 3.5 per cent belonged to yellow 
unions, the rest being Christian unions (Kocka 1984: 66) (see chart 4.1). 
Workers’ motivations for joining yellow unions were partly opportunistic. They 
expected material favors from their employer in retu n, such as occupational social benefits, 
while secretly remaining loyal to their political convictions. Evidence for this is found in the 
fact that in secret elections to appoint worker committees, yellow unions often received 
disproportionately weak results. Kocka, for instance, reports about an election at the union-
hostile heavy industry firm Krupp: ‘When in March 1917 there was a secret ballot…at Krupp, 
a center of the ‘yellow’ movement, to elect a workers’ committee, only 4,000 out of 40,000 
workers voted for the Wirtschaftsfriedlichen.’ (Kocka 1984: 72). 
Regulating firm behavior. The coordination of anti-strike actions meant a significant 
tutelage of the individual employer by its association. Associations started to regulate the 
behavior of individual firms during strikes. In order to enforce member compliance with these 
rules they could rely on the control of payments form the strike insurance schemes they 
operated. In addition, associations also imposed fines on disobedient firms, whereby members 
had to pay a deposit to ensure the enforcement of fines (Suhr 1924: 14). To give some 
examples of how associations regulated the behavior of their members: Members were urged 
                                                
26 I thank user Bob C (Canada) in the internet forum of dict.leo.org for providing highly useful suggestions for 
how to translate the term ‘wirtschaftsfriedlich’ into English. Yellow unions are known in German also as 
“wirtschaftsfriedliche’ unions or ‚Werkvereine’. Note that the German term for unions is “Gewerkschaften”, and 
not “Werkvereine”, which means that in German these organizations are not called unions at all 
27 27.8 % of all organized workers in the heavy industry belonged to yellow unions, according to Ullmann 1981: 
200. 
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or obliged to include strike clauses in their supply contracts, which liberated the supplier from 
contractual obligations in case of a strike (Kessler 1907a: 232-237; Tänzler 1929: 63).  
Also accepting ‘scrap work’ (orders a competing firm was unable to carry out due to a 
strike) was generally not permitted to member firms. In addition, the operation of strike-
breaker programmes (see above) restricted entreprenurial freedom as employers were 
obliged to temporarily hand over a number of their workers to a competitor affected by a 
strike, upon the association’s request. Coordinated lockouts meant that organized firms could 
not decide upon the usage of lockouts on their own, but had to follow the orders of their 
association instead. Often, member firms also had to relinquish the right to negotiate with 
striking workers and unions to the association, while they were, at the same time, bound to 
accept the outcome of the association’s negotiations (Leckebusch 1966: 125). In addition, in 
order to secure member solidarity during industrial conflict, firms were generally not allowed 
either to join or to leave an association during the occurrence of industrial conflict and had to 
accept notification periods of up to two years in case they intended to leave their association28 
(Suhr 1924: 14). In order for anti-strike coordinaton to be effective, employers had thus to 
give up part of their entrepreneurial freedom and adhere to collective discipline (Ullmann 
1981: 195). 
To sum up, in the 19th century German employers had developed various forms of 
coordination that were intended to repress organized labor, to prevent strikes and to defeat 
strikes. Employer associations were originally not founded for the purpose of providing an 
organizational basis for the collaboration with organized labor but for the purpose of 
excluding labor and avoiding collaboration. The majority of employer associations in the 
Wilhelmine Empire opposed collective bargaining. Some associations, though, started to 
accept collective bargaining from about 1900 on. The next section analyzes why this shift 
occurred. 
2.III Changing Employer Strategies: Centralization and Differentiation 
Between about the end of the 19th century and World War I a simultaneous process of 
centralization and differentiation of employer organiz tions took place, at the core of which 
was the formation of two separate national peak-level federations, which pursued partly 
differing strategies toward organized labor. Employer associations centralized to strengthen 
their power position vis-à-vis labor, while at the same time some associations in sectors where 
unions were particularly strong began to accommodate labor demands. 
                                                
28 The rules discussed here did, by and large, remain in place until as recently as the 1980s. During the 1990s, 
many employer associations shortened notification periods to prevent member exits. 
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The Crimmitschau strike: a catalyst for centralization 
Not only the initial formation but also this subsequ nt process of centralization of employer 
association was motivated by the intention to better confront the challenge of organized labor. 
A crucial catalyst in the centralization of German employer associations was a five-month 
strike in 1903/04 by textile workers in the town of Crimmitschau in Saxony. This strike 
escalated into a nationwide trial of strength betwen capital and labor and led to the formation 
of the first nationwide peak-level federation of employers. The declared aim of the striking 
workers was to achieve the ten-hour working day and a ten per cent wage increase. The strike 
started in August 1903 and involved 7,000 out of a tot l of 8,000 workers, either as strikers or 
as locked-out workers (Erdmann 1966b: 66; Leckebusch 1966: 49; Tänzler 1929: 13; Beutler 
1956: 31).  
This strike subsequently escalated into a nationwide confrontation between capital and 
labor, because both sides received substantial financ al support from other regions. Due to the 
protracted nature of the strike, local unions were running out of funds and appealed to unions 
in other parts of Germany for financial support. The national union organizations and the 
nationwide social democratic press (Weber 1954: 104), supported the strike . With the funds 
that they managed to collect from their allies in other parts of Germany, the Crimmitschau 
textile workers could prolong their strike. Similarly, the employers interpreted the conflict as 
a struggle over the balance of power with nationwide relevance (Schneider 1987: 220). The 
CDI saw the conflict as a fight ‘by the whole of German Social Democracy against the whole 
of the German employers about the question of power; th  question whether the employer 
should be the master in his workplace or, instead of him, the social democratic organizations’ 
(CDI circular of December 24th, 1903, quoted in Ullmann 1981: 194). 
The protracted nature of the conflict put the Crimmitschau employers in a difficult 
situation. They had to turn to the national industry federation, the CDI, for financial support. 
The request of both sides for help from other regions and national federations turned the 
conflict from a local into a national issue. Shortly after the CDI had decided to provide 
substantial financial support to the local employers in December 1903 the workers in 
Crimmitschau decided to abandon their strike unconditionally (Braun 1922: 40-41; Tänzler 
1929: 15), without having wrested any concessions from the employers. The conflict ended in 
an unconditional defeat for labor. This show of nationwide solidarity among German 
employers was a result of their perception that the Crimmitschau strike was deliberately 
orchestrated by the socialist labor movement at the national level and part of a wider national 
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struggle over political power (Tänzler 1929: 14-15). The Crimmitschau employers could win 
this conflict only with the assistance of the CDI. 
The formation of the first national employer federations 
The Crimmitschau conflict motivated the organizational centralization of German employer 
associations. The strike made German industrialists realize their organizational weakness vis-
à-vis organized labor. The Crimmitschau strike had shown to employers the increasing 
professionalization of the labor unions in coordinati g and orchestrating strike action. 
Employers came to the insight that a unified national federation was needed to counterbalance 
the strength of the already centralized labor movement.29 In January 1904, shortly after the 
end of the strike, the CDI took the initiative to establish a peak-level federation of German 
employer associations, the “Hauptstelle der Arbeitgeberverbände” (Central Office of 
Employer Associations). The declared purpose of the planned organization was to ward off 
“illegitimate union demands” and to coordinate support actions among associations during 
industrial conflicts (Kessler 1907b: 247). Equally important, on a political level, the 
centralization was also intended as a signal of flexing the muscles vis-à-vis the growing 
strength of the labor movement. The Hauptstelle declared that its formation was intended:  
…not as a challenge to the workers, exacerbating the existing opposition between 
entrepreneurs and workers, but as a defense organizatio  of the entrepreneurs who have been 
pushed into a defensive position. The Hauptstelle shall promote social peace, as long as this is 
possible, but it shall represent a sharp weapon, when t e workers deliberately disturb peace. 
Most of all, it shall be a strong bulwark against the...ever growing …claims to power of 
the...social democratic and union organizations (quoted in Tänzler 1929: 21) 
 Employers thus hoped that the new organization would re-establish the balance of 
power between capital and labor, which in their view had become tilted too much towards 
labor. The new federation was hence not merely intended to represent the interests of business 
but, more importantly, to shift the distribution of power between capital and labor and deter 
strike threats. To emphasize this point, Gustav Stresemann, the executive director of the 
Association of Saxonian Industrialists, declared in a speech in December 1904 ‘we want to 
hope that precisely because two powers now confront each other, large strikes … will rather 
be avoided than provoked.’ (quoted in Beutler 1956: 51, translated from German by TP) (see 
also Leckebusch 1966: 51). Due to internal conflicts, this plan, however, eventually resulted 
in the formation of two rival federations.  
                                                
29 Attempts to form a nationwide employer federation were made previously, for instance at the CDI’s general 
assembly in 1890, but had failed. At that time, resistance against centralization came predominantly from the 
heavy industry in the Ruhr (Weber 1954: 102), where organized labor had been weak. 
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The committee that was set up to prepare the formation of the new peak-level 
federation included not only representatives of the CDI, but also its organizational rival, the 
League of Industry (BdI), which was founded in 1895 as a secession frm the CDI. The CDI 
represented mainly the heavy industry, the BdI the smaller manufacturing industry firms 
(Ullmann 1976). The CDI’s aspiration to align the planned federation closely with its own 
organization made the BdI representatives skeptical, which feared becoming overly dependent 
on the CDI. Talks between the two groups collapsed in April 1904 and, as a result, two 
separate peak-level employer federations were formed: the “Central Office of German 
Employer Associations” (“Hauptstelle Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände”), formed by the 
CDI,30 and the “Association of German Employer Associations” (“Verein Deutscher 
Arbeitgeberverbände”), formed by the BdI (Kessler 1907b: 248). 
The formation of two rival employer federations continued the cleavage between the 
heavy industry, organized in the CDI, and the manufct ring and processing industries, 
organized in the BdI. This cleavage had emerged in the preceding decade due to conflicts over 
economic policy issues, in particular foreign trade and cartelization. The heavy industry was 
highly cartelized and sheltered by protectionism. The manufacturing industries, in contrast, 
tended towards free trade and market liberal positions. This cleavage also extended into the 
field of labor relations, as the next subsection shows. (Ullmann 1981: 198). 
Irrespective of these differences, the two federations concurred in their main political 
purpose: to fight “illegitimate union demands” and to ward off strikes. The split between 
‘Hauptstelle’ and ‘Verein’ eventually turned out as short-lived one. Given their close 
affinity in purpose and activities, the two peak-level federations started to cooperate with each 
other soon after they were founded. In April 1913, the two peak-level federations merged into 
a new peak-level federation, the “Vereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverände” 
(Confederation of German Employer Associations, VDA). The merger was intended to make 
employers more effective in their resistance to union demands and in representing employer 
interests more generally (Tänzler 1929: 37-38). Preventing and defeating strikes also 
remained the main organizational goals after the merger (Erdmann 1966b: 71). 
                                                
30 The close ties between CDI and “Head Office” are illustrated by the fact that both organizations were headed 
by the same person, Henry Axel Bueck. 
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Sectoral Differentiation: confrontation vs. negotiation 
Although the general goals of the two peak-level federations31 were almost identical, both 
wanted to fight ‘illegitimate union demands’, their st ategies differed. From around the turn of 
the century on, a sectoral differentiation of employer strategies in dealing with organized 
labor emerged. Following the abolition of the anti-socialist legislation in 1890, labor union 
strength experienced a boost during the 1890s, which led some sectors to rethink their 
relationship to organized labor. The heavy industry maintained its traditional authoritarian 
position, known as the ‘master in my own house’ position, while some other sectors re-
evaluated their situation and decided to start to negotiate with unions. These sectoral 
differences are reflected in the positions of the two peak-level federations: The Hauptstelle 
was dominated mainly by the heavy industry, while th  Verein was dominated by the 
manufacturing and processing industries, in particular by metalworking, construction and 
timber (Tänzler 1929: 16-17; Leckebusch 1966: 48-51; Ullmann 1981: 198). 
The purpose of both federations ultimately was to prevent and defeat strikes, but they 
differed in their attitude towards collective agreements. The manufacturing industries tended 
to gradually shift away from the earlier confrontational approach, while the heavy industry 
remained adamantly opposed to organized labor and collective bargaining. The CDI and 
Hauptstelle, both dominated by the heavy industry,32 were fiercely opposed to recognizing 
and negotiating with unions, while the BdI and the V rein, dominated by manufacturing 
industries and construction,33 gradually began to accept collective bargaining as, at least, one 
possible way of solving industrial conflicts. Construction, timber and metalworking were the 
main sectors that started to conclude collective agr ements already before World War I, at a 
time when there were practically no collective agreem nts in the heavy industry (Kessler 
1907a: 308-350; Ullmann 1977: 97-100) (see table 2.1). The smaller manufacturing firms 
were thus generally more prepared to recognize unions and to negotiate with them than the 
large heavy industry combines (Erdmann 1966b: 69; Schroeder 2003b: 646; Faust 1986: 94; 
Leckebusch Fn.22 on p.126 and p.129; Ullmann 1977: 1 8-191). 
Two statements made by the BdI and the CDI respectively illustrate this difference. 
The executive director of the BdI, Stresemann, declar d in a Reichstag meeting on April 12th, 
1907:  
                                                
31 The goals of the two federations are stated in their statutes, reprinted in (Leckebusch 1966: Appendix 4 and 5) 
32 Among the associations organized in the ‘Hauptstelle’ were the associations of the iron and steel industry, 
mining and the textile industry, in other words, those sectors also organized in the CDI. See (Tänzler 1929: 24) 
33 Among the associations organized in the ‘Verein’ were the associations of the metalworking industry, 
construction, timber, as well as some craft sectors. See (Tänzler 1929: 24-25) 
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I hope that these collective agreements will one day become an instrument for social peace. 
Both sides -employers and employees - should strive with all their energy to sign such 
collective agreements, wherever possible. (quoted in Büren 1934: 82-83, translated by TP). 
In contrast to Stresemann’s view stands the official position of the CDI34 
The Central Association of German Industrialists [CDI] considers ...collective wage 
agreements between employer organizations and the organizations of the workers as extremely 
hazardous for the German industry and its prosperous development. Collective wage 
agreements remove from the individual employer the ...n cessary freedom in deciding over the 
deployment of labor and over wage determination. Moreover, they bring the individual worker 
unavoidably under the control of the worker organiztion (…) collective wage agreements are 
a serious impediment to the technical and organization l progress of German industry. (CDI 
resolution May 5th, 1905 quoted in Schmelzer 1906: 19, translated form German by TP). 
With this memorandum the CDI expressed its intention  prevent the formation of 
collective agreements. The CDI was determined to avid a negotiated compromise with 
organized labor and, instead, hoped that industry would be able to prevail in an open power 
struggle with organized labor, as also the epigraph to t is chapter also shows. In the view of 
the CDI, and with it large parts of German industry, he labor unions were functioning merely 
as the economic wing of the Social Democrats and were aiming at revolutionary agitation and 
the intensification of class struggle, rather than at concrete improvements of the living 
conditions of their members. Therefore, any cooperation between employers and unions 
would be pointless. The CDI’s declared goal was to ‘force down, smash and destroy the labor 
unions’ (CDI executive director Büeck at the CDI general assembly December 1910, quoted 
in Schneider 1987: 221). The CDI’s opposition to cooperation with organized labor is also 
reflected in its opposition to worker participation in the administration of social insurance via 
independent worker committees (see chapter 3). From the point of view of the CDI, worker 
committees (Arbeiterausschüsse) undermined the authority of management within the firm 
(Ullmann 1977: 172). 
The position of the CDI rested on authoritarian andpaternalistic beliefs about the right 
methods of business administration. These beliefs, known as the ‘master-in-my-own-house’ 
position, were dominant among industrialists in the Wilhelmine Empire, most notably in the 
heavy industry. The German historian Hartmut Kaelble has called this position ‘authoritarian 
paternalism’ (autoritäter Patriarchalismus). Expressing this view, CDI executive director 
Bueck argued that ‘the worker becomes the subject of the employer with the signing of the 
work contract, he has to submit himself to the latter, he employer becomes his master, a 
                                                
34 This statement was issued in response to a decision by the Bavarian state government on March 2, 1905 to 
endorse the formation of collective wage agreements. The memorandum found wide support in the CDI general 
assembly. Only one representative, from the textiles industry, voiced objections. (Ullmann 1977: 178-9) 
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relationship that exists and is willingly accepted also in all other aspects of life.’ (Henry Axel 
Bueck, 1905. quoted in Ullmann 1977: 179). As Kaelble emphasizes the dominance of these 
authoritarian-paternalist beliefs among German industrialists destroyed the basis for any 
cross-class collaboration in Wilhelmine Germany (Kaelble 1967: 56-60).  
The first larger sectors that started to deviate from the ‘master in my own house’ 
position were construction, printing and timber35 (see table 2.1) (Kessler 1907a: 319-323; 
Ullmann 1977: 97-100). These sectors belonged to the League of Industry (BdI), which 
organized those sectors that were discontent with the CDI and its policies. In the construction 
sector the first local collective agreement was signed in 1899 (Cologne). In 1910, construction 
employers launched an initiative for a nationwide collective agreement in this sector, in 
response to a large strike of construction workers in the same year (Erdmann 1966b: 77). The 
construction sector was characterized by very small firms. Fierce price competition had put 
pressure on firms to undercut the wages paid by competitors. The construction employer 
association (‘Arbeitgeberbund für das deutsche Baugewerbe’) intended to harmonize wages 
through a nationwide collective agreement, in order to stop destructive price-cum-wage 
competition (Tänzler 1929: 59-60; see also Markovits 1986: 33).  
The problem of competition from firms paying substand rd wages affected in 
particular sectors dominated by small firms and unskilled labor. While in the heavy industry 
the challenge of price-cum-wage competition was neutralized by the formation of price cartels 
and production syndicates,36 the dominance of smaller firms in construction made the option 
of price cartels unrealistic in this sector, because compliance was difficult to control given the 
large number of competitors. Compliance with collective wage agreements, by comparison, 
appears to have been easier to control because workers and their unions could be relied upon 
to demand the compliance by the individual firm. For the construction sector, the 
harmonization of wages served thus as a functional equivalent to the formation of a prize 
cartel (Tänzler 1929: 60-61; Schönhoven 1987: 223). Employers in this sector, hence, did 
indeed see the advantages of collective agreements and used them to restrict downward wage 
and price competition.  
In general, however, collective agreements were not a widespread phenomenon in the 
period before World War I. In 1914, only about 16 per cent of all German workers were 
                                                
35 The first sector to sign a collective agreement were the typographers (1873). Their example did however 
remain without followers for more than two decades. The construction industry followed with first agreements 
signed 1899 (Berlin) and 1903/04 (Cologne). (Erdmann 1966b: 77) (Kessler 1907a: 21-22) 
36 While the price cartels and production syndicates in the heavy industry had resulted in an extent of market 
dominance that allowed these firms to coordinate eff ctively against strikes, the smaller firms predominant in 
construction and manufacturing were far more vulnerable to strikes. 
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covered by a collective agreement (see table 2.1 below). In addition to construction, collective 
agreements concentrated in the sectors of clothing, food, metalworking, printing and timber. 
As table 2.1 shows, collective agreements were almost absent in the heavy industry before 
World War I (Tänzler 1929: 71; Ullmann 1977: 97-100). Coverage by collective agreements 
also varied according to firm size. Most workers covered by collective agreements were 
employed in small- and medium sized firms (<100 workers). Larger firms were less prepared 
to subject themselves to collective agreements. In 1914, only about 14 per cent of all covered 
workers were employed in firms with more than 100 workers (see table 2.2 below). This 
reflects the opposition to collective agreements in the heavy industry and other “big industry” 
sectors (textiles, chemicals). 
Explaining sectoral differences 
Why did the initiative for collective bargaining come from the small and medium-sized firms 
in sectors like construction and not from the large firms in the heavy industry? How can these 
differences in strategy regarding organized labor be explained? The willingness of the small 
firm sectors to negotiate with organized labor and ccommodate labor demands is most likely 
the result of the fact that these firms were more vulnerable to industrial conflict. The smaller 
firms that characterized the manufacturing and processing industries were less well equipped 
to resist union demands compared to the larger firms n the heavy industry, and therefore were 
more willing to cooperate with organized labor. 
Table 2.1 Collective bargaining coverage acc. to sector (1914) 
Sector Absolute Number of workers 
covered 
Percentage of workers 
covered  
Agriculture 3 490 4.3 
Heavy industry 92 0.0 
Stone and earth industry 60 166 8.7 
Metalworking and machine 
building 
147 503 9.0 
Chemical engineering 7 154 5.3 
Textiles 10 874 1.3 
Paper 38 844 20.1 
Leather 32 254 22.8 
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Timber 163 597 31.1 
Food 108 237 14.1 
Clothing 148 857 22.9 
Construction 474 824 46.8 
Printing 88 448 52.7 
Commerce 45 165 4.5 
Transport 53 919 19.7 
Hotels and restaurants 7 600 2.6 
Music and theatre 559 0.3 
Others 4 167 5.5 
Total 1 395 723 15.8 
Sources: Tables 5 and 7 in Ullmann 1977: 225-228 . The percentage of workers covered has been calculated on 




Table 2.2 Collective bargaining coverage acc. to firm size (1914) 
Firm size (no. of 
employees) 




Percentage of all workers 
covered  
14.3 17.9 18.8 25.6 8.8 6.5 7.8 100 
Source: Table 8 in Ullmann 1977: 230. 
 
Chart 2.1 Strike success rate according to sector (1907-1914) 
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Note: share of strikes in which unions succeeded to wrest concessions from employers, 1907-1914 (Kaelble 
1967: 70, Fn119) 
 
As shown in chart 2.1 above, the ability of labor unions to wrest concessions from 
employers through strike action differed markedly across sectors. Within heavy industry, the 
unions were much weaker compared to the manufacturing and processing industries. Only 25 
per cent of all strikes in the heavy industry yielded concessions from employers. The 
existence of large cartels and production syndicates in the heavy industry allowed these firms 
to coordinate effectively against strikes, for instance by blacklisting organized workers and 
coordinating lockouts.37 In addition, the regional concentration of the heavy industry in the 
Ruhr area and the very small number of employers in this sector facilitated the coordination 
                                                
37 The coalmines in the Ruhr also formed their own employer association relatively late, in 1908. The ned for an 
own employer organization was perceived as low in this sector (Faust 1986: 94). 
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among employers, while, at the same time, made it more difficult for workers to exercise 
bargaining power by threatening to change employer. The very large firms in this sector (see 
table 2.3 below) were least vulnerable to threats from organized labor and hence were able to 
hold on to their traditional ‘master in my own house’ position more so than other sectors. Up 
to 1918, there were practically no collective agreem nts in the heavy industry. The heavy 
industry was also the sector that was able to rely most extensively on blacklisting, 
occupational social benefits and on the funding of yellow unions as measures of union 
repression (Faust 1986: 92; Ullmann 1981: 203; see also Markovits 1986: 33). 
Table 2.3 Share of very large firms according to sector 
Note: Workers employed by firms with more than 
1000 employees as a percentage of all workers 
employed in the sector. Heavy industry defined as 
mining, iron, and steel. The category metal processing 
excludes locksmiths and plumbers, NA: data not 
available 




In the manufacturing and processing industries, in co trast, the ‘master in my own 
house’ approach became less viable over time. Unions in these sectors were in general much 
stronger and the smaller firms in this sector were more vulnerable to strikes (Faust 1986: 100; 
Ullmann 1981: 203). Between 51 and 74 per cent of strikes in these sectors resulted in 
concessions by employers, as shown in chart 2.1 above. As they faced strong unions, 
employers in these sectors also had to be more prepared to negotiate with unions. They were 
more willing to accommodate labor demands because they were more dependent on the 
goodwill of organized labor. The timber industry, the sector suffering heaviest from strikes, 
was also among the first to sign collective agreements with their union counterpart. To 
SECTOR  1882 1895 1907 
Heavy Industry 34 45 53 
Stone and earth 2 3 3 
Metal processing 0.5 4 7 
Machine building 8 10 17 
Electro-technical industry NA 33 40 
Chemical industry 5 13 18 
Textiles 2 4 4 
Paper  NA 2 2 
Food 5 3 8 
Construction 1 2 2 
Printing NA 1 2 
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simplify, where unions remained weak, employers remained hostile to cooperation, where 
unions were strong, employers eventually decided to cooperate.  
 In short, the sectoral variation in the willingness of employers to negotiate with labor 
unions and conclude collective bargains before World War I was the result of sectoral 
differences in the ability to resist strikes by way of confrontation and repression. Where 
unions were weak and firm size was large, as in the heavy industry, employers could continue 
the traditional authoritarian approach to industrial elations, described in section II of this 
chapter. Where unions were growing stronger and firm size was comparatively small, the 
authoritarian approach became unsustainable and employers needed to show more flexibility 
in dealing with labor demands.38 
 A different explanation is offered by the skill formation thesis, which suggests that the 
willingness of employers to accommodate labor results from their dependence on workers 
with specific skills. Collective wage agreements offer income security and, hence, result in a 
protection of skill investments (Estévez-Abe et al. 2001: 180-181; Cusack et al. 2007: 388). 
Unfortunately precise and reliable statistical data on sectoral skill structure are not available 
for that period. We have to rely on general knowledge on the skill profiles of different sectors 
instead. In general, the heavy industry relied mainly on unskilled labor, while the 
manufacturing industries tended to rely more on skilled labor. This fact provides some 
plausibility to the skill formation thesis, as the avy industry (coal mines, iron and steel) was 
the sector most hostile to collective bargaining. However, the two largest sectors concluding 
collective bargains already before World War I, construction and timber, were also relying 
mainly on unskilled labor. Both sectors were suffering from widespread strike action during 
that time (see above) and were unable to coordinate effectively against strikes due to small 
firm size and intense competition in these sectors. In these sectors, employers needed to be 
flexible in dealing with organized labor and gradually turned to collective bargaining as an 
alternative to repression and authoritarianism. 
 Conclusions  
Employer associations are today an organizational pillar of coordinated capitalism in 
Germany. This chapter has analyzed the historical origins of employer coordination. What 
                                                
38 Swenson 1989: 41 provides another alternative explanation, which centres on the extent of exposure to 
international competition. According to his explanation, sectors highly vulnerable to international competition 
were more open to collective wage bargaining compared to sheltered sectors. This explanation is disconfirmed 
by the fact that, since 1879, the heavy industry was shielded from international competition by protective tariffs. 
Protectionism did not prevent the heavy industry from opposing collective bargaining. 
 72 
motivated firms to form employer associations? Why did firms perceive a need to represent 
their labor market interests collectively? The chapter has shown that confronting organized 
labor more effectively was the main motivation for the formation of employer associations in 
the Wilhelmine Empire. The formation of employer associations was, first and foremost, 
intended to prevent and defeat strikes and to repress the labor movement with various 
measures, rather than at forming an organizational basis for the cooperation with labor. 
German industrialists considered the labor unions ad social democracy as revolutionary 
threats to the established political-economic order. A ‘master in my own house’ approach to 
labor relations dominated German industry. Coordinated lockouts, strike breaker programmes, 
blacklisting of striking workers, anti-strike funds, the funding of house-broken ‘yellow 
unions’ and occupational social benefits were characte istic measures of employer 
associations and individual employers to defeat strikes and destroy organized labor.  
 In their confrontationist approach to organized labor German industrialists during that 
time could count on the state as their firm ally. The anti-socialist laws had assisted 
industrialists to keep the socialist labor movement in check. The abolition of these laws in 
1890 had required employers to rely increasingly on their own organizational capacities to 
confront the socialist labor movement. The formative period of German employer 
associations was the period following the abolition f the anti-socialist laws, a period 
characterized also by growing union strength. The historical formation of employer 
associations was a response to a political challenge, the rising labor movement, rather than the 
result of any objective economic necessity for organiz tion. Also the centralization of 
employers’ organizational structure was intended to improve their effectiveness in countering 
the labor challenge. 
 The chapter has shown that the vast majority of employer associations in the 
Wilhelmine Empire refused to recognize unions or to negotiate with them. They intended to 
destroy the labor movement, not to integrate it by institutionalized cooperation. Only from 
about the turn of the century onwards did some sectors start to conclude collective 
agreements, most notably construction and timber. In contrast, the leading heavy industry 
sector remained adamantly opposed to any form of coperation or bargaining with unions 
until World War I. Based on sectoral comparison, the chapter has demonstrated that the 
variation in the willingness of German employers to conclude collective agreements is most 
likely the result of sectoral differences in union strength. The smaller firms in the 
manufacturing sectors were more vulnerable to strikes than the larger firms in the heavy 
industry and thus were unable to afford the authoriarian approach to labor relations pursued 
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by the heavy industrialists. They needed to take a more flexible approach and try to 
accommodate labor demands. The origins of employer associations and collective bargaining 
are thus closely linked to union strength. 
 Few things about the historical evolution of industrial relations in Germany are as 
puzzling as the enormous change that they have gone through since the beginning of 
industrialization. Today, German employers prefer strong unions, which are able to enforce 
collective agreements and industrial peace. German employers do, in principle, endorse social 
partnership and social compromise. Employers did, however, not pursue this strategy from the 
very beginning. Originally, employers were highly reluctant to accommodate labor. The shift 
from confrontation to accommodation occurred only gradually over time. Accommodation 
occurred as the result of a series of political struggles that took place at critical junctures in 
German history against a background of far-reaching changes in the political and economic 
context. These struggles and changes are analyzed throughout this thesis, in particular in the 




Defeating the socialist labor movement was a goal German industrialists shared with 
the Bismarckian government and state elite. Rather an relying on repressive measures 
exclusively, social policy was instrumentalized forthis goal as well. During the 1880s, the 
German Empire had introduced public social insurance programmes to protect workers 
against the risks of work injury, sickness, old age, and disability. The German heavy industry 
and the CDI had broadly supported these plans and, in the case of work injury insurance, even 
acted as an active promoter of a public policy soluti n. As this chapter has shown the heavy 
industry was the sector most resolutely determined to estroy the socialist labor movement. 
The next chapter will look at the involvement of German industry in Bismarck’s social 
insurance reforms.  
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3 Bismarck’s Social Reforms: German Employers and Social Pacification 
 
With the Bismarckian social reforms in the 1880s, Germany had become the first country in 
the world to introduce a public system of social insurance. By and large, these reforms were 
supported or accepted by the leading interest associations of German industry. Looking back, 
Henry Axel Bueck, the executive director of the immensely powerful Central Association of 
German Industry (CDI), had praised these reforms ‘as a work of civilization of the highest 
order, which, as a model for all times, will bring [the Empire] honor for good’ (Bueck 1905a: 
792). Why did the powerful heavy industrialists organized in the CDI decide to back social 
reform? As we have seen in the previous chapter the CDI adamantly refused to cooperate or 
negotiate with organized labor and considered the ideas of social democracy as an eminent 
threat to industry and its interests. The CDI’s motivation was thus not to forge an alliance 
with the organizations of the labor movement. Why did the CDI thus decide to support a 
policy that apparently aided the economic independence of the working class?39 
 To answer this question will not only allow us to understand the role industry has 
played in the formation of the German welfare state but will also contribute to our 
understanding of the more general question of what s pes the positions that industry takes in 
politics. The conventional labor mobilization approach attributes the formation and expansion 
of the welfare state to a decline in capitalist power. According to this view, employers have 
been compelled by the strength of the labor movement to accept the welfare state. In contrast, 
the cross class coalition approach attributes the formation and expansion of the welfare state 
to the structural power of employers, who perceived the welfare state as being in their own 
economic interest. The analysis in this chapter theefore pays particular attention to the 
importance of economic self-interests and coercion by political constraints. 
 After presenting the political context and the goals of the government (section I), the 
chapter analyzes the positions of industrial employers concerning the three social insurance 
programmes, whereby the analysis focuses on the programme of work injury insurance (II), 
because this is the programme that industry was most interested in. Industry paid somewhat 
                                                
39 Note on sources: This section uses archival documents contained in a multi-volume collection of primary 
sources published by the Historical Commission of the German Academy of Science in Mainz (Ayass et al. 
1998, 2001; Ayass et al. 2003; Tennstedt et al. 1995). 
 I also draw on the PhD thesis by Monika Breger on the role of industry in the design of Bismarck’s social 
policy, (Breger 1994, 1982), the PhD thesis by Heinrich Büren (Büren 1934) and the work of Hans-Peter 
Ullmann, (Ullmann 1979). For the analysis of intra-business differences I draw on a report by the Royal Prussian 
Statistical Office, (Francke 1881). 
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less attention to the issues of health insurance and disability and old-age pensions (III). After 
evaluating the relevance of intra-business differences (IV), the chapter finally discusses the 
main motivation of industry for supporting the introduction of social insurance (V). 
3.I Social Insurance as Social Pacification: The Main Actors and their Goals 
The origins of the German welfare state are to be found in the response by the conservative 
state elites to the challenges created by the so-called ‘social question’ (‘soziale Frage’). The 
so-called ‘social question’ stands for the concern by the government and economic elites 
about how to pacify the politically radicalized working class and how to secure the political 
stability of the authoritarian political regime. The founding of the German nation state in 1871 
was initially followed by a short economic boom, but was followed by a severe international 
economic recession that started in1873 and led to falling world market prices for German 
products and soaring unemployment in Germany40 (Kitchen 1978: 139f.). The crisis had 
raised the anxiety of the political and economic elte about the revolutionary potential of the 
increasingly discontent and radicalized working class (Ritter 1983: 9). The Paris Commune 
1871, the short-lived revolutionary municipal government of Paris, had further contributed to 
the anxiety of the government and economic elites about a potential spill-over of the 
revolutionary moment to Germany.  
In this context, Bismarck responded with a political strategy that became known as 
innere Reichsgründung,41 or, the domestic political consolidation of the Empire. This strategy 
resembled a Machiavellian approach of securing the political loyalty of important social 
groups by handing out concessions, while at the same ti e repressing political opponents. 
The introduction of social insurance, like many other of Bismarck’s policy decisions, was less 
motivated by a commitment to deal with specific policy problems, but by the expectation that 
the reform would shore up popular support for the Empire. The introduction of social 
insurance was an integral part of a ‘double strategy’, a strategy of divide and conquer, or of 
“carrots and sticks” (Ritter 1983: 28-29). 
The suppression of the socialist labor movement through anti-socialist legislation was 
the other part of the strategy. As mentioned in chapter 2, these laws were introduced in 1878 
with the support of  most of the Conservative and National Liberal deputies in the Reichstag 
and banned the organizations of social democracy of all political activities. These laws were 
passed in response to an assassination attempt on the Emperor, for which the government put 
                                                
40 The depression was triggered off in the USA by a stock market crash and bankruptcies in the railway sector 
(Kitchen 1978: 139ff) 
41 The term ‘innere Reichsgründung’ was coined by the German historian Böhme (Böhme 1971). 
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the blame on the social democrats. The laws were abolished in 1890, because of their 
perceived ineffectiveness in weakening the social democrats. Following their abolition, the 
parliamentary strength of the Social Democrats soared (see table 3.1 below). 
Table 3.1 Distribution of Reichstag seats in the German Empire (1871-1918) in percent  
Party groups/ 
Election 
1871 1874 1877 1878 1881 1884 1887 1890 1893 1898 1903 1907 1912 
Conservative 
Parties 
24.6 13.8 19.7 29.3 19.7 26.7 30.5 23.4 25.2 19.9 18.9 21.1 14.3 
National Liberals 
and smaller right-
wing liberal lists 
40.6 39.8 35.5 27.4 11.9 12.8 24.9 10.6 13.4 11.6 12.8 13.6 11.3 
Liberal Union 
(centrist) 
0 0 0 0 11.6 0 0 0 3.3 3 2.3 3.5 0 
Left-wing liberals  12.3 12.6 9.8 7.3 17.4 18.7 8.1 19.1 8.8 9.3 6.8 8.9 10.6 
Centre Party 
(Catholic) 




0.5 2.3 3 2.3 3 6 2.8 8.8 11.1 14.1 20.4 10.8 27.7 
Others 5.5 7.6 8.6 10.2 11.3 10.9 9.2 11.4 14.3 16.5 13.7 15.7 13.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Legend: Conservative Parties: German Conservative Party + German Reichspartei. Right-wing liberals: National 
liberals+ Liberal Reichspartei, Left-wing liberals: German Progress Party + German People’s Party 
Source Wikipedia http: //de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reichstagswahl 
 
 The introduction of ‘worker insurance’ was the ‘carrot part’ of Bismarck’s strategy. A 
speech delivered by the Emperor Wilhelm I on Novembr 17th, 1881, the so-called ‘Imperial 
Message’, announced the government’s plans for the in roduction of social insurance: 
…the healing of the social damage cannot be achieved xclusively by way of repression of the 
social democratic riots, but equally needs to involve the positive promotion of the welfare of the 
worker (Imperial Message, 1881 November 17th Ayass et al. 2003: Document No. 9, 61-64). 
Bismarck himself expressed the objectives of his social policy plans in a similar way:  
If there would be no Social Democrats, and if not so many would be afraid of them, then not 
even the moderate progress that we have made so farin social reform would exist (Bismarck in 
a speech to the Reichstag, 1884 November 26th, quoted in Hentschel 1983: 9).  
The genesis of the welfare state in Germany was not the result of a political project 
pursued by organized labor or social democrats, but, to the contrary, a part of a conservative, 
authoritarian project to keep the social democrats away from power. Social insurance was the 
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project of the governing state elite aimed at consolidating its hold to power. German Social 
Democracy at that time was orthodox Marxist in its ideological orientation and aimed at 
overthrowing the capitalist order through a socialist revolution (Berman 2006: 35-36). The 
government offered material benefits to the working class in order to keep it away from 
political power. In the absence of a radical socialist movement the introduction of social 
insurance at that time would most likely not have happened. The growing strength of the 
socialist labor movement and its orthodox Marxist orientation were the ultimate motivation 
for the government to seek the introduction of social insurance. In the absence of a radical 
socialist labor movement, an authoritarian political regime would have been unlikely to 
embrace the welfare of workers. In addition to this, intellectual input coming from bourgeois 
social reformers had a remarkable influence on the thinking of the state bureaucracy. 
The role of the ‘bourgeois social reformers’ 
The so-called ‘bourgeois social reformers’ served as a catalyst for the genesis of social policy 
in Germany. They functioned as intellectual agenda-setters. The bourgeois social reform 
movement consisted of academics, economists, journalists as well as some renegade 
industrialists. The goal of the movement was to find a solution to the ‘social question’, that is, 
of how to conciliate and pacify the working class. These so-called ‘socialists of the chair’ 
(‘Kathedersozialisten’), had a particularly strong impact on the thinking of government 
officials and industrial elites. They sensitized the latter groups towards social problems and 
often proposed very elaborate and detailed policy solutions. Their activities consisted of 
problem-oriented studies, lectures, speeches, publications, and educational activities. The 
bourgeois social reformers rejected the economic laissez faire liberalism of the Manchester 
School. They advocated state-interventionism to secure the loyalty of the working class to the 
political regime. They also advocated the introduction of social insurance, worker protection 
laws and worker participation in economic affairs through works councils and corporatist 
institutions. Finally, they influenced the genesis of social policy, first, by permanently 
confronting the political and business elites with social problems and, secondly, by providing 
detailed policy proposals that state officials could draw upon (Plessen 1975 presents a 
detailed analysis of the political impact of the social reformers).  
The movement found its first expression in 1844 with the foundation of the ‘Central 
Association for the Welfare of the Working Classes’ (‘Central-Verein für das Wohl der 
arbeitenden Klassen’). The association was made up of senior state officials and business 
people and aimed at improving the living conditions of workers. The association made 
remarkable proposals concerning labor relations, which were in strong contrast to the ‘master-
 
79 
in-my-own-house’ attitude prevailing among German industrialists at that time. The group 
demanded equal representation of workers and employers in the business chambers and 
business courts. To avoid arbitrary decisions by employers, it demanded that employers be 
obliged to draft shop rules detailing, inter alia, dismissal protection and working time 
regulations. In general, employers responded to these proposals with hostility. In 1849, the 
government rejected a detailed draft law for shop rules presented by the association, with the 
argument that this would violate entrepreneurial prerogatives and that these issues should be 
left to the individual employer to decide (Leckebusch 1966: 19-20). 
The most influential organization of the movement was the ‘Association for Social 
Policy’ (‘Verein für Socialpolitik’), founded in 1872 by a group of influential political 
economists42 with the purpose of contributing to ‘the enlightenment of the public opinion in 
favor of a social reform’ (Schönberg 1886: 23). Among its members were also senior 
government officials, politicians from bourgeois parties, journalists and industrialists. The 
association pursued its goals by organizing political debates and conferences, carrying out 
problem-centred policy analysis and disseminating its studies and policy proposals through 
writings and lectures. The group’s protagonists criticized the individualizing tendencies of 
industrial capitalism as well as laissez-faire liberalism and advocated state interventions to 
solve the ‘social question’. ‘The deep cleavage that runs through our society’ declared 
Professor Schmoller, one of the original members of the association in his inaugural address 
in October 1872:  
the struggle which today separates entrepreneur and worker, the classes which have and those 
which have not, the possible threat of a…looming social revolution, have….created doubts, 
whether the prevalent economic doctrine will maintain its dominance,…History teaches us that 
all higher cultures… have collapsed because of… social class struggles and revolutions, their 
incapacity to find a reconciliation between the upper and the lower classes …The ideal should 
be nothing less than to allow an ever larger part of our people to participate in all higher goods 
of culture, education and prosperity (inaugural address by Schmoller at the ‘Eisenach 
conference’, October 8th, 1872, quoted in Erdmann 1966b: 61-62) 
The bourgeois social reformers have contributed substantially to the genesis of the 
German welfare state. Many of its protagonists enjoyed good contacts with the state 
bureaucracy and confronted state officials and industrialists with social problems and reform 
proposals. They offered an intellectual blueprint for a reformist solution to the ‘social 
question.’ It is notable how many of the proposals that first emerged among the social 
reformers were really implemented in Germany later on: social insurance for workers, worker 
                                                
42 Among the founding members were the university professors Brentano, Schmoller, Schönberg, Wagner, Sombart 
and Weber (Leckebusch 1966: 21-22). 
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protection laws and institutions for the participaton of the working class in economic 
decision-making, in particular through works councils (Parnell 1994: 158 re social insurance 
and 206-207 re works councils; see also Plessen 1975). 
Despite their apparent impact on policy making, the social reformers did in general not 
stand in high esteem, neither with industrialists nor with the socialist labor movement. For 
different reasons, both kept a sharp eye over the bourgeois social reformers. Industrialists 
appear to have been generally uneasy about the reform proposals. In general, the social reform 
proposals were perceived by industry as being somewhat unrealistic and as too much of a 
burden to firms. The executive director of the CDI, Henry Axel Bueck, remarked in 1906 that 
‘every industrialist will think twice about hiring a young graduate who enjoyed his social 
policy education at the Berlin Business School under Professor Sombart’ (quoted in Kessler 
1907a: 43, translated from German by TP. Sombart was one of the original members of the 
Verein für Socialpolitik). The social democrats were equally critical of the social reformers. 
They accused the social reformers of being submissive to the interests of the existing political 
regime and defending ‘capitalist class rule’. Not wi hout any reason, the Social Democrats 
perceived the social reform movement as an attempt to pacify the working class and to 
consolidate the capitalist economic order (Osthold 1934: 13-14).  
The role of social democracy  
The socialist labor movement refused to cooperate in he social insurance project because they 
sensed the ulterior motives behind it. Der Sozialdemokrat, he SPD’s official organ,43 reported 
in November 1881 that two party leaders had been appro ched by conservative politicians 
offering the following bargain: If the social democrats would accept to support social 
insurance reforms, these parliamentarians would vote in favor of abolishing the anti-socialist 
legislation and would call on their party colleagues to vote for the social democrats in some 
constituencies in Berlin. The social democrats reject d the offer (Der Sozialdemokrat No.48, 
1881, November 24th, Document No. 21 in Ayass et al. 2003: 85-88). The social democrats 
were not in principle opposed to social protection, though, and had at other occasions already 
demanded worker insurance. They perceived the government’s social policy plans as an 
attempt to placate the working class and to avert more far-reaching reforms. In the same 
article in Der Sozialdemokrat this position was justified as follows:  
May our persecution be increased tenfold, we will never give our approval to such ‘reforms.’ 
Under no circumstances will we relinquish the right of he people to work and to exist, the right 
                                                
43 “Der Sozialdemokrat. Zentralorgan der deutschen Sozialdemokratie” was the official organ of the German Social 
Democrats. It was published in Zurich to circumvent the anti-socialist legislation. Since 1881, its chief editor was 
Eduard Bernstein (Ayass et al. 2003: 85, Fn1).  
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and the obligation of the people to achieve its demands, if necessary through violence, for the 
lentil dish of a work injury and disability insurance of most dubious value. This is the proud 
answer of Social Democracy to the Imperial Message. (Der Sozialdemokrat, No.48, 1881 
November 24th, reprinted as document no. 21 in Ayass et al. 2003: here 88, translated by TP).  
Similarly, the SPD party congress in Copenhagen44 1883 declared that it considered the 
‘so-called social reforms’ a red herring that would be ‘used only as a tactic tool, to distract the 
workers from the true path’ (resolution of the Congress of the German Social Democractic 
Party in Copenhagen, 1883 April 1st, reprinted as document No. 34 in Ayass et al. 2003: 
127). Social democracy did thus not support Bismarck’s plans and did not participate in the 
drafting of the legislation. 
The role of industrial employers 
Industry did not initiate the social insurance refoms, but went along with the government’s 
plans primarily because it acknowledged the need to pacify the working class. Politically, 
industrial employers were affiliated with the conservative parties and the National Liberal 
Party (see table 3.2 below), whereby a split developed between the dominant heavy industry 
and the small, but growing, manufacturing industrie. The heavy industrialists, like the 
agrarian industrialists, aligned themselves with the two conservative parties (Reichspartei & 
Conservative Party). They viewed the labor movement as a revolutionary threat and rejected 
any cooperation with its representatives. The manufact ring industries aligned themselves 
with the National Liberal Party and, facing strong unions in their sectors, were more open 
towards labor demands, as shown in chapter 2 (see al o K elble 1967: 109-11). 
Both groups did, in principle, support Bismarck’s social reform project, though the 
heavy industry took a much more active role in the reform process (Ullmann 1979: 588-90). 
With the CDI, the heavy industry had a powerful political organ and enjoyed privileged 
access to Bismarck. Its strong antipathy against the social democratic labor movement 
provided it with a particular interest in the suppression of the latter. The attention of the heavy 
industry focused in particular on the issue of work injury insurance, which the heavy industry 
actively promoted, while the programmes for health, disability and old-age insurance received 
far less attention from the heavy industry, as well as other sectors (Breger 1994: 38).  
   
                                                
44 To circumvent the anti-socialist legislation the Congress had to be held abroad. 
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Table 3.2 Industry representatives in the German Reichstag (1890-1918) 








Conservatives 358 28 7.8 
Dt. Reichspartei (German 
Imperial Party) 
130 32 24.6 
Centre 600 37 6.1 
National Liberals 291 94 32.3 
Left-wing Liberals 300 43 14.3 
Social Democrats 369 10 2.7 
Note: data aggregated over the 8th to 13th legislative period ,excludes smaller parties. Source: Jaeger 1967: 51, 
Table 3 and table 6, own calculations  
 
What motivated industrial employers to endorse Bismarck’s social legislation? Were 
employers’ intentions identical to those of the government or did employers support the 
government’s plans for different reasons? What were the demands articulated by employers? 
Did the reforms live up to industry’s expectations? How widespread was support for social 
insurance within industry? The following two sections analyze in detail the intentions of 
industry, the goals industry intended to achieve, and what kind of social policy industry 
wanted. Section II deals with the case of work injury insurance, the programme that industry 
had paid the greatest attention to. Section III deals with the programmes of health, disability 
and old-age insurance, while section IV discusses th  relevance of intra-business differences. 
3.II Employers’ Support for Work Injury Insurance 
The attention of industry centered primarily on theissue of work injury insurance. The CDI 
and the associations representing heavy industry45 upported the introduction of a public work 
injury insurance with compulsory coverage for all workers. Industry was one of the agenda-
setters on the issue of work injury insurance, which contrasts with the comparatively passive 
role of industry on other social policy reforms. A draft bill developed by a group of heavy 
industrialists led by Louis Baare substantially influenced the government’s own draft bill 
(Breger 1994). The case of work injury insurance is one of the extremely rare cases where 
                                                
45 The associations representing the heavy industry were in particular the Association of German Iron and Steel 
Industrialists (VDESI) and the so-called Langnam-Verein. 
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industry actively advocated the introduction of a new public social policy, rather than merely 
consenting to an initiative of other actors (s.a. Mres 2003a: 259). 
  The exceptional position of work injury insurance justifies the analysis of the 
introduction of this policy in more detail. In order to understand the reasons for the 
exceptionally active role of business it is essential to look at the policy alternatives that were 
on the agenda and how they would have affected industry. The policy status quo and the 
policy choices promoted by other actors are the altrnatives that industry compared the 
introduction of work injury insurance to. To understand what business expected to gain from 
work injury insurance it is important to know what it was thereby trying to overcome or to 
prevent. 
Industrial employers supported work injury insurance as a lesser evil to the pre-
existing employers’ liability legislation, which had contributed to the aggravation of class 
conflicts. The compensation of workers for work injuries was regulated in the Employers’ 
Liability Law enacted in 1871 (RGBl 1871: 207). This law made the employer personally 
liable for all work injuries caused due to his negligence. To gain an entitlement for 
compensation, workers needed to go to court. They needed to file a lawsuit against their 
employer. The onus of proof was in principal on the worker.46 In practice only about 20 to 25 
per cent47 of all work injuries were compensated. The law was generally considered as 
insufficient for protecting workers and the majority of injured workers continued to depend 
on municipal poor relief (Breger 1982: 80). 
Industry viewed employers’ liability rules as costly and as causing an aggravation of 
class conflicts. Many employers had taken out private policies to insure against the costs of 
compensation payments. More importantly, the confrontation of employers and workers in 
court had contributed to an unwelcome aggravation of class antagonisms within firms and had 
provided the labor unions with opportunities for mobilization.48 Employers thought that the 
Employers’ Liability Law unjustly turned work injuries into an offence committed by the 
employer, while in reality most work injuries would be caused by unforeseeable events or 
force majeure, and were thus without anybodies fault (Breger 1994: 26-28). Indeed, as work 
                                                
46 With the exception of the railway sector, where the burden of proof was on the employer 
47 The chamber of commerce in Dortmund reported a compensation rate of 25 per cent, in (Francke 1881): 404. 
(Breger 1994)reports a compensation rate of about 20 per cent. Also (Ritter 1983): 31 estimates that about 20 per cent 
of all work injuries registered were compensated. (Tennstedt 1981): 175 notes that about 10 to 40 per cent of all 
accidents were covered, though the actual compensatio  r te was lower due to bankruptcies of firms.  
48 See, for instance, reports by the chambers of commerce in Osnabrück and Dortmund (Francke 1881): 401 and 404 
and the protocol of the conference in Bochum, November 2nd/3rd, 1880, where German industrialists discussed a 
proposal for work injury insurance (Baare 1880). See also petition of the chamber of Commerce Essen to the 
Reichstag, April 19th, 1881, analyzed in (Breger 1982): 83. 
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injuries are hardly ever caused by intention, the proof of fault turned out to be very difficult in 
practice, as the low compensation rate shows.  
 Two basic options for reforming liability legislation were on the agenda: (a) the 
compensation of injuries by a compulsory public insurance programme, or (b) a tightening of 
employers’ liability obligations combined with stricter regulations for worker protection. For 
employers, work injury insurance provided an attracive alternative to a tightening of liability 
legislation. The introduction of work injury insurance effectively eliminated the obligations 
that liability legislation imposed on employers. More ver, shifting the responsibility for 
compensation from the individual employer to a public insurance programme meant that the 
meaning of work injuries would also change, from something akin to an offence committed 
by the individual employer, to a general risk, a risk that the state had to take care of (Breger 
1994: 43-44). Work injury insurance allowed industry o pass on the responsibility for 
compensating work injuries to the public and at thesame time promised to reduce class 
conflicts within the firm. In particular the heavy industry, where the risk of work injuries was 
particularly high, hoped to reduce the cost burden of compensating work injuries by shifting 
costs to a broader risk pool that also included other industries with a lower risk. The perceived 
shortcomings of employers’ liability legislation were the main reason for industry to 
collaborate with the government to introduce a new programme of work injury insurance 
(Breger 1982: 83). 
 The policy alternative on the agenda was a policy programme of so-called ‘worker 
protection,’ which involved the tightening of employers’ liability rules. This policy 
programme was advocated by the social democrats, the labor unions and the bourgeois social 
reformers, and was supported by some senior government officials. A tightening of liability 
rules had been debated in the parliament. Worker protection appeared thus as a politically 
viable alternative. The worker protection programme ant state legislation aimed at 
protecting workers from work-related risks. In addition to the tightening of employers’ 
liability rules, the programme included also proposals for the prescription of preventive 
measures, state factory surveyors, working time regulations and special rules protecting 
women and young workers. Employers wanted to avoid w rker protection legislation and, in 
particular, strengthened liability rules (Berlepsch 1994). 
 Neither the social democrats nor the bourgeois social reformers perceived worker 
protection as an alternative to social insurance. Instead, they favored a combination of both. 
In a parliamentary motion of February 1879, the social democrats demanded a public work 
injury insurance with compulsory coverage as a comple ent to a strengthened Employers’ 
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Liability Law to make sure workers would actually receive compensation (Seeber and Fesser 
1994: 97-99). Still, the social democrats and the labor unions focused their demands on 
worker protection. The SPD had already introduced a motion for a new worker protection law 
in the Reichstag in April 1877. The motion included a maximum working day of 10 hours for 
men and 8 hours for women and young workers, a ban on work during night time and on 
Sundays (with exceptions), a ban on child labor, a ban for women to work underground and 
on construction sites, as well as dismissal protection rules (Berlepsch 1994; Seeber and Fesser 
1994: 93). 
 At about the same time, senior state officials hadalso drafted a law strengthening 
worker protection, but Bismarck dismissed this proposal as being ruinous for industry, and 
shelved the draft. Worker protection and employers’ liability rules would poison the relations 
between the two sides of industry, Bismarck believed, and would offer the unions the 
opportunity to play the role of workers’ champions (Hennock 2007: 89). The draft law did 
thus not make it to the parliament for debate. Instead, Bismarck turned his attention to social 
insurance as a way of undermining support for the Social Democrats (Berlepsch 1994: 67). 
This was welcomed by the heavy industry, as it offered a way for averting the looming 
tightening of the 1871 Employers’ Liability Law. 
 A crucial part of Bismarck’s strategy for building up loyalty to the political regime 
was to pacify major social groups by offering concessions to them, expecting political support 
in return. Political turmoil should be forestalled at any cost. Employers’ liability legislation 
and worker protection were intricate issues in thisrespect, as they required the Chancellor to 
make a decision that might satisfy one group, while at the same time upsetting the other. A 
public work injury insurance offered a way out of this dilemma for Bismarck, because it was 
a solution that promised to be acceptable to both sides.49  
 The idea of work injury insurance was not the brainch ld of Bismarck, however. The 
idea of establishing work injury insurance with compulsory coverage had several origins. In 
1879, the opposition social democrats had demanded such a programme, as mentioned above 
(Seeber and Fesser 1994: 97-99). At about the same time, the chamber of commerce in 
                                                
49 In August 1879, Bismarck presented his ideas for public insurance programmes in a circular to the 
governments of the federal states. In addition to work injury insurance, he also proposed public schemes for life 
insurance, fire insurance, hailstorm insurance and cattle insurance, all on the basis of provision by state 
monopolies 49 (Ritter 1983: 43). The exclusion of commercial providers from these areas of business was 
intended to crowd out the private insurance sector49 (Ritter 1983: 44). The choice of risks shows that t e public 
insurance project was initially not exclusively directed at industry and labor, but in particular also at agriculture, 
because Bismarck, who was an aristocratic estate own r, also wanted to consolidate the alliance with agriculture, 
established by the turn to protectionism in 1879. 
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Dortmund, a city in the heartland of Germany’s heavy industry, had written to the Prussian 
Minister of Economics, Maybach, to demand the introduction of municipal work injury 
insurance programmes (Breger 1994: 25-26). Within te government, Theodor Lohmann, the 
senior state official in charge of social policy issues, was working on a draft for an 
amendment of the 1871 Employers’ Liability Law that would have included legislative 
incentives for voluntary private insurance50 (Hennock 2007: 99).  
The heavy industry as agenda-setter 
Lohmann’s proposal was however rejected by Bismarck. Instead, he mandated the heavy 
industrialist Louis Baare to draft a bill for public work injury insurance. Baare was director 
general of a large coal and steel combine in the Ruhr (‘Bochumer Verein’) and president of 
the chamber of commerce in Bochum. Already in April that year, Baare had presented a 
memorandum on the work injury issue to the national Minister of Economics, Hofmann, 
which the latter brought to Bismarck’s attention. I this memorandum Baare proposed the 
repeal of the 1871 Employers’ Liability Law and replace it with an insurance programme. 
Baare proposed the establishment of compulsory insura ce funds, financed with contributions 
from both workers and employers (Hennock 2007: 88; Breger 1994: 26).  
 Like other heavy industrialists, Baare was highly critical of the 1871 law because the 
law provided a source of ongoing confrontation and conflict between employers and workers. 
He expected that if industry accepted work injury insurance, this would help to get rid of the 
disliked liability rules: “If we are ready to make sacrifices now, we will sustain the support of 
the Reich government in the fight against an extension of the Employers’ Liability Law” he 
told his fellow industrialists (Baare 1880). Baare made clear that for industry work injury 
insurance was the lesser evil compared to a tightened liability legislation. He reminded his 
fellow industrialists:  
not to set the benefits of the insurance in a too narrow-minded way, as otherwise the tightening 
of employers’ liability is definitely to be expected. If the industry is prepared to make sacrifices 
now, it will secure the goodwill of the government i  the fight against the extension of the 
Employers’ Liability Law (quoted from Breger 1994: 53, translated from German by TP). 
 Together with a small group of other representatives of the heavy industry, Baare 
drafted a proposal for a work injury insurance scheme. This proposal was intended as an 
alternative to a tightening of employers’ liability legislation. To explore the extent of support 
for his plan within broader circles of industry, Baare organized a conference in Bochum on 
November 2nd/3rd, 1880. This meeting was attended by about 30 repres ntatives, many of 
                                                
50 Employers would be freed from their liability if they provided an insurance for their workers 
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them from heavy industry and other “big industry” sectors. The Baare proposal received 
strong support at this meeting (Baare 1880; see also Bacmeister 1937: 225). Anecdotal 
evidence for the strong support for Baare’s proposal is lso provided by the fact that after 
having learned about Bismarck’s decision to mandate B are with drafting a proposal, the CDI 
wired a message to the Chancellor congratulating him to this decision (Breger 1994: 26). 
At about the same time, senior officials in the Ministry of Economics were also 
working on a draft for work injury insurance (Hennock 2007: 96). The ministry draft, together 
with the one by the Baare group, formed the basis for the bill that Bismarck presented to the 
Reichstag in January 1881 (Breger 1982: 82; 1994: 27). This first bill was rejected by the 
Reichstag, though, and needed to be revised twice by the government before parliament 
accepted work injury insurance in 1884. The issues debated by the Reichstag focused on the 
financing and the administrative organization of work injury insurance, as well as the role of 
worker representatives in the administration of the programme. Once the draft moved to the 
parliamentary arena, the industrialists had little control over the policy-making process 
(Hennock 2007: 99). 
 Despite the subsequent changes to the bill made in the Reichstag, the contribution of 
heavy industry on the work injury insurance law was considerable.51 In alliance with 
government, heavy industry had set the course for the introduction of work injury insurance 
and against a tightening of employers’ liability legislation. Getting rid of employers’ liability 
legislation and its deteriorating effects on labor relations was the main reason why industry 
had supported work injury insurance (Baare 1880).  
Industry’s work injury insurance proposal  
The bill drafted by Baare and his collaborators contained the following elements:  
• compulsory coverage for all workers, covering large segments of the economy, also 
agriculture; with opt-out possibilities for firms that are participating in occupational 
                                                
51 The following paragraphs analyze the main concerns of industry regarding the design of the work injury law. The 
main archival sources used are the protocol of the Bochum conference (Baare 1880), an abridged version of which is 
reprinted in (Breger 1994: 48-60), which provides highly valuable insights into the deliberations among German 
industrialists; a survey of the positions on work injury insurance conducted by the Royal Prussian Statistical Office 
among 61 regional chambers of commerce (Francke 1881); and documents from the collection of archival sources 
published by the Historical Commission of the German Academy of Science mentioned above, especially (Ayass et al. 
2003). 
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liability insurance schemes.52 No voluntary opting-in for groups not covered, in order 
to avoid an overloading with bad risks (adverse selction problems). 
• Financing by contributions from employers (50 per cent), workers (25 per cent) and 
municipal subsidies (25 per cent). It was argued that e municipalities would benefit 
from work injury insurance because of a reduction of the burden on municipal poor 
relief, and they were therefore called upon to subsidize the insurance. Workers should 
also contribute to make sure they had a stake in the efficient administration of the 
scheme, so the official justification (Breger 1994: 29-30). Financing should take place 
on a pay-as-you-go basis, which involves less start-up costs as compared to pre-
funding. 
• Administration by an Imperial Insurance Board (‘Reichsversicherungsamt’) with the 
participation of employer and worker representatives. A centralized nationwide 
organization by the state was considered as cheaper nd more effective than a 
decentralized organization through private insurance firms or liability insurance 
associations (see also resolution by the CDI general assembly, 1882, September 18th, 
Document No.33 in Ayass et al. 2003: 125; see also Breger 1994: 31). 
• Benefits should be as low as possible and be subject to ceilings. Where feasible, the 
proposal preferred discretionary clauses instead of efinite benefit entitlements. The 
first four weeks should be covered by the health insurance funds. Only from the 5th 
week on would benefits be covered by the work injury insurance scheme. This shifted 
a significant part of the costs to the health insurance funds, which were in general 
financed to two thirds by the worker and one-third by the employer. This was 
motivated by the intention to reduce the cost burden on work injury insurance, but was 
also defended on the grounds that the health insurace funds would be better suited to 
identify benefit abuse.  
• Public insurance should remain limited to the risk of work injury. No introduction of 
compulsory old-age or disability pension programmes. This would be too expensive 
and promote malingering and benefit abuse (Baare 1880).  
A law was passed by parliament on June 27th, 1884, which established a public work 
injury insurance programme with compulsory coverage. The programme was to be 
                                                
52 In the coal industry self-organized insurance associati ns existed already for a long time in the form of the 
Knappschaften. The Knappschaften were employer-sponsored occupational insurance associations for coal miners, 
providing compensation for sickness and disability, (Parnell 1994: 15-19). They have served as a precedent for the so-
called Berufsgenossenschaften [occupational insurance ssociations]. 
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administrated by occupational liability insurance associations, the so-called 
Berufsgenossenschaften. These insurance associations had to be set up collectively by the 
employers on a sectoral basis. They had to collect con ribution fees from member firms and 
pay out benefits. The Reichstag, thus, opted for corporatist self-administration instead of 
direct state administration, as originally proposed by the Baare group. Moreover, the law 
obliged employers to finance work injury insurance alone. The law stipulated that the 
programme has to be financed exclusively by contributions from employers. Industry had 
demanded additional contributions from workers and state subsidies, instead (Breger 1982: 
101-103). In return, however, the health insurance period was eventually extended to 13 
weeks, instead of 4 weeks. Despite these deviations from its original proposal, industry 
accepted the law. Industry hoped that the new law would lead to an improvement of labor 
relations, promote industrial peace and help to suppress organized labor (Breger 1982: 86-87). 
To summarize, leading heavy industrialists had played a significant role in the 
introduction of work injury insurance in Germany. Heavy industry was one of the actors that 
have brought the issue of work injury compensation onto the political agenda. Indeed, work 
injury insurance is one of the very few cases where industry had actively promoted a new 
social policy, instead of merely responding to the initiatives of other actors.53 By putting 
forward their own proposal they expected to be able to prevent a tightening of liability 
legislation. The initiative by the heavy industrialists had contributed to the introduction of 
work injury insurance, but it appears unlikely that in the absence of the threat of tightened 
liability legislation and the aggravation of class conflicts these industrialists would have 
supported work injury insurance. It was not alone th  high risk of work injuries in this sector 
that led the heavy industry to support work injury insurance, but the way pre-existing 
institutions had turned this risk into a source of class conflict. 
The ‘Berufsgenossenschaften’: industry against corporatism 
Heavy industry had originally been skeptical about the corporatist form of insurance 
organization.54 The Baare bill had proposed administration by a centralized state agency with 
the participation of employer representatives. Industry considered this form to be the cheapest 
                                                
53 The historian E.P. Hennock has argued that the claim ‘that heavy industry was shaping the provisions of 
the legislation are not borne out by the … Baare correspondence. It was certainly intended to work in the interest 
of industrial employers, but their wishes were far from paramount’ (Hennock 2007: 96). Hennock is right that 
the final bill passed by parliament deviated in important ways from the preferences of the heavy industry, as 
shown above, but the proposal presented by the Baare group has certainly influenced the government’s draft bill. 
54 In contrast, the chemical industry had supported th Berufsgenossenschaften (Breger 1982: 112). 
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and most effective form of administration (Bueck 1905a: 208). In the end, industry accepted 
that work injury insurance would be administrated by so-called Berufsgenossenschaften, 
employer-organized liability insurance associations (Breger 1994: 35; Ullmann 1979: 599-
600). In September 1882, the CDI declared to accept this form of organization in order not to 
jeopardize the passing of the bill: 55 
The delegates [of the CDI general assembly] still consider that the work injury insurance is 
best implemented through an Imperial Agency (‘Reichsanstalt’), as originally planned….In the 
interest of the success of the law they do however not object to the corporative organization. 
(resolution by the CDI general assembly on September 18th, 1882, Document No. 33 in Ayass 
et al. 2003: 125). 
The initiative for a corporatist organization came from Bismarck and his advisers 
(Hennock 2007: 99). The replacement of the planned Imperial Insurance Board by 
Berufsgenossenschaften had helped the government to gain the support of the catholic Center 
Party for the bill. This party was pivotal for forming a majority in favor of the law. In 
principle, the Center Party supported the law, but it was opposed to centralized state 
administration and demanded more decentralization instead (Ritter 1983: 48-49).  
More generally, Bismarck intended the corporatist Berufsgenossenschaften to become a 
model for the organization and representation of economic interests within the state 
(Abelshauser 1984: 292-293). They should either co-exist, or even replace, the national 
parliament, the Reichstag, as the legislature. The reason for this was that Bismarck considered 
parliamentary democracy as an unreliable source of political legitimacy and was planning to 
set up corporatist institutions as an alternative to representative democracy (Ritter 1983: 44). 
In October 1883, Lohmann, the top state official in charge of social policy, reported about a 
meeting with Bismarck:  
The work injury insurance is secondary for him. Of primary importance for him is through this 
opportunity to achieve corporate associations, which, in the course of time, have to be created 
for all productive social classes, so that one attains the foundations for a future popular 
representation, which will become an important co-determining factor in legislation, either 
instead of, or in addition to the Reichstag, even, if the worst comes to the worst, through a coup 
d’état. (Bismarck to Lohmann on October 5th, 1883, according to Lohmann’s recollection, 
quoted in Ritter 1983: 44) . 
Industry’s opposition to worker committees 
The main point of controversy surrounding the organiz tion of work injury insurance 
concerned the issue of ‘worker committees’ (“Arbeiterausschüsse”). Industry could 
successfully prevent the formation of worker committees (Breger 1982: 117-123; 1994: 36-
                                                
55 This analysis does therefore not confirm the finding by Mares that large industrial firms have preferred 
corporatist administration to state administration (Mares 2003a: 83-84). 
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37; Ullmann 1979: 600). The arguments used by industry in this controversy provide us with 
important insights regarding the attitude of industry towards the participation of labor in 
social policy governance. The worker committees were included neither in the Baare bill nor 
in the first government bill. They were introduced only by the second government bill. Each 
Berufsgenossenschaft should have its own worker committee to represent the interests of the 
workers (Breger 1994: 36). Due to the opposition from industry they were again eliminated 
from the final bill (Breger 1982: 117-120). The position of industry was, in short, the 
following: The participation of worker representatives in the joint administrative committees 
was accepted, but independent worker committees were rejected (Bueck 1905a: 258).  
 This position was motivated by fears about an intensification of class conflicts and a 
strengthening of the socialist labor movement through worker committees. The participation 
of worker representatives in the administrative committees was seen as necessary to ensure 
the collaboration of the workers. Giving workers a role in administration was thought to be 
essential to avoid benefit abuse and to ensure a prudent and efficient use of the insurance 
funds (see, for instance, the report by the chamber of commerce in Osnabrück in: Francke 
1881: 401; resolution by the CDI general assembly, 1882 September 18th, document no.33 in 
Ayass et al. 2003: 125-126; see also Breger 1994: 36). In contrast, separate worker 
committees were suspected of becoming hotbeds for social democratic agitation and 
mobilization and of undermining the authority of the employer (Bueck 1905a: 268-269; 
Breger 1994: 36; Vogel 1951: 42-43). As a result, class antagonisms would intensify, instead 
of diminishing (Bueck 1905a: 267-268). In the larger administrative committees, in contrast, 
the employer side would have a majority of votes and the worker representatives could be 
integrated more effectively. The goals of diminishing class conflict and suppressing the 
socialist labor movement are thus also reflected in the disputes over the organization of social 
insurance. 
3.III Employers’ Positions on Health and Pension Insurance 
Bismarck continued his strategy of pacifying the working class with plans for health 
insurance and disability and old-age pensions. Industry was more reluctant to support these 
two programmes, compared to work injury insurance, but nevertheless decided to go along 
with Bismarck’s plans. The general motivations for support however had been similar. 
Industry endorsed health and pension insurance as a s crifice necessary to pacify the working 
class and suppress social democracy, rather than becaus  it thought that these programmes 
would be in its economic interest. 
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Public health insurance: crowding out union funds 
Like work injury insurance, the introduction of health insurance was a rather uncontroversial 
issue and was in principle supported by industry. On June 15th, 1883 the national parliament 
passed a law introducing public health insurance for all workers. Workers had to pay two 
thirds of the contributions, employers had to pay the remaining third (Breger 1982: 54-56). 
Industry supported compulsory coverage for all workers as necessary to avoid adverse 
selection problems (Bueck 1905a: 195). Also the co-financing by employers was accepted by 
industry. Industry pushed for benefit levels to be low, not only to keep the cost burden low, 
but also to avoid malingering (Breger 1982: 61). 
The main issue of conflict concerned the integration f the union-sponsored 
‘assistance funds’ (‘freie Hilfskassen’) into the system of public health insurance. These funds 
were part of the highly fragmented system of health insurance provisions that had emerged in 
Germany since the 1850s. Company health insurance funds co-existed with municipal, guild, 
parish and union-run assistance funds, as well as the so-called Knappschaften, the 
occupational insurance funds for miners. Some of these insurance funds were based on 
voluntary, others on compulsory coverage. Some were local, others regional and others again 
nationwide. A law passed in 1876 (‘Hilfkassengesetz’) attempted to harmonize the existing 
system by regulating the benefit levels and contribu ion rates of the union-sponsored 
Hilfskassen (Breger 1982: 54). This attempt failed because many Hilfskassen decided not to 
register for certification according to the new law nd preferred to operate as so-called ‘wild 
funds’ instead, in order to avoid state regulation (Ullmann 1979: 578-579). The 1883 law 
maintained the fragmented organization of health insurance by mandating the existing 
insurance funds with administrating public health insurance (Ullmann 1979: 581). In short, 
the 1883 law harmonized coverage, financing and benefit rules, but kept the organizational 
basis of health insurance unchanged. 
The unions used their Hilfskassen as a vehicle for mobilization. The Hilfskassen were 
able to offer comparatively generous benefits by declining to accept older workers and were 
very popular among workers. Employers did not contribu e to the financing of these funds 
and had no say in their administration. Ideologically, the Hilfskassen were motivated by the 
idea of ‘worker independence’, i.e., the idea that, as long as a socialist state was out of reach, 
the working class should take charge of its needs itself, without any state interference, in 
order to avoid any dependence on the bourgeois state. After the passing of the anti-socialist 
legislation in 1878, which banned the Social Democrati  Party from any form of political 
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agitation, the Hilfskassen became an increasingly important organizational vehicl  for the 
socialist labor movement (Seeber and Fesser 1994: 101-105). 
Industry strongly opposed the Hilfskassen because it saw them as a ‘hotbed for social 
democratic agitation and organization’ (Bueck 1905a: 474). With the plan to introduce a 
system of public health insurance the question arose whether the Hilfskassen would be 
integrated into the new public system; that is, whether workers insured by the Hilfskassen 
would fulfill the criteria of compulsory coverage. Industry opposed this. Industry wanted that 
workers insured by one of the Hilfskassen would still be obliged to join a company health 
insurance fund (Bueck 1905a: 197-201). Industry did however not prevail on this point as the 
government gave in to demands to integrate the Hilfskassen (Breger 1982: 71). 
The fact that industry had opposed the Hilfskassen indicates that the pacifying aspect 
of social insurance mattered much more to industry than the cost aspect. Employers opposed 
the Hilfskassen, despite the fact that they did not need to pay any contributions to them, like 
they had to do for the other types of insurance funds. Some organizations even called upon 
their members not to take advantage of cost savings by insuring their workers with the 
Hilfskassen (Breger 1982: 72). For employers, the cost advantages did not outweigh the 
political disadvantages of the union-run insurance funds. They were willing to accept a rise in 
labor costs in order to undermine the labor union movement. 
The Hilfskassen provided the Social Democrats with an organizationl vehicle for 
agitation and mobilization and thus threatened to contribute to the strengthening of their 
influence within the working class. The aim of the social insurance reforms was however the 
exact opposite: to fight the social democrats by pacifying the working class. The opposition of 
industry to the Hilfskassen reveals what motivated industry to support social insurance. The 
working class should receive social protection, butno  political influence. The goal of 
industry and government was to suppress social democracy by pacifying the working class 
and thereby neutralizing the class antagonism that fuelled the growth of the social democrats 
and organized labor. The Hilfskassen were an obstacle to this goal and therefore industry 
wanted to crowd them out. 
Disability and old-age pensions insurance 
Pension insurance for disability and old age was the last of the three social insurance schemes 
introduced during the 1880s. The conservative heavy industrialist Stumm had proposed a 
mandatory public pension insurance already in 1878, but at that time failed to gain 
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Bismarck’s support (Vogel 1951: 38-39). Three years l ter, the Imperial Message declared the 
government’s intention to establish a public pensio system (see above). In November 1887, 
the government presented an outline for the planned pension system. One year later, in 
November 1888, the government presented a bill for a disability and old-age pension law to 
the parliament. In May 1889, the law was passed by the national parliament (Hennock 2007: 
184-187). This law introduced pension insurance benefits for disabled persons and persons 
above the age of 70. The scheme was pre-funded and financed by contributions from 
employers and workers in equal shares, plus state subsidies. Regional insurance agencies were 
in charge of administrating the scheme (Hennock 2007: 187-197). 
Industry generally reacted with hesitation to the government’s plans for public pension 
insurance. The CDI and other leading industry associati ns declared ‘not to oppose’ and to 
‘sympathize’ with the introduction of a public pension system, but at the same time thought 
that the timing for its introduction would be premature, given that industry had just accepted 
to shoulder the costs of work injury and health insurance (Breger 1982: 133-134; Bueck 
1905a: 324). According to industry, the introduction f pension insurance should be ‘put off 
as long as feasible’ (Langnam-Verein in 1889, quoted in Breger 1982: 133). Despite this 
reluctance to support pension insurance, the CDI declared itself ‘ready to cooperate with the 
government in order to create a law that is in linewith …the requirements of the real life’ 
(Bueck 1905a: 324). Despite the existence of some res rvations, industry thus decided to 
cooperate with government in order to secure some influence over the outcome.  
The reluctance of industry to support disability and old-age insurance was due to several 
reasons. First, the perception had arisen within industry that the construction of social 
insurance was progressing too fast nd would result in prohibitive levels of labor costs. 
Second, industry suspected that public pensions would undermine work incentives and 
encourage work shirking. Disability pensions would be prone to abuse by workers because the 
fact of work disability would be difficult to check (Breger 1982: 133ff). According to Henry 
Axel Bueck, the leading spokesperson of the heavy industry, the provision of a generous 
public pension would cause many capable workers to leave the labor market and thereby 
reduce the labor supply: ‘My experience is that…if a worker, under the pretence of physical 
disability, declares not to be able to work, nothing on earth can prove that he would still be 
able to do so’. Furthermore, Bueck elaborated that 
If the state would promise every worker from the outset a pension for disability and old age as 
a legal entitlement, this would diminish the sense of individual self-reliance, and this would be 
the greatest damage that we could do to our society…I have said…“to be poor must never stop 
being a misfortune” This may sound very harsh, very heartless, but simply remove the 
perspective that presents misery, deprivation and poverty as a consequence of carelessness, 
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indolence, idleness and dissoluteness, and at the sam moment a large share of the poor will 
stop to make an effort, which today, with all their nergy and most of them with success, 
endeavor to avert this sad fate (annual report by Henry Axel Bueck to the 11th general 
assembly of the Langnam-Verein, 1881, November 29th, document no. 23 in Ayass et al. 
2003: 97, translated from German by TP) 
 Third, industry had also gained the impression that its strategy of influencing social 
policies by cooperating with government did not show the expected results. Already in the 
parliamentary debates over the 1883 health insurance law, the CDI had realized that many of 
industry’s concerns had been ignored, such as its opposition to union-run insurance funds 
(speech by Bueck at the CDI general assembly in Stuttgart on September 15th, 1883, see 
Bueck 1905a: 239-240). Moreover, Bueck indicated that t e efforts to pacify the working 
class through social benefits may be a case of forlorn hope. There was no evidence that the 
social reforms so far would have weakened social democracy. In the future, industry would 
need to be more cautious in supporting the government’s social policy plans (Bueck 1905a: 
240-241). The strategy of influence by cooperation was not as successful as industry had 
expected. Despite these objections, industry did continue to endorse Bismarck’s goal of 
pacifying the working class. Industry could not deny that a public pension system was in 
principle an appropriate tool to achieve this goal and thus eventually decided also to accept 
pension insurance. 
In the policy-making process industry focused its efforts on two goals: to keep pension 
benefits as low as possible and to influence the administrative organization of pension 
insurance. The government had planed to mandate the corporatist Berufsgenossenschaften 
with the administration of pension insurance. The CDI had consented to this form of 
organization in the case of work injury insurance, but had in the meantime become more 
hostile to the Berufsgenossenschaften (Bueck 1905a: 432). The reason for this change was 
that the Berufsgenossenschaften had in the meantime developed into an organizationl rival to 
the CDI. Up to the 1880s, the CDI had been the unchallenged political voice of German 
industry, despite the fact that it was far from representative of the overall economy and was 
dominated by the heavy industry. This threatened to change in 1887, when the 
Berufsgenossenschaften decided to form their own national federation with the ambition of 
developing from mere insurance associations into a political interest group for business 
(Ullmann 1979: 605-607; Breger 1994: 46; Hennock 2007: 189).  
Being based on compulsory membership, the Berufsgenossenschaften were much 
more representative of German business as a whole compared to the CDI, which relied on 
voluntary membership. The Berufsgenossenschaften thus had the potential of becoming an 
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organizational competitor to the CDI as the dominant political interest group of German 
business. The resistance of the CDI was decisive in making the government abandon its plans 
to extend the Berufsgenossenschaften to old-age and disability pensions. The result was a 
state-based organization, relying on regional insurance agencies, instead of corporatist 
insurance associations (Hennock 2007: 189). In short, by cooperating with the government, 
industry did manage to prevent a corporatist organization of pension insurance. 
3.IV Intra-Business Differences on Social Insurance 
The active role played by prominent heavy industrialists in the introduction of work injury 
insurance and the endorsement of the social insurance reforms by the CDI and other leading 
industry associations suggests that German employers had predominantly supported the 
introduction of social insurance. CDI executive director Bueck claimed in retrospect that 
German industry had belonged to the ‘most effective promoters’ of the introduction of social 
insurance (Bueck 1905a: 792). Some scholars have argued that German industry had been 
internally split on the issue of social insurance. The German historian Hans-Peter Ullmann 
argues that large groups among German employers had been opposed to the introduction of 
social insurance. According to Ullmann, a small but politically powerful group of employers, 
the big industrialists organized in the CDI, supported social insurance, but other groups of 
employers had opposed social insurance. These dissenting groups were less well organized 
and therefore lacked the clout to shape the reform utcome. According to Ullmann, 
opposition to social insurance came inter alia from exporting manufacturing firms and 
employers with a politically liberal orientation (1979: in particular 592-594; see also Vogel 
1951: 43-44)  
 Also Isabella Mares argues that employers had been int rnally split regarding the 
introduction of work injury insurance. According toMares, work injury insurance ‘was the 
desirable outcome for large, manufacturing employers and primarily for producers in 
industries characterized by a high incidence of workplace accidents. Not all employers, 
however, supported these radical reforms’ (Mares 2003a: 76). In contrast, Monika Breger56 
finds that German employers supported the social insurance reforms at large: ‘The conclusion 
of this study, that industrial employers had supported the social legislation, does indeed hold 
for them as a whole’ (Breger 1982: 223, translated by TP). In a similar way, also Büren57 
found that the vast majority of German industrialists had supported the introduction of social 
                                                
56 Monika Breger is a German historian, who wrote her PhD thesis about the positions of industrial employers in 
Germany regarding the state’s social policy reforms between 1878 – 1891 (Breger 1982). 
57 Herbert Büren wrote a PhD thesis on the attitude of German employers towards social policy issues. 
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insurance (Büren 1934: 54). This divergence in findings suggests that a closer look at the 
extent of support for Bismarck’s social reforms among German industrialists is needed. To 
what extent did the support for social insurance articulated by the CDI and leading 
associations of the heavy industry represent the positions of German business at large? Did 
German business stand united behind Bismarck’s goal of pacifying the working class? 
 The most comprehensive source concerning intra-busines  differences on positions 
regarding social insurance issues available58 is a survey conducted by the Royal Prussian 
Statistical Office among 61 regional chambers of commerce concerning their attitude towards 
work injury insurance (Francke 1881). This survey allows a basic quantification of business 
support for social insurance, even though the survey is limited to the programme of work 
injury insurance. The results of the survey59 show that slightly more than one half of the 
chambers supported work injury insurance. About onefourth of the chambers would have 
preferred a reform of liability legislation instead of work injury insurance (see table 3.3 
below). The results also show that the support was motivated by the goal of overcoming the 
Employers’ Liability Law.60 
 
Table 3.3 Business Positions on Work Injury Insurance 
Position taken Percentage 
Chambers considering the 1881 draft for a Work Injury Insurance Law to 
be in general a substantial improvement compared to the 1871 
Employers’ Liability Law 
53 % 
Chambers not considering the 1881 draft for a Work Injury Insurance 
Law to constitute a substantial improvement compared to the 1871 
Employers’ Liability Law 
39 % 
Chambers preferring a reform and extension of the Employers’ Liability 
Law to a legal regulation of work injury insurance 
26 % 
Chambers in favor of private work injury insurance associations (either 
instead of or in addition to a state agency) 
34% 
                                                
58 Unfortunately a quantification of the positions of employers regarding the other programmes is not possible 
within this thesis. Moreover, none of the scholars referred to above has carried out such a quantification.  
59 This is a source that is also used by Mares (2003a: 71 nd 76), as well as by Ullmann (Ullmann 1979: Fn43). 
60 It should be noted that not all chambers took a position on this issue. 53 chambers did not take a position and are not 
included in this survey Francke 1881: 397 
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Chambers rejecting state subsidies to work injury insurance and, at the 
same time, advocating worker contributions to it. 
38 % 
Source: Francke 1881: 397-398  
 The survey shows that business was indeed split about the advantages of work injury 
insurance. Far from all chambers endorsed Baare’s daft for work injury insurance. A small 
majority of the chambers had supported compulsory work injury insurance. Support for work 
injury insurance went far beyond high risk sectors, such as the heavy industry, though61. 
Ullmann estimates that during the 1880s the CDI represented about 2 per cent of all German 
firms, employing about one third of all workers.62 (1979: 594 and Fn.47). These firms were 
primarily in the heavy industry and in textiles. While the CDI represented the interests of big 
industry, the chambers tended to represent the interests of smaller and medium-sized firms. 
As the chambers relied on compulsory membership for all firms in a region, their positions 
were more representative of the views of the busines  community at large than the positions 
of the CDI. The fact that also a majority of the chambers supported the plans for work injury 
insurance indicates that support for social insurance had not been limited to the high-risk 
heavy industry, but instead included also large segments of the rest of industry.63 
 Intra-business differences about social insurance remained latent and did not lead to 
the formation of sectoral cross-class alliances. The absence of such alliances is also to be 
expected given that the differences did not concern so much the introduction of social 
insurance as such, but concerned largely details of the planned social insurance legislation, 
such as the financing and the administrative organization of the planned insurance institutions 
(Breger 1982: 227-238). These differences were thussecondary in importance and did not 
affect industry’s general agreement with the governme t’s plans to pacify the working class. 
Industry’s support for social insurance was voiced primarily by the CDI, the peak-level 
                                                
61 The sectors with the highest incidence of deadly work accidents were railways (597 deadly accidents per 
100,000 workers), mining (261) and steel production (160) Heavy industry, together with railways, were thus the 
sectors with the highest risk incidence. However, support for work injury insurance came also from sectors with 
a very low risk incidence, such as the textiles andcotton industry, a sector that was also organized within the 
CDI. In textiles/leather the risk incidence was 18 deadly accidents per 100,000 workers (data on risk incidence 
taken from Mares 2003a: 72). 
62 see also (Bueck 1905a: Vol.2, 259f, ) who claims that e CDI represented firms employing about two thirds of all 
German workers 
63 In order to know whether positions towards work injury insurance were actually shaped by firm size and/or 
risk incidence it would be necessary to correlate the positions of the individual chambers with the structure of the 
economy in their region. Unfortunately the survey by the Royal Prussian Statistical Office does not include any 
data about the structure of the German economy at that time. To conduct such an analysis, these data would need 
to be collected separately. To carry out such a systematic comparison of the various chamber positions is 
therefore not possible in this chapter, neither is it available in the existing literature. Despite this desideratum, we 
can definitely say that a substantial part of German business did in principle support the introduction of work 
injury insurance.  
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federation of industrial employers. Despite its lack of representativeness, the CDI acted in 
effect as the unrivalled political voice of German industry during that time.64 The CDI had the 
ear of the government and managed to influence social legislation in important respects. 
Differences between the CDI and smaller associations remained latent because the shared 
goal of crushing the socialist labor movement led the different segments of industry to 
sideline internal differences regarding details of p licy design. 
3.V Why did German Industry Support Social Insurance? 
Containing the rising labor movement was the main reason that motivated German employers 
to support Bismarck’s social insurance plans. Industry backed a strategy of labor pacification 
developed by the government, because it perceived its interests to be closely tied to the 
existing political regime. Industry perceived the capitalist order and the protection of its 
master-in-my-own-house attitude to labor relations to be closely tied to the consolidation of 
the authoritarian political regime of Bismarck. The social democrats were aiming at the 
political rule of the working class and the overthrow of capitalism. Industry perceived social 
insurance as a sacrifice that was necessary and appropriate to defeat this challenge: ‘The best 
way for weakening the power of the social democrats is to fulfil that part of their demands 
that every philanthropist has to accept as legitimate’ (Oechelhaeuser 1889: 109) (s.a. decision 
by the CDI general assembly in Dresden, September 26th, 1881, document no.33, Fn4. in 
Ayass et al. 2003: 125). Industry realised that it could only achieve this aim: 
if the manifest grievances are corrected, which provide the social democrats with opportunities 
to persuade also the quiet elements of the worker population of the abjection of the existing 
and thereby to win them over for their revolutionary plans (Fritz Kalle, chemical industry 
association and Mittelrheinischer Fabrikantenverein, 1883, quoted in Breger 1982: 87). 
 The heavy industry spearheaded business support for he introduction of social 
insurance (Breger 1982: 15). This is noteworthy as heavy industry was the sector most hostile 
to organized labor, as we have seen in chapter 2. It refused to recognize labor unions and any 
form of bargaining (see Chapter 2) and was politicaly conservative, forming, together with 
the landed aristocracy, the backbone of support for he authoritarian political regime. Heavy 
industry was, however, not adverse to state interventions as long as they served its interest. 
Indeed, it had been the driving force behind the turn o protectionism in 1879. In contrast, the 
manufacturing industries had been politically more lib ral and in favor of free trade (Kaelble 
                                                
64 Supporting the finding by Ullmann, also Hennock stre ses the lack of representativeness of the CDI: ‘Exactly 
because it was a voluntary association, the CDI was far from representative of German industry. It represented a 
minority able to exercise the influence of wealth and power. But it came to be regarded in government circles as 
the representative of wealth and power.’ (Hennock 2007: 190, italics in original). 
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1967: 109-111). The manufacturing industries also abandoned their opposition to labor unions 
much earlier than did heavy industry, as we have seen in chapter 2. By and large, the support 
of the manufacturing industries for the introduction f social insurance was more low-profile 
compared to that of the heavy industry (Breger 1982: 223-238). This apparent paradox 
between anti-unionism and pro-welfarism is solved once we recognize that industry supported 
social insurance as a weapon for defending the traditional authorities within firms as well as 
within the state.  
 The importance of the social democratic challenge for compelling industrial employers 
to endorse the introduction of social insurance becomes even clearer when we conduct the 
following counterfactual thought experiment: Would employers have supported the 
introduction of public social insurance also in the absence of a politically radical social 
democracy? We can answer this question in the affirmat ve only if we can find plausible 
theoretical reasons for arguing that employers have an conomic self-interest in public social 
insurance, an interest independent of the existence of the socialist challenge. In the absence of 
a radical socialist labor movement, a hypothetical business initiative for social insurance 
would need to rely entirely on economic interests in ocial insurance. 
 Such an economic self-interest may be theoretically derived from the dependence of 
firms on a cooperative and skilled workforce. The provision of social protection may, for 
instance, help firms to improve worker loyalty and work motivation or encourage them to 
invest in skills. To satisfy these objective interests, employers are however not bound to rely 
on the state. They can in principle also try to achieve these goals through other means, in 
particular by providing occupational social benefits on their own. This is also what many 
large German firms had already been doing in the lat  19th century. Already before the 
introduction of social insurance in the 1880s, many large firms had developed their own 
company welfare programmes, among them the industriali s Borsig, Krupp, Siemens and 
Stumm (Vogel 1951: 35; re. Siemens see also Burhenne 1932). These programmes were 
influenced by pre-industrial, feudal ideas of patriarchal welfare. They were motivated by a 
combination of sense of social responsibility and employer interests in a loyal and productive 
workforce (Breger 1982: 245-247; Vogel 1951: 36-37). As noted by Kocka, big industry 
firms had developed: 
indirect techniques of integration and discipline which had enabled [them] to avoid direct 
confrontations with labor. Through company pension fu ds, bonuses, works’ magazines, 
anniversary celebrations, lectures and other welfare benefits, employers had tried to generate 
employee loyalty and dependence and in this way reduc  the opportunities for trade union 
influence (Kocka 1984: 71). 
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 Employers also provided these occupational social benefits also because they were 
expected to tie workers to the firm. Firm-sponsored occupational benefits were expected to 
strengthen workers’ loyalty to their employer by evoking among workers a sense of gratitude 
to their employer. Workers would come to see their employer as a benevolent person and thus 
become more inclined to abandon their socialist loyalties. Industrialists considered as 
important “to keep awake the worker’s feeling of dependence (‘Anhänglichkeit’) on his 
employer; to get across to the worker that there is a certain identity of interests, that the 
employer does not stop to consider the care for the worker as being his obligation” (CDI 
representative Jencke in March 1889, quoted in Breger 1982: 137). Industry thus understood 
occupational social benefits as an important instrument for creating worker loyalty and for 
undermining the support for the socialist labor movement among their own workforce. 
 Firm-sponsored occupational social benefits are an alternative form of social 
pacification. The potential of firm-sponsored benefits to create worker loyalty is however 
undermined by public social policies, because the latt r reduces the workers’ dependence on 
benefits from the employer. Many employers in the 1880s have been well aware of this. They 
accepted that public social insurance was necessary to pacify the working class, but were at 
the same time concerned that this would weaken the dep ndence of the individual worker on 
his employer. Public social insurance would make workers grateful to the state, and not to the 
employer (annual reports by the chambers of commerce in Osnabrück and Essen, cited in 
Breger 1994: 42; 1982: 136-139; Ullmann 1979: 587). From the employer’s point of view, the 
character of public social insurance was thus, in other words, dialectic. Fears about the 
crowding out of company pension schemes also contribute to an explanation of the reluctance 
of industry to endorse pension insurance (Breger 1982: 136-137; Ullmann 1979: 586; Vogel 
1951: 45). In short, the formation of the welfare state undermined employers’ ability to tie 
their workforce to their firm by crowding out firm-sponsored occupational benefits. Why did 
industry allow this to happen? 
 The presence of the social democratic challenge, however, compelled industry to 
accept a transfer of social protection from the firm to the state. Industry perceived the survival 
of capitalist entrepreneurship to be closely tied to the survival of the authoritarian political 
regime. In their orthodox Marxist orientation the social democrats constituted a fundamental 
challenge to the industrialists. To ward off this challenge industry needed to accept that in the 
future the state would be likely to reap the rewards of worker loyalty, rather than industry 
itself. In the absence of a radical socialist labor m vement firm-sponsored occupational social 
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benefits would have provided a superior way for industry to create worker loyalty and 
motivation. To conclude this counterfactual argument, in the absence of the social democratic 
challenge, German industry would very likely have pr ferred to serve its need for a loyal and 
productive workforce with occupational welfare. It would therefore have been unlikely to 
support state institutions of social protection, which tends to crowd out occupational welfare. 
The challenge posed by the socialist labor movement however compelled industry to accept 
the transfer of social protection provisions to the state as a lesser evil. 
Conclusions 
Bismarck’s social insurance reforms provide a clear case of politics of pacification. While 
today social insurance is often understood as an accomplishment of the labor movement, 
German social reformers at that time intended social insurance as a weapon against the labor 
movement. Social reformers intended the social insurance reforms as a tool for the 
pacification of the working class and the stabilisation of the existing political-economic order. 
The introduction of social insurance was the product of a political alliance between the 
authoritarian government of Bismarck and powerful groups of industrialists. Both actors 
understood social insurance as a tool to contain the growth of the labor movement. The 
working class was offered social protection in order to prevent it from claiming political 
power. 
 Industrialists supported the formation of the Bismarckian welfare state in order to 
pacify the working class and contain the rise of social democracy, and not because they 
wanted to design a policy framework conducive to labor productivity and economic 
efficiency. Political interests trumped economic interests. A genuine belief that the rise of 
social democracy needed to be stopped combined with strategic considerations to convince 
the leading industry associations to cooperate withthe government in the drafting of the social 
insurance legislation. These industrialists supported social insurance because they expected 
social protection to be an effective way of pacifying and appeasing the politically discontent 
working class. Support for social insurance was particularly strong in the heavy industry, 
which was the sector most hostile to labor unions ad social democracy. In addition, the 
heavy industry, where the risk of work injuries was high, also had a particularly strong 
interest in eliminating conflicts over work injuries that resulted from the existing liability 
legislation, which were grist to the labor unions’ mills. Work injury insurance offered a 
convenient way for removing the notoriously contentious questions of work injury 
compensation from the sphere of labor relations by moving responsibility to the state instead. 
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 In addition, strategic considerations also played an important role. By offering its 
cooperation and support, industry expected to be abl  to influence important details of the 
proposed legislation and sustain the goodwill of Bismarck towards industry’s interests. 
Moreover, the introduction of protectionist tariffs in 1979 had eased competitive pressures on 
German industry, reducing the salience of the labor cost issue. In the policy-making process, 
the focus of industry was on keeping benefit levels as low as possible, forestalling 
opportunities for benefit abuse and restricting the institutional opportunities for mobilization 
by organized labor (Breger 1994: 43-47). In short, industry’s support for social insurance was 
motivated by a combination of genuine preferences (pacification) and strategic considerations 
(influence). 
 The expectations of industry had only partly been fulfilled. Neither had industry’s 
demands been fully accepted nor had the expected reconciliation of the working class 
occurred. First, despite its willing cooperation with the government, not all of industry’s 
demands were implemented, as CDI executive director Bueck had complained (Bueck 1905a: 
432-3). Industry managed to limit the influence of worker representatives in insurance 
administration by preventing independent worker committees (Arbeiterausschüsse), but did 
not manage to prevent the integration of the union-run health insurance funds (freie 
Hilfskassen) into public health insurance. More importantly, ‘the goal to conciliate the masses 
has not been achieved’ as Bueck pointed out with disappointment (Bueck 1905a: 792). 
Electoral support for the social democrats soared after the abolition of the anti-socialist 
legislation in 1890 (see table 3.1 above). Consequently, from the 1890s onwards, industry 
became increasingly more reluctant to support governm nt plans for the expansion of social 
policies (Büren 1934: 60-74). 
 The findings of this chapter provide important insights that help to explain the role of 
employers in the formation of the welfare state. The Bismarckian social reforms were the 
project of a conservative state elite, aimed at stabilizing the existing political order. Neither 
the conventional labor mobilization approach nor the cross class coalition approach explain 
appropriately why German employers have supported th  introduction of social insurance. 
Following the conventional labor mobilization approach, we would expect the acceptance by 
German employers of social insurance to reflect an erosion of their political power. In 
contrast, the cross class coalition thesis argues that employers had a genuine economic self-
interest in the welfare state and thus colluded with labor to promote its formation and 
 104 
expansion, rather than having been forced to accept th  welfare state by an overwhelmingly 
powerful labor movement (e.g. Swenson 2002). 
 Neither has really been the case. Irrespective of how we operationalize it, there 
appears to have been no objective erosion of capitalist power in the 1880s. The ‘master in my 
own house’ approach was the prevailing approach to labor relations among German 
industrialists during that time (Büren 1934: 60-74; Vogel 1951: 37-38). No collective 
agreements constrained the exercise of entrepreneurial freedom. The CDI enjoyed close ties to 
the government and was an eminently powerful organization, able to influence government 
policy in many fields. At the same time, the anti-socialist legislation had kept the 
parliamentary strength of the social democrats low (see table 3.1 above). The objective 
strength of the labor movement, measured either as parliamentary strength or as union 
density, was thus still very low. There has thus argu bly been no objective erosion of 
‘capitalist power’. 
 Rather than any objective erosion in capitalist power, a perceived danger of an erosion 
of capitalist power motivated industrialist to back social policies. The granting of social 
protection should prevent workers from claiming political power. The rising popularity of the 
Social Democrats and the labor unions threatened to undermine the traditional power 
structures in state and economy. The authoritarian attitudes that were prevalent among 
German industrialists during that period excluded any form of power sharing with the 
organizations of the labor movement. Moreover, social democracy at that time still relied on 
an orthodox Marxist ideology aimed at ‘transcending Capitalism’ (Berman 2006: 35-36). Its 
main goal was not social reform, but to overthrow capitalist class rule and replace it with the 
political rule of the working class, leading to socialism. Government and industry both 
perceived social democracy as a revolutionary force, a force that due to its political goals 
could not possibly be integrated into the existing authoritarian political order and therefore 
needed to be defeated. The perceived radicalism of the challenge, rather than the objective 
political strength of the labor movement, compelled employers to support social reforms. 
 This chapter has shown how the historical context has affected the social policy 
preferences of German employers in the 1880s. Industriali ts’ preference for social insurance 
had been genuine in the sense that they held a genuine desire to defeat social democracy and 
maintain the existing political-economic order. Industrialists’ support for social insurance has 
been a response to challenges created by the political environment and not the product of any 




  The following chapter looks at how the enormous transformations created by World 
War I and the subsequent political revolution led employers to fundamentally re-evaluate their 







4 World War I and its Consequences: Class Collaboration in Exceptional 
Times 
 
World War I and its domestic repercussions produced a critical juncture in the development of 
the German political economy. At the end of World War I, German industrialists signed an 
agreement with organized labor, which fundamentally reorganized industrial relations, known 
as the Stinnes-Legien agreement. With this agreement, German employers accepted, among 
other things, the recognition of unions, sectoral colle tive bargaining, works councils and the 
eight hour working day. Before the war, German industrialists had, with few exceptions, 
opposed negotiating with organized labor, after the war they had been actively seeking 
collaboration with organized labor and made major concessions to secure union collaboration. 
What made such a fundamental shift in employer attitude towards organized labor in such a 
short period of time possible? 
World War I had changed the role of the state vis-à-vis industry. To simplify, before 
the war, capital had the state as its ally; after th  war it faced the state as a potential enemy. 
Two distinct changes occurred during this short period that together transformed the structure 
of class power: First, the changing relationships between state, capital and labor as a result of 
the reorganization of the economy during the war, and second, the uncertainty over the future 
role of the state created by the revolutionary situat on that followed Germany’s defeat in the 
war. This chapter analyzes, in turn, the relevance of these two changes for the radical re-
orientation of German employers’ politics toward organized labor. First, the chapter looks at 
how the reorganization of the economy for the war effort had changed the power relations 
between capital and labor. Thereafter, the chapter considers the relevance of the revolutionary 
situation that followed Germany’s defeat in the war. Finally, the chapter examines the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement, the first major attempt of class collaboration in German history, 
and what motivated employers to seek class collaboration, as well as the subsequent erosion 
of this compromise.65 
                                                
65 The sections about World War I draws in particular on the study of the effects of the war on class relations and 
class conflicts in Germany by Jürgen Kocka, one of the foremost economic historians in Germany, which was 
first published in German in 1973 (Kocka 1973) . When citing from this work in the text, I refer to the English 
translation of the book, published in 1984 under th tile “Facing Total War, German Society 1914 –1918 (Kocka 
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4.I Class Relations during the War: The State Changes Sides 
The war had led to a fundamental change in power relations between capital and labor. Up to 
World War I, capital had the German state as an ally against organized labor: the war changed 
that. Like in the other war-waging nations, the economic and technological effort needed to 
wage the war66 strained the economic resources and administrative capacities of the German 
state. In response to this, the governments of Germany and the other major combatant nations 
all expanded their control over the economy. New ministries and state authorities were 
established to organize the war effort and tax levels were increased substantially. As imports 
and raw materials were generally scarce and the labor supply constrained by the war’s 
demand for soldiers, all economic production needed to be directed as far as was possible 
towards strategically important industries. 
The state-led reorganization of the German economy for the war effort meant that 
market competition ceased to be the prime mechanism for the distribution of economic 
resources and was replaced by state economic planning instead (Feldman 1992 [1966]: Ch. I-
V). Prices for essential goods, including cloths and foodstuff, were either decreed by the state 
or the goods were distributed by issuing ration cards (Carr 1979: 231-232). The allocation of 
raw materials and of workers, both scarce resources, wa  controlled by state authorities, such 
as the War Raw Materials Department (KRA, Kriegsrohstoffabteilung) located at the Reich 
Economic Office (RWA, Reichswirtschaftsamt) (Kocka 1984: 73; Feldman 1976: 316). All 
this amounted to a radical departure form the state’  pr -war economic liberalism.67 
For German business the reorganization of the economy meant a substantial 
curtailment of entrepreneurial freedom. Whether a firm was making large profits, as many 
firms did during the war, or had to close down its factories, was now not so much dependent 
on its competitiveness in the market but on decisions made by state authorities (Kocka 1984: 
                                                                                                                                              
1984), as well as well as the benchmark study by Gerald Feldman of the relations between army, industry and 
labor in Germany during World War I (Feldman 1992 [1966]) Furthermore, the section also draws on 
Leckebusch (Leckebusch 1966: in particular 60-68) 
66 World War I introduced the usage of entirely new tchnologies of warfare, such as the use of tanks, armoured 
cars, machine guns, submarines and chemical warfare. World War I is sometimes referred to as the war “waged 
with 20th century technology and 19th century strategies” 
67 As the historian William Carr has pointed out:  
“war-time collectivism”…was a frank admission that the free working of the market economy could not be ol rated in times 
of economic crisis; central controls had to be imposed on the system in the interest of national survival. …. [Germany’s] 




73). In short, the war had profoundly changed the relationship between state and capital. The 
non-interventionist pre-war state of affairs had been shattered (Feldman 1976: 315-317). 
While the war-time extension of state control over the economy, depicted as 
‘bureaucratic state socialism’,68 was not specific to Germany, what was specific for Ge many 
in particular was the government’s strategy to harness the collaboration of organized labor 
and organized employers for the organization of the war-time economy. Unions and employer 
associations were mandated by the government to take joint responsibility for the governance 
of newly established institutions for the organization of the war-time economy. The 
incorporation of organized labor into the governance of the war-time economy was a 
concession to labor that was made possible by a reversal of the state’s approach to the labor 
movement, which business was forced to accept. Army and government were actively seeking 
the collaboration of organized labor in order to secur  popular support for the war. The 
extension of government controls and the state’s turn to organized labor had alienated capital 
from the state in a profound way and left capital without any political ally.  
Organized labor as an esteemed ally of the state 
At the same time as the German state extended its control over the economy to focus 
productivity, it was also seeking to secure the political loyalty of the working class. This need 
of the state to secure the political loyalty of theworking class to the existing political regime, 
already an important motivation for social policy reforms before the war (see chapter 3), was 
greatly amplified by the war. The army and the state bureaucracy deemed the collaboration 
and support of the union leaders as essential for winning the war. During the course of the war 
the economic hardship and deprivation of the working class had greatly intensified and led to 
massive political discontent among the workers: ‘Bitterness over economic misery, longing 
for peace, social protest and frustrated expectations f reform have been…the chief 
components of the discontent and bitterness which more and more came to characterize the 
mood of the …masses’ (Kocka 1984: 59). As all economic efforts had to be focused on the 
war effort, the occurrence of domestic social conflicts and strikes would have been 
destructive. In this situation, state and army appeled to the social democratic labor union 
leaders to make an effort to discipline the working class and mobilize it behind the war effort. 
The rapprochement in the relations between the stat and labor resulted in a novel 
state-labor alliance. Thereby, military and governme t intended to ensure themselves of the 
                                                
68N.B.: a depreciative term used in Germany by those hostile to the reorganization of the economy 
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loyalty and collaboration of the labor unions in the war effort, while union leaders expected to 
gain influence and recognition in return. While in the decade preceding the outbreak of the 
war, tensions between labor, business and the state had increased, the onset of the war had 
resulted in what was called ‘sacred truce policy’ (Burgfriedenspolitik ).69 ‘Sacred truce’ meant 
the general agreement between all major political ators, including also the social democratic 
party and the social democratic unions, to put on hld all domestic political conflicts as long 
as the war was going on. The labor movement, in effect, committed itself to abandon class 
struggle and its political goals more generally (socialism) for the period of the war. While in 
the years before the war the social democrats had been opposed to war, they reversed their 
position at the start of the war. The vast majority of social democratic deputies in the 
Reichstag had in 1914 voted in favor of the war loans needed by the government to finance 
the war. The leadership of the social democratic party had become convinced that Germany 
was actually under attack and had decided to support the war out of a sense of patriotic 
loyalty with the German state 70 (Miller 1974). 
The social democratic unions, like their Christian democratic and ‘yellow’ colleagues, 
agreed to the Burgfrieden. Unions declared that, for the period of the war, they would 
abandon all strike action, not demand any wage increases71 and be willing to cooperate with 
employers and the state in the organization of the war economy. The support of the unions for 
the sacred truce and their willingness to cooperate wi h state and business facilitated a 
rapprochement between capital, labor and the state. Th  unions gained the political and legal 
acceptance by the state and, initially, also some measure of goodwill by employers, which 
tacitly had come to recognize union leaders as being quite pragmatic and practically minded 
persons.  
The period of class confrontation appeared to be ovr. ‘The dictatorship of 
revolutionary slogans has been broken,’ wrote the Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung, one of the 
major employer association newspapers, ‘ not through the intervention of the State but 
through the vicissitudes of world history’ (DAZ, Vol.13 August 2nd 1914, translation taken 
from Kocka 1984: 68). Business thought that class confrontation would subside as a result of 
the strengthening of feelings of national solidarity within the working class. Reflecting this 
view, Emil Kirdorf, director of the Gelsenkirchen mining company, declared in the spring of 
                                                
69 The famous statement by emperor Wilhelm II made in the Reichstag after the outbreak of war succinctly 
reflects the mood of truce “I know no political parties any more, only Germans” 
70 The decision by the social democratic leadership to support the war had later lead to a split within t e social 
democratic movement. In 1916 leftwing factions within the party that opposed the war left the party and formed 
the ‘Independent Social Democratic Party’. 
71 Due to the shortness of labor supply, nominal wages w re, nevertheless, rising substantially during the first 
years of the war (Erdmann 1966). Real wages, though, declined during the war due to high inflation. 
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1915 ‘that the patriotic spirit amongst the labor frce is unquestionable…Workers called upon 
to join up responded to this call with enthusiasm…In such a labor force the patriotic spirit will 
always remain alive’ (quoted in Kocka 1984: 68). 
The Patriotic Auxiliary Services Law: Concessions to Organized Labor 
The labor unions new-gained role materialized in the so-called War Auxiliary Services Law 
(“Hilfsdienstgesetz” or HDG). This law was adopted by the Reichstag in December 1916 and 
brought legal recognition and institutional integration for organized labor. The purpose of the 
law was to mobilize additional resources for the war effort by introducing a new programme 
of compulsory civilian mobilization that covered all of the adult, male population. Since the 
start of the war Germany was suffering from a sever lack of skilled labor. The army and the 
defense industry were engaged in a fierce competition for labor resources and the lack of 
labor supply had put severe constraints on the defens  industry to boost its production output 
(Feldman 1992 [1966]: 64-73).  
 After the intensification of the war in the summer of 1916, the army responded with 
the so-called ‘Hindenburg programme’. Paul von Hinde burg, the Supreme Commander, 
ordered a doubling of the production of munitions and the tripling of the production of 
machine guns. According to the defense industry, this goal would require an additional 2 to 3 
million workers (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 198-199). Given the strained situation on the labor 
market, the implementation of the programme required either the removal of troops from the 
front or the mobilization of additional workers for the defense industry. To avoid the former 
the army eventually proposed a new programme of compulsory labor, which led to the 
Auxiliary Services Law. This law mandated that ‘[e]very male German betwen the ages of 
seventeen and sixty who is not serving in the armed forces is obligated to perform Patriotic 
Auxiliary Service during the war.’ (§1 of the Auxiliary Services Law of December 5th, 1916, 
reprinted in Feldman 1992 [1966]: 535). 
Compulsory civilian service only made sense if, at the same time, the free movement 
of labor would be restricted. After all, what would be the point of allocating workers to 
munitions factories, if they would be free to change job at any time? Compulsion against 
labor mobility was, however, a delicate issue as the labor unions were opposed to that. 
Excessive labor mobility, caused by intense wage competition among firms to attract skilled 
labor, had already been a serious problem in some industrial districts before the introduction 
of the auxiliary services programme (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 74-79). 
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 The metal industry in Berlin had approached the government with a proposal to 
restrict labor mobility by making the worker’s right to change job dependent on the consent of 
his present employer. The employer had to issue a ‘l aving certificate’ to the leaving worker 
to enable him to be hired by a different employer. If the employer, for some reason, refused to 
issue a leaving certificate the worker was unable to change job. The government however was 
reluctant to use compulsion to limit labor mobility and called on industry to rely on voluntary 
agreements to reduce labor mobility instead (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 81). The state feared that 
compulsion would cause strikes and non-cooperation by the unions (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 
86).  
Such a voluntary agreement to control labor mobility was achieved in February 1915 
between unions and employers in the Berlin metal industry (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 77). The 
agreement established a so-called ‘War Board’, a committee for the settlement of disputes 
over labor mobility, consisting of an equal number of union and employer representatives. If 
an employer refused to issue a ‘leaving certificate’, the worker could turn to the War Board, 
which would then decide about the legitimacy of theworker’s request to leave and, if it 
considered the worker’s complaint just, would issue a leaving certificate to him, which the 
worker could use in place of the employer’s certificate (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 78). The 
agreement meant that the unions had to sacrifice their principle of free movement of labor but 
it allowed them to gain influence. The agreement gave them recognition by the employers and 
the settlement of conflicts on the basis of parity representation of both sides (Feldman 1992 
[1966]: 78).  
The War Ministry advocated the extension of the ‘Berlin model’ of parity-based war 
boards to the whole of the economy, but the proposal met with massive resistance from 
employers in other areas. The VDA had called on employers in other regions and sectors not 
to copy Berlin’s war board model (Schönhoven 1987: 255). The War Ministry threatened to 
set up public mediation boards where the voluntary introduction of parity-based war boards 
failed due to employer resistance (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 88). The ‘Berlin model’ had found 
very few followers among firms from other regions and sectors. Employers generally opposed 
it on the grounds that these committees would establi h a problematic precedent for the 
organization of the post-war economy. The most violent resistance came from heavy industry 
(Feldman 1992 [1966]: 90). Privy Councilor Hilger, a heavy industrialist from Upper Silesia, 
expressed the position of the industrialists clearly:  
I see in these arbitration agencies an extraordinarily great danger. They will not be terminated 
after the end of the war. That is a belief in miracles. I am completely convinced that when we 
once have them we will never get rid of them, and then a breach is shot through our social 
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position (statement by Privy Councilor Hilger, Nov 16, 1916, quoted in Feldman 1992 [1966]: 
91) 
 
Employers explicitly linked their opposition to an extension of the Berlin War Boards 
to differences in union strength. Such a concession w uld not be necessary in other regions, 
where unions would be much weaker than in Berlin. In a meeting with a representative of the 
War Ministry in March 1916, employer representatives pointed out that the situation in Berlin 
would not be characteristic for the rest of Germany. I  Berlin the majority of workers were 
unionized, in the Ruhr and in Upper Silesia, the centers of Germany’s heavy industry, the 
unions would be much weaker (statements by Dr. Hoff, VDESI and Dr. Tänzler, VDA 
referred to in Feldman 1992 [1966]: 89). Class collaboration was thus explicitly rejected on 
the grounds that union weakness did not require it. 
 German employers failed to assert themselves against the labor-state alliance in favor 
of the war board model. As part of the Auxiliary Services Law parity-based arbitration 
committees were made mandatory. The law restricted labor mobility by making a change of 
job contingent on the employer’s consent. At the same time, the law established parity-based 
arbitration committees to settle disputes emerging from this restriction (§ 9 of the Auxiliary 
Services Law of December 5th, 1916, reprinted in Feldman 1992 [1966]: 537-538}. This rule 
was one of several concessions made by the government to the union leaders. 
The Auxiliary Services Law represented a triumph for the quest of labor union leaders 
for influence and recognition, a triumph that was made possible by the fact that the war effort 
made the union leaders valuable partners for the stat . The severe food crisis in the winter of 
1916/17, the so-called ‘turnip winter’, intensified the political discontent of the working class 
(Carr 1979: 236) and fuelled the anxiety within army and government about potential mass 
strikes. Foisting the planned programme of compulsory labor service on the workers against 
their will may have added further fuel to the flames of worker discontent. An agreement with 
labor union leaders was therefore needed to ensure their help in calming the working class. As 
General Gröner, the head of the newly established Reich War Office, which was to direct the 
new mobilization programme, stated: ‘The task is extraordinarily difficult. It can only be 
solved in the closest understanding with industry and l bor. The War could in any case not be 
won against the opposition of the workers’ (quoted in Kocka 1984: 136). 
Industry was in favor of the new mobilization programme but resented the concessions 
made to organized labor (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 195) because of their precedent-setting 
character, as noted by Kocka: ‘During the legislative process the unions and the SPD,…, 
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succeeded in implementing changes in the Law which the entrepreneurs were forced to 
accept, although very unwillingly and on certain conditions. One of these conditions was the 
restriction of the law to the period of the War only’ (Kocka 1984: 136). 
In addition to the parity-based war arbitration committees, the introduction of 
mandatory ‘workers’ committees’ in all auxiliary service firms with more than 50 workers (§ 
11 of the Law) was another major concession to labor. Despite their limited competencies, 
these committees signified the end of unlimited entrepreneurial authority. The worker 
committees established in the auxiliary service firms became the precedent for the Works 
Councils Law adopted after the war, in February 1920. Before, mandatory works councils 
only existed for large coalmines, where works councils had been made mandatory in response 
to a strike in 1905 (Müller-Jentsch 1986: 217; Kocka 1984: 137). 
The crumbling of the ‘sacred truce’  
The Patriotic Auxiliary Services Law is likely to have contributed to the crumbling of the 
class truce, which had already set in before the passing of the Law. While the Law enforced 
the cooperation between business and labor, it was also instrumental in strengthening the anti-
interventionist resentments among business (Kocka 1984: 140). After the outbreak of the war 
the relations between employers and unions had initially improved in the wake of the ‘sacred 
truce’ policy endorsed by the social democratic unions and the SPD, as shown above. Joint 
committees (‘Arbeitsgemeinschaften’) of unions and employers were established in sectors 
where cross-class cooperation had already existed before the war, dealing with social issues, 
such as the integration of war-disabled workers into the firms (Kocka 1984: 69; Leckebusch 
1966: 62; Tänzler 1929: 109). However, this truce had already started to dissolve in late 1915, 
when the first wildcat strikes occurred. In the course of the war, with a quick victory 
becoming ever more illusionary and the material living conditions of the working class 
deteriorating, the class truce became more and more difficult to sustain. The political 
radicalization of the working class was looming, while, at the same time, business developed 
an increasing hostility towards state interventionism and war-time collectivism (Kocka 1984: 
140). 
The economic planning machinery created by the army and its attempts to tie the 
unions into the mechanisms of this machinery meant that business had lost its erstwhile ally: 
the state. In general, German business opposed the in egration of the unions into the 
organization of the economy, and was forced to accept the newly created institutions. As 
noted by Kocka:  
 
115 
In general German industrial employers and their representative organization, the 
‘Vereinigung Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände’, flatly rejected the completely non-
revolutionary offers of cooperation and demands for co-determination by the unions. Where a 
cooperative equality of the two classes prevailed in large-scale industry during the War, this 
usually occurred through the insistence of the unions, against the will of the entrepreneurs and 
under pressure from the military and civilian authorities (Kocka 1984: 69). 
  The loss of entrepreneurial freedom due to war-time collectivism was acceptable to 
industry only as a temporary sacrifice, perceived as necessary to win the war. As a rule, 
business opposed the new union powers institutionalized by the Patriotic Auxiliary Services 
Law and stressed that their validity had to be limited to the period of the war and should not 
be seen as a precedent for the post-war organization of the economy. Noticing the increasing 
indulgence by the state to the demands made by organized labor, the willingness of business 
to accept state interventionism went down even further.  
 Industry insisted on the temporary nature of the new labor-integrative institutions. In 
August 1917 the Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists sued a petition to the 
national government demanding the restoration of entrepreneurial freedom by the state 
(Leckebusch 1966: 65). In June 1917, the VDA petitioned the National War Office 
(“Kriegsamt”), protesting against the allegedly hazardous effects of the Patriotic Auxiliary 
Services Law on firms. The VDA stressed that the concessions wrested under the pressure of 
the necessities of war would only have transient validity and would in no way include a 
commitment for the period after the War (Leckebusch 1966: 65). Also in 1917, the general 
assembly of ‘Arbeit Nordwest’, the regional employer f deration for north-western Germany, 
where the country’s heavy industry is concentrated, expressed its expectation that ‘with the 
discontinuance of the root cause [“Entstehungsursache”] of the Law, i.e. the return to peaceful 
circumstances, also the institutions of the Law – the obligatory worker committees and 
arbitration boards – will be abolished, because during peacetime such institutions should be 
left to the free decision of the employer’ (Braun 1927: 35-36).  
In a similar way, one of the major employer associations’ newspapers (Der 
Arbeitgeber) demanded in early 1918 the abolition of the new institutions for labor 
representation: ‘They should and must fall, when the war is over, and there will be few who 
regret that, because every single one has felt their r pressive restraints…The free 
entrepreneurial initiative meets with restraints and bounds wherever…entrepreneurial 
daringness and the energy of the genius…is replaced by…mediocrity and moderateness’ (Der 
Arbeitgeber, 1918, no.1, p.2, translated by TP, quoted in Leckebusch 1966: 67-68). Heavy 
industry, in particular, characterized by its traditional ‘master-in-my-own-house’ approach, 
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was hostile to the integration of labor unions that w s forced upon it by the War Auxiliary 
Services Law.72 In a memorandum published in the summer of 1918 the Association of 
Coalmines (“Zechenverband”) maintained that ‘It is almost unnatural to grant a right of 
codetermination in business administration, issues of wages and price decisions to the …labor 
organizations or their leaders, who bear no responsibility for the prosperity of the enterprise 
and bear no risk’ (Osthold 1934: 259-260). 
The deterioration of employer-union relations in the course of the war resulted in large 
part from employers’ response to the encroachment on entrepreneurial autonomy by 
government controls and the strengthening of the political and economic power of the labor 
unions. The initial period of truce gave employers reason to believe that the war would lead to 
a calming of the class conflict and cause revolutionary ideas to lose ground within the 
working class. A moderation of labor demands and labor politics did, indeed, take place in the 
beginning of the war, reflected in various forms of v luntary cooperation between capital and 
labor and an initial commitment to refrain from strike action. This initial rapprochement, 
though, turned out to be unsustainable and class relations deteriorated, in particular, in the 
years following the passing of the Patriotic Auxiliary Services Law, which enforced the 
cooperation of capital and labor in the organization and implementation of war-time economic 
planning.  
As they had done also before the war, German industriali s after 1915 restarted to 
finance non-confrontationist ‘yellow unions’ (‘wirtschaftsfriedliche Werkvereine’) on a 
widespread basis (Kocka 1984: 70-72). In the period of the ‘sacred truce’, employers had 
temporarily refrained from supporting the yellow unions. The promotion of yellow unions 
was intended to weaken the social democratic unions and help employers to get a foothold 
within the working class. This strategy of divide and conquer remained ultimately 
unsuccessful and yellow unions always remained veryweak also throughout the war. Social 
democratic unions remained by far the largest ones (s e chart 4.1 below). The fact that 
employers resorted to this anti-union strategy shows that their fundamental attitudes to the 
union movement had remained essentially unchanged throughout the war period, despite the 
initial rapprochement that resulted from the sacred t uce.  
                                                
72 In contrast, in many sectors of the peacetime industries, characterized by smaller manufacturing firms, 
cooperation between employers and labor tended to be more peaceful also during the war. In those sectors, 
where collective agreements had already been signed before the war, in particular building, wood, decoration, 
brewing, tailoring and printing trades, these voluntary forms of collaboration were even strengthened during the 
war (Kocka 1984: 69). However, this does not change the fact that, over the course of the war, attitudes among 
German industrial employers in general had shifted against cooperation with the labor unions. 
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German employers had, in essence, not changed their hostile attitude towards the 
social democratic labor unions, organizations to which large parts of the German industry had 
even refused any right to exist just a few years ealier. German industrialists, like the state 
elite, believed initially that the nationalist project, and the expected military victory, would 
lead to the permanent pacification of the working class and to the political end for the 
socialists. These expectations were disappointed by subsequent developments: massive 
discontent among workers, a strengthening of revolutionary forces and a certain estrangement 
between moderate union leadership and radicalized working class masses. 























Source: Kocka 1984: 66 (for the period 1905 to 1919 and Preller 1949: 204 (for the period 1913 to 1932), 
in addition Erdmann 1966: 109 and Raumer 1954: 432 for 1921, Tänzler 1929: 27 for 1905 and Tänzler 
1929: 117 for 1917. sources checked for consistency of data. Missing: data not available  
 
The main impact of the war on the political positions of German employer associations 
was the development of a fierce opposition to state in rventionism (Kocka 1984: 140). 
Before the war, business could rely on the state as a firm ally in the defense of entrepreneurial 
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freedom against the labor challenge. Wartime economic planning had rendered the state itself 
as the largest threat to entrepreneurial freedom. Moreover, under the pressure of the 
exigencies created by the war the state elites had turned to the leaders of organized labor for 
support in calming the discontent working class. Business had thus lost its erstwhile ally: the 
authoritarian state.  
The paramount political concern of business throught the war had been to prevent 
the limitations on entrepreneurial freedom that had been introduced during the war being 
made permanent after the war. These encroachments took many forms: the labor-integrative 
institutions established by the Auxiliary Services Law undermined the traditional ‘master-in-
my-own-house’ approach of the heavy industrialists. Price ceilings, import and export 
controls, state allocation of raw materials and the forced closure of strategically non-essential 
factories all fundamentally undermined entrepreneurial freedom. 
In addition to this, a new threat suddenly emerged toward the end of the war: the threat 
of a social revolution, amplified by the possibility of a disorderly demobilization, with about 
10 to 12 million soldiers returning back from the front within a very short period of time. As a 
consequence, a large pool of persons that was armed and likely to be unemployed, frustrated, 
and politically disoriented had to be expected. In this situation, German business conducted a 
dramatic about-face and discovered organized labor s a valuable ally. An ally needed to 
organize an orderly demobilization and to stem the thr at of a social revolution. 
4. II The Post-War Situation: Revolution and Uncertainty 
In November 1918 German business and labor reached an agreement that fundamentally 
restructured the political economy of Germany. In this agreement, known as the Stinnes-
Legien agreement,73 German industrialists agreed to recognize labor unions as the legitimate 
representatives of the working class. Moreover, they also accepted the general introduction of 
collective bargaining agreements and other institutions of cross-class cooperation, like labor 
exchanges and arbitration committees both on the basis of parity representation, as well as the 
discontinuation of their financial support to yellow unions and the introduction of the eight 
hour working day (see Tänzler 1929: 144-145 for a full list of concessions see below).  
This class compromise reflected a remarkable change i  position by German 
industrialists concerning their relationship to organized labor: away from the confrontational 
attitude prevalent before the war, towards the accomm dation of labor demands. The 
                                                
73 Alternatively, the Stinnes-Legien agreement is also frequently referred to as the November agreement or ZAG 
agreement or even as the Magna Charta of Labor. The term Stinnes-Legien agreement refers to two of the 
leading participants in the negotiations. 
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concessions made by business to labor in the Stinnes-Legien agreement were major ones, 
considering in particular that before the war most German industrialists had resolutely refused 
to recognize, let alone to collaborate with, organized labor. It is hardly possible to understand 
how this agreement came about without understanding what motivated industrialists to sign 
this agreement. 
In principle, one can think of two possible alternative explanations. One possible 
explanation is that the radical about-face in industry’s position may have been the result of a 
change in preferences in regard to what kind of political-economic institu ons German 
industrialists considered as best suited to the production strategies they intended to pursue. 
Such a change in preferences may possibly have been caused by long-term structural changes 
in the composition of the German business community and facilitated by its strong tradition of 
corporatist organization and self-government.74 In this view, World War I and the political-
economic uncertainty that followed served merely to speed up the largely predetermined 
development towards labor integration (see e.g. Abelshauser 1984: 312).  
Alternatively, the about-face may have been the result of a strategy of political 
accommodation, made necessary as an adjustment to a particular historical situation, the war 
and the ensuing revolutionary situation, which confr ted German industrialists with a radical 
shift in the balance of power and unprecedented uncertainty about its future (Kocka 1984: 72-
73). This uncertainty required a radical change in strategy in order to secure entrepreneurial 
freedom and private capital ownership.75 The first explanation emphasizes long-term 
structural changes, the second contingent historical events.  
The empirical analysis in the following section supports the second explanation. On 
the basis of a detailed analysis of statements by employer representatives the analysis shows 
that a specific historical situation characterized by extraordinary political uncertainty, 
unrelated to structural changes in the German economy, motivated German industrialists to 
fundamentally reconsider their position towards organized labor and class collaboration at the 
end of World War I. The reorganization of the economy by the state during the war, the 
imminent defeat and the looming social revolution all together created a situation of 
extraordinary uncertainty over the future political-economic order, whereby the continuation 
and, even more so, the aggravation of government controls over the economy appeared as a 
                                                
74 Long-term structural changes are emphasized in particular in (Feldman 1976: 340) , while the importance of 
pre-war tendencies of corporatist organization are emphasized in (Abelshauser 1984: 298) 
75 The importance of the revolution is emphasized in particular by Rosenberg (Rosenberg 1977: 278) and (Kocka 
1984: 72-73) 
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very realistic threat. To ward off this threat industrialists were seeking a strategic alliance 
with organized labor. 
Towards the end of the war, major German industrialists started to actively seek the 
collaboration of organized labor. Their motives fordoing so were decisive in making the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement possible. These motives, however, were the product of the specific 
historical situation that German industry was confrted with at that moment in time. A 
situation that was determined by a fundamental uncertainty about the future shape of 
Germany’s political-economic order. This uncertainty resulted from the imminent military 
defeat and the ensuing breakdown of the old authoritarian political regime. Throughout the 
war German industrialists had hoped that a military victory and annexations would strengthen 
the popular legitimacy of the authoritarian monarchy, t ereby allowing a return to the status 
quo ante of a non-interventionist political-economic order. In October 1918, German 
industrialists were caught off guard by the rapid course of events and suddenly found 
themselves to be dependent on the willingness of organized labor to collaborate in order to 
stabilize the situation and prevent their expropriation. Leading industrialists realized that an 
orderly demobilization and a well-organized transition from war-time to peace-time economy 
would be essential to stem the threat of social revolution and Bolshevism. An orderly and 
smooth transition though could only be achieved in collaboration with organized labor, 
because the state bureaucracy appeared no longer capable of organizing this transition in an 
effective way. 
The German November Revolution 1918 
Uncertainty over the future political-economic order culminated in the events of November 
1918, which became known as the so-called ‘November revolution’. This revolution was 
decisive for bringing about the Stinnes-Legien agreem nt and its main events are therefore 
briefly discussed in this sub-section. The revolutin consisted of a series of subversive events 
and upheavals that culminated on November the 9th, 1 18. It led to the forced abdication of 
the Emperor on that day and ended, eight months later, with the establishment of a 
parliamentary republic based on universal suffrage for men and women. The revolution was 
not controlled or orchestrated by a single party or organization, but was, instead, the result of 
the chaotic actions of several groups and parties that were pursuing partly conflicting political 
goals. At the time the revolution took place it was f r from clear that the outcome would be a 
capitalist order based on a parliamentary democracy, nor were the political goals pursued by 
the revolutionary groups entirely clear.  
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 The key actors in the revolutionary events were (a) the representatives of the old 
regime, (b) the political leaders of the Majority Social Democrats (SPD) and the social 
democratic labor unions, and, in opposition to SPD and union leadership, (c) the revolutionary 
“worker councilor movement”, an unguided grass-roots movement that had emerged 
spontaneously all over Germany during the last days of the war, consisting mostly of workers 
and returning soldiers. The councilors were supported by the Independent Social Democrats 
(USPD), a political party that had emerged as a secession from the SPD (subsequently called 
the Majority Social Democrats) during the war. 
The revolution took its starting point when at the end of October 1918 sailors on board 
of two battleships refused to obey orders (Carr 1979: 248). During the following days the 
revolution spread quickly throughout the country and the emerging movement of ‘workers’ 
and soldiers’ councilors’ were demanding control over state authority all over Germany (Carr 
1979: 250). Events culminated on November the 9th in Berlin. Workers had left the factories 
and were demonstrating on the streets (Carr 1979: 250). The SPD leadership, headed by 
Friedrich Ebert, feared a radicalization of the revolution along the lines of the Bolshevik 
revolution that had taken place just one year earlir in Russia, spoiling the prospects for a 
more orderly, reformist transformation of the political regime. On November the 7th, SPD 
leader Ebert declared that ‘If the Kaiser doesn't abdicate the social revolution is unavoidable. 
But I don't want it, indeed I hate it like the sin’ (Baden 1968: 599f.). On November the 9th the 
Emperor abdicated76 and his Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, surrendered his position to 
Friedrich Ebert, the SPD leader. On the same day, Karl Liebknecht, the leader of the 
revolutionary Spartacist League77 proclaimed Germany to be a Socialist Republic: 
Party comrades, I proclaim the Free Socialist Republic of Germany….; in which there will be 
no more servants, in which every honest worker will find the honest pay for his work. The reign 
of capitalism which has turned Europe into a field of corpses is broken. (quoted in Michalka and 
Niedhart 1992: 21) 
The SPD party leadership was trying to calm the mood and to take the sting out of the 
revolutionary movement. Under pressure, it also proclaimed a republic and declared to form a 
‘workers’ government’ headed by Ebert. The SPD leadership was thus acting in opposition to 
the USDP and the revolutionary worker councilors. Both sides were claiming to be in control 
of state authority. In order to calm the revolutionary forces and to give more legitimacy to the 
                                                
76 On that day the Emperor had fled to the Netherlands, meaning that, in effect, though not officially, he had 
abdicated. 
77 The Spartacist League constituted the left-wing within the USDP and later transformed itself into the 
Communist Party 
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new government he intended to form, Ebert offered the USDP half of the seats in the new 
government. The USDP accepted but insisted on a number of concessions. Only Socialists, no 
conservatives or liberals, should be included in the new government. Moreover, the 
government had to declare that all power resided ultimately with the revolutionary workers’ 
councilors and that the government exercised power only in their name; and finally, the 
elections to the new republic’s constituent assembly should be delayed until the revolution 
was consolidated. The last point was of particular importance because the USDP was aiming 
at a nationalization of key industries. By delaying the constituent assembly, the USDP had 
hoped to be able to achieve a quick nationalization hat would face the assembly with 
unchangeable facts. 
  The provisional government that was formed on November 10th, the Council of 
People’s Deputies (“ Rat der Volksbauftragten”), consisted of three Majority Social 
Democrats and three Independent Social Democrats and acted on behalf of the revolutionary 
workers’ councilors (Carr 1979: 254). This ambiguous compromise, a socialist government 
acting on behalf of a revolutionary movement but headed by a moderate reformist (Ebert), 
reflected the uncertainty at that time over the future path Germany would take. The historian 
Rudolf Coper, for instance, remarked:  
Ebert was faced with a dilemma. The first proclamation he had issued ….began: ‘The 
outgoing Reich Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, has … transferred upon me the 
administration of the office of Reich Chancellor. I am about to form the new government in 
agreement with the parties and shall report to the public forthwith!’ (…)Twenty-four hours 
later …. Ebert became a People's Commissar and acknowledged that the political power 
resided in the workers' and soldiers' councils. Germany was, in fact, a soviet republic. (Coper 
1955: 102) 
Supported by a new constitution and, in particular, the introduction of universal 
suffrage for men and women,78 the Majority Social Democrats were confident of gaining an 
electoral majority through parliamentary elections and thus thought themselves able to 
implement their reformist programme within the framework of a parliamentary democracy. 
The USDP, in contrast, supported the revolutionary councilor movement.79 The revolutionary 
worker councilors also lacked a unified political programme or ideology and many of them 
were, in fact, social democrats. The workers’ councilors had emerged at the local level as a 
spontaneous outburst of political discontent and did not have any centralized decision-making 
                                                
78 Hitherto, universal suffrage existed only for men. 
79 The USDP, founded in April 1917, had emerged from a split within the SPD about the party’s support fo the 
war credits and the ‘sacred truce’ policy. The USDP was primarily united by its firm anti-war stance, while it did 
not have a uniform political programme or ideology. The founders of the USDP included the more moderate 
‘revisionists’ Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky as well as the revolutionary Spartacist League, led by Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, who later founded the German Communist Party (KPD). 
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structure. Their political priorities were to end the war and democratize the political system. 
Demands for the nationalization of heavy industry were raised by the worker councilors and 
also circulated widely within SPD and USDP.  
Many worker councilors wanted to go further and establish “direct democracy” in the 
factories, resulting in the ‘self-administration of the economy by the working class’ (Müller-
Jentsch 1986: 218; Maier 1975: 138). Elected worker councils should take over control at all 
political levels in the form of a ‘council republic’, a government by soviets, inspired by the 
Russian model. The economy and political system would both be governed by worker 
councilors. The leaderships of SPD and social democratic unions wanted to prevent such a 
Council Republic because they believed in the superiority of a piecemeal, reformist strategy. 
The anxiety about the possible consequences of a soci li t revolution was shared by the 
leaders of the social democratic labor movement and the leaders of industry and, therefore, 
formed the common ground upon which the Stinnes-Legien agreement could be built. 
4. III The Stinnes-Legien Agreement: Class Collaboration in Uncertain Times 
In the context of this uncertainty about the future political-economic order of Germany, a 
group of big industrialists and labor union leaders joined forces to engineer a far-reaching 
class compromise that established an institutional basis for cross-class cooperation. The 
agreement was engineered in October and November 1918; and signed on November 15th, 
1918, six days after the outbreak of the revolution. These big industrialists had reversed their 
attitude towards cooperation with organized labor and were now actively seeking cross-class 
collaboration. The motives for this about-face were rooted in the political and economic 
uncertainty of that time. Industry had been seeking the collaboration of organized labor, 
initially, for the purpose of jointly organizing the demobilization, the re-integration of 
returning soldiers into the firms, in order to thereby secure a smooth transition from war-time 
to peace-time economy. An orderly and smooth demobilization was necessary for avoiding a 
collapse of economic production and mass unemployment, and was thus considered by 
industry as crucial for avoiding a social revolution. However, due to the imminent collapse of 
the old political regime industry could not rely onits pre-war ally, the state, in organizing an 
orderly demobilization, and decided to resort to organized labor instead. 
Up to the summer of 1918, German industry, with fewexceptions, had rejected union 
proposals for cooperation in the organization of the post-war economy. Already at the 
beginning of the war labor union leaders had called upon employers to form joint working 
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committees (‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft’), but these calls were left unanswered in most sectors. 
Such working committees80 were established in those sectors where negotiations had already 
been taking place before the war, in particular in co struction, printing and timber (Reichert 
1919: 5), while the heavy industry in particular maint ined its traditional anti-union stance 
(Feldman 1976: 323; Schönhoven 1987: 254). The official position of the employer 
associations toward cross-class collaboration remained negative throughout the war (Kocka 
1984: 69). The initiative for cross-class collaboration came originally not from industry but, 
instead, from an impulse from outside. 
 This outside impulse came from August Müller, a stte secretary who had good 
contacts to union representatives, and Hermann Schumacher, a political economist and 
academic social reformer who had good contacts to industry. In May 1917 these two men 
initiated talks between employer representatives, ld by the heavy industrialist Hugo Stinnes, 
and union representatives, led by Carl Legien (Leckebusch 1966: 71; Feldman 1976: 323-
324). These talks, however, collapsed in October 1917 because unions could not consent to 
the employers’ demand that they should declare their political support for a strategy of 
military annexations, a strategy that had been at the core of a plan by the Fatherland Party and 
industrialists to re-unite the population behind the war effort (Feldman 1976: 324). At that 
time, future developments appeared apparently too uncertain for both sides and no side was 
prepared to make the kind of concessions that would have been needed to forge a cross-class 
alliance. 
Negotiations between capital and labor at the natiol level did not resume before 
October 1918. Already some time before, in January 1918 Hans von Raumer, the executive 
director of the Association of the German Electric Engineering Industry, took the initiative for 
talks between employers and unions in his sector. Raumer was realistic about Germany’s 
military situation, and feared that, unless the cooperation of organized labor in the 
organization of the post-war economy could be won, political chaos and continued 
government control would be the consequence (Raumer 1955, 1954). Raumer sidestepped the 
leading business associations on the grounds that their clumsy organization made them unable 
to change their official positions without lengthy debate. 
Instead, Raumer decided to consult with individual industrialists, most of them from 
the manufacturing industries: Carl Friedrich von Siemens (electric engineering), Walter 
Rathenau and Felix Deutsch, both from the electric engineering firm AEG, Reichsrat von 
Rieppel, the executive director of the machine building firm MAN, and Hugo Stinnes, the 
                                                
80 These committees dealt in particular with job placements for war-disabled persons. 
 
125 
reform-oriented heavy industrialist already involved in the May 1917 talks (Raumer 1954: 
428-429). These persons formed the core of the employer group in the negotiations with the 
unions. All, except one, were representatives of the manufacturing industries and were critical 
of the conservative political views that dominated in the heavy industry. The most severe 
opponents of cross-class collaboration were thus sidestepped by Raumer and his 
collaborators, though the associations of the heavy industry agreed to sign the agreement x 
post (Raumer 1954: 428; Reichert 1919: 11 for the list of signatory associations). 
Raumer’s initiative did not, however, initially find much support among industrialists 
in other sectors. Remarkably, the first meeting with union representatives did not take place 
until October 2nd, 1918 (Leckebusch 1966: 71; Raumer 1954: 428). Up to the autumn of 1918, 
dominant groups among German employers apparently resisted negotiations with unions. This 
is evident from a memorandum published by the VDA in March 1918, in which the federation 
elaborated its ideas for the organization of the peacetime economy. This memorandum 
included no space for institutions of cross-class collaboration. The memorandum opposed any 
intervention into entrepreneurial freedom by the state or the unions. It demanded the 
dismantling of the measures of ‘wartime socialism’, in particular the works councils and 
parity-based arbitration boards, and demanded the re-establishment of a free market economy 
after the war: 
An emergency law, necessitated by the exigencies of war, is in particular the War Auxiliary 
Services Law, for the continuity of which there is obviously no reason after a peace 
agreement…To be sure, also the institutions created by the law are dispensed with. This holds 
in particular for the arbitration committees and arbitration boards… (VDA memorandum from 
March 1918, quoted in Leckebusch 1966: 68, translated by TP, emphasis by TP) 
 
The looming military defeat and the uncertainty about the future political-economic 
order motivated German employers to reconsider theiposition towards organized labor and 
its demands. Cooperation with organized labor was now the lesser evil compared to the 
revolutionary threat posed by the political radicaliz tion of the unorganized worker masses. 
Employers recognized that a cross-class collaboration would only be possible if they were to 
make concessions to organized labor. The executive director of the Association of German 
Iron and Steel Industrialists, Jacob Reichert, argued in the autumn of 1918: 
It is clear that the industrialists want to win the workers and their organizations for a common 
industrial policy, which can only be achieved if weoffer a service in return for the assistance 
that we expect from the employees. And this return service had to consist [in the past, TP] and 
will have to consist in concessions in social question , in particular regarding working 
conditions. That is the big sacrifice that entrepreneurs have made and will have to make. This 
is not only a financial sacrifice, but, I believe, for some industrialists also a difficult sacrifice 
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in terms of conviction, given that, up to recent months, they have refused to negotiate with 
organizations that represent only a small faction of the workforce, but nevertheless would like 
to be seen as the legitimate representatives of the entire workforce. But what’s the use of this 
anyhow? The sacrifice has to be made. And further sac ifices will have to be made in the 
future, because of economic necessities and also political necessities (Reichert 1919: 7, 
translated by TP). 
Reichert was thus fully aware of the power and the influence that the labor unions held 
over the working class and that therefore finding a agreement would be unavoidable, even 
though this would be painful. Cooperating with the unions was a delicate issue for the 
employer associations, which only a few years earlir had refused to even recognize unions. 
How problematic the issue was for the employer associati ns is evident in the fact that the 
agreement was not engineered by the employer associtions themselves, but became possible 
only as a result of the personal initiative of a small group of individual industrialists and 
industry representatives. These people did not act upon a mandate from their associations, but 
did so only in their personal capacity (Raumer 1954: 430). The peak-level federations of 
employers and labor unions ratified the agreement ex post, only after the negotiations were 
already concluded.81 
The terms of the Stinnes-Legien agreement 
The reversal of industry’s position towards labor fr m confrontation to collaboration reflects 
the changing balance of class power created by the political uncertainty that resulted from the 
revolutionary situation. The reformist labor unions became a pivotal ally for employers in 
their fight against chaos and revolution. While it took eight months for the talks to get started 
after Raumer had taken the initiative in January 1918, events began to proceed very fast from 
October on. The first round of negotiations took place on October 22nd, 1918. Already on 
November the 6th, the group presented to the government a plan for a demobilization 
programme and on November the 15th, the events of November the 9th had in the meantime 
further aggravated the political situation, both side  ratified the agreement that became known 
later as ‘Stinnes-Legien agreement’82 (Reichert 1919: 9). The agreement provided for a joint 
working committee for the permanent cooperation betwe n capital and labor, the 
‘Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft’ (ZAG), as well as the following list of specific concessions to 
                                                
81 The members of the negotiation team included in addition to von Raumer, who chaired the negotiations, n the 
employer side: von Siemens and his company director Henrich, Rathenau (AEG), Deutsch (AEG), Rieppel 
(MAN, machine building), von Borsig (VDA), Vögler, and Stinnes; on the union side: Legien, Bauer, Eisner, 
Leipart Harmann, Schlicke, and Stegerwald (Reichert 1919: 8). The majority of these industrialists came from 
mechanical and electric engineering firms, while thhitherto powerful heavy industrialists were apparently 
sidestepped, as mentioned above. 
82 Alternatively, the agreement is also known as ‘November agreement’ or as ‘ZAG agreement’ and sometimes 
even referred to as the ‘Magna Charter of Labor’. The original text of the agreement is reprinted in Leckebusch 
1966: Appendix 10 (p.224 – 226).  
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the unions (the original text of the agreement is reprinted, inter alia, in Reichert 1919: 21-22; 
see also Tänzler 1929: 144-145; as all as Weber 1954: 117-118). 
1. Recognition of the labor unions as the legitimate representatives of the workers  
2. No limitations to workers’ freedom of association  
3. Employers will refrain from supporting ‘yellow unions’  
4. Demobilized soldiers have a right to return to the firm where they were employed 
before the war  
5. Joint administration of labor exchanges based on parity representation of capital and 
labor  
6. Wages and working condition have to be regulated by collective agreements, 
organized on a sectoral basis  
7. Worker committees for all firms with more than 50 employees, to represent the 
interests of the workforce and monitor the implementation of the collective 
agreements in cooperation with the entrepreneur  
8. Formation of parity-based arbitration committees by collective agreements  
9. Eight hours working day, without concomitant wage reductions, but conditional on 
other countries doing the same  
10. Formation of a new body (the ZAG), to implement this agreement and to organize the 
demobilization, based on parity representation  
11. Decisions made by the ZAG are binding for both side. 
 
These were very major concessions by business to labor, motivated by the aim to 
guarantee an orderly demobilization with the help of union collaboration and thereby avoid a 
social revolution. The agreement was supported by the new socialist government and its main 
components were transformed into law.83 According to Raumer’s own recollection, there was 
not much debate about the demands made by the labor unions, except notably the abandoning 
of the yellow unions and the introduction of the eight hour working day (Raumer 1954: 428; 
Reichert 1919: 12-13; Erdmann 1966b: 90-103). Fearing that the socialist government would 
                                                
83 The Weimar constitution, passed on August 11th, 1919, which founded the Weimar Republic, removed the 
remaining limitations on the freedom of association and recognized labor unions and employer associatins (Art. 
159 of the Weimar constitution). The organizations of employers and workers were legitimised to negotiate 
wages and working conditions; collective agreements had to be respected by the state (Art.165). Already in 
November 1918 the government issued an ordinance regulating working time. In December 1918 an ordinance 
was passed, which established on a provisional basis wage agreements, works councils and arbitration boards 
(Tänzler 1929: 154). The ordinance established in particular the ‘indispensability’ (“Unabdingbarkeit”) of 
collective agreements, meaning that collective agreements cannot be amended by agreements between the 
individual worker and his employer, except to the advantage of the worker. Thus, collective agreements were 
effectively established as creating a minimum wage standard. In addition, the ordinance also introduce the 
‘declaration of general applicability’, i.e. a possibility for the Ministry of Labor to declare collective agreements 
as being generally binding for all firms and all workers, including those not organized in employer associations 
and unions. Indispensability and general applicability were both accepted by employers (Weber 1954: 121).The 
ordinance also prescribed works councils for all undertakings with at least 20 workers as well as parity-based 
arbitration institutions for the settlement of labor disputes. The Works Council Act passed by the parliament in 
January 1920 turned the works councils into a permanent institution (see below). Most of these rules and 
principles enshrined in these laws and decrees, indispensability, general bindingness and works council, are still 
part of the industrial relations institutions in Germany today. Public arbitration boards with power to make 
binding decisions, though, did not survive the Weimar Republic. 
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foist the eight hour working day upon business by law, industry eventually decided for a 
voluntary agreement: 
The eight hour working day is one of the most long-standing demands of organized labor. 
With a revolutionary government, consisting only of workers, one had to suspect that in the 
absence of a concession by the entrepreneurs, the eig t hour working day would be introduced 
by law. A voluntary agreement is, without doubt, worth twice as much as to push one’s luck 
for a compulsory regulation. (Reichert 1919: 12, Reich rt was the executive director of the 
Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists) 
Remarkably, the agreement consisted only of concessions by business to labor, and no 
explicit concessions by labor to business. Why have German industrialists signed an 
agreement that extorted only concessions from them? Clearly, what these industrialists were 
seeking was the willingness of organized labor to collaborate with employers on the crucial 
issues of organizing demobilization and the transition o a peace-time economy,84 and thereby 
colluding with capital in warding off a social revolution. Both sides declared that they ‘are 
resolved to work together in unity concerning all questions pertaining to the demobilization 
and transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy’ (demarche by unions and employer to 
the Reich Chancellery, October 30th, 1918, quoted in Feldman 1976: 332-333 , translated by 
Feldman). 
Remarkably, though, the agreement did not touch upon the issue of nationalization of 
key industries, an important demand of the social democratic labor unions, one which they 
also shared with the revolutionary councilor movement. By accepting the agreement, the labor 
unions had achieved recognition and institutional itegration.85 But they had also effectively 
impeded their aim of nationalizing key industries, notably the heavy industry. It is 
understandable, therefore, that the social democratic unions presented the agreement as being 
a mere intermediary step towards their eventual goa, the socialization of the economy. In 
November 1920, the Federation of Social Democratic Unions (ADGB) declared that the ZAG 
would be ‘a useful tool in the struggle over the conquest of economic power and the 
socialization of the economy. Its importance is limited in time and it will cease, as soon as 
…other organizations are built that integrate workers into the control of the economy’ (quoted 
in Erdmann 1966b: 108, translated from German by TP).
To sum up, the Stinnes-Legien agreement reflects a massive shift in the position of 
German employers towards organized labor, from confrontation and repression towards 
                                                
84 This willingness to collaborate with business is clearly implied in points 10 and 11 of the agreement. 
85 The agreement was signed by the social democratic, as well as the Christian labor unions. 
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negotiations and compromise. In a retrospective on the ZAG published in 1955,86 Hans von 
Raumer, the initiator of the talks, remarked that ‘[s]even entrepreneurs, without any mandate 
by their associations, had made the decision that revolutionized the relationship of the 
entrepreneurs to the unions’ (Raumer 1955, translated from German by TP). The VDA 
executive director Gerhard Erdmann, had in retrospect stated the ultimate purpose of the 
agreement clearly: ‘These men have the historic credit to have contributed considerably, 
through their personal courage, towards keeping chaos and a Bolshevist revolution from the 
German Reich’ (Erdmann 1966b: 99, translated form German by TP). In short, the goal of the 
industrialists that forged the agreement was to pacify the working class with the assistance of 
moderate labor union leaders. 
4. IV Class Collaboration as Social Pacification: Employers’ Motivations 
To understand how the revolutionary situation induced industrialists to change their mind it is 
important to look at the timing of the negotiations. The Stinnes-Legien agreement was not the 
result of a long-run process of rapprochement betwen capital and labor but, to the contrary, 
of a sudden about-face. Before October 1918 German industry in general presented itself 
unwilling to make concessions to organized labor and, with few exceptions, refused to accept 
collective bargaining and institutions of class cooperation and conciliation. Throughout most 
of the war period, German business representatives were adamant that the institutions for 
class conciliation introduced by the Auxiliary Services Law (worker committees at the 
workplace and parity-based arbitration boards) would not be allowed to serve as a precedent 
for the organization of the post-war economy (see sction I above). For most of the war 
period, industry remained unwilling to make the kind of concessions that would have opened 
the way for class collaboration. Only once the revoluti nary challenge became manifest did 
industrialists develop a strong commitment to class compromise. 
 Talks between industrialists and labor union leaders had already begun in 1917 but 
had initially come to naught. Up to the summer of 1918 no discernible progress was made in 
class rapprochement, while in contrast events started to happen very fast during the final 
weeks of the war, when Germany’s defeat was imminent. Negotiations between union leaders 
and industrialists started on October 22nd, 1918, the agreement was signed only three weeks 
later, on November the 15th, 1918 (Raumer 1954: 428-430). This rapid speed-up of events 
                                                
86 The text is a speech written by Raumer in the 1950s by order of the public broadcasting station WDR, which 
produced a radio documentary on the genesis of the S innes-Legien agreement. The fact that this major public 
broadcaster produced a documentary on the Stinnes-Legien agreement underlines the importance given to this 
agreement in Germany. Raumer’s speech was reprinted by the BDI in 1955 (Raumer 1955). 
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points to the crucial importance of uncertainty about the future political-economic order in 
compelling industry to accommodate organized labor. By signing an agreement with the 
unions, they intended to reduce the uncertainty about the future path Germany would choose. 
Even in July 1918, Hans von Raumer, the initiator of the agreement, still had to urge his 
colleagues to resume talks to form an ‘organic collaboration with the unions…before the 
flood of events overcame us all’ (Raumer 1954: 428-9). The purpose of this section is to 
present further archival evidence confirming the importance of social pacification in the 
motivations of industrialists to make concessions to organized labor.  
On October 9th, 1918 German iron industrialists met in Düsseldorf t  discuss what to 
do to prevent revolution and nationalization. The participants of the meeting mandated Hugo 
Stinnes to negotiate with organized labor (Reichert 1919: 7) but did so with apparently mixed 
feelings. The participants were completely clear tht an alliance with organized labor would 
be the only way to stabilize the political situation and to ward off nationalizations and a social 
revolution (Reichert 1919: 6). Though the labor unions had lost strength in the early years of 
the war, due to the conscription of many of their members, they had experienced a rebound in 
their strength after the passing of the Auxiliary Services Law (see chart 4.1 above). Therefore, 
they could potentially serve as a strong ally for business against the revolutionary challenge, 
if their cooperation could be won:  
What was important was: How can one rescue industry? How can….the entrepreneurs be 
saved from socialization…and the approaching revolution? (….) The assembled were 
unanimous in feeling that the government of Prince Max von Baden …was untenable under 
the existing circumstances and that it would soon be brought down. …. In any case, the iron 
industrialists could expect no help from a weak government. …. Only organized labor seemed 
to have the commanding influence. From this fact the conclusion was drawn that, in he midst 
of general great uncertainty, the failing power of the state and the government, industry could 
only find strong allies in the labor camp, and they are the unions (Reichert 1919: 6 emphasis 
added by TP). 
At that time, German heavy industrialists were thus f lly aware of the crumbling 
authority of the old political regime and accepted he need to make sacrifices to organized 
labor in order to gain the desired union assistance i  social pacification. Industry did not trust 
the authorities of the old political regime to be capable of organizing an orderly and smooth 
demobilization and, hence, decided to resort to organized labor, the only actor that had 
sufficient credibility among the demobilized soldiers and munition workers to secure calm 
and order. Consequently, the organization of a joint demobilization programme was the top 
priority for business. The demobilization had to be conducted with great speed in order to 
evacuate enemy territory in time, care had to be tak n for the employment of the returning 
soldiers, food supplies needed to be organized, allocation of raw materials needed to be 
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rearranged, et cetera. Failure to do so would have resulted in millions of returning soldiers 
without employment and income: industrialists feared a large mass that was armed, politically 
discontent, and disoriented. Director Henrich of the Siemens87 group pointed out the dangers 
created by an ill-prepared demobilization in a speech given to colleagues: 
A poorly prepared demobilization will bring revolution and the destruction of industry and our 
economic life by our own people. A poorly prepared final struggle will bring defeat and the 
destruction of our industry by our own soldiers and the foreign troops streaming after them. 
(Director Henrich of Siemens speaking at a meeting of the German Society of Engineers, 
October 20th, 1918, quoted in Feldman 1976: 329, emphasis added by TP). 
 Privy Councilor Hilger, the Silesian heavy industrialist, who had previously belonged 
to the most adamant opponents of concessions to organized labor, responded with enthusiasm 
to the Stinnes-Legien agreement, which he considered as being ‘far more favorable’ than he 
had expected:  
Gentlemen, I stand before you today a Saul transformed into a Paul. Today we cannot get on 
without negotiations with the unions. Yes, gentlemen, we should be happy that the unions still 
find themselves ready to deal with us in the manner i  which they have, for only through 
negotiations with the unions, through our agreement with the unions, can we prevent - call it 
what you will - anarchy, Bolshevism, rule of the Spartacists, or chaos (statement by Privy 
councilor Hilger made at the meeting of the executive committee of the Association of the 
German Iron and Steel Industrialists on November 14, 1918, quoted in Feldman 1992 [1966]: 
528, emphasis added by TP). 
The nationalization of industry was clearly the biggest threat that the revolution posed 
to industry. Hugo Stinnes made this link very clear when he suggested to his colleagues that 
the agreement he and his collaborators had worked out w uld effectively avert the risk of 
nationalizations:  
I would urge you to pay as little attention as possible to these things [demands for 
nationalizations, TP], but take care of this matter [i. ., the agreement] here, for when that is 
made, then the other will disappear of itself [statement made by Stinnes in a meeting on Nov 
14, 1918 quoted in Feldman 1976: 337]  
Anxiety about nationalizations and the fundamental political character of the economic 
order following the revolution clearly took priority over the question of how to organize 
industrial relations in the new state. Social policy and industrial relations issues were of 
secondary importance to industry and concessions on these issues served merely as side-
payments, used deliberately with the purpose to win the support of the unions. Hans von 
Raumer remarked ‘What did a revolution have to offer to the unions at a moment when they 
had achieved the basic goals of their decade-long struggles through a voluntary agreement 
offered by the entrepreneurs?’ (Raumer 1954: 433). 
                                                
87 Note that Siemens himself was part of the negotiating team 
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Industry’s turn to class collaboration should not be mistaken for a conversion in 
underlying beliefs of industrialists about what kind of political-economic order or what kind 
of industrial relations system would be economically most efficient. It was a mere strategic 
adjustment to a dramatically altered context that hd eroded industry’s previous power 
position and confronted it with extraordinary uncertainty about future developments. Carl 
Duisberg of I.G. Farben, the leading representative of the German chemical industry and a 
participant in the Stinnes-Legien negotiations, hadc ndidly confessed how he had managed 
to come to terms with the new political regime:  
From that day when I saw that the cabinet system was bankrupt, I greeted the change to a 
parliamentary system with joy, and I stand today, where what is at stake is what I consider to 
be the highest value, namely the Fatherland, behind t e democratic government and, where 
this is possible, I work hand in hand with the unions and seek in th s way to save what can be 
saved. You see, I am an opportunist and adjust to things as they are [Duisberg to Dr. 
E.A.Merck, Oct 17, 1918, quoted in Feldman 1976: 337, emphasis added by TP] 
Support among the rank-and-file of both sides towards the new approach was fragile 
from the beginning and contributed to the demise of cross-class collaboration in the 
subsequent years. Not all German industrialists were happy about the agreement. The two 
peak-level federations of German industry, the CDI and the BdI, were both unhappy that their 
federations had been bypassed and sent a protest to the government declaring that the 
businessmen involved in the negotiations had no mandate to speak for industry as a whole 
(Feldman 1976: 334). Leaders of regional associations n Rhineland and Saxony criticized 
that the far-reaching concessions made would not have been necessary in their provinces, 
where the situation was calmer, while representatives of smaller and medium-sized firms 
complained that big industry had offered more than what they would be able to afford, in 
particular with respect to the eight hour working day (Reichert 1919: 12; Feldman 1976: 334-
339). It would thus be erroneous to think that all of German industry would have fully 
supported the agreement. 
  The agreement was controversial within the busines  community, but it became 
possible because the political uncertainty at that time and the urgency of the matter allowed a 
group of single-minded industrialists to bypass theusual mechanisms of intra-business 
consultation and, together with their union counterparts, create a fait accompli that also the 
dissenters were compelled to accept. Once the political situation had become more stable the 
interest in class collaboration also started to wane. This holds for both sides. Employers tried 
to retreat on some concessions, in particular the eight hour working day, while unions became 
more reluctant to collaborate. Ordinances and laws passed by the state had already transferred 
the concessions made by employers into legally binding rules, making organized labor less 
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reliant on continued collaboration. The next section l oks at the mixed success of class 
collaboration in practice. 
4. V Class Collaboration in Practice: The Erosion of Consensus 
The operation in practice of the joint committee set up by the agreement, the ZAG, fell far 
short of the expectations and its implementation progressed only slowly. It took more than 
one year for the committee’s bylaws to be passed on its constituent assembly on December 
12th, 1919 (Berg and BDI 1956: 201). Once the revolutionary moment had receded, employers 
were trying to retreat on some of the concessions made, in particular concerning the eight 
hour working. Cooperation within the ZAG started to crumble already in 1920 (Berg and BDI 
1956: 202). The committee was finally dissolved in 1924, when the social democratic union 
federation (ADGB) left the ZAG in response to employers in some sectors unilaterally 
abandoning the eight-hour working day. The construction and metal worker unions had 
already left the ZAG in 1922 (Berg and BDI 1956: 203). However, after the ADGB had left, 
only the Christian Democratic unions remained in the ZAG, in effect condemning the ZAG to 
irrelevance. Employers became unwilling to sustain the ZAG through concessions to the 
unions, which resulted in the unions abandoning the ZAG. In short, once the uniting forces of 
the revolution had disappeared, irreconcilable conflicts surfaced again and both sides returned 
to their pre-war positions and strategies of class confrontation (Leckebusch 1966: 73). 
The Provisional National Economic Council 
The establishment of a new institution for corporatist policy-making, the Provisional National 
Economic Council (“Provisorischer Reichswirtschaftsrat”), further contributed to the demise 
of the ZAG by creating a competing arena for negotiati n and compromise, though also this 
institution remained largely ineffectual. This body was established in April 1920, based on a 
programme for ‘economic democracy’ that was advocated by the social democratic Minister 
of Economics, Wissell, and the social democratic labor unions (Leckebusch 1966: 79; Tänzler 
1929: 156). After the social democratic-led governme t had decided that plans for a 
nationalization of the heavy industry were premature (Carr 1979: 270), the focus of social 
democratic and labor union policy shifted to the concept of ‘economic democracy’ instead. 
This concept was based on the idea of democratic self-governance of the economy, based on 
equal representation rights for workers and employers.  
 The formation of corporatist bodies of economic governance was envisaged in the 
Weimar Constitution. According to Art. 165 (3) of the constitution, parity-based consultative 
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bodies, the ‘economic councils’, were to be established at all levels of the economy, from the 
local via the regional up to the national level. While the works councils established labor 
representation at the level of the workplace, the economic councils would serve a similar 
purpose at the higher political levels. The National Economic Council was supposed to form 
the peak-level of this multi-level structure of ‘economic democracy’. The establishment of the 
intermediate level bodies did however never occur and the programme got stuck as a result of 
the intensifying disagreements between capital and l bor (Braunthal 1978: 169-171).  
The Provisional National Economic Council established in 1920 was the only of these 
corporatist institutions provided in the Weimar Constitution that was actually put into 
practice. The Council was intended as a ‘parliament of the economy’, though it possessed 
only very limited competencies. The limited definition of competencies was the result of a 
compromise in the constituent assembly between socialist and bourgeois parties (Berg and 
BDI 1956: 205). Its main competence was to issue non-binding opinions on planned 
legislation in the field of economic and social policies. The Council was effectively 
competing for competencies with the ZAG committee and thereby contributed to the demise 
of the ZAG (Tänzler 1929: 172). 
 Similarly to the ZAG, the Economic Council also remained a largely ineffectual body. 
The Council was made up of 326 members that were organized into three groups, employers, 
workers and other interest groups88 (Leckebusch 1966: 79, Fn.214). The size of the body and 
the inclusion of the third group, the ‘others’, had both contributed to the ineffectualness of the 
Council. Finding a majority in the Council was generally difficult. In cases of a conflict 
between capital and labor, members from the third group often provided the crucial votes for 
one of the two sides to gain a majority. This reduced the need for capital and labor to find 
compromises, as each side could hope to find allies for its position from among the third 
group (Erdmann 1966b: 111; Braunthal 1965: 187). 
Despite the eventual failure of the ZAG to establish a body of corporatist governance 
at the national level, the Stinnes-Legien agreement r mains enormously important for the 
subsequent development of the industrial relations n Germany, because the concessions made 
by employers were transferred into law. Some of the concessions originally made by business 
were, however, later withdrawn, in particular the eight-hour working day. 
                                                
88 The third group included, inter alia, academics, consumers, free professions and public authorities 
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The working time conflict: Withdrawal of concessions 
The transformation of the basic elements of the Stinnes-Legien agreement into law meant the 
institutionalization of the cross-class compromise forged during the revolutionary post-war 
situation. The public arbitration boards and the eight-hour working day became the main 
targets of attack by employers. The Stinnes-Legien agreement specified that daily working 
time should not exceed eight hours. Demobilization decrees had turned this rule into law 
(Leckebusch 1966: 76). The eight-hour working day did, however, turn out to be at odds with 
economic exigencies. The effort to rebuild economic production and the obligation imposed 
on Germany by the Peace Treaties to make reparation payments to the victors, part of these in 
the form of deliveries of coal, steel and agricultural products, strained the production 
capacities of the German coal mines and led to a serious lack of coal supply. The coalmining 
industry responded to this by trying to extend overtime work, an attempt that met with 
substantial resistance by the coalmining unions (Erdmann 1966b: 136). 
 In 1922 German heavy industry stepped up its campaign against the existing working 
time regulations and demanded that they be made morflexible. In October 1923 the peak-
level federation VDA issued a memorandum declaring that only a “return to pre-war working 
times” would allow the economic reconstruction of Germany. After the validity of the 
demobilization decrees regulating working time had expired, the coalmines exploited the 
regulatory vacuum and extend working time unilaterally, that is, without the consent of the 
unions (the so-called ‘Unna decision’). 
  Attempts by the Social Democratic parliamentary faction to extend the validity of 
working time regulations did not find a parliamentary majority and, as a consequence, the pre-
1918 rules were reinstated. The social democratic-led grand coalition, headed by Stresseman, 
collapsed over the working time issue and the labor unions in 1924 left the ZAG in protest 
over the unilateral behavior of employers on this is ue. In December 1923 the new 
government, a coalition of non-socialist parties, decreed a new working time regulation that 
accommodated the demands of the heavy industry for more flexibility. The working day could 
be extended to 10 hours by collective agreements or by government decree. Subsequently, 
collective agreements became the basis for working t me regulation, strengthening the 




The introduction of mandatory works councils, as institutions for the representation of worker 
interests at the workplace, was one of the most substantial and durable outcomes of the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement. As mentioned in section I, mandatory works councils were 
introduced already by the Auxiliary Services Law in 1916, but at that time were accepted by 
employers only as a temporary institution, valid for the period of the war only. In the Stinnes-
Legien agreement (Point 7), employers accepted mandatory works as a permanent institution. 
A few months later, employers decided to oppose the Works Council Law passed by 
parliament in January 1920. In the meantime, the political situation had stabilized sufficiently 
for employers to recover from the shock of revolutin. With their regained confidence, 
employers tried to withdraw the concession they made only one year before. Employers 
claimed that the government bill would provide the works councils with too far-reaching 
competencies, in particular in regard to co-determination rights concerning the hiring and 
firing of workers and the introduction of new production methods (Berg and BDI 1956: 209-
211). Moreover, they suspected that works councils would harm cooperative labor relations 
by creating a platform for political agitation (Leckebusch 1966: 78-79; Tänzler 1929: 211). 
Worker demands for elected representatives at the workplace date back to proposals 
presented to the revolutionary Frankfurt Parliament in 1849. Already from the 1880s on, 
precursors of works councils were established by some firms on a voluntary basis. The 
Worker Protection Law (“Arbeiterschutzgesetz”) of 1890 recognized works councils as a 
voluntary option for firms. The Prussian Mining Law of 1905 for the first time established 
works councils on a compulsory basis, though the law only applied to Prussian coalmines. 
The War Auxiliary Services Law then institutionalized works councils on a broader basis, 
albeit only for the period of the war (Leckebusch 1966: 77-78; Thelen 1991: Ch.3). In the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement German employers eventually consented to works councils as a 
mandatory institution for the whole economy. In Janu ry 1920, the national parliament with a 
broad majority (215-63) passed a law that institutionalized mandatory works councils 
(Braunthal 1978: 167-168).  
The 1920 Works Council Law (“Betriebsrätegesetz”) obliged all firms that 
permanently employed more than 20 workers to establi h a works council. According to the 
law, the works councils were supposed to fulfill a double function: first, to represent the 
“common interests of the employees” vis-à-vis the entrepreneur and, second, to support the 
employer in achieving the “purpose of his business” ( §1 of the Works Councils Law, adopted 
by the German National Assembly on January 18th, 1920). Works councils were not allowed 
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to initiate or participate in strikes and were obliged to cooperate with the employer to ‘protect 
the plant from unrest’ (Markovits 1986: 34). Thus, the works councils had to represent labor 
interests and assist the employer at the same time. The double purpose reflects a compromise 
between capital and labor, though in practice, works councils limited themselves to 
representing the interests of workers. 
Employers responded to the passing of the law with despair. They feared that the 
works councils would become a vehicle for political agitation and radicalization among 
workers (Tänzler 1929: 211; Berg and BDI 1956: 209-11). At the VDA general assembly in 
1919, the employer federation issued the bleak warning that ‘the introduction of works 
councils and their prospective competences mean such a deep intervention into the 
entrepreneur's right to self-determination and respon ibility that...a damage to the enterprises 
and the whole industry would be the consequence.’ (quoted in Braun 1927: 46, translated 
from German by TP).89 The implementation of the law was uneven. Some employers refused 
to comply (Brigl-Matthiaß 1926: 76). They did not set up works councils at all or dismissed 
councilors that they considered to make undue use of their rights in order to intimidate other 
councilors and make them quiescent (Guillebaud 1928: 2 5). Other firms reportedly made 
positive experiences with works councils and admitted that the initial fears had not 
materialized90 (Erdmann 1966b: 144-145). 
                                                
89Subsequently, the conflict between organized labor nd employers focused more on the precise delimitaton of 
the power of works councils, rather than on their ex st nce as such. Employers demanded that works council 
competencies should be limited to labor issues, while t e labor unions wanted the works councils to be involved 
on all issues of business policy. The law did not specify the precise areas of interests where works coun ils 
would be entitled to act, except for declaring that t e works councils had a right to veto dismissals. The conflict 
over works councils competencies involved in particular the implementing regulations that defined the rights and 
competencies of works councils. In February 1921 an implementing regulation obliged firms to present their 
balance sheets to their works council. One year later, works councils became entitled to be represented as a 
minority group in the supervisory boards of firms (Fürstenberg 1978: 2). The competencies of works councils 
where, thus, extended far beyond social issues into economic issues, that had hitherto been the prerogative of the 
entrepreneur. (Erdmann 1966b: 139-146). 
 
90 The following statements from the mining industry illustrates the changing attitude towards works coun ils:  
‘In retrospect, after three years of practical experience with the works councils, one can definitely make the satisfying 
statement that the Works Council Law, which was initially ….seen as a wedge [separating capital and labor] harming labor 
peace and as a cause of economic decay, has become a tool for the stabilization of labor peace and the rapprochement 
between employer and employees,…, [that is]not to be sneezed at. …. 
Today, one can make the pleasant statement that one has been mistaken and that the great mass of German people take a 
much more realistic and reasonable [‘wirtschaftsvernünftig’] position on economic issues than what one had dared to hope, 
[and] that the revolutionary and councillor movements of the initial demobilization period was merely the consequence of a 
not very dramatic fire blight that was raked by foreign ideas’ (Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung, No.28, 1923, quoted in Erdmann 




The Stinnes-Legien agreement is a case of strategic cross-class collaboration, motivated by 
the goal of industrialists to pacify the population with the assistance of pragmatic labor union 
leaders. The concessions made in this agreement have shaped the institutions of German 
industrial relations up to the present, most importantly the works councils and rules for 
sectoral collective bargaining. The agreement was, first and foremost, an ad hoc response to 
the threat of a socialist revolution, which united employers and union leaders, rather than the 
product of foresighted industrialists trying to design economically efficient labor market 
institutions. Class cooperation in the ZAG committee collapsed after a few years. Employers 
retracted from major concessions once the political situation had stabilized, most importantly 
the eight-hour working day, resulting in the collapse of institutionalized cross-class 
collaboration in 1924. With the containment of the revolutionary movement, the goal of social 
pacification lost relevance. 
During most of the war period, like before the war, the vast majority of German 
employers refused to negotiate with labor unions and viewed their reformist demands as the 
main threat, rather than the political radicalization of the unorganized working class. Only as 
late as autumn 1918 did key segments of German industry changed their mind. They did so to 
prevent a social revolution and a further intensification of state interventionism. What had 
changed, compared to before the war, was the role of the state, both its actual and its 
anticipated future role. Before the war, employers could rely on the government as their ally 
against organized labor. The pre-war German state took a non-interventionist position on 
economic issues and, even after abolishing the anti-socialist laws in 1890, was trying to 
repress the socialist labor movement by various means. The war changed this. The army 
turned to organized labor for assistance in order to sustain popular support for the war effort. 
At the same time, entrepreneurial freedom became highly restricted by war-time economic 
planning. German business was left without a reliable ally. The war had alienated industry 
from its old ally, the government, and, at the same ti e, had turned organized labor into a 
more respectable force in the view of industry. 
The sudden change of mind by German employers was an attempt to reduce the 
extraordinary uncertainty about Germany’s future political-economic order through a 
negotiated compromise with the unions. The collapse of the old regime and the revolutionary 
threat made the big industrialists politically powerless and dependent on the cooperation of 
 
139 
the unions to build a bulwark against a socialist revolution.91 Industry feared the 
collectivization of industrial ownership and a massive intensification of state interventionism 
if the revolution would succeed. The revolutionary movement receded after the initial post-
war period and the Weimar system of parliamentary democracy showed first signs of 
stabilization. At the same time, also cross-class collaboration began to crumble. After heavy 
industry employers had unilaterally annulled the eight-hour working day in 1924, the labor 
unions withdrew from the ZAG, meaning the collapse of this form of institutionalized cross-
class collaboration. Several attempts in the coming years to reinvigorate the ZAG failed. In 
the absence of a unifying challenge, the political mood had started to turn toward class 
polarization again. 
This chapter has tried to show that strategic accomm dation to a situation of 
extraordinary political and economic uncertainty is better able to explain the Stinnes-Legien 
agreement than a genuine preference of German employers for cultivating social compromise. 
The latter interpretation is suggested, for instance, by an argument presented in Cusack, 
Iversen and Soskice (2007: 377-381). According to these authors, employers relying on so-
called asset-specific skills should be expected to actively seek and cultivate institutions of 
cross-class cooperation and collaboration. Cusack et al. use the Stinnes-Legien agreement and 
the ZAG as an example illustrating the validity of their argument (Cusack et al. 2007: 380). 
The fragile and short-lived character of cross-class collaboration in the ZAG does, however, 
not fit the expectation of a genuine employer preference for social compromise, neither does 
the development of collective bargaining before World War I (see chapter 2). Moreover, as 
this chapter has shown, the historical sources do not provide any evidence that issues of skill 
formation would played a role in employer deliberations leading to the agreement. Instead, 
these deliberations were overwhelmingly dominated by fears of a social revolution. 
  The institutions and policies created by the Stinnes-Legien agreement were mere 
concessions to the labor unions, rather than a reflection of genuinely held preferences by 
industrial employers. They were not the result of far-sighted industrialists trying to design a 
                                                
91 The historian Arthur Rosenberg had remarked about the Stinnes-Legien agreement that ‘The great 
industrialists were now just as powerless as the feudal class which had ruled Germany until 1918’ and that ‘They 
were ready to accept anything if only they could keep their property’ (Rosenberg 1977: 278, translation aken 
from Feldman 1976: 336). Arguing in a similar way, the German historian Jürgen Kocka has emphasized that the 
ZAG “was probably the strongest bulwark against extreme revolutionary change’(Kocka 1984: 161). German 
employers had come to accept collective bargaining, works councils and cooperation with unions in the face of 
an imminent social revolution. Though collective bargaining had already been accepted by a few sectors on a 
voluntary basis before the war (see chapter 2) it took the threat of a social revolution to eventually make a 
national cross-class agreement possible.  
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modern production regime in line with the production requirements of their firms. They were 
motivated by the goal of winning the collaboration by the labor unions in organizing 
economic demobilization and pacifying the population. Industry’s consent to collective 
bargaining and other institutions for cross-class conciliation, I argue, has not been supported 
by a conversion in beliefs and preferences about what kind of industrial relations system 
would be most beneficial for organizing industrial production, but was an accommodation to 
the temporary political weakness of industry. 
  It is revealing to note that already one month afer the signing of the agreement Hugo 
Stinnes started to fund a precursor of the Nazi movement (Feldman 1992 [1966]: 529). No 
sustained ‘spiritual conversion’ towards class compromise and conciliation had occurred 
during this period. Institutions of class compromise in the Weimar Republic remained fragile. 
Support for class collaboration among the rank-and-file on both sides remained limited. The 
difficult economic situation severely curtailed the room for distributive compromises and 
ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Little over a decade after the 
signing of the Stinnes-Legien agreement important heavy industrialists decided to support 
Adolph Hitler in his bid for power (Hallgarten 1955; Turner 1985).  
*** 
 
A sustained conversion of employers towards social ompromise became possible 
only after World War II, when business resorted to the concept of the ‘social market 
economy’. Even though, the Weimar Republic was initially characterized by cross-class 
collaboration, rather than conflict, employers and u ions failed to construct a viable model of 
cross-class cooperation and corporatist forms of interest reconciliation during this period. 
Before the collapse of the Weimar Republic in the wake of the economic crisis that started in 
1929, however, capital and labor, once more, managed to come to a compromise on a major 
political issue: the introduction of unemployment isurance in 1927. German employers had 
long opposed the introduction of unemployment insurance, before eventually accepting its 
introduction in 1927. The next chapter looks at why, despite intensifying class antagonisms, a 




5 Business and the Origins of Unemployment Insurance: Protecting Work 
Incentives 
 
A people of strong force of will and progressive energy would not brand itself with the 
stigma of inferiority…by passing a law about the insurance of unemployment; i.e., the 
acceptance of a [social] cancer by the state (…) Let us stop with this greenhouse culture and 
acclimate our people to a rougher climate. (…) Let us not forget that a healthy and just 
struggle for the daily bread is indeed advantageous (Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung, No.44, 
October 10th, 1920, quoted in Führer 1990: 212-213, translated by TP) 
 
The topic of unemployment insurance is pivotal to the debate about the role of employers in 
the formation of the welfare state. The cross class coalition thesis and political 
accommodation thesis make opposite claims about the pref rences of employers with respect 
to unemployment insurance. In 1927 Germany introduce  public unemployment insurance. 
Before the war, in the German Empire, employers fundamentally opposed any form of 
unemployment insurance. After the war, in the Weimar Republic, they decided to endorse the 
introduction of public unemployment insurance. How can we explain this turn of employers 
from opposing to endorsing unemployment insurance? What motivated employers to change 
their mind? 92 
Unemployment insurance is a crucial case for the cross-class coalition thesis, a 
programme that is seen by protagonists of this argument as essential for firms relying on a 
high-skill production strategy. The cross-class coaliti n approach interprets the establishment 
of unemployment insurance as the product of a politica  alliance between labor and important 
segments of capital. The main motivation for employers to support unemployment insurance 
is seen in the assumed positive effects of unemployment insurance on skill investments. 
Building on insights from the VoC school, this explanation stresses the importance of 
unemployment insurance for encouraging investments in firm and industry-specific skills. 
Earnings-related unemployment insurance benefits guarantee the worker that his investment 
in specific skills will not be devalued during times of unemployment and thus ‘reward the 
                                                
92 This chapter draws in particular on the PhD thesis by the German historian Carl Christian Führer (Führer 
1990), which concerns the introduction of unemployment insurance in Germany (1902-1927), as well as on the 
work by Anselm Faust (Faust 1986, 1987) and by Michael Wermel and Roswitha Urban (Wermel and Urban 
1949). 
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worker for his or her specific skill investment even when the worker is out of work’ (Estévez-
Abe et al. 2001: 152). Unemployment insurance is thus understood as an incentive for 
workers to invest in specific skills. Building on this insight, protagonists of the cross class 
coalition thesis suggest that employers that are dep ndent on specific skills actively promoted 
the introduction of unemployment insurance, because workers’ investments in specific skills 
were in their economic self-interest (Mares 2003a: Ch.2 ; Estévez-Abe et al. 2001: 180-181).  
 The political accommodation thesis suggests an alternative explanation assuming that 
employers’ acceptance of unemployment insurance derived from political accommodation, 
rather than from genuine preferences. Relying on Esping-Andersen’s concept of 
decommodification, this approach expects employers to oppose unemployment insurance. 
Esping-Andersen defines decommodification as a policy outcome characterized by the fact 
that ‘a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market’ (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 22). Compensation during periods of unemployment makes workers less vulnerable to 
the risk of unemployment. It raises the reservation wage and is therefore likely to undermine 
work incentives. It is for this reason that Esping-Andersen expects employers to oppose social 
policies (Esping-Andersen 1990: 22). Following this approach, one should expect employers 
to oppose unemployment insurance, because of its expected negative effects on work 
incentives and labor supply. If this argument is correct, employers’ acceptance of 
unemployment insurance is most likely the result from a strategic accommodation to a 
changing political context, rather than an expression of genuine employer preferences rooted 
in their economic interests. 
This chapter analyzes the introduction of unemployment insurance in Germany with 
the purpose of examining the ability of these two competing hypotheses to explain the 
positions that German employers took during the politica  processes that led to the 
introduction of public unemployment insurance in 1927. Did employers actively promote the 
introduction of unemployment insurance, as the cross-class coalition thesis predicts? Or, 
alternatively, did employers accept unemployment insurance for strategic reasons as the 
political accommodation thesis predicts? What role did skill investments and strategic 
considerations play in shaping employers’ position t wards unemployment insurance? 
Answering this question has a twofold purpose. First, it is likely to improve our understanding 
of the role of employers in welfare state development; and, second, it is likely to further our 
theoretical understanding of how employer associations from their social policy preferences. 
 The two arguments differ in their predictions because they rely on markedly different 
assumptions about what kind of rationale employers follow in forming their political 
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objectives. The cross class coalition thesis relies on an economic rationale, the political 
accommodation thesis on a political rationale. The economic rationale consists of the goal of 
improving economic efficiency and labor productivity. The political rationale consists of the 
goal of maintaining political influence by accommodating to an unfavorable political context. 
By examining the relative importance of economic and political rationales and objectives, this 
chapter thus also contributes to a better understanding of what shapes employers’ political 
behavior. 
 The chapter is structured as follows: after elaborting the arguments on which the two 
alternative explanations are based in some more detail, the chapter provides a detailed 
historical narrative of how the introduction of unemployment insurance came about. The 
chapter discusses the attitude of German employers towards unemployment insurance in the 
context of the Wilhelmine Empire and the Weimar Republic, respectively, and shows that 
differences in political context between these two regimes have been instrumental in making 
employers change their mind (section I-III). Finally, the chapter discusses the validity of the 
two alternative explanations with regard to unemployment insurance in the light of the 
empirical evidence (section IV). 
Business and unemployment insurance: Two alternative explanations 
German business had adamantly opposed calls for unemployment insurance up to World War 
I (as shown in section I). After the war, the employer federation VDA came to reverse its 
position and decided to endorse plans for a public unemployment insurance (as shown in 
section III). The cross-class coalition thesis and the political accommodation thesis provide 
two alternative ways of explaining and understanding this reversal. These two approaches 
differ in the kind of motivations they assume to have led to this change. While the cross-class 
coalition thesis suggests that the new position came about as a result of changing preferences 
among employers, the strategic accommodation thesis suggests that the change was merely a 
strategic adjustment of employers to an inevitable political reality. This section revisits the 
key arguments in this theoretical controversy, which were already briefly outlined in the 
introductory chapter.  
Central to the cross-class coalition thesis is the argument that employers played a 
crucial role in welfare state development by actively promoting the introduction of new social 
policies. Estévez-Abe et al., for instance, expect that employers will actively promote 
unemployment insurance, because unemployment insurace encourages workers to invest in 
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specific skills93 and thus skill-based production strategies. These authors argue that ‘social 
protection often stems from the strength rather than e weakness of employers’ (Estévez-Abe 
et al. 2001: 181). In a similar way, Mares argues that ‘for large firms, considerations about the 
need to institutionalize guarantees to their workers that the investment in their skills would 
not be undermined during periods of unemployment were of paramount importance’ (Mares 
2003a: 147). In this view, employers are expected to promote unemployment insurance, 
because “institutions of social protection help employers overcome market failures in skill 
formation” (Mares 2003a: 251). This argument suggests an explanation of employers’ 
endorsement of the 1927 unemployment insurance law th t builds on the reliance of dominant 
groups within German industry on asset-specific skills. The political accommodation thesis, 
in contrast, suggests an understanding of employers’ ndorsement of unemployment 
insurance as a strategic accommodation to a changed political context, a context where 
continued opposition would have turned employers into i effectual bystanders. 
These two alternative explanations link to the theoretical controversy about the nature 
of employers’ social policy objectives. This controversy builds on a distinction between 
‘genuine’ and ‘strategic’ preferences. Both explanations build on this distinction. Political 
behavior may be motivated by so-called ‘first order’ or ‘genuine’ preferences. Preferences are 
considered to be ‘first order’, or ‘genuine’ or ‘real’ or ‘pre-strategic’, when they derive 
directly from the perceived self-interests of an actor. They are unaffected by considerations 
about what is politically feasible. Alternatively, political behavior may be motivated by so-
called ‘lower order’ or ‘strategic’ preferences. These preferences result from actors’ 
accommodation with what they consider politically feasible in a given situation. To put it 
simply, strategic preferences represent a ‘lesser evil’ or second best option to an actor. The 
cross class coalition thesis emphasizes the first type of motivation, the strategic 
accommodation thesis the latter . 
The interpretation of the 1927 unemployment insurance reform as the result of a 
change in genuine preferences among German industrialists has been articulated in its clearest 
and most sophisticated form in the work of Isabela Mares:  
…the change in the preference of employers from a rejection of any system of compensation 
against the effects of unemployment to a support of a system of contributory unemployment 
insurance is not simply a change in the strategic preferences of employers (that results from 
the interaction with other social actors) or of employers' anticipation of a policy outcome that 
has a high probability of being successful, but a ch nge in the ‘real’ or ‘pre-strategic’ 
preference of employers, that is in turn caused by changes in the balance of power among 
employers from ‘traditional’ industries (such as iron and steel) to more skill-intense industries 
                                                
93 Unemployment insurance is one of three policies identified by Estevez-Abe et al. as promoting skill 
investments, the other two being income protection through collective bargaining and employment protection. 
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that rely more heavily on exports (chemicals, machine tools, electricals) and by differences in 
the structure of the risk of unemployment faced by these industries (Mares 1996: 30). 
Consistent with this interpretation of business endorsement of unemployment insurance 
as driven by first-order preferences, Mares also emphasizes that employer support had been 
crucial for the success of the reform. Without the change in employer preferences the 
introduction of unemployment insurance would have been far less likely to succeed. 
Therefore, employer preferences constitute an important cause of welfare state formation:  
This change in the preference of employers and their final collaboration in the introduction of 
unemployment insurance is the crucial factor which facilitated the passing of the 
unemployment insurance bill in 1927 (Mares 1996: 5 , emphasis added by TP). 
This chapter takes issue with this account and develops an alternative account which 
explains employers’ endorsement of unemployment insurance as the result of a strategic 
accommodation by German business to changes in the political context. I argue that 
employers genuine, first-order, preference had been a labor market free of any form of 
unemployment protection. Given that this option ceased to be politically viable for specific 
reasons, employers were compelled to choose their ‘lesser evil’ among several of the 
politically viable options. As the range of viable policy options changed over time, employers 
decided to accommodate and changed their positions in turn. Positions changed because 
external conditions limited the range of options available. Employers were fighting for their 
economic self-interests, but which policy they considered to meet their interests best 
depended on the specific political context and how it shaped the policy options available to 
choose from. 
Clearly, political behavior is in reality always motivated by a combination of real and 
strategic preferences, rather than exclusively by the one or the other. Developing strategic 
preferences on a given policy issue only makes sense for a political actor as long as the actor 
also holds a genuine, first-order preference related to that policy issue. Without holding any 
genuine preferences, there is no need for forming strategic preferences. However, which of 
the two components of actor motivations we put emphasis on is not a moot or abstract issue 
but is of importance for how we understand and explain the origins of the welfare state. If 
business support for social policy had been the direct result of genuine, first-order 
preferences, then any explanation of the historical origins of the welfare state has to take into 
account the economic self-interests of firms as a constitutive cause of welfare state 
development. If, in contrast, business support had been motivated by strategic considerations, 
then the political circumstances that motivated this accommodation turn out as the crucial 
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factor facilitating the political compromises that have shaped the formation of the modern 
welfare state, rather than the economic interests of firms per se. The two explanations thus 
lead to different explanations about the causal forces of welfare state development. 
5. I The Wilhelmine Empire: Employers against Unemployment Insurance 
In line with what the de-commodification thesis predicts, German employers had originally 
been strongly opposed to any form of support for the unemployed (Centralverband Deutscher 
Industrieller 1913: 2). After the war, they had come to change their position and, after a 
period of wavering and internal undecidedness, had in the end, in 1926, decided to cooperate 
with government in the drafting of a bill establishing a public unemployment insurance. In 
1892, Bueck, the influential executive director of the Central Association of German 
Industrialists (CDI) had called unemployment insurance a ‘monstrous project’ (quoted in 
Faust 1986: 170). Three years later (1895), he had declared that unemployment insurance was 
‘decisively rejected’ by the CDI (quoted in Faust 1986: 171).This section first briefly presents 
the positions of the other major political actors before turning to the reasons for employers’ 
opposition to unemployment insurance during the Wilhelmine Empire (1871-1918). 
The political debate  
The issue of unemployment insurance first appeared on the political agenda during the 1890s. 
At that time, public support to unemployed workers was very limited and unemployed 
workers often relied on union-run funds instead. Responsibility for supporting unemployed 
persons rested with the municipalities, which were responsible for organizing public relief 
works. From about the turn of the century on, some municipalities started to provide subsidies 
to union-run unemployment insurance schemes in order to alleviate the financial burden on 
municipal relief programmes (Hennock 2007: 308-314). A few towns also started to organize 
their own municipal unemployment insurance schemes (Hennock 2007: 315). Most 
municipalities, however, were reluctant to establish their own unemployment support schemes 
and favored a nationwide unemployment insurance inst ad (Führer 1990: 116-118).  
Concrete proposals for a nationwide unemployment insurance programme came first 
from the bourgeois social reformers. In 1894, the economist Georg Adler produced the first 
proposal for a public unemployment insurance scheme, organized on a mandatory basis and 
financed jointly by the state, employers and workers (Faust 1986: 151). This proposal, as well 
as similar proposals by other reform-minded academics, did however not find much political 
endorsement. Support for these proposals came chiefly from the municipalities, which hoped 
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for a mitigation of the cost burden on municipal relief works (Führer 1990: 114-116). The 
municipalities were however unable to find powerful allies at that time. 
The social democratic labor movement was split on the issue of unemployment 
insurance. At SPD party congresses in 1893 and 1894a majority of delegates voted against 
proposals for public unemployment insurance (Führer 1990: 52). The social democratic labor 
movement was wavering between two options: unemployment insurance organized by the 
state or unemployment insurance organized by the unions, the so-called ‘Ghent system’. The 
social democratic labor unions had started to build p Ghent schemes from about the 1890s 
on. These schemes provided benefits to union members only. The unions’ main motivation 
for building up Ghent schemes was to use these schemes to mobilize the working class and to 
bolster their financial strength during strikes. In 1891, 12.9 per cent of all union members 
were insured against unemployment by Ghent schemes, by 1905 the share had increased to 
65.6 per cent and by 1913 to 81.3 per cent (Führer 1990: 55).  
The social democratic labor unions rejected the social reformers’ proposals for public 
unemployment insurance and demanded instead subsidies by the state and by employers for 
their own Ghent schemes. The motivation for this poition was twofold: First, unions feared 
competition by a public unemployment insurance programme to crowd out their own Ghent 
programmes. Second, they did not trust the sincerity of government intentions. In the hands of 
the authoritarian political regime, they suspected, unemployment insurance would become a 
tool that would be turned against the working class. The unions suspected that the government 
would misuse unemployment insurance for wage dumping and the disciplining of the working 
class, in particular by forcing benefit recipients to accept low-paid or under-skilled jobs or to 
serve as strike breakers (Führer 1990: 59). Under the conditions of an authoritarian political 
regime, the labor unions were thus not prepared to entrust the state with supporting the 
unemployed. 
Within the Social Democratic Party views diverged. The social democratic labor 
unions (“Freie Gewerkschaften”) formed the moderate wing of the party and had a strong 
voice within the party. Consequently, a large part of the party supported the Ghent system and 
preferred public subsidies to these schemes, instead of  public programme. Supporters of a 
public unemployment insurance initially remained a minority within the party. Only in the 
years before World War I (ca. 1911-1914) both the party and the unions shifted their stance in 
favor of a position aiming at a public insurance soluti n. The Ghent system was now 
perceived as being only a transitional solution for the problem of unemployment, while in the 
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longer run unions and party would aim at a public unemployment insurance in tandem with a 
democratization of the political regime (Führer 1990: 67-69). 
Industrial employers and unemployment insurance 
The stance of industrial employers towards the issue of unemployment insurance was more 
stable during that period: they resolutely opposed any form of financial support to the 
unemployed. Their opposition was motivated by two basic types of concerns. First, they 
suspected that unemployment insurance would have negativ  effects on work discipline and 
work incentives. Second, they feared an unbearable incr ase in labor costs (Führer 1990: 201-
221). Regarding the first concern, unemployment insurance was suspected to undermine the 
employer’s position of authority vis-à-vis his worke s, thereby corroding work discipline. 
Unlike programmes that protect against the risks of old age, disability, sickness and work 
injury; unemployment insurance protects workers that are in principle capable to work. 
Unemployment insurance makes individual workers less dependent on their employer by 
providing them with a prospect of maintaining a live hood even without working. 
Programmes insuring against the risks of old age, disability, work injury and sickness protect 
only those types of workers that would be unable to work anyway or could not be expected to 
work. Unemployment insurance, in contrast, protects workers who are, in principle, assumed 
to be capable to work. Unemployment insurance reducs their dependence on work and thus 
the authority of the employer over them. 
 German employers at that time suspected that the decline of workers’ dependence on 
work, their decommodification, would harm work discipline and foster idleness. They 
suspected unemployment insurance to promote the formation of an ‘army of layabouts’, 
workers who would prefer to live from social benefits rather than work. Consistent with this 
view, employers also blamed unemployment on deficiencies of the individual. They 
understood the occurrence of unemployment as the result of an individual worker being unfit 
or unwilling to work, rather than as the result of macro-economic conditions. Employers 
argued that unemployment was generally low and, where unemployment occurred, it would 
usually be the fault of the unemployed person itself. Employer periodicals presented 
unemployment insurance as being a mere ‘premium on lazi ess’ financed by the employer 
(Der Arbeitgeber, No.2, 15.01.1914: 18) (also DAGZ, No.8, 23.2.1919: 2) (Faust 1986: 170-
172). In short, employers opposed unemployment insurance because of suspected negative 
effects on work incentives. 
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The second reason why employers opposed unemployment insurance concerned the 
suspected rise in labor costs. Industry pointed out that it had already accepted the introduction 
of several social reforms in the 1880s, and was nowunable to cope with any further increase 
in labor costs (Faust 1986: 170). Bismarck’s social insurance reforms in the 1880s included 
programmes for the protection of workers against work injury, sickness, occupational 
disability and old age. These reforms were supported by German industry primarily because 
the reforms were seen as an instrument for the pacific tion of the working class (see chapter 
3). The reforms, however, failed to have the expected pacifying effect and unions continued to 
gain strength during the 1890s and 1900s. The CDI noted this with discontent (Bueck 1905a: 
792). Soon after Bismarck’s social policy reforms had been enacted, German industry 
changed its position and turned against the further expansion of social insurance as intended 
by the government. German industrialists started to argue that the financial limits of social 
policy expansion had now been reached. Higher labor costs would harm industry’s 
international competitiveness and lead to job losses (Büren 1934: 60-86). 
 The bourgeois parties seconded the employers’ position. The Conservative Party, 
representing the interests of the landed aristocracy and agriculture, was resolutely opposed to 
unemployment insurance. Due to the massive migration of workers into the cities, agriculture 
was suffering from a lack of labor supply. The Conservatives suspected unemployment 
insurance to eliminate the incentives for unemployed urban workers to return back to 
agriculture and, for this reason, sided with the employers. Also the National Liberal Party, the 
party with the closes ties to industry (see tables 3.2), rejected proposals for a public 
unemployment insurance scheme, arguing that such plans would undermine the sense of 
personal responsibility among workers.  
 The Catholic Center Party, which had a very heterog neous social base, remained 
internally divided and remained inactive on this issue. The two small left-wing liberal parties, 
Freisinnige Partei and Deutsche Volkspartei, were considering supporting a public 
unemployment insurance but remained, on the whole, inactive on this issue. To conclude, 
before World War I, German employers could rely on the support of a stable parliamentary 
majority against the introduction of public unemployment insurance. Last, but not least, the 
national government was reluctant to take up the issue and remained inactive, thereby 
implicitly supporting those opposed to public unemployment insurance (Führer 1990: 95-106 
for the positions of the bourgeois parties and the government). 
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Employer arguments against unemployment insurance 
The variety of specific arguments put forward by employer associations against 
unemployment insurance ranged from ostensibly technical arguments, e.g. claims that the lack 
of statistical data would make the calculation of the costs of the programme impossible, to 
arguments of principled opposition. What all arguments boiled down to was an 
uncompromising rejection of any form of support to the unemployed. This subsection 
elaborates in more detail the arguments frequently used by German employers against 
unemployment insurance in the Wilhelmine Empire.94 
No systematic unemployment. First and foremost, the political legitimacy of 
unemployment insurance was questioned. According to a memorandum by the CDI, there is 
no need for unemployment insurance, because there would be a sufficient supply of jobs 
anyway and thus everybody willing to work would find work. According to the report, 
unemployment would be an isolated phenomenon and, to the extent it actually exists, would 
be primarily the fault of the individual worker, due to the worker's idleness and lack of work 
discipline (Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller 1913: 3 and 15).  
Regional imbalances. The same report suggested that unemployment would primarily 
reflect regional imbalances in labor supply, in particular due to the widespread rural exodus, 
which had led to a lack of labor in agriculture and an oversupply of labor in the cities 
(Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller 1913: 4). It was feared that the introduction of public 
unemployment insurance would encourage the rural exodus even further, as the problems of 
not being able to find a job in the city would be all viated by the new insurance programme.  
 Rewarding idleness. The argument that unemployment would in practice not affect the 
hard-working and skilled among the workforce and that unemployment insurance would thus 
benefit only the ‘undeserving’ is a recurring theme in the statements of business 
representatives at that time. Unemployment insurance would only benefit those kinds of 
workers that were lazy, unskillful, incapable, rebellious or tried to dodge work. In 1913, Fritz 
Tänzler, the executive director of VDA, pointed out that unemployment insurance would 
mean that the hard-working (“Tüchtigen”) would need to subsidize those that were idle and 
unqualified (“Mindertüchtigen”) (quoted in Führer 1990: 84-85). Moreover, the problem of 
unemployment was seen as being artificially ‘talked up’ by the Social Democrats and the 
unions, who would intend to stir up social unrest (Führer 1990: 84). 
                                                
94 For the analysis of employer statements towards unemployment insurance during the pre-World War I era I 
rely to a large extent on Führer, a German historian who wrote his PhD thesis on the 1927 unemployment 
insurance reform (Führer 1990: in particular 82-93). All quotes translated into English by TP. 
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 Weakening the sense of personal responsibility. Congruent with this view, employers 
also repeatedly voiced the concern that a public unemployment insurance programme would 
undermine the sense of personal responsibility among the workers. The following statement 
from a conference of employer-run labor exchanges (1903) reflects this view: 
First of all, unemployment is not an evil, to the contrary, most people see work as an evil and 
unemployment as the desirable state, and if one is r a onably protected from the material 
setbacks that use to come along with unemployment, the larger part of the population will seek 
to enjoy the blessings of the new insurance (quoted in Führer 1990: 86, translated from 
German by TP). 
 Undermining work effort and work discipline. If the prospect of unemployment ceases 
to constitute a threat to the worker, the employer loses an important disciplining device: the 
dismissal. The worker will be less willing to make a serious work effort, if the prospect of 
unemployment becomes less frightening. The following statement made at the same employer 
conference in 1903 mentioned above, illustrates this concern:  
The means for maintaining [work] discipline, which the employer has to his discretion…,are 
reduced to a minimum, or are removed completely. The only right, that remains to the 
employer, although with qualifications and conditions, is that he may dismiss the worker, and 
that the worker than is exposed, at least for a certain period of time, to the danger of 
unemployment. To avoid this danger, the workforce will, after all, still undertake some effort 
(quoted in Führer 1990: 87, translated from German by TP). 
 Raising the reservation wage. Another argument used against unemployment 
insurance was the suspected harmful effects on wage flexibility by raising the reservation 
wage. Alexander Tille, a representative of the German heavy industry, declared in 1908 that a 
public unemployment insurance would prevent unemployment from pushing down wages 
during times of economic crisis, thereby erasing the market mechanisms of demand and 
supply (Führer 1990: 86-87). As with the introduction of unemployment insurance, workers 
would stop to face a massive loss of income as a result of economic crisis, they would also 
become more reluctant to accept wage reductions during periods of economic crisis. 
 Undermining entrepreneurial authority. Closely related to the arguments concerning 
work effort and work discipline were arguments concer ing the employer’s authority over his 
workforce. As the quotes above show social psychological reasoning was applied to show that 
unemployment insurance would have hazardous effects on the workforce. Unemployment 
insurance was suspected to weaken the employer’s authority in the workplace. Tille, for 
instance, argued that: 
In every such [economic] crisis [the worker becomes aware that only the entrepreneur is 
capable to create jobs]. This way, he [the worker] l arns to look up to the entrepreneur, 
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because he senses that his economic well-being is in his hands. He will, voluntarily, call him 
master (quoted in Führer 1990: 88, translated from German by TP). 
Opposition by German business to unemployment insurance before World War I 
appears to have been unanimous. All segments of business shared the same reservations 
against unemployment insurance. Not only the large industrialists in the heavy industry, with 
their authoritarian ‘master in my own house’ approach, but also employers in the 
manufacturing industries, agrarian employers and small businesses were opposed to 
unemployment insurance. There appears to have been no sectoral cleavage on unemployment 
insurance (Faust 1986: 175-177; Führer 1990: 90-93; Ullmann 1976: 153-154). 
German employers viewed the union-run Ghent schemes with even greater suspicion 
than public unemployment insurance. These schemes provided benefits to organized workers 
only and were used by unions to mobilize workers and to strengthen their financial resilience 
during industrial conflicts. Employers called on the state and the municipalities not to 
subsidize Ghent schemes as these schemes were used by the unions as a means to sustain 
strike action. The CDI declared in 1911 that by giving tax-financed subsidies to Ghent 
schemes, employers would be coerced to ‘sharpen the knife that is going to be turned against 
them’ (quoted in Führer 1990: 89, translated by TP). In the same way, also the peak-level 
employer federation, the VDA, opposed any public subsidizes to Ghent schemes. In Bavaria, 
where some municipalities subsidized Ghent schemes, th  Association of Bavarian Metal 
Industrialists threatened in 1909 to relocate plants away from municipalities that supported 
local Ghent schemes (Führer 1990: 89). 
In short, the opposition of German employers to unemployment insurance in the pre-
war period disconfirms the cross class coalition thesis, while it does provide evidence for the 
validity of the decommodification thesis. Arguments concerning skill formation appear not to 
have played a significant role in the political debate about unemployment insurance during 
that period. Even if they would have, such arguments would have been clearly at odds with 
the resolute opposition of German employers to the introduction of unemployment insurance. 
Instead, the arguments used show that German employers at that time were primarily 
concerned about the suspected hazardous effects of unemployment insurance on work 
discipline and work incentives. The opposition of German employers to unemployment 
insurance before World War I can be explained by the de-commodification thesis. Employers 




German industrialists at that time did not see unemployment insurance as a means of 
encouraging investments in specific skills. They were not aware of the potential effects of 
unemployment insurance on skill investments. Unemployment insurance was suspected to 
promote idleness, reduce labor supply and harm work discipline, while at the same time 
increasing labor costs. Alexander Tille warned that with unemployment insurance, social 
welfare would lose the ‘character of alms’ and thus al o its stigmatising character. A 
representative of the metal industry warned that unemployment insurance could lead to a 
situation where nobody would be prepared to work anymore (both statements quoted in Faust 
1986: 172). In short, employers expected unemployment insurance to reduce, not to increase, 
the supply of capable and skilled labor. The initiative for protecting workers from the risk of 
unemployment came from the unions and their Ghent schemes, rather than from employers.  
5. II The Introduction of Unemployment Insurance in the Weimar Republic 
In the Weimar Republic, a political majority in favor of unemployment insurance emerged 
and made the introduction of unemployment insurance possible. In July 1927, the national 
parliament passed a law that introduced unemployment insurance. The new programme of 
unemployment insurance replaced the pre-existing pro ramme of unemployment assistance, a 
means-tested programme administrated by the municipalities introduced in 1918. In addition, 
the law reformed the administration of labor market policies and put the national labor market 
authority and its job placement agencies under the control of tripartite bodies, consisting of 
employers, unions and the government. The administration of the new programme of 
unemployment insurance was entrusted to the newly created tripartite labor market authority. 
This created a close organizational link between the job placement services and the 
administration of unemployment insurance and, at the same time, involved employers and 
unions in the administration of both. 
 The law had the support of a broad parliamentary majority. The non-socialist 
governing parties and the opposition Social Democrats supported the bill. Only the 
communists, the Nazis and several deputies of the rig t-wing nationalist DNVP voted against. 
The bill was the result of a political compromise that the employer federation also decided to 
endorse. Only shortly after the passing of the bill, the deteriorating economic situation led 
employers to abandon this compromise and demand a return to means-testing. This section 
analyzes the political debates in the Weimar Republic that preceded the introduction of 
unemployment insurance as well as the positions of employers during these debates. 
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For the expansion of the welfare state, the Weimar Republic provided conditions that 
were favorable in political terms, but unfavorable in economic terms. Democratization for the 
first time gave the Social Democrats a chance for participation in national government. At the 
same time, economic development was characterized by high volatility and recurring 
economic slumps. Throughout the period of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), real GDP per 
capita hardly ever reached the levels it had reached before the war (Schmidt 1998: 40). High 
levels of unemployment became a recurring phenomenon. After the war, demobilization led 
to a massive rise of unemployment caused by the difficulties of integrating the large number 
of soldiers returning from the front into a stagnati g economy. The economic disruptions of 
the demobilization period were followed by a short inflationary boom during the period of 
1920-1922, driven by a weak currency and the resulting boost to exports (Feldman 1984: 55-
66). This had temporarily mitigated the problem of unemployment. With the onset of 
hyperinflation in 1923 and the currency reform unemployment began to rise again (Faust 
1987: 264).  
In November 1918, the new revolutionary government, led by the Social Democrats, 
had responded to the imminent problem of mass unemploy ent by establishing a programme 
of mandatory unemployment assistance (“Erwerbslosenfürsorge”). By way of an emergency 
decree, initially valid only for the period of demobilization, the government obliged 
municipalities to provide financial support to the unemployed. This programme was 
understood as a temporary solution, which was to be replaced with a permanent programme 
of unemployment insurance in due course (Führer 1990: 170; Büren 1934: 198). The 
programme provided means-tested flat-rate benefits to all non-employed persons who 
declared to be ‘willing to work’. The programme was financed by the municipalities, the 
regional states and the federal state. Municipalities had to administrate the programme and 
had substantial discretion in applying the rules of benefit eligibility (Wermel and Urban 1949: 
21-23). As the municipalities were also in charge of social assistance they had little incentive 
to be restrictive with granting unemployment assistance benefits, as doing so would have 
merely shifted costs from one programme to another. 
The programme of unemployment assistance became a crucial catalyst for making 
German employers change their mind regarding unemployment insurance. The introduction 
of unemployment assistance had changed the policy status quo against which employers had 
to evaluate the value of unemployment insurance. German employers were highly discontent 
with unemployment assistance and the way it was administrated. In their view, the 
municipalities were insufficiently checking need and willingness to work and were handing 
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out benefits in an indiscriminate way. The introduction of unemployment assistance had 
created a new reality for employers, one that they perceived as even worse then 
unemployment insurance. Before the war, the alternaives on the political agenda had been 
either unemployment insurance or no compensation to the unemployed at all. Now, the 
alternatives on the agenda were either unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance. 
The following subsection deals with the political debates about unemployment assistance and 
unemployment insurance from 1918 to 1927, before turning to the question why 
unemployment insurance had finally changed from being the ‘unspeakable evil’ to being a 
‘lesser evil’ for German employers in section III. 
The political debate  
The initiative for the introduction of unemployment i surance after World War I came from 
the government. The introduction of unemployment assistance in November 1918 was 
intended as a temporary solution which would have to be replaced by a programme of 
unemployment insurance in due course. The government’s main motivation for promoting 
unemployment insurance was to alleviate the cost burden on the state by shifting some of the 
costs to the two sides of industry. Unemployment insurance would need to be financed by 
workers and employers through payroll taxes, while un mployment assistance was financed 
initially solely by general tax revenues. Already in August 1919, the Minister of Finance, 
Matthias Erzberger (Center Party), noted the ‘dismal experiences’ the government had made 
with unemployment assistance and declared the introduction of unemployment insurance ‘as 
soon as possible’ as a key priority for the governme t, in order to alleviate the burden on 
public finances (Führer 1990: 171). Four years later, in September 1923, Rudolf Hilferding, a 
social democratic Minister of Finance, called the introduction of unemployment insurance an 
‘essential requirement’ to deal with the ‘catastrophic financial situation of the state’ (Führer 
1990: 181). By shifting the compensation of the unemployed from the assistance to the 
insurance principle, the government intended to shift t e financial burden to employers and 
employees.95 
                                                
95 After the war, a significant expansion of social poicies had occurred, resulting in substantial increases in 
social expenditures. At the end of the 1920s, social expenditures as a share of GDP were four times as high as 
before the war. During the same period, total payroll taxes had increased from 8 per cent to 15.5 per cent 
(Hentschel 1983: 129). This development had various causes: partly, this was the result of deliberate social 
policy expansion, partly due to economic stagnation and raising numbers of benefit claimants. Social policy 
expansion started already immediately after the end of the war. The introduction of entirely new programmes, 
such as unemployment assistance, and the extension of existing programmes to new social groups led to a 
substantial increase in public social expenditures. Compensating war victims was one key motivation of social 
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The introduction of unemployment insurance happened at a time of enormous 
instability, both in political and in economic terms. Economically, the period between 1918 
and 1927 was characterized by high volatility in economic production and recurrent 
experiences of high inflation and mass unemployment. The unpredictable character of 
economic development at that time provided unfavorable circumstances for the establishment 
of a major new welfare state institution. Economic volatility made the number of persons that 
the new programme would need to support very difficult to predict.  
Equally important, political instability contributed to the difficulties of introducing 
unemployment insurance. The Ministry of Labor had produced a first internal draft for an 
unemployment insurance law already in November 1919. It took all in all three government 
bills and several revisions until parliament would pass unemployment insurance in 1927. 
During the period of the reform process, from Novemb r 1919 to July 1927, Germany had 
experienced in total eleven different government cabinets. Most of them had to rely on weak 
parliamentary support, only three of them were backed by a parliamentary majority.96 The first 
three coalitions, up to June 1920, were led by the Social Democrats; the majority of the 
following coalitions (5) were led by chancellors belonging to the catholic Center party.  
The successful introduction of unemployment insurance during this period of political 
and economic instability was greatly facilitated by two factors: First, the commitment by the 
Minister of Labor and the ministerial bureaucracy to the project of unemployment insurance 
played an important role. Despite the frequent changes in government, the post of Minister of 
Labor was consistently held by the same person, Heinrich Brauns, throughout most of the 
period, from June 1920 to June 1928 (Preller 1949: 52 -532; Faust 1987: 264). Brauns was a 
catholic priest and belonged to the Center Party. Brauns took the role of a policy entrepreneur 
in the reform process. He generally advocated a policy f compromise between capital and 
labor and actively promoted social policy expansion.97 As the minister in charge he had been 
able to follow through the project of unemployment insurance nearly throughout the entire 
period. His role as a policy entrepreneur had thus played an important role to make the 
introduction of unemployment insurance possible (Führer 1990: 173-175) . 
                                                                                                                                              
policy expansion. In 1920, social benefits for 1.5 million war disabled persons and 2.5 million war orphans and 
war widows were introduced. Another key motivation of expansionary reforms was to set off benefit losses that 
resulted from inflation. In various programmes, benefit values were repeatedly increased; for example, by the 
1922 reform of the pension system (Schmidt 1998: 42). 
96 The three government coalitions enjoying a parliamentary majority were the Grand Coalition ( August 1923 to 
November 1923) and two non-socialist coalition governments (“Bürgerblock”) 
97 A biography of Heinrich Brauns is available on the w bpage of the German Historical Museum http: 
//www.dhm.de/lemo/html/biografien/BraunsHeinrich/index.html (accessed 03-01-2008) 
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Second, in spite of the frequent changes in governmnt, a stable parliamentary majority 
in favor of unemployment insurance emerged nevertheless. While before the war, most 
parliamentary parties had either opposed unemployment insurance (National Liberals and 
conservative parties) or had been internally divided (Social Democrats and Center), now, in 
contrast, a majority of parties did in principle support unemployment insurance. The catholic 
Center party had overcome its pre-war disagreement and had become an advocate of 
unemployment insurance. The non-socialist parties were generally discontent with 
unemployment assistance, which they perceived as handing out generous benefits to layabouts 
and as being prone to benefit abuse, and saw unemploy ent insurance as an effective way of 
better controlling benefit entitlements (Führer 1990: 171). 
Importantly, also the Social Democrats changed its po ition. The social democratic 
labor unions abandoned their pre-war demands for a state subsidized Ghent system and now 
supported a public insurance solution instead. The occurrence of mass unemployment during 
the first months of the war and during the demobilization period after the war had confronted 
the unions’ Ghent schemes with massive financial problems, which had made the unions more 
skeptical about the advantages of the Ghent schemes (W rmel and Urban 1949: 24-25). At the 
same time, the democratization of the state had made l bor’s suspicions about the state 
abusing unemployment insurance as an anti-labor weapon redundant. Both aspects facilitated 
labor’s shift to supporting public unemployment insurance. While the SPD and a majority of 
social democratic labor unions favored unemployment insurance, a minority within the labor 
movement remain opposed to the introduction of unemployment insurance and favored the 
continuation of unemployment assistance instead98 (Führer 1990: 189-201). In December 
1921, the majority of the unions organized in the Federation of Social Democratic Labor 
Unions (ADGB) voted against the assistance principle and in favor of the insurance principle 
(ADGB 1921: 19). A majority of social democratic unio s had thus supported the 
introduction of a mandatory public unemployment insurance, financed by payroll taxes and 
administrated together with employers on a parity basis. 
                                                
98 Opposition to unemployment insurance came from the left-wing within the SPD, as well as from the 
Independent Social Democrats (USDP), the Communists (KPD), and from those unions within which these 
factions were dominating (Führer 1990: 190). In particular, the largest white-collar union, AfA-Bund, affiliated 
with the left-wing of the SPD, and the German Metalworker Association, the largest single union in Germany, 
did remain opposed to unemployment insurance (Führer 1990: 192). These groups preferred unemployment 
assistance instead of unemployment insurance for redist ibutive reasons. These groups considered the financing 
of support to the unemployed by general tax revenues as socially more just than the financing by insurance 
contributions. Unemployment insurance would oblige workers to pay for the consequences of unemployment by 
themselves. In contrast, assistance financing by general tax revenues was burdening also the rich and was 
therefore preferred(Führer 1990: 189-195). 
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A coalition between the Social Democrats, the Catholic Center Party and other smaller 
centrist parties in favor of unemployment thus emerged, which provided a stable 
parliamentary majority in favor of reform (see table 5.1 below). The parties that remained 
opposed to unemployment insurance were the right-wing nationalist German National 
Peoples’ Party (DNVP), which represented, among other groups, also gricultural employers, 
the Nazis (NSDAP) and the Communists. 

























Legislative period National 
Assembl
y 
I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. 
Seats total 423 459 472 493 491 575 608 584 647 
NSDAP - - 32² 14² 12 107 230 196 288 
DNVP 44 71 95 103 73 41 37 52 52 
DVP 19 65 45 51 45 29 7 11 2 
Centre 91³ 64 65 69 61 68 75 71 73 
DDP 75 39 28 32 25 20 4 2 5 
SPD 165 103 100 131 153 143 133 121 120 
USPD 22 83 - - - - - - - 
KPD - 4 62 45 54 76 89 100 81 
Others 7 30 45 48 68 91 33 31 26 
Note: parties in bold voted in favor of the unemployment insurance law 
²including seats of the nationalist “Völkische” 
³joint list together with Bavarian People’s Party 
 
Legend: NSDAP: National Socialist German Workers’ Party, DNVP: German National Peoples Party, DVP: 
German Peoples Party, DDP: German Democratic Party, Center: Zentrum, SPD: Social Democratic Party, 
USPD: Independent Social Democrats, KPD: Communist Par y. Smaller Parties are aggregated. 
Source: Preller 1949: 180 , data compared with Gonschior 2005 for errors  
 
Table 5.2 Business representatives in the Reichstag (1928) 
PARTIES 
 
 DEPUTIES AFFILIATED 
WITH INDUSTRY 
DEPUTIES AFFILIATED 






People’s Party (DNVP) 
9 9 18 
German People’s Party 
(DVP) 
15 8 23 
Center Party (Catholic) 3 6 9 
Democratic Party 
(DDP) 
8 3 11 
Bavarian People’s 
Party 
1 1 2 
Economic Party 1 12 13 
Total 37 (out of 491) 39 (out of 491) 76 (out of 491) 
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Source: Lewinsohn 1931 ( 93-94). Note: The total number of seats in the Reichstag was 491, pro-business 
deputies made thus up about 16 per cent (or 76 deputies) of the parliament. 
5.III Changing Employer Positions in the Weimar Republic 
During the Weimar Republic German employers abandone  their pre-war opposition to 
unemployment insurance and did, in principle, accept the need for a public unemployment 
insurance, as did the majority of parliamentary parties (VDA 1923: 35-36). The VDA 
cooperated in the drafting of the government bill and ccepted the final outcome. This change 
in position was accompanied by internal disagreements a d several changes of position 
between 1919 and 1927. We can identify broadly three p riods that characterize the 
development of employer positions. Following the introduction of unemployment assistance 
in 1918, a majority of employer organizations initially supported a change to unemployment 
insurance (1918-1922). A minority of employer associations remained opposed to 
unemployment insurance during this period, in particular those associations representing 
smaller and medium-sized firms. After the introduction of a payroll tax for the financing of 
unemployment assistance, employers turned against unemployment insurance and called upon 
the government not to go ahead with the planned programme (1923/1924). During the final 
phase of the reform process, employers finally abandoned their resistance and decided to 
cooperate with the government in the drafting of the bill (1925/1926).99 The employer 
federation VDA eventually endorsed the bill passed by parliament, although several deputies 
representing industry voted against the bill. This subsection analyzes the motivations for 
employers to abandon their pre-war opposition to unemployment insurance and to cooperate 
with the government in the drafting of the details of the new programme.  
During the Weimar Republic German employers confronted a political context that 
was entirely different from the pre-war Empire. Befor  the war industry could rely on the 
authoritarian political regime as its firm ally. After the democratization of the political 
system, the participation of the Social Democrats in government had put this alliance into 
question. For the change in employers’ position towards unemployment insurance, two 
aspects turned out as particularly important: (i) the introduction of means-tested 
unemployment assistance in 1918 and (ii) the new political majority in favor of 
unemployment insurance. In the view of employers, the new programme of unemployment 
assistance was fundamentally flawed and even worse than unemployment insurance (Tänzler 
1929: 207-208). In addition, a political majority in favor of unemployment insurance had 
                                                
99 This periodisation relies on the work by Büren (Büren 1934: 208 )and Führer (Führer 1990: 209) 
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emerged after the Social Democrats and the Center Party had made up their minds. Both 
parties had been undecided about unemployment insura ce before the war.  
If they wanted to get rid of the disliked unemployment assistance scheme, employers 
had two basic options: either, to try to dismantle unemployment assistance entirely or, 
alternatively, to try to replace it with unemployment insurance. As the first option appeared 
politically much more difficult to achieve they eventually embarked on the second option as 
their ‘second-best choice’. The change in political ontext had turned unemployment 
insurance turned into a “lesser evil” option for employers. The following subsections analyze 
the reasons why employers considered unemployment insurance as less problematic than 
unemployment assistance. 
Employers’ broader social policy objectives in the Weimar Republic 
To understand industry’s position towards unemployment insurance it is helpful to consider 
the general of industry towards social policies during the Weimar Republic. The paramount 
social policy objective of German industry during that period had been to contain social 
policy expansion and the increase in public social expenditure. During the early post-war 
period (1918/1919) business had been in a politicaly weakened position, due to the 
revolutionary threat and its dependence on the willingness of organized labor to cooperate. 
With the stabilization of the political situation employers became politically more self-
confident again and started to become more outspoken and assertive in their social policy 
positions. Working time regulations had been their main target. With their attack on the eight-
hour working day, a part of the Stinnes-Legien agreem nt, employers resumed their fight 
against state intervention and eventually brought about the collapse of cross-class cooperation 
in the ZAG. Their objections against the works councils law in 1920 is another case in point 
(see chapter 4).  
More generally, employers demanded a reorientation of social policy towards a so-
called productivity-oriented policy approach. Social policy should aim primarily at promoting 
economic production rather than at helping those in need (Tänzler 1923: 274). The main 
objective of social policy should be to support everything ‘that promotes production and 
increases [product] demand’ (Tänzler 1924: 2). By this, employers did not mean a form of 
Keynesian demand management, but primarily the containment of public social expenditure. 
From 1924 on, employers intensified their demands for cost containment and more cost 
effectiveness in social policy, after the social poicy expansion of the previous years led to 
substantial increases in social expenditures (Tänzler 1929: 216). They denounced the ‘surplus 
production of social policy legislation,’ a depreciative phrase used by the VDA executive 
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director Fritz Tänzler (Tänzler 1929: 210) . The employer federation argued that social 
expenditure had reached the limit of what German firms could cope with and, thus, social 
policy expansion had to stop (VDA 1925a: 91). In a similar way, the other peak-level 
federations, the German Diet of Industry and Commerce (DIHT) and the Federation of 
German Industry (RDI) also complained that wages and payroll taxes had become 
unacceptably high and would, as a result, make firms unprofitable (Führer 1990: 204-205).  
At the same time, German employers did not in principle challenge the political 
legitimacy and necessity of social policy. The VDA and with it a majority of employer 
organizations did not aim at dismantling existing social policies, but instead at the 
preservation of the status quo of social policy and the containment of future social policy 
expansion. Only a minority of business groups demanded a dismantling of existing social 
policy programmes. Employers were well aware of thepolitical dangers that a radical 
dismantling of social policy might create. A dismantling of core social policy programmes 
was suspected to promote social unrest and a strengthening of militant forces within the labor 
movement. In 1922, Carl Duisberg, founder of the chmicals company I.G. Farben and 
president of the industry federation RDI between 1925 and 1930, had reminded German 
industrialists about the importance of containing the communist threat: 
In foreign policy, as in social policy, we have…alwys been ‘too late’. We have always 
realized the situation too late, have done the right thing too late, which naturally, because it 
was too late, remained without effect. We cannot afford another ‘too late’. We always have to 
remain aware that bolshevist Russia stands in the east. There, there is only one will, one goal, 
to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat all over Europe (Duisberg 1923: 68, translated 
from German by TP)  
German employers were trying to strike a balance between on the one hand avoiding a 
further increase in social expenditures, while on the other hand preventing a return of 
revolutionary dangers by making radical demands that would threaten political stability and 
class compromise. Duisberg’s statement demonstrates the acute sensitivities among German 
employers about the looming dangers of failing to solve ‘the social question’. In a similar 
way, the president of the VDA, Ernst von Borsig, warned about the political consequences of 
a complete dismantling of social policy institutions, stressing that this could lead to ‘open or 
latent revolution’ (Führer 1990: 207). The basic necessity of social policy remained thus 
undisputed among dominant industry groups.  
Unemployment insurance vs. unemployment assistance 
The main reason why employers preferred unemployment insurance to unemployment 
assistance concerned the issue of work incentives. The kind of arguments used against 
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unemployment assistance after 1918 were largely identical to those used against 
unemployment insurance before the war. Unemployment assistance would benefit only the 
layabouts and erode workers’ willingness to work. Earnings-related unemployment insurance 
suddenly appeared as the lesser of two evils, compared to the means-tested unemployment 
assistance. Unemployment assistance, like social assist nce, was suspected of promoting 
idleness and destroying the sense of self-reliance mong workers. 
 This suspicion was furthered by the fact that municipalities tended to grant 
unemployment assistance benefits in an indiscriminate way to all non-employed persons that 
declared to be willing to work. No record of previous employment was required. Though 
recipients were obliged to accept work if offered, in a period of high unemployment a 
person’s willingness to work was in practice often difficult to prove. In addition, employers 
resented the fact of not having any influence over d cisions about the granting of benefit 
entitlements. Municipalities had little incentive to check benefit eligibility carefully, as they 
were also in charge of social assistance. Careful checking would have merely shifted costs 
from one programme to another. In short, employers opposed unemployment assistance 
because it had a strong decommodifying effect on the working class.  
Inspired by social Darwinist thinking, German employers thought that means-tested 
assistance programmes would unduly promote the ‘survival of the unfittest’. If there would be 
no social assistance, they reasoned, there would be few r ‘unfit’ in the first place. This is 
because social assistance benefits were suspected of damaging the individual’s energy and 
capacity for self-reliance (Eigenverantwortung). The following statement by Ernst von 
Borsig, president of the VDA from 1924 to 1931, illustrates this argument:  
It is possible that without the social assistance provided by the state perhaps 50,000 people 
will perish who manage to get by with the help of this assistance. But it is also possible, that, if 
this assistance would not exist, 4 to 5,000 other people would develop their capacities and 
energy in such a way that this would be - seen purely f om an economic point of view- even 
more important (Borsig quoted in Führer 1990: 206, translated by TP). 
The arguments against social protection used by industry in the Weimar Republic were 
thus highly similar to the arguments used before the war (see section I), though now these 
arguments were not directed against social policies in general, but against social assistance. 
While the payment of social benefits to those who were ‘willing and capable to work’ was 
accepted, employers distinguished carefully between ‘d serving’ and ‘undeserving’ claimants. 
Facing the existence of unemployment assistance, employers in general abandoned their pre-
war opposition to unemployment insurance and began to see the later as an alternative to the 
perceived deleterious effects of unemployment assistance. The payment of unemployment 
 
163 
insurance benefits required a record of previous employment and was thus thought to be less 
prone to erode work incentives or to promote idleness. In a reversal of their pre-war position, 
employers now discovered the advantages of unemployent insurance.  
In December 1920 the peak-level industry federation (RDI) declared that 
unemployment assistance ‘is necessarily seen as alms [by the recipient] and, in the long run, 
undermines the self-confidence and sense of personal responsibility of the workforce’ and for 
this reason should be replaced by a ‘mandatory public insurance against unemployment as 
soon as possible.’ Objections of a principled nature against unemployment insurance could no 
longer be accepted as being of critical importance (decision by the RDI executive board on 
December 16th, 1920, printed in RDI 1921). In a similar way, the Chambers of Commerce in 
the Ruhr area declared in a joint memorandum in October 1920 that unemployment assistance 
would be ‘demoralizing, because it only allows the state to take care, while an insurance 
would encourage the wage-earner to practice self-help and would keep alive the idea of self-
reliance in him’ (Führer 1990: 210, translated by TP). These statements confirm the 
hypothesis that employers’ new support for unemployment insurance reflected a lower-order 
preference, motivated by the assumption that an insura ce programme has less detrimental 
effects on work incentives. 
The importance of accommodation to political constraints is also confirmed by what is 
known about the RDI’s internal deliberations. The dcision to endorse unemployment 
insurance was prepared by the RDI social policy committee. In a meeting of this committee, 
its speaker, the plant director Hubert Hoff, had invoked two arguments in favor of 
unemployment insurance. First, there would only be two options available, unemployment 
insurance and unemployment assistance. The third option, a dismantling of unemployment 
assistance without any substitution would not be avail ble, as such an option would not have 
‘any reasonable chance of success’. Second, unemploy ent insurance would be ‘the lesser of 
the two evils’ because ‘if the system of unemployment assistance is continued, the employer 
has no influence on the use of the funds’ (protocol of the RDI executive board meeting on 
December 16th, 1920, stated in Führer 1990: 211). With 16 votes in favor and 5 votes against, 
the RDI social policy committee decided to endorse th introduction of unemployment 
insurance. Subsequently, the RDI executive board ratified this decision with only one vote 
against (Führer 1990: 215). The internal deliberations of the RDI thus show clearly that the 
endorsement was motivated by a strategic accommodation to the political context. 
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Not all business interest groups agreed with the new position, though. Opposition to 
unemployment insurance came in particular form associati ns representing smaller and 
medium-sized manufacturing firms. The German Diet of Industry and Commerce (DIHT), the 
federation of the regional chambers of commerce, took the lead within the camp of the 
opponents. In October 1920, the DIHT declared to have ‘substantial fundamental objections’ 
to unemployment insurance (Führer 1990: 213). Opposition to unemployment insurance was, 
however, not limited to small firm sectors. Also parts of big industry remained opposed to 
unemployment insurance. The Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung (DAGZ), one of the leading 
periodicals articulating the views of big industry, continued to agitate against unemployment 
insurance even in the Weimar Republic, using the same kind of arguments as before the war 
(see epitaph to this chapter). Although the employer federation eventually endorsed the 
government bill, several deputies affiliated with industry voted against the bill in the 
parliamentary vote (see below). 
Strategic arguments also played a role among those t at decided to continue to oppose 
unemployment insurance. The position taken by Adolf Haeusser illustrates this point. 
Haeusser was the one member of the RDI executive board that voted against unemployment 
insurance during the decisive meeting mentioned above. He represented the chemical industry 
and was chairperson of the firm AG Farbenwerke. Hauesser justified his support for 
unemployment assistance by arguing that it would be ‘an imperfect regulation, and precisely 
for this reason it will soon be dismantled. Whereas unemployment insurance, once 
introduced, cannot be dismantled anymore’ (protocol of the meeting by the RDI executive 
board on December 16th, 1920, quoted in Führer 1990: 215). Haeusser thought that industry 
should better await a change in the balance of political power in order to then take the 
opportunity to try to turn back the state of social policy to its pre-war status.100 Unlike a 
majority of German industrialists, he considered the c anges in the balance of political power 
to be of a temporary nature and, for this reason clu g to industry’s pre-war position of 
opposition to unemployment insurance. 
Policymaking: Turnabouts and strategic accommodation 
The shift in the position of German employers towards supporting unemployment insurance 
could potentially have led to a cross-class alliance, as a majority among the unions also 
favored unemployment insurance over unemployment assist nce. Indeed, in a decision by the 
ZAG board in October 1921, unions and employers unanimously called upon the government 
                                                
100 The view by Haeusser was supported by some other employer groups, in particular the employer association 
of Hamburg-Altona and the Chamber of Commerce Bremen (Führer 1990: 217, Fn.170). 
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to substitute unemployment insurance for unemployment assistance (meeting of the ZAG 
executive board October 13th, 1921 VDA 1921). However, the employer federation, VDA, 
conducted an about-turn in autumn 1923 and called upon the government not to go ahead with 
the planned reform. The deteriorating economic situation had made employers skeptical about 
the financial sustainability of the planned unemployment insurance.  
 In 1923, the inflationary boom of the early post-war period turned into a slump with 
hyperinflation and the collapse of the currency. Unemployment soared rapidly. During the 
autumn of 1922, at the peak of the boom, the number of ecipients of benefits from 
unemployment assistance had reached a low of about 17,000 recipients. At the end of 1923 
the number of recipients of unemployment assistance benefits had gone up to 1.5 million101 
(Preller 1949: 166-167). In 1925, the VDA estimated hat the introduction of unemployment 
insurance would cause a cost increase of about 30 per cent, as compared to unemployment 
assistance (VDA 1925a: 61). In short, employers became increasingly worried about the cost 
burden of unemployment insurance and got cold feet.
To alleviate the pressure on public finances, the government introduced a payroll tax 
for the financing of unemployment assistance in October 1923. Two thirds of the costs of 
unemployment assistance were to be financed by workers and employers in equal shares, 
whereas the remaining third was to be financed by the municipalities and subsidies from the 
regional and federal state level (Preller 1949: 364). For this decision no parliamentary 
endorsement was required. In addition, in February 1924, a record of previous employment (3 
months during the last 12 months) was introduced as a qualifying condition (Faust 1987: 265; 
Führer 1990: 181-182). The long-term unemployed became thereby excluded from receiving 
unemployment assistance benefits. In effect, these changes had turned unemployment 
assistance into a hybrid programme, combining elements of he insurance principle with 
elements of the assistance principle. With this reform the government had made great 
progress in alleviating the public budget of the burden of supporting the unemployed. As we 
have seen above, this was also the original motivation of government for promoting the 
introduction of unemployment insurance (Führer 1990: 181). 
Although the shift of the cost burden from the state to the two sides of industry could 
be expected to have weakened employers’ resistance to the introduction of unemployment 
insurance, for the time being employers did in factmaintain their opposition to unemployment 
                                                
101 This dramatic deterioration was partly the result of the ‘Ruhr occupation’, the occupation of the Ruhr area by 
France and Belgium in response to Germany defaulting on its obligations to deliver war indemnities. As a result 
of the occupation, production in the Ruhr heavy industry collapsed. 
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insurance. The introduction of work record requirements is likely to have reduced the 
concerns of employers about the dangers of benefit abuse and the ‘subsidizing of work-shy 
shirkers’, which had previously motivated their oppsition to unemployment assistance. As a 
result, the necessity of shifting to unemployment insurance probably appeared less salient to 
employers. 
In 1925, the VDA conducted another about-turn. The employer federation decided to 
cooperate with government in the drafting of the unmployment insurance bill. At same time, 
the federation decided to maintain in public its opp sing position “for the time being”. By 
cooperating in the drafting of the law, the VDA expcted to be better able to ensure that its 
concerns would be taken into account by policy-makers (meeting of the VDA social policy 
committee on January 27th, 1925 VDA 1925b; cf. also Führer 1990: 218). The VDA 
succeeded in changing some regulations in its preferred way and in the end decided to 
endorse the bill that was passed by the national parliament in July 1927102 (Erdmann 1927: 
347). 
In the policy-making process the VDA’s focus had been primarily on two concerns: 
cost effectiveness and the way the new programme would be organized. First, employers 
wanted the new programme not to be more expensive than the old unemployment assistance 
programme. Benefit levels should be kept moderate. S cond, employers attached great 
importance to the organization of programme administration. They wanted employers to be 
involved in the administration of the new programme, rather than an unilateral administration 
by the state, primarily in order to control the cost effective use of funds and to make sure 
benefit abuse would be controlled. Employers also supported a close integration of existing 
job placement services with the administration of unemployment insurance in order to allow 
for the strict implementation of the work obligation rule (Büren 1934: 208-209, re. both 
points). 
                                                
102 The ‘Law concerning unemployment insurance and employment services’ passed in July 1927 
consisted of two parts: The first part established the new unemployment insurance programme, while the second 
part reformed the organization of labor market policy by establishing a new public authority for this purpose, the 
new ‘National Office for Employment Services and Unemployment Insurance’. The placement of unemployed 
workers and the granting of unemployment insurance benefits had been united in one organization. The new
authority was governed by tripartite decision-making bodies, including workers, employers and the state on a 
parity basis. The old programme of unemployment assistance had been administrated unilaterally by the 
municipalities, which now lost many of their earlier competencies. Unemployment insurance benefits were 
granted only to those who were ‘involuntarily unemployed’, were ‘willing and capable to work’ and had been 
employed for at least 26 weeks during the last 12 months. Benefit payment was limited to a duration of 26 
weeks. Benefit levels were earnings-related and means-testing was abolished (Faust 1987: 276; Führer 1990: 
189). Compared to unemployment assistance, the new law thus improved the control of employers over the us  
of funds and the granting of benefits and at the same time reduced decommodifying character of social policy, by 
linking benefits to previous employment. 
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On some specific policy details, unions and employers managed to find common 
ground in the policy-making process. Both sides of industry wanted parity-based 
administration (‘social self-government’), rather than direct administration by the state. Both 
sides wanted close organizational links between labor exchanges and unemployment 
insurance administration (Führer 1990: 255-256). Both sides demanded the state to continue 
to play a role in the financing of unemployment compensation in the form of public subsidies 
in order to keep the payroll tax low (Führer 1990: 292-293). Moreover, both sides also 
opposed occupational risk differentiation by way of dif erentiating the contribution rate across 
sectors (Führer 1990: 316-317). In short, in the deliberations over specific issues of policy 
design in the later stages of the decision-making process, employers and unions did often 
agree. Once employers had decided to support the proj ct, possible disagreements between 
capital and labor about policy details were not a re son for delaying the reform. The 
convergence of employer and union positions about plicy details should not, however, be 
mistaken for the occurrence of a cross-class alliance in favor of the introduction of 
unemployment insurance. 
The decision by employers to cooperate in the drafting of the unemployment insurance 
was motivated by the goal of overcoming unemployment assistance as well as strategic 
considerations. In order to avoid becoming an irrelevant bystander to a reform project that 
enjoyed broad political support, the VDA decided to offer their cooperation. Only in this way 
could the VDA expect that its concerns about the organization and financing of the new 
programme would be taken into account. Unlike in the Wilhelmine Empire, a clear 
parliamentary majority in favor of unemployment insurance now existed.103 As a result, 
employers now perceived to stand a greater chance of influencing the project if they relied on 
cooperation, instead of on opposition. One representative of the metalworking industry 
pointed out that it would be “completely useless…to take the stance: We do not want to have 
any unemployment insurance!” (Oppenheimer from the Association of Berlin Metal 
Industrialists, quoted in Jastrow et al. 1925: 113). A strategy of fundamental opposition would 
                                                
103 The parties of the various non-socialist coalition governments in power since November 1923 and the 
opposition Social Democrats all endorsed the introduction of unemployment insurance. In the parliamentary vote 
on July 7th, 1927, 335 deputies voted in favour and 47 voted against the bill. The votes against came from the 
Communists, the nationalist DNVP (German National Peoples Party) and the Nazis (Faust 1987: 276; Führer 
1990: 189). 
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in the long run stand “no reasonable chance” to succeed104 (meeting of the VDA social policy 
committee, January 27th, 1925 VDA 1925b).  
While the employer federation (VDA) had officially endorsed the bill, several 
parliamentary deputies representing business interests voted against the bill or abstained from 
the vote. Most of them belonged to the right-wing nationalist DNVP. Most of these votes 
came from agricultural employers,105 who did not want to participate in the unemployment 
insurance scheme because most agricultural workers would not have qualified for benefits. 
Some of the votes against the law however also came from big industry, for example from the 
coalmine director Bernhard Leopold. Among those industry deputies abstaining from the vote 
was the executive director of the Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists 
(VDESI), Jacob Reichert, (Führer 1990: 220-221; Liesebach 1957: 116). Politically right-
wing but of diverse sectoral backgrounds, these employers did not support the compromise 
endorsed by the VDA. Given the overwhelming majority in favor of the law, these business 
deputies however refrained from fighting their case. As we will see in the following 
subsection, the passing of the law had not been the end of the debate. Less than two years 
after the passing of the law, the onset of the economic depression led employers revitalize 
their campaigning against unemployment insurance. 
In short, the support of employers for unemployment insurance was the result of an 
accommodation to a changed political context, rather t an a reflection of underlying genuine 
preferences for the social protection of unemployed workers. Before the war, employers had 
adamantly opposed unemployment insurance. Once the programme of unemployment 
assistance had been introduced the range of policy ptions that were politically viable had 
become narrower. No policy of unemployment protection at all ceased to be a viable policy 
option. The choice now was not between either having some kind of public unemployment 
compensation or having none, as before the war, but instead between two different types of 
unemployment compensation: between unemployment assistance and unemployment 
insurance. Earnings-related unemployment insurance maintained a greater dependence of 
workers on gainful employment compared to means-tested unemployment assistance. 
Moreover, many municipalities tended to hand out unemployment assistance benefits in an 
indiscriminate way and often made little effort to enforce work obligation rules, as they had 
                                                
104 Even the German Diet of Industry and Commerce (DIHT) decided in November 1926 that steadfast 
opposition to unemployment insurance would be pointless. The DIHT had previously been adamantly opposed 
to unemployment insurance and was the last of the peak-level federations to fall in line with the new strategy of 
pragmatic cooperation. 




no incentive to reduce the number of benefit recipints. Employers decided to accept 
unemployment insurance because they considered it a lesser evil. 
Reform of the new unemployment insurance system 
The political compromise in favor of unemployment isurance turned out as very short-lived. 
Soon after the passing of the law, unemployment star ed to soar as a result of the onset of the 
depression in 1929. The number of unemployed persons106 i creased from about 1.2 million in 
June 1927 to about 6.1 million in March 1932107 (Preller 1949: 166-167). The contribution 
rate (3%) had initially been set in a way that the programme would be capable to support up 
to 800,000 unemployed persons (Faust 1987: 276). The number of unemployed persons had 
soon started to exceed the maximum the programme was designed for. The level of future 
unemployment had thus been grossly underestimated by policy-makers. The law obliged the 
federal state to cover revenue shortfalls by providing loans to the insurance administration. 
This meant an ever-growing burden on the federal budget. 
The massive deterioration in the finances of unemployment insurance led to a heated 
controversy over the issue of how to reform unemployment insurance. Employers revoked the 
1927 compromise and demanded massive cutbacks to contain the increase in social 
expenditures. The positions among the political actors of how to reform unemployment 
insurance differed greatly and developed into what w s perceived by the social democratic 
labor movement as a conflict over the principles of the German welfare state. Labor unions 
and SPD insisted on increases in the contribution rates, while employers and the DVP 
(German Peoples Party) demanded substantial cost cuts o solve the fiscal deficits. 
 At the center of employers’ demands for cutbacks were two demands. First, seasonal 
unemployment should be excluded from unemployment insurance benefits108 and second, 
means-testing of unemployment insurance benefits should be re-introduced (Büren 1934: 211-
212). Employers thus abandoned the insurance princile and demanded a return to the 
assistance principle.109 In 1930, the executive director of the RDI, Kastl, complained that 
unemployment insurance would ‘eliminate the mechanisms of demand and supply on the 
                                                
106 Number of persons seeking work as registered at the labor exchange offices, Preller 1949 relies on official 
data from the national labor market authority (Reichsanstalt). 
107 Schmidt states that the later number was equivalent to an unemployment rate of about 30 per cent (Schmidt 
1998: 47). To compare with, the number of unemployed p rsons receiving unemployment insurance benefits had 
been about 1.5 million in March 1932 (Preller 1949: 166-167). 
108 Seasonal unemployment occurred especially in agriculture and in construction. See Preller 1949: 365 
109 It was in particular the latter demand that was interpreted by the social democratic labor movement as an all-
out assault on the institution of unemployment insurance as such(Timm 1952). 
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labor market’ and for this reason it would have become impossible to ‘adjust wages in line 
with business-cycle developments’ (quoted in Weisbrod 1978: 210). The short-lived nature of 
employers’ endorsement of unemployment insurance underli es the strategic nature of this 
endorsement. Employers’ endorsement of the insurance principle in 1927 did not reflect a 
genuine or first-order preference in favor of unemployment insurance, but an accommodation 
to an unfavorable political context. 
5.IV What Motivated Industry to Change its Position on Unemployment Insurance? 
Before World War I, German employers had unanimously opposed unemployment insurance 
as hazardous to work discipline and work incentives. In the Weimar Republic employers had 
by and large come to accept unemployment insurance. Why did this shift occur and by what 
concerns was it motivated? This section summarizes th  reasons why German employers 
reversed their position from opposing to supporting u employment insurance and discusses 
the relevance of strategic and genuine preferences in motivating the political decisions of 
German employers. 
The decision of employers to finally endorse unemployment insurance was a response 
to a set of profound changes in the political context hat had happened after the war. The 
analysis in this chapter has highlighted two specific changes: First, the introduction of 
unemployment assistance in 1918 and second, the emerg nce of a stable political majority in 
favor of unemployment insurance. The introduction of unemployment assistance in 1918 had 
established an institutional policy legacy that in interaction with the political majority in favor 
of unemployment insurance made a return to the pre-war status characterized by the absence 
of a public policy for the compensation of the unemployed politically very unlikely.  
As we have seen in the preceding sections, the interest of employers in the issue of 
unemployment protection derived from the decommodifying effects of unemployment 
benefits. Unemployment benefits provide workers with some chance of making a living 
without gainful employment and thus reduce their dependence on their employer, as Esping-
Andersen has pointed out (1990: 22). It is for this reason that employers have been so 
reluctant to accept the provision of social benefits to the unemployed. Protecting workers 
against the risk of unemployment was suspected to reward the ‘work-shy shirkers’ 
(“arbeitsscheue Drückeberger”) within the working class. Once workers would be able to get 
by without working, a good deal of them would tend to become unwilling to accept any work 
at all. Protecting workers against the risk of unemployment was acceptable to employers only 
under the condition that a way would be found to limit the payment of unemployment benefits 
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to those workers that were truly ‘involuntarily unemployed’ and truly ‘willing and capable to 
work’. Employers considered great care to be necessary to make sure that those unemployed 
workers not fulfilling these criteria, the ‘shirkers’, would not enjoy any benefit entitlements.  
In this respect, unemployment insurance is less problematic for employers than 
unemployment assistance. The reason for this is that these two programmes differ in the 
extent they enable the unemployed population to make a living without employment. The 
work obligation of benefit recipients can be enforced more effectively in an insurance scheme 
compared to an assistance scheme. Unemployment assis ance required no record of previous 
employment. In some instances, the level of the flat-rate benefits tended to approach wage 
levels, which eliminated work incentives for benefit recipients (Preller 1949: 365). The 
problem of controlling who is to receive benefits was exacerbated by the way the programme 
was administered. The municipalities were in charge of administering the programme 
unilaterally. They were seen by employers as not carefully enforcing the work obligation rule, 
which was supposed to limit benefits to those willing to work. In practice, the municipalities 
had little incentive to enforce the rule of work obligation, as denying the payment of 
unemployment assistance benefits would have merely shifted the cost burden to the municipal 
poor relief programmes. The administration of unemployment assistance thus denied 
employers any influence over the granting of benefit payments. 
Unemployment insurance, in contrast, links benefit n itlements to the record of 
previous employment and thus limits the possibilities for workers to make a living without 
any gainful employment. In addition, unemployment insurance would be administrated with 
the involvement of employer representatives, instead of by the municipalities, and would thus 
provide employers with some control over who should receive benefits. In short, 
unemployment insurance was less of an evil than unemployment assistance to employers, 
because it is better suited to maintain the benefit recipients’ dependence on gainful 
employment. Framed in terms of the need to maintain ‘ he sense of personal responsibility’ 
and self-reliance among the workers, employers aimed at maintaining the work discipline and 
work incentives of the working class. Decommodifying the unemployed was a threat to this 
aim. Before the war, when no public policy for the protection against unemployment had been 
in place, employers’ objective had been to preserve the policy status quo. After the war, when 
the introduction of unemployment assistance de-commdified the working class even more 
than what unemployment insurance would do, the employers’ objective had become to 
dismantle unemployment assistance. 
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The second component in the explanation of the change in employers’ attitude towards 
unemployment insurance was the shift in the political enter of gravity in the Weimar 
Republic, compared to the Empire. The authoritarian government of the Wilhelmine Empire 
had been reluctant to engage with the issue of unemploy ent insurance, while a majority of 
parliamentary parties had either opposed unemployment insurance (National Liberals, 
Conservatives) or had been internally split (Zentrum, Social Democrats). After the war, the 
social democratic labor movement turned away from the Ghent system, which had come 
under enormous fiscal stress as a result of recurrent waves of mass unemployment. Instead, a 
majority of the social democratic labor unions and the SPD now endorsed a public solution to 
the problem of unemployment compensation. Also, the two major non-socialist parties, the 
German People’s Party and the Center Party, were now endorsing the introduction of 
unemployment insurance. The balance of power had thus s ifted against the preferences of 
employers. 
Equally important was the fact that unemployment insurance had received a strong 
advocate in the form of the Christian-democratic Minister of Labor, Heinrich Brauns, who 
followed through the reform project from the beginning to the passing of the bill in July 1927. 
In short, given the strong political support in favor of unemployment insurance, employers 
realized that a full-fledged dismantling of unemployment assistance had little chances to 
succeed, though this is very likely to have remained their first-order preference. To avoid 
becoming irrelevant bystanders, employers decided to endorse unemployment insurance and 
cooperate in the drafting of the bill. Their intentio  for doing so was partly strategic, partly 
genuine. In terms of strategy, their intention was to improve their capacity to influence details 
of the new policy. In terms of genuine preferences, their goal was to prevent the continuation 
of the disliked unemployment assistance programme. 
 The strategic character of employer positions is confirmed by their recurrent reversals 
of position. After the introduction of unemployment assistance in November 1918 and the 
presentation of a first ministerial draft for unemployment insurance in November 1919, the 
two leading federations, the RDI and the VDA, had deci ed relatively quickly to endorse the 
introduction of unemployment insurance, albeit with some internal opposition. In autumn 
1923, the federations changed their mind and called upon the government to stop the project. 
They now feared a further increase of public social expenditure by unemployment insurance 
due to soaring unemployment (Büren 1934: 201). The soaring of unemployment in 1923 had 
fuelled employers’ concerns about the unpredictabili y of the cost impact of the new policy 
and so they developed doubts about the desirability of the policy change. 
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The opposition of employers to unemployment assistance alone were thus not 
sufficient to convince them of the advantages of the insurance option. Additionally, the 
insight that a strategy of radical opposition would mean to fight a losing battle was important 
for employers to finally decide to cooperate in thedrafting of the new programme. However, 
the resulting political compromise remained a short-lived one. The economic depression that 
started in 1929 precipitated a massive financial crisis of the new insurance programme. 
Employers abandoned the compromise and began to attack unemployment insurance, 
advocating a return to means-testing and the hollowing out of the insurance principle (Büren 
1934: 208-209). These reversals would have been unlikely if employers’ support for 
unemployment insurance had been motivated by a genuin  preference for protecting the 
unemployed.110 
On a more general level, the acceptance of unemployent insurance by employers 
was facilitated by a changing understanding of the causes of unemployment. Before the war, 
employers argued that unemployment would be a phenom n caused entirely by individual 
defects; such as laziness, lack of skill, or unruliess; and would not affect the good workers 
(see section II in this chapter). Given the occurrence of mass unemployment during the 
Weimar Republic this position had become incredible. Unemployment became now generally 
perceived as a structural phenomenon, caused not by deficiencies of the individual worker but 
by systemic conditions. Also German employers came to accept this new understanding. In 
their 1924 social policy programme, the VDA declared that unemployment was one of the 
‘most serious questions’ of German politics at that time (VDA 1924). An article published in 
Der Arbeitgeber ,the VDA’s official organ, described unemployment as having ‘the character 
of force majeure’ (Wolff 1926). The understanding of unemployment as being caused by 
systemic conditions, rather than individual deficien i s, is likely to have contributed to 
employers’ acceptance of unemployment insurance as politically legitimate. 
There appears to be little evidence for the hypothesis that a concern for the protection 
of skill investments motivated employers to accept unemployment insurance. Arguments 
                                                
110 Additional evidence for the strategic nature of employers’ support for unemployment insurance is provided 
by the stress of employers that monetary support to the unemployed is only accepted by them as a ’policy f last 
resort’ (Büren 1934: 202). Priority should be given instead to job placement services, vocational re-training, job 
creation programmes and public relief works. Only to the extent that such measures failed to reduce 
unemployment, should passive social benefits be granted (Büren 1934: 213). Employers by and large welcomed 
the use of public relief works, such as the programme of ‘productive unemployment assistance’ established in 
1923, as a useful way of maintaining the unemployed p rsons’ capacity to work110 (Büren 1934: 202; Preller 
1949: 367). This general prioritisation of active masures over passive social benefits confirms the interpretation 
of employers’ support for unemployment insurance as having been motivated not by a genuine preference but by 
strategic motivations instead. Employers accepted th  payment of social benefits to the unemployed only as a 
second-best policy option, to be used only if measures to reduce unemployment failed. 
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relating to the protection of skill investments appear not to have played a central role in the 
debates leading to the introduction of unemployment insurance at all. Mares (2003), who 
stresses the importance of skill investments in making employers support unemployment 
insurance, provides only one specific piece of archival evidence relating to the protection of 
skills111 (Mares 2003a: 147): ‘The condition of unemployment leads to the change in the 
profession of the unemployed, which is an extremely unfavorable situation for the training of 
workers in particular occupations and for employer who can hold on to their skilled workers 
only with great difficulty’ (VDA 1927: 136 , translation by Mares). We have to bear in mind 
that the degeneration of skills due to prolonged periods of unemployment that this statement 
refers to, takes place with or without the payment of unemployment insurance benefits. 
Concerns about skill degeneration may explain why employers demanded re-training 
activities, public relief works and improved job placement services, but not why they 
accepted social benefits to the unemployed. In short, arguments related to skill investments 
appear to have been of subordinate to the protection of work incentives and strategic 
considerations. 
Table 5.3 Sectoral composition of German Industry (1927/28) 
Sector % 
Mining 10.0 
Stone and earth industry 4.1 
Iron and Steel 10.3 
Mechanical engineering and car manufacturing 8.2 
Electric engineering 4.1 
Chemical engineering 3.8 
Textiles 7.6 
Clothing 5.8 
Paper and pulp 5.8 
Leather 1.7 
                                                
111 I did not find any further business statements relating unemployment insurance to skill investments i the 
literature and sources consulted. For the analysis of business statements, I draw in particular on a PhD thesis on 
the genesis of the unemployment insurance law of 1927, written by the German historian Hans Christian Führer 
and the sources used there (Führer 1990). It is worth pointing out that this study barely mentions theissue of 
skill investments as a motivation of employers, despit  the fact that the study also includes an in-depth analysis 




Timber industry  4.1 
Food 14.7 
Energy utilities 2.1 
Construction 11.4 
Note: Share of sector in percentage of total industrial output, sectors in bold are those relying on high-skilled 
labor. 
Source: Weisbrod 1978: Table 1, p.34   
 
Although direct archival evidence for the importance of preferences relating to the 
protection of skill investments is weak, it is still possible that underlying structural changes in 
the composition of German industry during the Weimar Republic have facilitated employers’ 
policy reversal, a suggested by Mares (Mares 1996: 30). The newer manufacturing industries 
were more skill-intense compared to the older heavy industry and for this reason may have 
been more open to labor demands. We therefore need to look at the relative importance of 
skill-intense industries were during the Weimar Republic. Following the definition of skill-
intense sectors used in Mares (chemicals, machine-tools and electric engineering) (1996: 30), 
only about 16 per cent of total industrial output came form these sectors at the time 
unemployment insurance was introduced in Germany (see table 5.3 above). Skill-intense 
sectors did thus not dominate German industry at thime. It is therefore unlikely that 
concerns about the protection of skill investments had been the main factor explaining why 
employers decided to change their mind in the Weimar Republic. 
To summarize, the argument presented in this chapter differs from a cross-class 
coalition argument in two important regards: First, the specification of the reasons for 
employers’ reversal from opposing to supporting unemployment insurance and second, the 
relevance for the reform outcome that is attributed to this change. First, the chapter has shown 
that employers acceptance of unemployment insurance refl cted an accommodation to 
political constrains, rather than genuine preferences for social protection of the unemployed. 
Changes in politics and policy status quo motivated employers to change their positions on 
unemployment insurance. I argue that, before as well as after the war, the genuine preference 
of employers had been to limit the decommodification of the unemployed as much as possible 
in order to maintain work discipline and work incentives. What the best way for employers 
was to achieve this preference changed over time due to changes in the policy status quo and 
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the balance of political power. Political accommodation can explain business support for 
social policies better than economic interests.  
Second, the argument in this chapter differs from a cross-class coalition argument in 
respect to the causal impact that is attributed to employers for shaping the reform outcome. 
The existence of a cross class alliance presupposes that employers and unions cooperate with 
the purpose of jointly promoting a certain policy opti n, whether for strategic or for non-
strategic reasons. The analysis of the reform process in this chapter does however not support 
the interpretation that the unemployment insurance law resulted from such a cross class 
alliance. Although the analysis did find that employers and unions found common ground on 
a number of important issues of policy design, the unstable and wavering character of 
employers’ support for unemployment insurance did not allow the formation of a stable cross 
class alliance. The driving force behind the project had not been a cross class alliance but 
primarily the ministerial bureaucracy. 
Remarkably, the reform took place at a time when class cooperation was crumbling. 
While during the early post-war period class cooperation was prevalent as a result of the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement and the ZAG, class cooperation eroded subsequently and the pre-
war positions of class antagonism resurfaced (see chapter 4). Due to its strategic and narrowly 
conceived nature, the compromise over unemployment insurance was unable to revitalize 
class cooperation more broadly. The onset of the economic crisis in 1929 led to the collapse 
of class compromise and ultimately to the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the coming 
into power of the Nazis. Large parts of German industry had become disillusioned about the 
capacities of the parliamentary system to provide th  necessary conditions for profitable 
production and turned to Nazism instead (Hallgarten 1955; Turner 1985). In short, a sustained 
and stable form of class cooperation or a cross-class alliance did not develop during the 
Weimar period. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how the kind of unemployment policies demanded by industrial 
employers were shaped by the political context. In the German Empire, employers had been 
adamantly opposed to any form of public support to the unemployed. In the Weimar 
Republic, employers came to change their mind and eventually supported the introduction of 
unemployment insurance. The chapter has shown that this reversal reflected a calculated 
accommodation to far-reaching changes in the politica  context that would have rendered the 
continuation of fundamental opposition a losing battle. The chapter has emphasized, in 
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particular, two specific changes: First, changes in the balance of power between supporters 
and opponents of unemployment insurance. Before the war, a stable parliamentary majority 
against unemployment insurance existed: after the war, a stable parliamentary majority in 
favor of unemployment insurance emerged, because the Social Democrats and the Center 
Party, different to before the war, decided to support unemployment insurance. To avoid 
losing political influence by being bystanders to an unstoppable reform, employers decided to 
cooperate in the drafting of the government bill. 
 Second, before the war no public policy to support the unemployed had been in place. 
The work incentive mechanisms produced by the market forces had thus been fully operative. 
The programme of unemployment assistance introduced immediately after the war changed 
this. Unemployment assistance was a means-tested flat-rate benefit programme that could be 
paid to anybody out of work and gave employers no control over the granting of benefit 
entitlements. For this reason, employers strongly opposed unemployment assistance. 
Unemployment insurance, in contrast, based benefits on previous employment and earnings 
and gave employers some control over the use of funds through their participation in the 
administration of the new programme. As turning back the clock to the pre-war times was 
politically unfeasible, employers eventually decided to endorse the introduction of 
unemployment insurance as a lesser evil. By supporting the project they expected to be able to 
get rid of unemployment assistance and influence important details of the new policy, in 
particular its institutional infrastructure. 
 Both in the Empire and in the Weimar Republic the concern of employers regarding 
the issue of unemployment protection derived from the suspected work disincentives 
produced by the decommodifying effects of supporting the unemployed. The provision of 
social benefits to the unemployed reduces the dependence of the individual worker on gainful 
employment and for this reason was suspected by employers to erode work discipline and 
work incentives. It was not the protection of skill investments, but concerns about the erosion 
of the employer’s control over the workforce that was the underlying pre-strategic preference 
that led employers to engage with the issue of unemployment protection. By supporting 
unemployment insurance employers tried to limit thedecommodifying character of social 
policy, replacing a strongly decommodifying policy with a less decommodifying one. 
** 
Employers’ preference for Bismarckian social policies over universal and egalitarian 
alternatives was not limited to the issue of unemployment insurance but holds also for other 
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social policies. The conflict over Bismarckian vs. universalist social policies resurfaced again 
after World War II, when employers lobbied against a transformation of the German welfare 
state system towards a universalist system of so-called “unitary insurance”. This failure to 
transform the German welfare state is analyzed in chapter 7. Before that, chapter 6 provides a 
brief digression on how the political experiences made by German employers during the 
Weimar Republic and the Nazi regime influenced their broader attitudes toward social 
compromise and the importance of embedding profit-seeking activities of firms into the 




6 German Business after World War II: Resort to the ‘Social Market 
Economy’ 
 
The change in the economic attitudes [Wirtschaftsgesinnung], in the economic forms and in the 
social order that has happened over the last 50 years, and that since 1948 continues in the 
Federal Republic, is expressed in the fact that nowadays we do no longer speak of a capitalist 
economic order but of a “ Social Market Economy”. By this type of market economy one 
means an economy based on the principle of private ownership of the means of production, free 
competition within the framework of the legal order, f eedom of contract, individual 
responsibility and a stable currency. This type of market economy is called social because its 
protagonists, which include the entrepreneurs, are committed to achieving the highest possible 
degree of social justice and security by using thisorder as the basis for the production and 
distribution of goods. 
Quote from the declaration of principles by the German employer federation BDA ‘Gedanken zur 
Sozialen Ordnung’ (BDA 1953a: 5, emphasis in original) 
 
The importance of the Nazi era and World War II as the catalysts of major transformations in 
German history is hard to overstate. The end of World War II turned was a critical juncture in 
the development of Germany’s political economy. During the late 1940s and the early 1950s 
the decisions were made that constructed or re-constructed those institutions of cooperation 
between capital and labor that are today seen as core elements of the German ‘coordinated 
market economy’. Coordinated wage bargaining and works councils were re-established 
following broadly the model of the Stinnes-Legien agreement. At the same time elements of 
state intervention in industrial relations were dismantled and co-determination at the firm 
level was introduced. Employers endorsed the politica  concept of a “social market economy” 
as an alternative to its leftist contenders, democratic socialism and communism. This chapter 
elaborates what this concept meant to employers and what motivated them to endorse the 
social market economy. 
6. I The Social Market Economy as Ideological Weapon 
Following World War II German employer associations reoriented their general approach to 
labor. They shifted from an approach of aggressive confrontation in the 19th century to 
accepting unions as an equal bargaining partner aft1945. The first attempts to establish a 
stable form of class cooperation had already been made after World War I through the ZAG 
committee established by the Stinnes-Legien agreement. D spite this attempt, the two sides of 
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industry did not, however, succeed in establishing a stable and sustained form of class 
cooperation during the Weimar Republic. Class antagonism and conflict eventually prevailed 
in a context of political and economic instability. Institutions for class conciliation remained 
disputed, in particular the role of the state arbitration boards. Economic crisis intensified 
distributive conflicts between capital and labor. 
The political and economic developments after World War II, in the Federal Republic 
(FRG), stand in marked contrast to the Weimar Republic. The rapid rises of prosperity during 
the ‘economic miracle’ period went hand in hand with political stability, more stable forms of 
class cooperation and bargaining and the expansion of the welfare state. The receding of class 
antagonism after World War II and the development of m re stable institutions of class 
compromise was accompanied by an ideational paradigm shift within the German business 
community. Employers became active protagonists of ‘social partnership’ and the so-called 
‘social market economy’, as expressed by the BDA statement in the epigraph to this chapter 
(Bunn 1959: 379). 
German business resorted to the ‘social market economy’ at a time when its political 
standing was weakened. The impression that financial support by the heavy industry had been 
important in helping the Nazis to come into power had weakened tremendously the political 
credibility of German industry (Hallgarten 1955; Turner 1985). Ludwig Rosenberg, the future 
president of the labor union federation (DGB) expressed this view:  
It need only be repeated …what Fritz Thyssen, the controller of Vereinigte Edelstahlwerke, 
reported in his book, I Paid Hitler. The world and the German people know what wretched 
and irresponsible roles he and numerous German industrialists played in those decisive months 
before Hitler came to power, and how the already bankrupt Nazi party was rescued through 
these politico-economic leaders. There is no doubt that without them the world would have 
been spared Hitler and the misfortune associated with him (Rosenberg 1953: 6 quoted in Bunn 
1958: 283). 
 While nowadays the concept of ‘social market economy’ is often understood as a 
synonym for the welfare state, during the 1950s it represented well-nigh the opposite (Van 
Hook 2004: 291). Its protagonists understood the ‘social market economy’ not as an 
alternative to but as the implementation of economic liberalism. The social market economy 
represented a set of economic policy principles, championed by the Christian Democratic 
Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, the chief political protagonist of the social market 
economy. Its defining goals were entrepreneurial freedom, free market competition and 
currency stability: ‘the social market economy celebrated the market, competition, and free 
trade’(Van Hook 2004: 3). Unlike other industrial societies that entered a period of greater 
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state intervention in the economy after World War II, Erhard’s economic policies dismantled 
economic controls and turned to economic liberalism instead (Shonfield 1965: 240). 
 In German public discourse of the post-war period the concept of the ‘social market 
economy’ functioned as the political ‘antidote’ to ‘democratic socialism’ and communism. 
Democratic socialism was the political platform of s cial democracy in the post-war period. 
With the collapse of the Nazi regime, the hour of ‘democratic socialism’ appeared to have 
arrived. The British and the Americans considered the social democrats to be the 
representatives of a suppressed democratic tradition in Germany and initially supported social 
democratic plans for economic reorganization. With the onset of the cold war, the US turned 
away from economic reorganization, in order to enlist the economic power of Germany in the 
new east-west conflict. This meant the end to plans for a nationalization of the heavy industry 
(Van Hook 2004: 53-94).  
German business and its political allies used the doctrine of the social market economy 
as an ideational tool to challenge competing doctrines of economic organization and 
demonstrate the superiority of a market-based order vis-à-vis its leftist alternatives. The 
political priority of German business was to resist the threat of ‘democratic socialism’, 
arguing that ‘economic and social theory of democrati  socialism fail’ (BDA 1953a: 4). 
Moreover, the creation of a communist regime in theEastern part of Germany (GDR) 
following the split of the German territory after World War II, made the danger of 
collectivization appear as even more real and serious. In this historical context, the ‘social 
market economy’ certainly appeared to German busines  not only as a lesser evil to be 
endorsed for strategic reasons, but also as the genuine savior of the capitalist order. 
In 1953, the Federation of German Employer Associations (BDA) published a social 
policy manifesto titled ‘Thoughts about the Social Order’ [“Gedanken zur sozialen 
Ordnung”] (BDA 1953a). This is the most important document published during the post-war 
period outlining the social policy doctrine of the f deration and its understanding of the 
concept of ‘social market economy’. The platform was presented shortly before the national 
elections in an apparent attempt to shape public opinion. The document is structured around a 
critical evaluation of three different ideological programmes: communism, democratic 
socialism and the social market economy - the latter being the one explicitly advocated by the 
BDA as an alternative to the other two. Democratic so ialism and communism are presented 
as the main political rivals to the social market economy. In the 1950s, the social market 
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economy was not perceived as an alternative to a liberal market economy but instead as its 
materialization. 
While the manifesto considers the flaws of communism as being obvious and does not 
spend much time on its refutation, ‘democratic socialism’ is considered as a much more 
serious programmatic contender. The document identifi s collectivization of industry and 
centralized economic planning by the state as the defining characteristics of ‘democratic 
socialism’, referring to the founding congress of the Socialist International in Frankfurt 1951 
(BDA 1953a: 3). The tenets of ‘democratic socialism’ were presented to be in conflict with 
individual economic freedom and, therefore, in violation of human dignity: ‘A social order 
based on human dignity is irreconcilable with its [democratic socialism’s] theories.’ (BDA 
1953a: 4). Communism and democratic socialism were the programmatic contenders against 
which the doctrine of the social market economy wasdirected. 
The doctrine of ‘social market economy’ was not a br inchild of German business, 
though. Instead, the concept was only adopted by business after World War II, while it has its 
intellectual roots among catholic social theorists of the Weimar period. The notion of a social 
market economy was first used during the 1920s by catholic academics at the University of 
Freiburg112 (Bunn 1959: 370; Joerges and Rödl 2004: 12). After World War II, the concept 
became the overarching political doctrine of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), which 
was the successor to the Center Party in the Weimar Republic. The Christian Democratic 
Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, justified his free market policies by reference to this 
programme (Kreile 1978: 198-200; see also Nicholls 1994; and Van Hook 2004). The 
doctrine of the social market economy was the answer by business and the political right to 
the programme of nationalization and economic planning advocated by the left. The doctrine 
of ‘social market economy’ aimed at disarming these challenges by combining a political-
economic order based on market competition with social peace and political stability. 
In the view of German business the political struggle taking place in Germany at that 
time was between the protagonists of the social market economy, on the one hand, and the 
protagonists of collectivism on the other. That support by German business for the social 
market economy was intended as a weapon against sociali m and communism is evident in 
the following summarizing statement taken from the 1953 Annual Report by the BDA: 
‘Neither an anonymous collectivism, the power of organizations and functionaries, nor the 
socialization of the economy and the people, but the observance of the worth and freedom of 
                                                
112 The journal of the movement is Ordo: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. To its 




individuals and the recognition and promotion of property rights and private ownership for all 
sectors of the society are the bases of our culture and of its appropriate social order. These 
bases alone can be the building stones for a spiritual dam against the dangers of bolshevist 
infiltration.  
Not in systematic leveling, but only in individual initiative and responsibility can a social 
order be anchored which assures social well-being and progress.  
Neither the communist state economy nor a socialist planned economy, but the social market 
economy has, as the facts and experiences in all countries show, actually demonstrated 
economic and social efficiency. To lead this social m rket system to even greater attainments 
remains the positive purpose and aim of the entrepreneurial economy. (BDA 1953b: 21,) 
Remarkably, German business emphasized the market component, rather than the 
social, in the doctrine of social market economy. When German business referred to the 
concept of ‘social market economy’, the meaning of the adjective ‘social’ always remained 
very vague. First and foremost, the adjective ‘social’ stood for the general belief that a 
political-economic order based on free market competition would be a better means for 
achieving social ends than any alternative politica-economic order: 
We embrace the social market economy with its principle of private ownership of the means of 
production, with free competition within the framework of the legal order, with freedom of 
contract, with individual responsibility and a stable currency. Compared to the planned 
economy…., this type of economy guarantees a maximum of production of economic 
goods…. This type of market economy is the economic foundation for achieving the 
maximum of social justice, security and freedom for every citizen. This is the reason why we 
call this a “social market economy” (BDA 1953a, emphasis added). 
From the view of German business, social ends had to be accomplished first of all by 
way of increasing economic production and national prosperity. Social policy should play 
only a secondary role. According to the protagonists of the social market economy, increases 
in economic prosperity for all should be achieved primarily through the market and not 
through the welfare state. The means to achieve this is wage policy, rather than social policy: 
‘The goal of wage policy is….the participation of the worker in the expanding production; 
that is, an increase in his real wage’ (BDA 1953a: 6). The social of the social market 
economy was delivered by rising real wages, in line with the development of labor 
productivity, according to the view of the BDA. 
The principle of social policy that the social market economy relies upon is 
subsidiarity. According to the doctrine of the social market economy, the welfare state should 
only have a subsidiary role, it should only step in when the market fails. This position relies 
on the argument that social justice can only be achieved if economic production expands and 
incomes rise. Social justice cannot be achieved by redistributing wealth through the welfare 
state but only by increasing economic output: ‘There is no sound social order that is not based 
on performance. One cannot borrow societal prosperity, one can only create it’ (BDA 1953a: 
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6). Increasing prosperity, in turn, is only possible on the basis of a free market economy. Yet, 
German business nevertheless accepted a role for public social policy in those areas where the 
market fails. Social protection would be necessary to maintain political stability and social 
peace:  
The social conscience and the raison d’etat require that the community steps in to help those 
citizens to secure their elementary preconditions of existence, who due to sickness, old-age, 
work incapacity, or other unavoidable fates, are not able to support themselves. This is a 
requirement of charity [Nächstenliebe]. Due to the natural imperfections of human 
beings…the requirement of charity…has to become law. (…) The limits are where the 
character and scope of public support threatens to paralyze the self-reliance of the citizen to 
care for himself and his family [Daseinskampf]. Public support must, therefore, remain 
subsidiary. Furthermore, it must not be extended into a universal ‘insurance against all 
risks’[Schicksalsversicherung] (BDA 1953a: 6, emphasis in original) 
This statement by the BDA documents clearly that German business did not support 
social insurance as  a protection of skill investments, as suggested by the cross-class coalition 
thesis, but as a means to maintain social peace and political stability. In no part of the BDA 
social policy programme analyzed above is any link established between the requirements of 
skill formation and social policy. Instead, social insurance and the fight against 
unemployment are supported on the grounds of normative obligations (‘social conscience’) 
and political stability (‘raison d’etat’).  
The simultaneous emphasis on the subsidiary character of social policy and the 
importance of self-reliance also indicates the continued importance of work incentives for 
employers. The kind of social policies supported by employers were conservative social 
policies, social insurance schemes based on employment and with earnings-related benefits. 
This type of social policy maintains work incentives and does not liberate the individual from 
its principal necessity to work. As we will see in the following chapter (7.I) employers did 
fight for the maintenance of the Bismarckian welfare state institutions and against a system 
shift to a universalist model after World War II. 
6.II Resort to Social Partnership 
Parallel to the paradigm shift of German business to the ‘social market economy’ a shift in 
attitude towards the labor unions occurred. The oldauthoritarian and confrontational 
approach, known as the ‘master-in-my-own-house’ approach was first undermined by the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement in 1918. In the Weimar Republic institutions of social partnership 
remained fragile and contested, though, while more sustained and stable forms of social 
partnership developed only after World War II. This change was facilitated by a more 
profound paradigm shift among German employer associati ns towards social partnership and 
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social compromise following World War II. While the Stinnes-Legien agreement had been 
primarily strategic in nature, the turn to social prtnership in the Federal Republic had a much 
more genuine and profound character. Nevertheless, the BDA drew on the Stinnes-Legien 
agreement to legitimate its turn to social partnership:  
The social order is an essential component of our internal order [innerstaatliche 
Gesamtordnung]. Since the November Agreement of 1918 concerning the 
Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft [Stinnes-Legien agreement], which leading and politically 
responsible representatives of the peak associations of employers and employees concluded, 
our German social order rests on the principle of apartnership relationship of employer and 
employees in the plants and between their organizations above the plant level. (BDA 1955a: 
7). 
The BDA understood social partnership to be a way of containing the militancy and 
strength of the labor movement. This is evident from the way the BDA tried to define the 
rules of social partnership. First, the BDA emphasized that social partnership must be based 
on a balance of power between capital and labor. This referred primarily to the equal 
representation of capital and labor in corporatist bodies for the administration of social 
insurance programmes and labor market policies. A goal business could achieve, as is shown 
in the next chapter. Second, unions must limit their activities to those domains that, in the 
view of business, belonged to the proper competencies of the ‘social partners’: the negotiation 
of wages and working conditions. They should refrain from pursuing broader political goals. 
Third, the BDA demanded that unions must be politically neutral and not take side in 
favor of any political party, nor must they participate in or fund any election campaigning. 
The BDA argued that any potential attempts by the non-partisan labor union federation 
(DGB) to cooperate with the SPD would destabilize th new parliamentary democracy. The 
BDA also considered the use of strikes for political purposes as against the rules and a serious 
threat to social partnership. Instead, unions had to limit themselves to bargaining with 
employers, whereby bargaining had to be limited to those issues that were within the proper 
domains of the social partners. Furthermore, co-determination at the firm-level, in particular, 
was seen as clearly beyond the legitimate domain of social partnership and in violation of 
capital ownership rights (see chapter 8). In short, the employer federation turned to social 
partnership as a tool for containing the potential militancy and power of the labor movement. 
Employers came to realize that social partnership would be a more effective way of 
containing the labor movement than confrontation. 
The shift by business to social partnership was not mere strategy but reflects a real 
shift in the approach by German business to the labor movement. Evidence for this claim is 
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provided by the fact that German business after 1945 had supported a politically unified and 
non-partisan labor union federation, instead of politica ly fragmented union organizations. 
Before the World War I, industry had actively tried to split the labor movement by funding 
‘yellow unions’ and other splinter groups (see Chapter 2). In the Weimar Republic the labor 
movement remained fragmented into political camps, with separate peak-level federations. A 
politically unified union federation could only be established after World War II. In 1951, 
Walter Raymond,113 the first president of the BDA (1949-1953) and a strong supporter of 
social partnership declared: 
I personally believe that the unified [trade union] structure is better than having competing 
trade unions, since the reconciling of the natural differences of opinion, which are present in 
every large organization, is easier when the organization is committed to the retention of unity 
rather than to a competitive struggle. (BDA 1951: 30. translation from German by Bunn, 
quoted in Bunn 1959: 376). 
A politically unified union organization may be more powerful than a politically 
fragmented one, but it provides business with a single bargaining partner, the prerequisite for 
effective and reliable bargaining. The support by the BDA of a unified trade union 
organization, and its lack of interest in a political fragmentation of the labor movement, can 
thus be seen as evidence of the credibility of the paradigm shift by German business. Unions 
had become fully recognized by employers as an equal bargaining partner. Bargaining and 
compromise-finding between capital and labor cannot be reliable and effective if one of the 
two sides is politically fragmented or if the representativeness of the organization of one of 
the two sides is in question.114  
The new social partnership approach of the BDA was not universally accepted among 
all German industrialists, though. Authoritarian and paternalistic attitudes were still 
widespread among German industrialists during the 1950s, in particular in the traditional 
heavy industry (Berghahn 1985: 183). The manufacturing industries, in comparison, did 
traditionally pursue a more cooperative approach towards labor relations (see also chapter 2). 
The BDA leadership had therefore to take a mediator role between the old ‘hardliners’ of the 
heavy industry and their anti-labor attitude, on the one hand, and the labor unions, on the 
other hand. Both needed to be persuaded of the benefits of the new cooperative approach.  
                                                
113 Walter Raymond, was an outspoken protagonist of the approach of ‘social partnership’. Unlike other 
business representatives, he did not have any leading position within the Nazi regime, neither within the NSDAP 
nor within the state apparatus, and represented a new compromise-oriented approach towards labor (Bunn 1960). 
114 This observation confirms the hypothesis advanced by Karl O Hondrich and others that interest associations 
that represent antagonistic interests will try to strengthen each other, in order to justify their own raison d’etre 
(Hondrich 1963: 43) 
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Also at the associational level, social partnership was not embraced by all. While the 
BDA embraced social partnership, the peak-level industry federation, the Federation of 
German Industry (BDI), remained more skeptical. The BDI remained particularly skeptical 
towards all types of corporatist institutions that involved a regulated and permanent form of 
bargaining with labor. The BDI enjoyed excellent informal contacts to officials in the relevant 
government ministries and preferred direct, bilateral cooperation between industry and 
government, thereby excluding labor115 (Braunthal 1965: 192-212). One important task of the 
BDA leadership during the 1950s was therefore ‘re-education’. Both, the labor unions and 
parts of business itself, needed to be persuaded of the benefits of social partnership. 
Conclusions 
In short, German employers resorted to the ‘social m rket economy’ as a programmatic 
alternative to communism and democratic socialism. The experiences of the Weimar Republic 
and the Nazi regime had seriously impaired the politica  legitimacy of unfettered capitalism 
and authoritarianism. At the same time, democratic so ialism, with socialization and 
economic planning as its core elements, appeared as a serious and politically viable doctrine, 
advocated by the unions and the social democrats. The social market economy served as an 
attractive programmatic alternative by business. The doctrine of the social market economy 
was intended to provide political legitimacy to an economic order based on free market 
competition and private capital ownership. Although today the social market economy has 
become well-nigh synonymous to the welfare state, for its protagonists during the 1950s the 
concept meant almost the opposite. In the post-war context, the social market economy 
embodied economic liberalism.  
As in the Wilhelmine Empire, social policy was part of the arsenal of weapons to be 
used in the struggle for the political legitimacy of the economic order. German business 
accepted social policies in principle as long as they could help to strengthen the political 
legitimacy of the liberal capitalist order, but it turned against policies that restricted 
entrepreneurial control over the use of capital. This was the case most clearly in the conflict 
over co-determination. The following two chapters analyze the response by German business 
to two reform initiatives with varying effects on entrepreneurial freedom: social insurance 
reforms and co-determination at the firm level. The two policies differ markedly in the way 
                                                
115 The different positions of BDI and BDA appears to be largely the result of the different policy domains the 
two federations operated in. As the BDI dealt primaly with the product market interests of firms115 it had to 
interact much less with unions than the BDA and is thus likely to have perceived a necessity to accommdate to 
union strength. 
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they affect the rights of capital ownership: social insurance programmes leave the freedom of 
decision of capital owners unaffected: codeterminatio  restricts the decision rights of private 





7 Post-War Social Policy Reforms: Containing Welfare Expansion 
 
The immediate post-war period (from the late 1940s to the early 1950s) was characterized by 
rapid transformations in the political, economic and social spheres. The economic misery and 
mass poverty of the first post-war years (ca.1945-49) was followed by a period of rapid 
economic recovery, the famed ‘economic miracle’ (Wirtschaftswunder). The labor market 
situation changed from mass unemployment in the late 1940s to full employment in the late 
1950s (Schmidt 1998: 68).The focus in social policy making changed as well. During the 
early post-war period policy makers focused on rebuilding the welfare state institutions that 
had been left financially broke by the Nazi regime. This period constituted a critical juncture 
that set the course for subsequent developments. Atemp s to transform the Bismarckian 
welfare state into a system of universal social protection failed and set the path for a 
reconstruction of the old Bismarckian system of fragmented social insurance. After the old 
programmes had been reinstated in the late 1940s, the focus shifted to expanding benefit 
generosity, made possible by rapidly growing prosperity. 
This chapter analyzes how employers have responded to key social policy reform 
projects during this period. Did employers’ endorsement of the “social market economy” 
translate into an endorsement for social policy reforms? How did employers respond to 
reform initiatives by other actors? On which kind of coalitions have these reforms been 
based? The chapter focuses on three core reform projects: First, plans for a transformation of 
the German welfare state from a Bismarckian system of social insurance to a universal system 
of so-called Einheitsversicherung; second, the conflict over parity representation for
employers and unions within the re-instated institutions of social self-government: and third, 
the reform of the pension system in the 1957, which  improved benefit adequacy. 
 These three reform projects have been supported by ifferent political coalitions. 
While in the case of the first two reforms employers p evailed, in the case of the pension 
reform they had to back down. The chapter shows that employers defended Bismarckian 
welfare state institutions against the challenge of a universalist welfare state system, 
indicating their preference for conservative social policies as opposed to universalist or social 
democratic social policies. Moreover, the third part shows that a weakening of employer 
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influence occurred as a result of a new dynamic of electoral competition that centered on 
welfare state expansion. 
7.I Social Insurance Reform: The Conflict over Universalism 
 (1945-1948)116 
During the late 1940s Germany experienced an attemp to depart fundamentally from the path 
of a conservative welfare state that the country had embarked upon from the 1880s onwards. 
Bismarck’s social insurance reforms during the 1880s had established a system of social 
insurance that provided earnings-related benefits to wage earners. Benefit rights differed 
between occupational groups, in particular between blue-collar and white-collar workers, and 
between private-sector employees and civil servants. The organization of social insurance was 
fragmented along occupational lines. The period of Allied occupation following the collapse 
of the Nazi regime provided a window of opportunity for a radical transformation of the 
German welfare state towards a universal and egalitari n ‘people’s insurance’ system 
comparable to the system developed by Lord Beveridg n the UK. This attempt to transform 
the German welfare model ultimately failed and the old Bismarckian system was restored. 
Like in the cases of the introduction of social insurance in the 1880s and the introduction of 
unemployment insurance in 1927, (analyzed in chapters 3 and 5), employers had also this 
time preferred a Bismarckian system of occupationally fragmented and earnings-related 
benefits over more egalitarian and universalist alternatives. This section analyzes the conflicts 
over universalism and the reasons why employers opposed a universal ‘people’s insurance’ 
model. 
The occupation of Germany by the Allies after the war had created a critical juncture 
that opened up the possibility of a fundamental departure from the pre-existing path. The 
intervention by an external actor, the Allied Contrl Council (ACC), changed the range of 
policy options that were politically viable, because the Allies promoted institutional reforms. 
Two options were on the agenda: Continuation with the Bismarckian welfare state model or, 
alternatively, a shift to a universalist-redistributive ‘unitary insurance’ 
(“Einheitsversicherung”). ‘Einheitsversicherung’ meant a system of social insurance covering 
the whole population (universal insurance) and applying the same benefit rules to all 
occupational groups (unified or unitary insurance).  
 The initiative for such a transformation to Einheitsversicherung came from the 
Allies. In September 1946, the Manpower Directorate of ACC had presented a proposal for a 
                                                




universal and unified social insurance system (Hockerts 1980: 26). The social democratic 
labor movement had traditionally demanded the introduction of universal ‘peoples’ 
insurance’117 (Hockerts 1980: 27, Fn.24.). The Allies considered the social democratic labor 
movement to be the representative of a dormant democratic tradition in Germany and were 
generally sympathetic to its political demands. Moreover, in 1946 the Labor government in 
the UK had enacted a pension reform inspired by the proposals of Lord Beveridge, which 
offered a template also for the reorganization of the German welfare state (Hockerts 1980: 27-
31; Whiteside 2003: 23-32 re. the 1946 National Insurance Act in the UK).  
The re-organization of social insurance proposed by the Allies in 1946 involved the 
extension of insurance coverage to previously uncovered groups such as the self-employed 
(“Selbständige”), uniform flat-rate benefits for all occupational groups and a centralization of 
the organization of social insurance. Instead of the plethora of insurance associations that 
existed so far, all programmes would be administrated by a single national authority, 
governed by the representatives of capital and labor. Remarkably, the Allies proposed that 
labor representatives should have two thirds of the seats and employers one third, a shift in 
power towards labor (Hockerts 1980: 37). Among the domestic actors, social democratic 
labor unions were the chief supporters of a universal Einheitsversicherung. The planned 
centralized organization and its governance by a labor majority would have provided 
substantial new power resources to the unions. Unsurpri ingly, the shift in the balance of 
power was one of the key reasons why employers opposed the planned reorganization (see 
7.II). But employers also had more fundamental objections about creating universal social 
entitlements, as shown below. 
In the end, the proposal presented by the ACC failed. The reason for the failure was a 
combination of domestic opposition and the waning of support for reorganization among the 
Allies themselves. The Allies focused primarily on issues of foreign policy and defense, while 
issues of social and economic policies over time reced d into the background. For several 
reasons the ACC began to withdraw from domestic economic and social policy issues from 
1947 onwards118 and gradually delegated legislative powers in these areas to the Germans. For 
this purpose the ACC created the so-called ‘Economic Council’ (‘Wirtschaftsrat’) in June 
1947. The Economic Council was intended to function as a provisional parliament for the US 
                                                
117 Demands for a universal and unitary insurance were made for instance at the SPD party congress 1902 in 
Munich, in the SPD Heidelberg programme from 1925 and in a resolution of the 1928 congress of the social 
democratic labor union federation in Hamburg (ADGB) (Hockerts 1980: Fn24 on 27-8). 
118 The single most important reason has been the onset f the cold war and the intention of the Western Allies to 
tie Germany to the West, which lead them to avoid a he vy-handed approach. 
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and UK zones in the field of economic and social policy119 (Berghahn 1985: 209; Hockerts 
1980: 86). The parties represented in the Economic Council were divided over the 
introduction of a universal Einheitsversicherung. The Social Democrats and the Communists, 
backed by the social democratic unions, favored a universal insurance programme. The non-
socialist parties (CDU/CSU, FDP and DP), backed by employers, were in favor of keeping 
the traditional Bismarckian social insurance system. SPD and KPD held 46 seats and 
CDU/CSU, FDP and DP together 52 seats in the Economic Council. There was thus no 
majority in the Council for a transformation of the German welfare state towards a universal 
Einheitsversicherung120 (Hockerts 1980: 88). 
Given this disagreement about the future institutional form of the German welfare 
state, the factions in the Economic Council decided to ivide the issues at hand into two parts. 
They agreed that the Council would only make decisions on urgent issues, such as benefit 
adjustments, while fundamental issues about the institutional form of the welfare state would 
be postponed, to be decided by the parliament of a future sovereign nation state. The Social 
Democrats accepted this postponement and refrained from putting their proposals for 
Einheitsversicherung on the agenda of the Economic Council. In December 1948 the 
Economic Council passed the so-called ‘Social Insurance Adjustment Law’ with the votes of 
SPD and CDU. This law raised benefit levels to counter the effects of inflation, but did not 
address the issue of institutional reorganization. The two parties had agreed on a lowest 
common denominator decision that left controversial i sues open in order to be decided at a 
later point. The Social Democrats expected to win elections to the first sovereign national 
parliament, which would allow them to go ahead with their plans, supported by stronger 
political legitimacy (Hockerts 1980: 88). 
The actual outcome of the first national elections thwarted this plan . In these elections 
Social Democrats and Communists together gained only 36.5 per cent of the vote (see table 
7.1 below) (Alber 1989: 59). There was thus no parliamentary majority in favor of 
Einheitsversicherung. The non-socialist parties gained a majority and formed a coalition 
government, led by the Christian Democrats (CDU), with their party head Konrad Adenauer 
as Chancellor. The non-socialist coalition governmet decided to restore the traditional 
Bismarckian organization of social insurance. The labor wing within the CDU supported also 
this decision (Hockerts 1980: 131). This meant a return to a decentralized and fragmented 
                                                
119 Initially, the Economic Council was only in charge of economic policy issues, in August 1948 its 
competencies were extended for social and labor market policy issues. (Hockerts 1980: 86-87) 
120 The total number of seats was 104. Even if the remaining six deputies would have supported an 
Einheitsversicherung, there would have been no majority f r such a plan. 
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organization, privileged benefit rights for white-collar employees and corporatist self-
government on the basis of parity between capital and l bor (Hockerts 1980: 107-170). As a 
result, proposals for Einheitsversicherung were off the political agenda. The window of 
opportunity for a reorganization of social insurance had been closed. 































Total number of 
deputies 
402 487 497 499 496 496 496 496 497 498 497 662 672 669 603 614 
CDU/CSU 139 243 270 242 245 242 225 243 226 244 223 319 294 245 248 226 
SPD 131 151 169 190 202 224 230 214 218 193 186 239 252 298 251 222 
FDP 52 48 41 67 49 30 41 39 53 34 46 79 47 43 47 61 
Greens/ 
Alliance 90 
         27 42 8 49 47 55 51 
PDS Left            17 30 36 2 54 
Others 80 45 17              
Source: Wikipedia (2008) 
 
Supporters and opponents of unitary insurance 
The positions in the conflict over Einheitsversicherung followed by and large the class 
cleavage, pitting blue-collar workers against employers and white-collar workers. Support for 
a universal and unified insurance system came from the Social Democrats, the Communists 
and the social democratic blue-collar labor unions. I  addition to industrial employers, 
opposition came also from the non-socialist parties, Christian unions, white-collar unions, the 
private insurance sector, artisans and medical practitioners (Hockerts 1980: 40-51). The social 
democratic labor unions did, in principle, favor a universal and unified insurance system, first, 
because this type of insurance system would result in a larger risk pooling and eliminate 
existing privileges of certain occupational groups, in particular white-collar employees and 
civil servants. A universal and unified system would cover all occupational groups and all 
risks (health, unemployment, accident and old-age) within one system. 
 Secondly, the governance of the proposed insurance organization was supposed to 
be based on a two thirds majority for labor, boosting the power resources of the unions. 
Opposition to some aspects of the ACC plan came also from within the labor movement, 
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especially to the benefit cutbacks included in the plan. On questions of institutional design of 
the new welfare state the social democratic unions did, however, support the principles of the 
ACC plan (Hockerts 1980: 426-427). The social democratic unions supported universal and 
unified institutions of social insurance because they eliminated occupational status privileges 
and created new power resources for organized labor(Hockerts 1980: 36-40). 
Like the non-socialist parties, industrial employers resolutely opposed any form of 
unified or universal insurance system. Employers advocated the continuation of an 
occupationally fragmented system of social insurance, administrated on a parity basis by 
capital and labor, and organized by  decentralized insurance associations:  
The Social Insurance Committee of the Confederation of German Employer Associations [the 
BDA, TP] in principle holds the position that the insurance principle within German social 
insurance must be maintained and must not be replaced or diluted by the principle of social 
assistance. It opposes a unitary social insurance [‘Einheits-Sozialversicherung’] and favors the 
maintenance of the four independent branches of social insurance: work accident, pension, 
health and unemployment insurance. Within each of these branches, comprehensive self-
government and far-reaching de-centralization…should be the strived for (statement of the 
BDA social insurance committee, quoted in Erdmann 1966b: 236, original source 
undocumented, translation and emphasis by TP). 
 Employers’ opposition to universalism was motivated by several concerns. First, they 
feared an erosion of work incentives and work effort, if benefit entitlements would be granted 
as a matter of citizenship, rather than as a product of the employment relationship. They 
feared that universal insurance would “paralyze the self-reliance of the citizen to care for 
himself and his family” (BDA 1953a: 6). They viewed the Bismarckian model of social 
insurance to be more in line with the protection of work incentives and work effort than a 
universal welfare model, which would alleviate the individual too much from its 
responsibility to care for its own livelihood.  Employers’ defense of the conservative social 
policy model embodied in the Bismarckian welfare state, and their opposition to a universalist 
or redistributive model, lends support to the decommodification thesis (see p.31-2), according 
to which employers will oppose decommodification as a threat to work incentives and the 
employer’s control over his workforce. They opposed Einheitsversicherung in part because 
they expected it to be more decommodifying than the Bismarckian model. 
Organizational self-interests were a second reason for employers’ opposition to 
Einheitsversicherung. Employers operated some insurance funds, either individually or 
collectively. Individual employers operated company health insurance funds. Employer 
associations operated accident insurance associations at the sectoral level (Hockerts 1980: 
45). Both types of insurance associations operated within legal framework of social insurance. 
They were cherished by employers as ‘a bridge for cooperation between entrepreneur and 
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workforce’ (Hilbert 1947: 286), that is, as  a tool facilitating cooperative labor relations. Due 
to their decentralized organization, they operated in proximity to the individual firm and were 
seen as being conducive to industrial peace. Furthermor , in the case of health insurance the 
narrow risk pooling involved in company funds also allowed firms to keep costs low. The 
unified and centralized insurance organization proposed by the Allies and supported the social 
democratic unions would have meant the dismantling or crowding out of these employer-run 
funds (Hockerts 1980: 45). 
Third, employers had an interest in maintaining the balance of power with unions 
created by the existing institutions. A centralized insurance administration would have created 
an organizational concentration of power in the hands of the labor unions, given the planned 
two thirds majority for labor in the governing bodies of social insurance. Employers criticized 
the ACC proposal as creating an ‘excessive centralization of social insurance’ and a 
concentration of power in the hands of labor (Schieckel 1947: 126). The proposal for a 
universal and unified insurance system was thus recognized by business as an attempt by 
labor to shift the institutional balance of power in its favor. In return, the unions accused 
business of trying to weaken the labor movement by denying a unified insurance system to 
labor. Fragmenting the working class into various occupational categories through the social 
insurance system meant fragmenting the labor movement also politically by obstructing the 
formation of a broad base of class solidarity, argued one union publication (Killat 1953: 87). 
In short, German employers preferred a welfare state b sed on the conservative-corporatist 
model to a welfare state based on a social democratic-universalist model (Esping-Andersen 
1990: Ch.2; Titmuss 1958). 
7.II Conflicts over the Balance of Power in Self-Government 
Capital and labor participate in the administration of the German welfare state by what is 
called “social self-government” (soziale Selbstverwaltung). Social self-government is a 
defining characteristic of the Bismarckian institutions of social policy and shapes the 
institutional power resources available to both side . Both sides cherished it, though in part 
for differing reasons. To the labor unions, self-government meant the transposition into 
practice of one component of their wider goal of ‘economic democracy’. To employers it 
served more prosaic goals. Self-government offers employers a means of ensuring that payroll 
tax revenues would be put to use in a cost effectiv way and at the same time provides a 
forum for the cooperation with labor that tends notto be highly conflict-laden, as mentioned 
above. Although for somewhat different reasons, both sides considered self-government as 
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preferable to unilateral state administration. For b th sides of industry the self-government of 
social policies was a source of political legitimacy and power resources that they did not want 
to forgo. Despite their joint preference for self-government, its re-establishment after the end 
of the Nazi regime was accompanied by intense confli ts between the two sides. This 
subsection provides a closer look at the main issue of conflict. 
Since the introduction of social insurance in the 1880s, public social policies in 
Germany had been administrated by the social partners, instead of by the government. As a 
rule, capital and labor were represented in the governing bodies of the respective programmes 
in proportion to their share of contribution payments to that programme. In old-age insurance, 
for instance, capital and labor were represented on a parity basis, while in health insurance, 
labor had a two thirds majority, and work injury insurance was administrated by the 
employers alone, reflecting the respective share in contribution payments. A reform of self-
government thus affected the vested interests of both sides. Parity representation meant that 
unions had to give up their majority in the administration of health insurance. Employers had 
to give up control over the work injury insurance associations, which they had been operating 
unilaterally at a sectoral level. 
The Nazis had banned all independent forms of interes  epresentation and had 
dismantled self-government. Instead, the administrat ve competencies affected were 
transferred to the government and the representatives of the two sides of industry were 
replaced with personnel loyal to the regime. This meant that after the end of the Nazi regime 
the organizational structures of corporatist self-government had to be rebuilt. Representatives 
of the Nazi party had to be replaced by representatives of the new social partner 
organizations, and institutional rules needed to be redefined. All this had to be done from 
scratch, as 12 years of Nazi rule and the social consequences of World War II had left the 
social insurance system financially bankrupt and organizationally in tatters (Schmidt 1998: 
66-67).  
The point of contention in the conflict over self-government was the distribution of 
power between capital and labor. Employers strongly favored parity representation, arguing 
that equality in strength would be essential to allw productive cooperation. The executive 
director of the BDA, Gerhard Erdmann, emphasized that ‘a true cooperation can not emerge if 
one of the two partners can dominate the other due to its superior number of votes’ (Erdmann 
1966b: 295). The SPD and the union federation DGB demanded unilateral self-government 
by the insured groups, meaning the exclusion of employers (Hockerts 1980: 135, Fn.117). 
Briefly after the Economic Council had passed the Social Insurance Adjustment Law (see 
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above), the Council turned its attention to the issue of self-government. Two bills were 
introduced: The Social Democrats introduced a bill proposing a two thirds majority for labor; 
a bill which they considered as a compromise between th  two positions. The Free Democrats 
(FDP) introduced a bill proposing parity representation, in line with the preference of 
employers (Hentschel 1983: 156; Hockerts 1980: 135). 
The Christian Democrats appeared to be internally split between the labor wing and 
the business wing The pivotal votes came from the labor wing of the Christian Democratic 
Party. Together with the votes of the SPD, the CDU labor wing would have provided a 
majority for the SPD’s proposal. In the end, the labor wing of the CDU voted in favor of the 
FDP bill, providing a majority for parity representation (Hockerts 1980: 137). The Christian 
Democratic unions thought that parity representation w uld give employers a stronger stake 
in the governance of social insurance, facilitate productive cooperation between the two sides 
and thereby help to overcome class struggle (Hockerts 1980: 138 and 141-142). In short, with 
the support of the non-socialist parties (CDU+FDP) employers managed to win the conflict 
over representation in self-government. 
The issue of representation had been so contentious because self-government provides 
both sides with important power resources. Control over personnel recruitment was one of the 
most important power resources provided by self-government. At the end of 1951, the 
organizations of social self-government employed about 80,000 to 90,000 persons (Hockerts 
1980: 134-5). Unions and employer associations used th  institution of self-government to 
allocate jobs to their officials. In particular for union officials, the organizations of self-
government had thereby become an important tool for upward social mobility. In turn, the 
capacity to allocate jobs helped both sides to streng hen support among their members. In 
1950, a leading DGB official criticized that “the employers and their supporters shall –that is 
their goal - dominate the administration of social insurance” in order for them to ‘gain control 
over the personnel policy of the insurance bodies’ (quote by Willi Richter, head of the 
department for social policy of the DGB and later president of the DGB, 1950, quoted in 
Hockerts 1980: 135). The salience of personnel recruitment as an organizational power 
resource was one of the main reasons why the conflit overt self-government was so 
contentious. 
Another key power resource was control over the use of insurance funds. Self-
government provides the social partners with some influence over the usage of insurance 
funds. Clearly, the basic parameters that define the finances of social insurance are defined by 
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law: decisions about contribution rates, coverage and benefit formulas are made by the 
legislator and not by the social partners. Nevertheless, there is some discretion in self-
government, for instance regarding the investment of reserve funds in the pension system and 
decisions about investments in hospitals, sanatoriums and other health care facilities in the 
health insurance system. In health insurance, the self-governing bodies can even change the 
contribution rate (Hockerts 1980: 134). Moreover, by participating in the administration of 
social insurance programmes, union and employer repres ntatives could also gain valuable 
expertise and information that would make it easier for them to influence future debates about 
social policy reforms. 
The support of German business for parity self-administration meant that it had to 
actively endorse cooperation with the unions. If parity self-administration was to work 
effectively, employer associations and unions had to cooperate. As all major parameters, in 
particular regarding contribution rates and benefit r gulations, are decided by the state,121 self-
government rarely requires the two sides to deal with issues that are politically highly 
conflict-laden. Instead, self-government deals with the relatively uncontroversial, technocratic 
issues of how to organize the administration of social policies and how to improve its cost 
effectiveness. Employers were happy to have a forum for the cooperation with organized 
labor in an area of activity that is rather technocrati  in nature and tends to be low on issues of 
strong contention. This allowed the new strategy of social partnership to develop and created 
a counter-weight to the often contentious exchanges in the area of collective bargaining, 
where employer and union interests often oppose each other. Social self-government 
promised to ‘de-politicize’ the relationship between capital and labor and move the 
relationship into a more peaceful and technocratic direction. Even today, representatives of 
business and labor argue that cooperation in self-administration is functioning well and that 
existing ideological disagreements are tacitly kept away from the bodies of self-
administration.122 
7. III The 1957 Pension Reform: Sidelining Business 
The pension reform of 1957 was the first major welfar  state reform in the Federal Republic. 
The reform raised pension benefits substantially, introduced wage indexation of pensions and 
enshrined financing on a pay-as-you-go basis (PAYG) in law. The economic recovery of the 
post-war period, the famed ‘economic miracle,’ had left the older generation behind. On 
                                                
121 With the exception of the health insurance schemes, where the social partners have a say in determining the 
contribution rates 
122 See also interviews with vice-secretary general of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and with the head of the 
DGB social policy department 
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average, pension benefits in the 1950s were less than one third of the average wage 
(Hentschel 1983: 160; Schmidt 1998: 73). The pension ystem introduced by Bismarck in the 
1880s intended to provide benefits merely as a supplement to other sources of support, such 
as family support, rather than covering the full costs of living. Before the 1957 reform, the 
benefits paid by the public pension system were oftn insufficient to lift the retired above the 
poverty level. The policy goal of the 1957 pension reform was to raise the standard of living 
among the retired and thereby to allow them to participate in the rapidly rising prosperity of 
the working population. 
The 1957 pension reform was strongly affected by the dynamic of electoral 
competition between the two major parties, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian 
Democrats (CDU/CSU). The reform project was initiated by Chancellor Adenauer (CDU), 
who decided to attempt a major welfare state reform in order to enhance popular support for 
the new Federal Republic and for his non-socialist coalition government in particular. Both 
parties were vying for pro-welfare votes. The proposals for a reformed pension system 
presented by the government and the oppositional SPD turned out to be remarkably similar 
(Hockerts 1980: 352-362). The reform was passed by the national parliament on January 22nd, 
1957 with the votes of the governing CDU/CSU and the oppositional SPD, while the CDU’s 
coalition partner, the Free Democrats (FDP) voted against (Hockerts 1980: 421). Unlike the 
reforms of the late 1940s (section I+II), this refom was not so much characterized by a 
programmatic left-right divide, but by electoral competition instead.  
With hindsight, the 1957 pension reform appears paradigmatic of the dynamic of 
social policy expansion that characterized the post-war period. Social policy expansion had 
become an instrument of electoral competition (Alber 1989: 254ff). Not only the SPD but also 
the CDU/CSU vied for the votes of the large group of wage earners. The Christian 
Democrats, as the main center-right party, relied on a very heterogeneous voter base, which 
comprised a large labor wing. In order to gain votes, the Christian Democrats decided to 
support social policy expansion. As a result, the expansion of social policy in the post-war 
period was in general supported by both parties. Out of 68 key social policy laws adopted 
between 1950 and 1983, 39 were also supported by the main opposition party, whereby most 
of these laws concerned the expansion of social policy (Alber 1989: 262, Table 43). Electoral 
competition had turned both of the two major parties into ‘welfare state parties’ and had 
resulted in the receding of the old programmatic cleavages. 
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Employers had unanimously opposed the 1957 pension reform. Despite powerful 
support from within the government and the Bundesbank, employers had little success in 
changing the reform according to their preferences. Employers directed their efforts against 
the planed mode of pension indexation. At stake was the choice between wage indexation, as 
advocated by the government and the SPD, and a weaker form of indexation linked to 
productivity gains, as proposed by the employers. This section analyzes the reasons why 
employers had opposed the 1957 pension reform and how t e new dynamic of electoral 
competition had resulted in a sidelining of employer interests. This sidelining motivated 
employers to intervene in the policy-making process with their own alternative proposal for 
pension indexation. The next subsection gives a brief overview of the reform process, before 
turning to the role of business in the subsequent subsections. 
The reform process 
The pension reform of 1957 emerged from earlier plans by Chancellor Adenauer to develop a 
master plan for a comprehensive reform of the German welfare state. The social policy of the 
first Adenauer government (1949 – 1953) was characte ized by policy improvisation, 
resulting in a patchwork of various measures. The priorities in this period were to rebuild the 
old institutions of Bismarckian social insurance and to address the pressing social needs that 
resulted from the war, including support to refugees, displaced persons and war victims. 
These tasks had largely been accomplished by the end of the first legislative period in 1953 
(Schmidt 1998: 69-72). 
The 1953 elections had further strengthened the Christian Democrats (see table 7.1 
above) and resulted in the reconstitution of the non-s cialist coalition government, again led 
by Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor. The CDU-led governm nt came under pressure to act 
after the SPD had presented a comprehensive ‘social policy master plan’ in 1952. This plan 
included proposals for a tax-financed national healt  service, full employment policies and a 
tax-financed, universal flat-rate pension system (Hockerts 1980: 220-222). The SPD and the 
CDU agreed on the need for a comprehensive overhaul of the existing social policy 
legislation, in order to simplify existing laws and make regulations more coherent. Attempts 
to draft a joint plan failed, however, due to the different policy positions of the two sides and 
the dynamic of electoral competition. The SPD favored tax-financed, universal social 
policies; the CDU favored contribution-financed insurance policies, maintaining the existing 
Bismarckian system of social insurance (Hockerts 1980: 223-231). In short, in terms of the 
typology of Richard Titmuss, the SPD advocated the “institutional-redistributive model” of 
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the welfare state, while the CDU advocated the “industrial achievement model” (Titmuss 
1958). 
In his inaugural speech for his second four-year term in office in October 1953, 
Chancellor Adenauer promised a comprehensive and all-encompassing reform of the German 
welfare state. He promised that the government would develop a ‘master plan for social 
reform’, covering all areas of social policy (Hockerts 1980: 242-243). The patchwork of 
reforms enacted during his first term in office had made the regulations of the already 
fragmented welfare state exceedingly complex and cofusing. The envisaged master plan was 
intended to simplify existing legislation and make the existing rules more coherent and 
systematic. Its goal was to design a ‘social insurance system of one piece’. Moreover, the 
comprehensive reform was also intended to benefit in particular those that were unable to 
work, in particular the retired and disabled persons. Thereby, these groups should be enabled 
to participate in the rapidly rising social prosperity. 
The development of the announced master plan did not, however, make any headway 
and was eventually abandoned. Internal conflicts wihin the government and inter-ministerial 
rivalries obstructed the reform progress. The firsttwo years the government was preoccupied 
with procedural questions. Who would be in charge of developing the envisaged master plan? 
The Ministries of Economics and Finance were at loggerheads with the Ministry of Labor. On 
the surface, the point of contention was the planned establishment of an inter-ministerial 
government commission to develop the envisaged master plan (Hockerts 1980: 248). The 
Ministry of Finance insisted on such a commission in order to avoid that the master plan 
would become the sole competence of the Ministry of Labor. The appointment of the 
commission failed due to resistance from the Ministry of Labor. This conflict over 
competencies was influenced by deeper goal conflicts be ween the ministries involved. The 
Ministry of Finance had a keen interest in promoting the idea of means-testing in the reform 
process in order to reduce social expenditures, while t e Ministry of Labor insisted on the 
importance of an earnings-related system of social insurance (Hockerts 1980: 297; Hentschel 
1983: 161-162). As a result of these inter-ministeral conflicts over competencies and goals, 
the idea of developing a ‘master plan for social reform’ was eventually abandoned. 
After the failure of the master plan the government decided to set its sights lower and 
narrow down the envisaged reform project. Given that the time left until the next 
parliamentary elections was running out, the governm t felt under increasing time pressure 
to act. Adenauer was determined to present a social policy reform in time for the 1957 
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elections in order to be able to challenge the Social Democrats in their position as a 
protagonist of social protection. The Social Democrats had presented a new pension reform 
plan in September 1955. The SPD had decided to put its earlier demands for a universal 
pension system on the back burner and was now focusing its demands on benefit 
improvements within the existing programme, instead. In the summer of 1955 Adenauer took 
the initiative to narrow down government plans to the area of pensions (Hockerts 1980: 307). 
Pension insurance was by far the largest programme in t rms of the number of recipients. 
Moreover, poverty was concentrated among pensioners. Therefore, an improvement of 
pension benefits appeared to be suitable to appeal to a large part of the electorate. 
Adenauer tried to overcome the stagnation of the reform process by bringing in advice 
from external experts. Already in the spring of 1955 he had mandated a group of academics to 
draft a proposal for the envisaged social policy master plan. This report, known as the 
‘Rothenfels memorandum,’ proposed far-reaching changes to the German welfare state. 
Among other things, the report proposed to base pension finances on pay-as-you-go financing 
(Achinger 1955: 107-9). This report was, however, considered too radical within the 
government and was not followed up. The blueprint for the 1957 pension reform came instead 
from another academic: Wilfried Schreiber, an economist affiliated with Catholic social 
teaching (Schreiber 1955). Schreiber’s pension plan g i ed the keen interest of Adenauer, 
who invited Schreiber to present his plan to a cabinet meeting in December 1955 (Hockerts 
1980: 316-318). The ‘Schreiber plan’ became the bluprint for the pension reform adopted by 
parliament in January 1957. 
Building on the Schreiber plan, the 1957 pension reform was characterized by three 
elements. First, pay-as-you-go financing became enshrined as the method of financing the 
pension system, basing the political legitimacy of the pension system explicitly on the notion 
of an inter-generational contract. Second, existing pension payments received a one-time 
increase of about 65 per cent for blue-collar workers and 72 per cent for white collar workers. 
Third, pension credits and pension benefits became indexed to the growth of gross wages. In 
effect, a person with an average wage and 40 years of employment was entitled to a pension 
of 60 per cent of its wage at the time of retirement (Hentschel 1983: 165).  
By linking the value of pensions to wage growth, this so-called ‘dynamisation of 
pensions’ was intended to make sure that the standard of living of the older generation would 
develop in line with the standard of living of the working population, which was rising rapidly 
due to the prosperity created by the ‘economic miracle’. Moreover, wage indexation in effect 
eliminated the effects of inflation on pension benefits. Before the reform, entitlements for 
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pension benefits had been calculated on the basis of the nominal value of the contributions 
paid by a person throughout his or her working life. In addition, pensions had not been subject 
to any automatic indexing but were instead adjusted occasionally through discretionary 
decisions by the parliament. As a result, pension benefits were vulnerable to devaluation due 
to inflation, unless parliament granted an adjustment of benefits. In effect, the pension reform 
of 1957 removed the risk of devaluation from pensioers. 
The role of business in the 1957 pension reform process 
The reform succeeded despite the united opposition of industrial employers, the insurance and 
banking sector, the central bank and its president (Vocke), as well as the Ministries of Finance 
(Schäffer) and Economics (Erhard). Opposition to the reform was spearheaded by the banking 
and insurance sector, which feared a crowding out of private pension provisions. In 
September 1956 associations of the banking and insura ce sector joined forces to form the 
‘Society for the Protection of German Savers’. The purpose of this group was to campaign 
against the ‘dynamic pension’ (Hockerts 1980: 378). Opposition was directed primarily 
against wage indexation, furthermore also against the one-time increase of benefit payments 
and against the extension of compulsory coverage to white-collar employees above a certain 
salary threshold, who had previously been excluded (Hockerts 1980: 376). The third part of 
the reform, the introduction of pay-as-you-go financing, was supported by the employer 
federation (BDA). The BDA justified pay-as-you-go financing on the grounds that a pre-
funded public system would lead to the concentration of financial power in the hands of 
centralized pension funds:  
The accumulation of reserve funds that results from pre-funded financing poses specific 
problems to the national economy, both relating to the investment as well as to the later 
disinvestments of capital. In addition, the accumulation of substantial capital funds gives the 
insurance institutions the character of credit institutions, with all the accompanying economic 
and political side effects. For the purpose of securing future benefit rights, it is…, however… 
not decisive, whether this securing occurs through pre-funding…or…is taken … from the 
current national product. (BDA 1955b: 21). 
The employer federation accepted that an increase in the purchasing power of 
pensioners was necessary, but insisted that this should not be accomplished through any form 
of automatic wage indexing. The BDA justified its opp sition to wage indexation with 
macroeconomic arguments. These arguments can be summarized by the following three 
points: (i) wage indexation exacerbates inflationary trends, (ii) crowds out private pension 
provisions and (iii) increases labor costs unduly (BDA 1955b: 19-21; 1956: 23-26). 
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First, the BDA argued that automatic wage indexation of pensions would be likely to 
lead to higher inflation by extending the impact of in lationary wage agreements to 
pensioners. In effect, wage indexation results in the value of pension benefits being decided 
by collective bargaining. Hitherto, pensioners had a strong political interest in currency 
stability, as their pension benefits were calculated on the basis of the nominal value of their 
contribution payments made in the past, instead of their current value. With the reform, 
pensioners would lose their political stake in currency stability and their economic interests 
would become tied to those of labor: ‘If now the army of pensioners gets politically tied to the 
interests of the wage earners, this will result in a political shift that is extraordinarily 
dangerous’ said one banker (Hugo Scharenberg, Hamburg, at the meeting of the CDU 
executive board on September 20th, 1956, quoted in Hockerts 1980: 380). 
 Fears about inflationary wage increases were given cr dibility in particular by the 
announcement of the labor union federation DGB in 1955 to pursue a so-called ‘active wage 
policy.’ Active wage policy meant wage increases above the level of productivity increases 
(BDA 1956: 12; Erdmann 1966b: 269). The BDA’s annual report for 1956 summarizes the 
concerns of German employers about the inflationary effects of the ‘dynamic pension’  
Recent wage and salary increases have gone significantly beyond the increase in productivity. 
This development... will be exacerbated by a pension dynamisation linked to wages. In the 
future, wage conflicts will also be about pension increases. Then, the wages will force up the 
pensions, and the pensions will force up the wages, and both together will force up the prices. 
(BDA 1956: 25, translated by TP) 
As an alternative to wage indexation, employers proposed to adjust pension benefits 
by discretionary decisions made by an expert committee, which would make its decisions on 
the basis of productivity developments (see below). 
Second, business feared an erosion of private savings due to the suspected crowding 
out of private pension provision by the public pensio  system. As a result, an ‘an important 
source of capital formation would be exhausted’ (BDA 1956: 25). The fear that a generous 
and inflation-proof pension would undermine the formation of investment capital was 
widespread also among German economists. The prevailing economic orthodoxy was 
monetarist and the influence of Keynesian ideas of demand management was very limited. 
This implied that economic policy focused on facilitating investments in the exporting sectors 
and not on boosting domestic consumption. Economists and economic policy makers gave 
priority to capital formation to boosting consumer spending (Shonfield 1965: 272-6). With 
hindsight, these fears about a depletion of private investment capital have turned out as 
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invalid. Since the introduction of the ‘dynamic pension’, aggregate private savings did in fact 
increase rather than decrease (Schmähl 2004: 164). 
Third, business was concerned about the reform’s effect on labor costs. Employers 
suspected that the financial costs of the reform would be substantially higher than what the 
Ministry of Labor had estimated. Different actuaries came to significantly different results 
regarding the expected costs of the reform, something the opponents of the reform tried to 
exploit by pointing out the massive uncertainty about the financial sustainability of the 
reform. The government projected that for the first ten years a contribution rate of 14 per cent 
would be sufficient, compared to 11 per cent in the old system. For the two decades thereafter 
an increase to 16.25 per cent would be necessary (BDA 1956: 23). Relying on a study by a 
different actuary, the BDA estimated that the required contribution rate would be as high as 
24.2 per cent in 1986 and 29.5 per cent in 2001, instead (BDA 1956: 24) (Heubeck 1956). To 
compare with, the actual contribution rate in 2001 had been at 19.1 per cent (Schmähl 2003: 
132, Table 5.5). In short, the financial sustainability of the new pension system in the face of 
demographic ageing was already an issue among actuari l experts at that time and was one of 
reasons why employers opposed the reform (Hockerts 1980: 385-387). 
Failed alternatives 
Business confronted a “grand coalition” of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and labor 
unions in favor of the “dynamic pension”. This compelled the opponents to come up with 
alternative proposals in order to avoid becoming irrelevant bystanders to reform project that 
appeared as unstoppable. The employer federation BDA and the private insurance sector 
presented two substantially different proposals. The proposal made by the employer 
federation BDA intended to took the edge out of thereform by changing the adjustment 
procedure. Instead of the quasi-automatic form of wage indexation proposed by the 
government, the BDA proposed a form of discretionary djustments. Decisions about 
increases of pension credits and pension benefits should be made by an expert committee on 
the basis of the development of labor productivity. The proposal suggested adjustments to be 
made every 5 years. The expert committee should include experts nominated by the 
government, the unions and the employers themselves (BDA 1956: 221-225; Hockerts 1980: 
331-332). The proposal thus meant that pension adjustments would not take place 
automatically, but would, instead, be subject to the discretionary decisions of experts. 
Employers hoped that adjusting pensions by discretionary expert decisions, instead of by 
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automatic indexation, would create a means of countering inflationary developments and help 
to limit the expected rise in labor costs. 
  In a surprising about-face, the private insurance sector presented a radically different 
proposal. In May 1956, the ‘Association of Private Life Insurers’ came forward with a 
proposal for what it called ‘flexible basic citizen pension.’ According to this proposal, every 
citizen should receive a uniform flat-rate pension, which would provide a minimum living 
income and would from time to time be adjusted to ‘economic progress’ (Bauer et al. 1956). 
The motivation behind this proposal is manifest. A basic pension system is less likely to 
crowd out private pension provisions compared to an e rnings related system, and therefore 
provides ample room for private pension provisions to prosper. 
The proposal, if implemented, would have meant a radical shift of the German pension 
system from the Bismarckian model to the Beveridge model, from earnings-related benefits to 
universal flat-rate benefits. The proposal came very late in the reform process and stood no 
chance of success. Of all parliamentary factions, only the Free Democrats (FDP) were 
sympathetic to the proposal (Hockerts 1980: 387-388). It reflects, however, a remarkable 
departure of the life insurance sector form the position of business in general. The life 
insurance sector was now propagating precisely the kind of universal basic pension that the 
Social Democrats had propagated earlier, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but had failed to 
introduce due to the massive resistance from all segments of business at that time. Now, a 
cross-class alliance in favor of a universal basic pension system could not materialize, as the 
Social Democrats had shifted their priorities, away from universalism and towards an 
incremental reform of the Bismarckian pension system. 
In contrast to the insurance sector, the employer federation supported the Bismarckian 
model of the welfare state and opposed a fundamental transformation of the welfare state 
towards a liberal or universalist model. The BDA was iming at containing pension 
expenditures, but it wanted to achieve this within t e existing framework of the Bismarckian 
welfare state, of a welfare state that provides earnings-related benefits rather than universal 
flat-rate benefits:  
Due to the legislative development, the boundaries b tween insurance,  social welfare 
and social assistance have become strongly blurred. The task of a social reform is to 
again create clear distinctions and to decide in favor of one single principle. [The BDA] 
declares its commitment to social insurance and the insurance principle, which creates 
legal entitlements on the basis of a quid pro quo’ of contributions paid and benefits received. 
[‘Leistung und Gegenleistung’]. (BDA 1955b: 20, emphasis in original.) 
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The different positions taken by employer federation and insurance industry are rooted 
in different preference orderings. Both groups had a strong interest in containing pension 
expenditures and limiting benefit generosity, albeit for somewhat different reasons. The 
insurance industry wanted moderate benefit levels in order to leave enough scope for private 
pension provisions. The employer federation wanted mo erate benefit levels in order to limit 
labor costs. However, the BDA, representing the labor market interests of firms, additionally 
had a strong interest in limiting the decommodifying effects of social policy in order to 
maintain work incentives. The BDA preferred the Bismarckian to the Beveridge model, 
because only an earnings-related system maintained the market distribution of income and 
thereby guaranteed the maintenance of work incentivs and work effort. A universal benefit 
system in contrast was suspected to undermine work incentives by liberating workers from 
the need to work (see also chapter 5).  
In short, the interests of employers in general were more complex than those of the 
insurance sector. The insurance sector merely wanted to carve out a space for private pension 
products, and therefore advocated a limited role for the state in pension provision. In 
comparison, employer interests were less straightforward. They had to combine their interest 
in containing pension expenditures with their interest in maintaining work incentives. 
Employers viewed a sound reward structure as essential for the maintenance of work 
incentives and the economic recovery of Germany, as the recovery could only be achieved by 
way of hard work. In their view, an overly decommodifying welfare state would have 
destroyed the foundations of economic prosperity by eliminating work incentives. Their 
interest in avoiding decommodification prevented German employers from advocating a 
radical transformation of the German welfare state owards a universalist flat-rate model. The 
case of the 1957 pension reform thus confirms the hypot esis that employers’ preference for 
conservative social policies is motivated by their interest in maintaining work incentives. 
Despite support from within the government and the central bank, employers did not 
prevail in the reform process. Business made intense fforts lobbying against the reform, such 
as the activities by the ‘Society for the Protection of German Savers’, the insurance sector’s 
lobbying group. In June 1956 BDA president Paulssen met personally with Chancellor 
Adenauer to urge the government to abandon plans for automatic wage indexation. The 
government bill presented briefly after discounted employers’ objections and stuck to wage 
indexation. In response, Paulssen wrote a letter to Adenauer in September 1956, in which he 
again reminded the Chancellor of the BDA’s objections. He received a reply by the Ministry 
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of Labor’s undersecretary of state. The reply dismis ed the objections and the alternative 
proposals made by the BDA. In October 1956, Paulssen and BDA executive director 
Erdmann met again with Adenauer. Adenauer informed th  employer representatives that an 
internal group would currently work out regulations to avoid negative economic 
repercussions. An offer by Adenauer to forward an exposé drafted by Erdmann to this group 
was all the employer representatives could achieve (Hockerts 1980: 391-392). In sum, 
employers failed to leave their mark on the reform outcome. In its 1957 annual report, the 
BDA expressed its disappointment: 
Regarding the core question in the reform of the public pension system, the pension formula, 
the majority of the parliament has in principle supported the automatic linking of pensions to 
the development in wages and salaries, regarding the determination of the first pension. The 
parliament has thus defied the objections made by various sides – including also by the 
Confederation of German Employer Associations – against such a linking of pension 
developments to wage developments regarding the threat to the purchasing power of the DM 
[Deutsche Mark] and the excessive demands made on the [wage bargaining ] autonomy of the 
social partners (BDA 1957: 224, translated from German by TP). 
The role of business in the 1957 pension reform wasone of reluctant acceptance. 
During the final plenary debates in the parliament, mployers refrained from articulating their 
opposition, given the clear majority in favor of the reform. After business had won the fight 
against the unitary insurance in the late 1940s, its focus shifted towards taking the edge out of 
expansionary reforms. In the debate over the introduction of the ‘dynamic pension’ business 
was sidelined, although it was actively campaigning against the reform. Except for some 
smaller concessions regarding the scope of compulsory coverage, business failed to prevail. 
The sidelining of business was the result of the dynamic of electoral competition 
between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. Both parties were vying for the votes 
of wage earners and pensioners. The CDU contained a strong labor wing and was thus 
receptive to plans for social policy expansion. The SPD and the CDU both supported the 
wage indexing of pensions. The Social Democrats had presented their own reform proposal, 
which was however remarkably similar to the governme t’s own bill. For reasons of electoral 
competition, the Social Democrats had put their earlier objective of a radical transformation 
of the German welfare state on the back burner and had shifted their focus to demands to 
incremental benefit improvements instead. 
 Adenauer felt that the government was under pressu to present a major social policy 
reform before the 1957 elections and decided to take a more active role in the reform process 
to ensure the timely passing of the reform. Despite of his close ties to the president of the 
Federation of German Industry (BDI), Fritz Berg (Braunthal 1965: 193), he had in this case 
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appeared not to be susceptible to the preferences of industrial employers. In short, under the 
influence of electoral competition, the social policy positions of SPD and CDU/CSU had 
converged. Electoral competition had outpaced ideological confrontation. Given their limited 
electoral weight, employers were sidelined. 
Conclusions 
The debate over institutional reform in the early post-war period required employers to show 
their colors: Employers came to defend the Bismarcki n welfare state in a situation where it 
was at risk to be replaced by a more egalitarian universalist model, as favored by the Social 
Democrats and the labor unions. Like in the case of unemployment insurance (chapter 5), 
employers preferred conservative social policy to universalist social policy. In other words, 
they preferred status protection and corporatist self-administration to egalitarian benefits and 
direct state administration. This finding confirms the importance of the protection of work 
incentives to employers, as emphasized by the decommodification thesis, as conservative 
social policies protect work incentives better than universalist social policies.  
Struggles over the institutional balance of power btween capital and labor in social 
insurance administration played also a central rolein this conflict. The first sovereign post-
war government, a non-socialist coalition led by the Christian Democrats, reconstructed the 
Bismarckian welfare state programmes in line with the preferences of employers and 
Christian democratic workers. The proposals for a universal and union-administered social 
insurance system had been defeated by an alliance between the non-socialist government 
parties and employers, whereby the pivotal votes came from the Christian-Democratic labor 
wing. 
Once questions of organizational design had been sorted out, the focus of politics 
shifted to benefit expansion, something that pushed employers to the margins. Issues of 
benefit adequacy turned out to be ideologically far less divisive and followed an altogether 
different logic of policy-making. The centerpiece of these reforms was the introduction of so-
called “dynamic pension benefits” in 1957. This refo m was characterized by a convergence 
of positions between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, driven by electoral 
competition between the two parties. This resulted in a sidelining of employers in the reform 
process. Again, the reliance of the CDU on a strong labor wing within the party had played an 
important role. This time, however, the CDU’s divers  class base worked against employers 
and led the party to pursue a policy of welfare state expansion, made possible by the rising 
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prosperity of the ‘economic miracle’. The resulting convergence of the two main parties on 
issues of welfare state expansion sidelined the objctives of employers, who had to reconcile 
themselves with the new reality. 
To conclude, the changing dynamics of welfare state politics had compelled employers 
to accommodate to a new political situation. During the organizational reforms of the late 
1940s, employers had a parliamentary majority on their side and did thus not need to make 
any compromises. They could rely on a favorable parliamentary majority to defeat proposals 
for a transformation of the German welfare state from a conservative to a universalist-social 
democratic model. In contrast, the pension reform of 1957 confronted employers with a broad 
parliamentary majority in favor of reform. Employers had lost the CDU as their parliamentary 
ally. While the CDU opposed the plans for organizational reform during the late 1940s, the 
party supported the pension reform of 1957. Employers were thus left without a strong 
parliamentary backing. They decided to accommodate and presented alternative reform 
proposals as “lesser evils”. The new dynamic of electoral competition confronted employers 
with new political constraints and led them to moderat  their positions, though with only 
limited success. 
* 
An important exception to employers’ politics of accommodation constitutes the case 
of co-determination. While employers reluctantly accepted the expansion of the welfare state 
in the face of political constraints, they fought adamantly against the introduction and 
extension of codetermination, even when the politica  odds were clearly against them. The 
case of codetermination provides a remarkable deviation by employers from the politics of 
accommodation. The following chapter looks at what made codetermination special to 






8 Codetermination: Employers against Economic Democracy 
 
 ‘Its [codetermination’s] decisive characteristic is its aim to abolish private property as the 
means of production (as is the aim of Marxism); its method is evolutionary (differing from 
Marxism, the method of which is revolutionary)’ 
Statement by Walter Raymond, president of the BDA (quoted in BDA 1953b: 268) 
 
It is often argued today that codetermination (Mitbestimmung) is a competitive advantage for 
German firms, contributing to a loyal and motivated workforce, improving communication 
between workforce and management and facilitating workforce restructuring (e.g. Jackson 
2005: 234-5; Streeck 1992: 137-68). This perspectiv stands in sharp contrast to the attitude 
of industrial employers to codetermination. Employers fought tooth and nail against the 
introduction and subsequent extension of codeterminatio . What were the goals of the 
protagonists of codetermination and why had they been so adamantly opposed by employers? 
And why did employers not manage to prevent the institutionalization of codetermination 
despite their best efforts? Had German employers subsequently changed their attitudes 
towards codetermination in the light of their practical experiences with this institution and, if 
yes, in which way? This chapter analyzes the politica  struggles that characterized the 
introduction and subsequent development of the institution of codetermination and the role 
played by employers therein. 
 The term codetermination stands for the representation of worker interests in decision-
making within firms on the basis of equality (parity) with owners.123 Today, codetermination 
forms an integral part of Germany’s so-called ‘dual system’ in industrial relations. The two 
parts of this system are (a) the representation of worker interests at the level of the individual 
firm, by the works councils and codetermination in the supervisory board of larger firms and 
(b) the system of collective bargaining between unions and employer associations at the 
sectoral level. Together, these institutions underpin the system of industrial relations in the 
Federal Republic. As shown in chapter 4, works counils and sectoral collective bargaining 
                                                
123 The concept is sometimes also used to include the works councils, which represent worker interests at the 
workplace level (Katzenstein 1987: 125; Thelen 1991: 63-83). In this chapter the concept of codeterminatio  is 
used to refer only to institutions of employee participation at the firm level. Employee participation at the 
workplace level, through the works councils, is notanalyzed in this chapter, neither are forms of labor-capital 
cooperation at the regional, sectoral and national level. 
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were already introduced in November 1918 as part of a more encompassing deal between 
capital and labor to defeat a revolutionary threat. Codetermination in the supervisory boards 
was added to the dual system after World War II, forged out of political struggles between 
capital and labor during the early post-war years.124 
 The outcome of these struggles was the legislation of codetermination in two different 
variants in the early 1950s. The so-called Montan Codetermination Law of 1951 defined 
codetermination rules in mining, iron and steel. The law instituted parity representation in the 
supervisory boards of firms in these sectors, givin o e half of supervisory board seats to the 
representatives of labor and the other half to the representatives of capital owners. In addition, 
the law instituted a special ‘labor director’, who is a full member of the firms’ executive 
board and whose appointment can be vetoed by the labor representatives. The second variant 
is enshrined in the so-called Works Constitution Law of 1952. This law instituted a weaker 
form of codetermination for firms with more than 500 workers outside of mining, iron and 
steel. The law gave labor representatives only one third of supervisory board seats and no veto 
over the appointment of the labor director. Codetermination in its fully-fledged form, i.e. 
parity codetermination, was thus only instituted in the heavy industry. In 1976 a new law 
extended codetermination rights in very large firms outside of the heavy industry. While the 
weaker codetermination rules of the 1952 law were acceptable to employers, they adamantly 
opposed the parity variants of codetermination as defined by the 1951 and 1976 laws. Unions, 
in contrast, viewed the 1951 law as a success and the 1952 law as a massive defeat, while 
being disappointed also by the rules of the 1976 law (Thelen 1991: 64; Thum 1982: 146-9). 
 This chapter is structured as follows: The first section analyzes the positions taken and 
the arguments used by unions and employers in this conflict and thereby puts it into the 
context of the wider programmatic disagreements betwe n the two sides about the proper 
political-economic order of Germany. The second section looks at how the two laws came 
about and why employers were so much less successful to in the case of the 1951 law than in 
the case of the 1952 law. The re-emergence of the cod termination conflict during the 1970s 
is analyzed in section three. Section four deals with the positions of employers to 
codetermination today.125 
                                                
124 A rudimentary form of codetermination at the firm level already existed in the Weimar Republic. A 
supplementary law to the 1920 Works Council Law, passed in 1922, entitled the works councils to two 
representatives in the Supervisory Board. This provisi n was strongly opposed by the employer associati ns. 
125 The purpose thereby is not so much to give a full account of how codetermination emerged and developed 




8.I Codetermination and the Economic Order: The Positions of Employers and Unions 
Codetermination is an example of an institution that is characterized by a sharp difference 
between the objectives that originally motivated its formation and the practical results it 
produced over time. At the time codetermination was introduced it had a very different 
meaning to political actors from what it would come to assume later. The issue of 
codetermination pitted the political programmes of employers and unions regarding the 
proper political-economic order of the Federal Republic against each other. This section 
analyzes the positions taken and the arguments used by both sides and thereby intends to 
demonstrate what kind of political-economic order German industrialists embraced and what 
kind of order they tried to prevent. 
  Employers and unions initially disagreed fundamentally over what kind of political-
economic order the new Federal Republic should be bas d upon. During the 1950s, the labor 
movement had by no means reconciled itself with the social market economy advocated by 
Ludwig Erhard and industrialists. Instead, the labor m vement wanted to transform the West 
German political-economic order on the basis of the socialization of key industries, economic 
planning and codetermination. These three components were understood as parts of a larger 
programme and together should ensure the democratization of the economy. Codetermination 
was thus not seen as an end in itself, but as a means towards a larger goal. Unions argued that 
just as all citizens have equal voting rights in the political sphere, business and labor should 
be entitled to equal voice in the economic sphere. Th y should thus be represented equally in 
the decision-making bodies at all levels of the economy (DGB 1950: 27).Through their 
involvement in codetermination and in economic planning institutions the labor unions would 
play a pivotal role in the new political-economic order. This pivotal role for the unions was 
justified on the grounds that unions would act as agents of the common good, rather than 
merely of the self-interests of their members (Hondrich 1963: 80-1; Thum 1982: 18-20). 
 These proposals were inspired by the programmatic con ept of ‘economic democracy’, 
developed by labor union intellectuals during the Wimar Republic. They intended economic 
democracy as a third way between unfettered capitalism and the bureaucratic centralism of 
Soviet communism. One of the main protagonists of this programme was the social 
democratic unionist Fritz Napthali. His programme for the democratization of the economy 
was officially endorsed by the national congress of the socialist labor union federation 
(ADGB) in 1925 (Berghahn 1985: 206-207). Napthali understood economic democracy as an 
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intermediary step towards socialism. Socialism was the ultimate goal, economic democracy 
the proximate goal (Napthali 1928):  
Socialism and economic democracy are twin goals inseparably linked together. There can be 
no fully developed economic democracy without a socialized economic system and the ideal 
of socialism cannot be realized without the democratization of economic control. If, in spite of 
the unity of the twin goals, the idea of economic democracy expands, it is because the new, 
concrete conceptions about the way to realize socialism are bound to the new social structure. 
The purpose and goal of socialism has remained essentially unaltered in the modern labor 
movement. The notions of the way leading to this goal have been changed in accordance with 
the growth of the labor movement and the transformations which have taken place in capital 
structure…The means for realizing socialism are through the democratization of the economy' 
(Napthali 1928: 16, translated by Bunn, emphasis added by TP). 
In the view of Napthali, the establishment of a socialist system required the 
democratization of the economy. As, for the moment, a socialist state was politically not 
feasible, the process of democratizing the economy had to start already within the capitalist 
system. According to Napthali, an important tool for democratizing the economy would be 
the codetermination of business policies by capital and labor. The democratization of the 
economy required the limitation of the amount of contr l of capital owners had over their 
firms: 
The nature of democracy requires codetermination by the workers. Works councils, self-
administration in social insurance…are only steps on the way towards this goal…Economic 
democracy means the restriction of the entrepreneur in his discretion over his means of 
production. A democratic economic order is impossible without a change in the relations of 
ownership. There is no economic democracy without a socialist economic system. Political 
equality does not equal true equality of the workers (Napthali 1928 , emphasis added by TP). 
 After World War II, the labor movement returned to this programme with new fervor, 
now reassured by the disastrous experiences made during the Weimar Republic and the Nazi 
era that a democratization of the economy would be of paramount importance to prevent the 
reoccurrence of past experiences. In contrast to the Weimar Republic, the labor movement 
now tended to tone down its teleological Marxist rhetoric, and instead argued that the 
establishment of economic democracy would be justified by the goal of avoiding another 
collapse of political democracy. The labor movement u derstood the rise of Nazism in the 
1930s as a result of the economic instabilities produced by capitalism and the role played by 
heavy industrialists in helping Hitler to come to pwer (Rosenberg 1953: 6).  
 The labor movement viewed the political, economic and social disasters of the 
Weimar Republic, which paved the way for the Nazi regime, as a result of the inability of the 
masses to influence the decisions of the industrial el tes. In its view, the collapse of Nazism 
implied also the collapse of capitalism and, hence, providing a historical mandate for a 
fundamental reorganization of the political-economic order (Thum 1982: 18-9). This view 
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was not limited to the labor movement and was shared widely in Germany during the early 
post-war years. Indeed, even the Christian Democrats’ founding party manifesto, the so-called 
Ahlener Program, stated explicitly that ‘the capitalis  system has failed the public and social 
interests of the German people. Following the terrible political, economic and social collapse 
as a consequence of a criminal power-directed politics, only a fundamentally new order can 
lead to a successful beginning.”126 (Kunz et al. 1975: 127). In short, the belief that the 
instabilities generated by unfettered capitalism and funding by big industrialists brought the 
Nazis into power were widespread at that time (see also Markovits 1986: 66-67). 
 Economic democracy and socialization of key industrie  were the core components of 
the economic reorganization that the labor unions envisaged (Bunn 1958: 283; Schmidt 1977: 
53-96). Socialization and economic democracy should serve the de-Nazification of the 
German economy. The industries to be socialized were those that had been particularly 
tarnished by cooperating with the Nazis, notably the iron and steel industry, coal mining and 
chemicals (Markovits 1986: 66). The goal was to depriv  the allegedly antidemocratic heavy 
industrialists of their power and to give labor ‘the utmost influence’ over all aspects of the 
economy, as the future DGB president Hans Böckler said in 1946 (Müller 1991: 127).  
 The Allies considered the labor movement as the representative of a dormant 
democratic tradition in Germany and were, generally speaking, sympathetic towards its 
demands. On the issue of how to reorganize the ownership structure in the heavy industry, 
however, they disagreed. The UK supported socialization, while France and the US were 
opposed. In the end, the Allied High Council decided in November 1948 that the decision 
over the ownership structure of the heavy industry hould be delegated to a future German 
government (Markovits 1986: 77; Van Hook 2004: 251-4). In the first national elections, in 
1949, the Social Democrats were running on a platform that included socialization and 
economic democracy, while the Christian Democrats advocated the social market economy 
and free market competition. As shown in chapter 7, its advocates understood the social 
market economy as an alternative to economic planning and socialization. The coming into 
power of a non-socialist coalition government in 1949 undid the prospects for a socialization 
of the heavy industry. Though the SPD and the DGB still continued advocating socialization 
for some years, in reality these plans were now off the political agenda and the labor 
movement shifted its focus to codetermination, instead (Thum 1982: 146-9; Van Hook 2004: 
257). 
                                                
126 The CDU did return to a pro-capitalist platform shortly after, however. 
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 The political rehabilitation of German industry after the early de-Nazification period 
and its regaining of political strength encouraged industrial employers to go on the offensive 
against codetermination. Employers of all sectors opposed codetermination and propagated 
weaker forms of employee participation. Business opposition to codetermination was 
articulated primarily by the two peak-level federations, the Federation of German Industry 
(BDI) and the Confederation of German Employer Associations (BDA). The reasons for 
employers to oppose codetermination mirrored the reasons for unions to support it. All 
arguments used by employers against codetermination started from the assumption that 
codetermination was intended by the unions as a means for the socialization of ownership 
(Bunn 1958: 284). As the epigraph to this chapter illustrates, employers viewed 
codetermination as part of a piecemeal strategy by unions to socialize ownership by indirect 
means. It was precisely this incrementalist characte  of economic democracy that alarmed 
employers, because it appeared as politically much more viable than the revolutionary slogans 
of the radical left (Borsdorf 1987: 22). Employers understood codetermination not as a tool 
for the integration of the working class into a capit list system, but as tool to overthrow 
capitalism.127 
Employers did not generally oppose employee participation rights, but wanted to see 
them limited to issues of social policy and working conditions and to the level of the 
workplace, rather than to the level of the entire fm. Employers did not reject employee 
participation rights at the workplace level concerning issues like working time and vacation 
arrangements, safety regulations, occupational social benefits, and the like128 (Bunn 1958: 
289). However, codetermination rights for labor at the firm level on the basis of parity with 
capital were fiercely opposed by employers. Employers’ opposition focused on the following 
three components of the codetermination demands by unions:  
• parity representation: unions demanded equal representation of workers and c pital 
owners on the supervisory boards of all large companies. Employers opposed this 
decisive shift in the balance of power within firms to labor. Parity representation 
would mean a creeping expropriation of industrial ownership by restraining the 
discretion of capital owners over the use of their property. 
• union power: unions demanded the right to appoint at least some of the labor 
representatives in the supervisory boards. Employers r jected any form of union 
                                                
127 The following paragraphs draw in particular on Bunn 1958. 
128 These rights had already been granted to labor in the Works Councils Law of 1920. Employers had originally 
rejected mandatory works councils as a potential vehicl  for the aggravation of class conflicts, but in the 
meantime had come to accept them (see also chapter 4). 
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influence in the appointment of the labor representatives. Labor representatives should 
be appointed exclusively by the workforce of the firm, and not by external unions. 
Employers thus suspected a strengthening of union pwer as a result of 
codetermination. 
• the scope of codetermination: unions demanded the right to codetermination on all 
aspects of firm policy. In contrast, employers wanted to limit the participation of labor 
representatives to social policy issues and exclude labor from decisions about broader 
economic issues, such as decisions over investments, production, or sales policy. 
Employers opposed the extension of employee participation from social policy to 
economic policy. 
 Employers justified their opposition to these three lements of codetermination by 
arguing that they would be fundamentally incompatible with the rights of capital owners. The 
right of private property includes the right of the owner to dispose of his property as he sees 
fit. Under codetermination, capital owners would however no longer be able to dispose over 
their property freely, as they would need to share this right with the representatives of labor. 
Therefore, although formal property titles remain uaffected, the rights flowing from this 
titles are severely curtailed by codetermination(BDA 1953b: 268; Bunn 1958: 290). On the 
basis of this argument, employers argued that codetermination would be a reformist way of 
establishing socialism. BDA president Walter Raymond declared in a speech in 1952: 
The advocates of economic democracy seek, in the last analysis, the same goal as do the 
Marxists, upon whom the former rely. They also use a  their point of departure, as did Marx, 
the allegation of the intolerable exploitation of the workers by capital. 
But in contrast to Marx they do not want to achieve th  immediate freeing of the working class 
through the risky method of “expropriating the expropriators”, that is, through socialization, 
but the end goal of socialism is to be preceded by the unobtrusive and safe method of 
penetrating the economy by means of codetermination (speech by Raymound, reprinted in 
BDA 1953b: 247-8). 
Moreover, employers argued that codetermination would give unions excessive 
control over the economy. Employers suspected that the unions and their federation would be 
able to centrally control the labor representatives in the individual firms, and thereby would 
be able to use codetermination as a tool of centrally guided economic planning. The 
individual industrialist would be much weaker than the centrally coordinated labor 
representatives in the supervisory board of his firm. The unions would be aiming at replacing 
industrial leadership with its own people in order to gain full control over the economy, as the 
BDI stated in 1953:  
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The principal opponent of the entrepreneurial economy remains Socialism, even if it operates 
with slogans such as ‘market economy of the left’. What it sticks to, however, is its demand to 
replace the elites. It intends to intensify the infiltration of leading positions in the administration 
and the economy with….affiliated intellectuals. The two co-determination laws have given a 
special impetus to this process. (BDI 1953: 28, transl tion by TP)  
 The sticking point in the conflict was thus whether control over the decision-making in 
firms should remain in the hands of capital owners o  be shared equally with the 
representatives of labor. For employers this question appeared as a matter of capitalism versus 
socialism. Unlike social insurance in the 1880s (see chapter 3), employers did not see 
codetermination as an appropriate tool for pacifying the working class. Employers’ position 
was also not motivated by potential effects of codetermination on labor productivity, labor 
loyalty and industrial peace. Such effects turned out as highly relevant in reality (see 
e.g.Streeck and Kluge 1999), but were not expected by employers at the time codetermination 
was introduced. The overwhelming fear of losing contr l over their firms and of a dramatic 
shift in the balance of power to the union side did not allow such considerations to develop 
during that time. Despite the massive resistance by mployers, unions managed to achieve a 
partial success. The unions managed to institutionalize parity codetermination in the heavy 
industry. A diluted form of codetermination, acceptable also to employers, was instituted in 
large firms outside of the heavy industry. The next section looks at why employers did not 
succeed in preventing the introduction of codetermination, despite the resistance they put up. 
8.II How Codetermination came about: The Policy-Making Process 
The outcome of the codetermination conflict was a partial success for the labor movement. 
The labor movement did not manage to achieve its more far-reaching goals, socializing key 
industries and introducing economic planning, but managed to institutionalize parity 
codetermination in the heavy industry and a diluted form of codetermination in firms outside 
the heavy industry. The political conflict about the institutional principles of the political-
economic order, which underpinned the codeterminatio  conflict, was fought out in the 
context of the Allied occupation. The situation was characterized by a high level of 
uncertainty about the political and economic future of Germany. The labor movement 
perceived this situation as a window of opportunity for a thoroughgoing reorganization of the 
German economy, but it had to confront massive resistance from employers and their 
parliamentary allies. The introduction of codeterminat on was made possible through the 
cooperation of Allied occupation authorities. This section traces the processes that led to the 
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institutionalization of codetermination in order to show why business failed to fully prevent 
codetermination.129 
The introduction of codetermination in the heavy industry (1946/48) 
Union demands for a reorganization of the economy, with a greater role for themselves,  
initially received a strong boost from the Allies’ plans for reorganizing  the German economy. 
While the Allies did not advocate codetermination as an institution, they needed the unions’ 
cooperation in their own plans for reorganizing the German economy. At their conferences in 
Yalta and Potsdam the Allies agreed to destroy the concentration of economic power that 
characterized German industry and banking, and that had facilitated the waging of the war, by 
dismantling the existing cartelistic and oligopolistic structures. (Herrigel 2004: 363-76; Thum 
1982: 26-31; Van Hook 2004: 250-3). In particular, the large combines in the heavy industry 
should be dismantled by splitting them into smaller independent units with new owners. 
These large combines often united mining, steel production and steel processing within one 
group. In 1938, 73 per cent of the national production of pig iron came from only six firms 
(Pritzkoleit 1953: 196). The British occupation authority confiscated the shares of the heavy 
industry firms in its occupation zone in August 1946 and decided to hold them in trust ‘for the 
German people’ until a permanent solution for the ownership question would be found 
(Böhme 1978: 123). The old owners, often tarnished by their collaboration with the Nazis, 
should be expropriated and new owners should be found. 
 The unions’ ambitions were furthered by a split beween Allies. The US favored 
private enterprise, while the UK initially favored the nationalization of the large heavy 
industry firms. Most of the German heavy industry was located in the British occupation 
zone, which meant that the UK was in charge of carrying out its reorganization. The recently 
elected Labor government in the UK advocated nationl zation and economic planning also in 
its own country and was, generally speaking, sympathetic towards the German labor 
movement. In October 1946, British Foreign Minister Bevin declared in the House of 
Commons that the German heavy industry should be nationalized (Berghahn 1985: 207). The 
UK occupation authority established an own agency in charge of West German heavy 
industry, the North German Iron and Steel Control (NGISC). The NGISC held the 
confiscated iron and steel combines in trust and was in charge of carrying out the intended 
reorganization of the heavy industry (Thum 1982: 33).  
                                                
129 The following two subsections rely in particular on the detailed studies by Gloria Müller (1987), Eberhard 
Schmidt (1977) and Horst Thum (1982). 
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 The NGISC played a crucial role in the introduction of codetermination. Although the 
NGISC officials held no ideological affinity for codetermination, their interest in union 
cooperation led them to make concessions to the latter. On October 15th, 1946 the NGISC got 
in touch with North German labor union leaders, seeking their expertise and support for the 
intended economic reorganization (Thum 1982. 33-4). The labor union delegation was headed 
by Hans Böckler, the future president of their national union federation (DGB). The labor 
unions had no real interest in the decartelization of the heavy industry, but were willing to 
cooperate with the NGISC if they could achieve stronger union control over industry in 
return. The cooperation was thus based on a strategic alliance.  
The head of NGISC, William Harris-Burland, assured the union leaders that the firms 
would not be returned to their old owners and that ‘t e interests of…the workers will be taken 
into consideration as far as possible’ (quoted in Schmidt 1977: 76). On December 14th, 1946 
the NGISC presented detailed decartelization plans to the union leaders, which included also 
provisions for codetermination in the newly created firms. The NGISC offered that each 
decartelized firm would receive a supervisory board consisting of an equal number of 
representatives of labor and shareholders. The unions agreed in principle and the details of the 
plan were worked out between the two sides in the following weeks (Schmidt 1977: 77). The 
negotiations proceeded so fast that the appointment of supervisory board members was 
already discussed on January 7th, 1947 (Thum 1982: 34). 
 On the basis of this agreement, parity codeterminatio  was introduced in 1947/48 in 
all iron and steel firms decartelized by the NGISC. These firms received a supervisory board 
consisting of five labor representatives and five capital representatives, plus a neutral 11th 
member appointed by the NGISC and acting as the chair. The labor representatives consisted 
of two members appointed by the works councils of the firm (one blue-collar and one white-
collar representative), plus two members appointed by the labor unions, one by the national 
union federation (DGB) and the other by the metalworker union (IG Metall). The fifth labor 
representative was appointed jointly by the other four and was intended to represent the 
‘public interest’. In addition, one of the three mebers of the firm’s executive board could 
only be appointed with the consent of the labor repesentatives in the supervisory board. This 
so-called “labor director” was in charge of the firm’s personnel and social policy affairs and 
enjoyed the same status as the two other members of the executive board. This model became 
the basis for the Montan Codetermination Law, the special law for the heavy industry passed 




 For strategic reasons, heavy industry responded with its own codetermination offer to 
unions. Employers were excluded from the negotiations between NGISC and the unions. The 
affected firms and their management did thus basically h ve no influence on what the two 
sides agreed upon. A group of managers from several major heavy industry firms approached 
the union leaders with an alternative proposal for codetermination in order to win the unions 
over to their side and to oppose decartelization (Potthoff 1986 [1957]: 42-6; Müller 1987: 
142-3). Moreover, these employers also understood codetermination as an appeasement 
measure to weaken radical elements within the labor m vement (Berghahn 1985: 211). The 
unions did not, however, respond to this offer because they thought they might be able to 
achieve a better deal by negotiating with the NGISC (Berghahn 1985: 211-215; Teuteberg 
1981: 50-51). 
 This offer by the iron and steel employers did notreflect a genuine preference for 
codetermination but was motivated by the intention  win the support of the unions against 
the decartelization plans by the Allies. This is evid nt from the fact that only three years later 
(1950/51) German industry vehemently resisted the legis ative institutionalization of parity 
codetermination (see below). In 1946/47, however, havy industry employers were ready to 
make far-reaching concessions to the unions, in order to gain their support against the Allied 
reorganization plans (Berghahn 1985: 215-6; Potthoff 1986 [1957]: 50). Their temporary 
endorsement of codetermination was a strategic move to try to prevent the reorganization of 
their firms. 
The legislation of codetermination in the heavy industry (1950/51) 
With the formation of the Federal Republic (FRG) in 1949 the prospects for a reorganization 
of the German economy in line with union demands deteriorated. The first national elections 
resulted in an unexpected victory for the Christian Democrats and a defeat for the SPD. The 
Christian Democrats gained 31 per cent of the vote, the SPD 29.2 per cent, FDP/DVP 11.9 per 
cent, KPD 5.7 per cent, the rest going to smaller non-socialist parties (Markovits 1986: 76). 
Together with the Free Democrats and several smaller parties, the Christian Democrats could 
form a non-socialist coalition government. This coalition was led by the CDU party 
chairperson Konrad Adenauer as the first Chancellor of the new republic. While the labor 
wing of the CDU had favored a Grand Coalition with the SPD, its business wing, the 
predominant wing within the party, had preferred a non-socialist coalition. As the SPD 
remained in opposition, the labor unions could not rely on the Social Democrats to implement 
their reform programme through the parliamentary process. 
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The issue of codetermination split the governing parties. A majority within the 
coalition opposed parity codetermination, in line with employers’ preferences. The Free 
Democrats (FDP), dependent on financial support from big business, were strongly opposed 
to codetermination and so was the powerful business wing within the CDU/CSU. 
Codetermination was supported by the non-partisan union federation (DGB), the Social 
Democrats and the labor wing within the CDU/CSU. The Christian Democrats were thus 
divided about codetermination along class lines. The multi-class voter base of the Christian 
Democrats resulted in different positions on codetermination within the party. 
Codetermination was a goal as important to the CDU labor wing as it was to social 
democratic unions. While the business wing was the dominant wing within the CDU/CSU, 
the party needed to take into consideration the preferences of its labor wing as well 
(Markovits 1986: 79). This was one of several reasons why the government had a strong 
interest that a compromise about codetermination would be found, though important members 
of the government opposed codetermination, most notably its Minister of Economics, Ludwig 
Erhard. 
A second reason was the legislation of codeterminatio  laws at the state level. Several 
regional states (Hessen, Bremen, Baden-Würtenberg) had introduced their own 
codetermination laws in 1948, though these laws were suspended by the US governor, Lucius 
Clay, who was generally skeptical of codetermination. When talks between employers and 
unions broke down in 1950 (see below), the new US governor, John McCloy, threatened to 
reinstate the state-level codetermination laws. The thr at of regionally fragmented legislation 
is  likely to have spurred government and employers to seek a compromise (Jacoby 2000: 76; 
Thum 1982: 39). 
 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer played an important role as a mediator in the 
institutionalization of codetermination, though he personally opposed codetermination (Thum 
1982: 42). In his inauguration speech in September 1949, he had announced the government’s 
intention to provide a legal framework for industrial relations (Thum 1982: 34). The 
government wanted to restore the old ownership relations in the heavy industry and return the 
confiscated shares to their old owners. The Allies made their approval dependent on the 
codetermination conflict being solved (Brück and Eichner 1974: 177). The government thus 
needed to try to find an arrangement with the labor unions. Moreover, Adenauer hoped that a 
compromise with the labor unions would help to secur  social peace and political stability in 
this period of high uncertainty about the political and economic future of West Germany 
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(Thum 1982: 146-9). In addition, as mentioned above, Adenauer also needed to pay attention 
to the wishes of the CDU’s labor wing, which supported codetermination. 
Initially, though, Adenauer and the government took a backseat in the conflict over 
codetermination and urged capital and labor to finda compromise on their own. For domestic 
and foreign policy reasons the government could notafford to ignore the issue of 
codetermination. At the same time, however, the issue could have lead to a potential collapse 
of the government, as Adenauer had to fear that the labor wing of his party would collude 
with the opposition Social Democrats to push through a codetermination law in parliament 
against the position of a majority within the government. Adenauer thus initially tried to stay 
neutral and not to offend either side (Thum 1982: 40). The government hoped that the two 
sides would find a compromise on that issue on their own, thereby preventing the need for the 
government to intervene. 
During the year 1950 several rounds of negotiations between employers and unions 
took place. These negotiations were characterized by stalemate and none of the meetings 
produced any results. The first round of talks took place in Hattenheim in January 1950. The 
talks were chaired by the president of the BDA, Raymond, and the president of the DGB, 
Böckler. Another round of talks took place in March, but failed again to produce any 
compromise solution. The intransigence of both sides blocked the way to a compromise. The 
unions wanted to have parity codetermination extended to all sectors. They did not want to 
accept any diluted form of codetermination, such as a minority representation of labor in 
supervisory boards. The employers fundamentally reject d parity codetermination. Hence, the 
two sides could not find common ground. 
In April and May the government came under increasing pressure to act due to two 
events. First, as mentioned, US governor McCloy threatened to reinstate regional 
codetermination laws, because of the lack of progress at the national level. The imminent 
reinstatement of these regional laws put both, employers and government, under pressure to 
act in order to avoid a federalization of the codetermination issue (Thum 1982: 39). Second, 
the parliamentary faction of the CDU/CSU had come forward with its own codetermination 
bill, intended as a compromise. However, this bill d d not have the government’s approval 
and was opposed by employers (Thum 1982: 42-7). In short, employers had to fear the 
legislation of codetermination rights against their will. 
In response to the increasing pressure, Adenauer took the initiative and mandated his 
Minister of Labor, Anton Storch, to draft a bill for a codetermination law. Storch came from 
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the Christian Democratic labor movement and thus enjoy d the trust of the party’s labor wing. 
The bill should fulfill the difficult task of accomodating both sides. This initiative was 
intended to pacify the labor wing within the CDU/CSU and avoid that the later would vote 
with the Social Democrats in favor of a far-reaching codetermination bill. Such a bill would 
have dashed the hopes of employers and the government ajority for a more limited 
codetermination law. A rift between the business wing of the CDU/CSU and the pro-business 
FDP, on the one side, and the labor wing of the CDU/CSU, on the other, would have risked 
the collapse of the fragile government (Thum 1982: 43-8).  
The government presented its bill to the parliament in October 1950. In the meantime 
further talks between employers and unions in May and July had again failed to produce a 
rapprochement. The government bill gave labor only e third of the votes on the supervisory 
board, instead of full parity. The labor representatives would be elected by the works councils 
and had to come from the workforce of the firm. External union officials could not be 
appointed as labor representatives. The proposal thus excluded the unions from 
codetermination. Employers were willing to accept this proposal for a diluted form of 
codetermination, but the unions were not (Thum 1982: 46-7). Not only did the bill not extend 
parity codetermination to firms outside of iron and steel, as demanded by the unions, it also 
meant the dismantling of parity codetermination in the iron and steel industry, where it had 
already been introduced under the auspices of the Alli s. The bill thus failed to pacify the 
labor movement, and had the contrary effect of alarming the unions that their goal of 
institutionalizing codetermination was now seriously at risk. 
In the following months the conflict escalated. After the repeated failure of talks the 
unions had become disillusioned about the chances of achieving their goal by way of 
negotiations alone. As a result, both sides shifted th ir efforts to public campaigning and the 
mobilization of their constituencies. Most importantly, the unions announced a nationwide 
general strike for January 1951, if their demands were not met. The mining and metalworker 
unions (IG Bergbau, IG Metall) held strike ballots among their members. 96 per cent of the 
metal workers organized in IG Metal and 92 percent of the mine workers organized in IG 
Bergbau voted in favor of a general strike to insist on the legislation of parity codetermination 
(Berghahn 1985: 223-4; Brück and Eichner 1974: 176; Markovits 1986: 78). The strike threat 
was intended to put the government under pressure to stand up for the institutionalization of 
parity codetermination. 
Employers also intensified public campaigning against codetermination. In November 
1950, the BDI organized a rally in Cologne. The BDI was dominated by big industry and was 
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one of the main actors lobbying against codeterminatio . More so than the BDA, the BDI 
voiced the views of the hardliners within industry. At this rally, the BDI president Fritz Berg 
condemned calls for codetermination as an attempt to evoke an unfounded class antagonism:  
‘Wherever it is claimed that there is a chasm betwen ourselves and our workers, it is a fiction 
that overlooks reality. Wherever one posits a deepening of an alleged chasm, one is practicing 
demagoguery. Whoever really tries to provoke a chasm, commits a crime.’ Speech by BDI 
president Fritz Berg at a rally in Cologne on Nov 8, 1950 (quoted in Van Hook 2004: 261) 
 Soon after the announcement of the strike threat the view took hold among employers 
and the government that a compromise with the unions needed to be sought. Employers and 
unions both called upon Adenauer to act as a mediator and to chair the negotiations (Thum 
1982: 71-4). On December 19th, 1950 the BDA called for the negotiations to be restarted 
under the chairmanship of Adenauer. The ultimate goal of the negotiations should be to 
maintain social peace. Adenauer should try to convince the unions to moderate their position. 
The BDA urged the chancellor to ‘remind all involved parties which enormous danger 
Germany faces today and which devastating consequences a class confrontation would need 
to have’ (quoted in Thum 1982: 74). In a similar way, BDI president Berg also called upon 
Adenauer to try to influence the unions to moderate their position. The fact that the employers 
were calling on Adenauer to intervene and mediate in the conflict illustrates the dilemma 
faced by employers. They could have decided to continue to reject the unions’ demands at the 
price of provoking industrial conflict. Alternatively, they could have given in to the unions at 
the price of losing full control over their firms (Thum 1982: 74). 
Adenauer accepted the call to chair the negotiations. He intended to prevent political 
polarization and destabilization, which potentially could have led to the collapse of his 
government. In January 1951 he held separate talks with employers and unions. Adenauer 
urged both sides to take more moderate positions. DGB president Hans Böckler however 
insisted that for the unions a weakened form of codetermination would not be acceptable, as 
this would be to the disadvantage of the workers in those firms were parity codetermination 
had already been introduced under Allied auspices (Thum 1982: 146-9). The government 
worked out a compromise proposal, which divided the issue into two domains. In iron and 
steel, codetermination shall be legislated on the basis of the NGISC model (parity 
representation), while a diluted form of codetermination would be established outside of iron 
and steel. The iron and steel industry should thus receive a separate arrangement, which 
would protect the gains the unions had already made in these sectors. 
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Employers were reluctant to accept this double arrangement, because they thought that 
this would set a problematic precedent that would alow the extension of parity 
codetermination to other sectors at a later date. Nevertheless, Adenauer managed to convince 
a majority of employer representatives to restart negotiations with the unions on the basis of 
this proposal. A minority of employer representatives remained stubbornly opposed to any 
compromise, among them the BDI president Berg (Thum 1982: 82). While the BDA 
welcomed the restart of the negotiations, the BDI opposed it. The final round of negotiations, 
chaired by Adenauer, involved five union representatives and five heavy industry 
representatives. The negotiating teams only included such representatives that had previously 
indicated to be willing to seek a compromise. Upon the Chancellor’s request, the hardliners of 
the BDI accepted not to participate in this final round of negotiations (Thum 1982: 84). 
The two peak-level federations, BDA and BDI, were trying to put pressure on Adenauer 
and the participating heavy industry representatives not to accept an overly generous 
compromise. While the negotiations were going on, BDA president Raymond wired a 
telegram to Adenauer urging him not to conclude anygreement that could have knock-on 
effects for the rest of the economy (Thum 1982: 85). In a similar way, BDI president Berg 
remarked with acrimony that the responsibility for any concessions made in the negotiations 
would rest with the government (Thum 1982: 82). He declared that: 
the whole industry sees in these negotiations, which take place under the threat of a political 
strike, a fatal shock to the authority of the state nd to the foundations of our still young 
democracy (Berg quoted in Berghahn 1985: 226, translated from German by TP). 
 Despite the intransigence of both sides, a compromise could eventually be found. This 
time, negotiations proceeded quickly, starting on Ja uary 19th and ending on January 25th. The 
compromise brokered by Adenauer followed the governm nt’s earlier proposal: Parity 
codetermination in the heavy industry shall be enshri ed in law, but shall not be extended to 
the rest of the economy. Concerning the heavy industry, the compromise followed the model 
of the NGISC without changes: The supervisory boards of heavy industry firms should 
consist of an equal number of capital and labor representatives, plus a neutral chair. In 
addition, all codetermined firms should have a labor director dependent on the approval by 
the labor representatives. As a concession to the unions, parity codetermination was extended 
from iron and steel to include also coal mining, where it was not yet established. 
 Following this compromise, the German parliament passed two laws, a first one 
concerning codetermination in the heavy industry, the so-called Montan Codetermination 
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Law of 195,1130 and a second one for large firms outside of the heavy industry, the Works 
Constitution Law of 1952 (Monissen 1878: 68-72). The latter defines a much diluted form of 
codetermination (see below). In short, a compromise could be found by creating a separate 
arrangement for heavy industry that institutionalized the gains made by the unions under the 
political aegis of the UK. On January 29th, 1951 the DGB called off the planned national 
strike (Thum 1982: 86). 
 To sum up, the institutionalization of codetermination in the heavy industry was the 
combined result of strong mobilization by the labor unions, including the threat of a general 
strike, and the active efforts by Chancellor Adenauer to engineer a compromise between 
capital and labor. Together with their parliamentary llies, employers tried to prevent the 
institutionalization of parity codetermination. They succeeded only partially, because of 
Adenauer’s decision to try to accommodate the labor unions. His behavior appears to have 
been motivated by a set of strategic considerations. Though Adenauer had very close links to 
the business wing of his party, he was concerned that the labor wing of his party would 
collude with the opposition SPD by presenting a joint codetermination bill in parliament. This 
would have undermined the stability of his coalition and could potentially have led to the 
collapse of the government. 
 Moreover, Adenauer wanted to gain the tacit acceptance of the labor unions for his 
foreign and economic policies, which involved, notably, the Western integration of Germany, 
the restoration of private capital ownership in the heavy industry and the free market policies 
of his Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard. These policies frustrated the unions’ hopes for 
economic reorganization (Thum 1982). A further escalation of the conflict over 
codetermination, involving a general strike, could have endangered his foreign and economic 
policies and might potentially even have led to the collapse of his government. For this reason 
he decided to accommodate the unions with the issue of codetermination. 
The 1952 Works Constitution Law 
In contrast to the Montan Codetermination Law of 195 , the Works Constitution Law of 1952 
turned out to be a huge disappointment for the labor movement. The Works Constitution Law 
regulated employee participation rights in firms outside heavy industry. The negotiations in 
January 1951 had left undecided how codetermination rights should be regulated in the rest of 
the economy. Still, the unions hoped to be able to x end parity codetermination to the rest of 
                                                
130 The full name of the law is ‘Special Codetermination Law for the Iron, Steel and Coal Industries’. The 
lawswas passed on April 10th, 1951. 
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the economy through an incrementalist strategy. They hoped to extend codetermination by 
stages. The Works Constitution Law dashed these hops. The law instituted a limited form of 
codetermination that was acceptable also to employers. The law was passed in July 1952 with 
the votes of the governing parties, while the SPD voted against (Teuteberg 1981: 62). The 
social democratic labor unions vehemently opposed th  law and called it ‘a dark moment for 
democratic development in the Federal Republic’ (Markovits 1986: 81; Thelen 1991: 64). 
The Works Constitution Law of 1952 consisted of two parts. The first part of the law 
regulated employee participation rights at the workplace level. The law reinstated the works 
councils, originally introduced by the Works Councils Law of 1920, but abolished by the 
Nazis. The new law defined the rights and responsibilities of the works councils in a 
somewhat more restrictive way than the Works Councils Law of 1920 (Thelen 1991: 74-5). 
The obligations of the works councils to serve the int rests of the firm and to carry out their 
tasks in loyalty to the firm, already enshrined in the 1920 law, were strengthened. The Works 
Constitution Law obliged the works councils to ‘work together with management in a spirit of 
mutual trust’ (paragraph 2, part 1) The law included an explicit ban on works councils to 
initiate strikes and does not allow works councils to bargain over issues regulated by 
collective agreements (Thelen 1991: 76). 
The second part of the law regulated codeterminatio rights at the firm level in large 
firms outside of heavy industry. Instead of extending parity codetermination to the rest of the 
economy, as the unions wanted, the law instituted a diluted form based on the proposal made 
earlier by the Christian Democratic Minister of Labor Storch. This form of codetermination 
was called ‘one-third codetermination’ (‘trittelparitätische Mitbestimmung’) and applies to 
firms with more than 500 employees outside of the heavy industry. One-third codetermination 
means that labor is entitled to appoint one third of the members of the supervisory board, 
instead of one half. The remaining two thirds are appointed by the shareholders. Moreover, 
the labor representatives were not granted the right to veto the appointment of the labor 
director like in the heavy industry.  
In addition, the Works Constitution Law differs from the Montan Codetermination 
Law with respect to the mode of election of the labor representatives. The Montan 
Codetermination Law gave the unions the right to appoint some of the labor representatives. 
Under the rules of the Works Constitution Law all lbor representatives were elected by the 
workforce of the firm. Unions were not entitled to n minate candidates and could not veto 
appointments. Union representatives from outside the firm could be elected by the workforce, 
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but at least two representatives had to come from the workforce. Thus, the unions could 
exercise no control over the appointment of labor rep esentatives. 
The failure of the unions to extend parity codetermination to the rest of the economy 
was in part due to their failure to device an effective mobilization strategy. The charismatic 
and popular president of the union federation, Hans Böckler, died unexpectedly on February 
16, 1951 (Markovits 1986: 79). His death left the union federation without strong leadership 
and disoriented about the appropriate strategy for m bilizing against the Works Constitution 
Law. His successor, Christian Fette, was unable to provide strong leadership to the federation. 
Fette was voted out of office in September 1952, as a result of the disappointment among 
union members about their defeat (Markovits 1986: 81-82). After its defeat in the 
codetermination conflict, the officially non-partisan union federation moved closer to the SPD 
again. In the election campaign of 1953 the DGB openly supported the SPD by choosing the 
thinly veiled slogan ‘vote for a better Bundestag’ (Markovits 1986: 82).  
In addition to a confused strategy of mobilization, the unions’ failure to extend parity 
codetermination was also affected by the changing political climate. The onset of the Cold 
War and the surge in anti-communism in West Germany in the early 1950s had created an 
unfavorable political climate for the radical economic reforms advocated by the unions. 
Socialization and economic planning were far less palatable to the general public in 1952, 
compared to five years earlier, when parity codetermination was introduced in the heavy 
industry. At the same time, the political priorities of the Allies had changed with the onset of 
the Cold War. Thoroughgoing attempts to de-Nazify industry and politics during the early 
post-war years were now replaced by the priority to win West Germany as an ally in the 
confrontation with the Soviet Union and to secure th  Western integration of the new Federal 
Republic. Related to this shift, the Allies lost interest in Germany’s domestic social and 
economic policies and did thus not intervene in favor of the unions. 
The issue of codetermination had been much more divisive than issues of welfare state 
formation and expansion. It is hardly possible to understand the divisiveness of 
codetermination without considering its embeddedness in the ideological controversy over the 
appropriate post-war political-economic order. Economic democracy and social market 
economy were the two polar concepts in this controversy. Unlike with social insurance, 
employers did not view codetermination as an appropriate instrument for consolidating the 
legitimacy of capitalism and for pacifying the working class. Instead, they viewed 
codetermination as an assault on the foundations of capitalism. Employers accepted social 
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insurance because they expected social protection to consolidate capitalism by helping to 
prevent radical alternatives. In contrast, codetermination did not represent such an alternative 
to a leftist challenge, but was perceived as part of that challenge. Codetermination was seen as 
an integral part of a wider union programme for socialisation and economic planning. The 
ideologically divisive nature of the issue made the development of lower-order preferences, 
the pursuit of second-best choices, difficult for bth sides. 
The introduction of parity codetermination in the havy industry became possible 
because the industrialists were bypassed by the relevant actors. The collaboration of the UK 
occupation authority made the introduction of parity codetermination in the heavy industry 
possible. The discredited moral and political legitimacy of the heavy industry had allowed the 
two protagonists to exclude its representatives from the negotiations. Once this precedent was 
set, it turned out to be difficult to dismantle. The Christian Democratic-led government of 
Adenauer assisted in the institutionalization of parity codetermination by helping to forge a 
compromise between capital and labor. For several rasons the Adenauer government in its 
early period had a strong interest in accommodating the unions. In this very early period of 
the newly founded Federal Republic, characterized by high levels of uncertainty about its 
future development, the maintenance of social peace and political stability was a top priority 
for Adenauer. Under the threat of a national general st ike, Adenauer decided to accommodate 
the labor unions and put employers under pressure to accept a compromise. While the 
government of Adenauer was, generally speaking, an employer-friendly government, manifest 
in the free market policies by its Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard, on the issue of 
codetermination conflicting pressures prevented it from siding firmly with employers. 
8. III Continued Confrontation: The Codetermination Reforms in the 1970s 
The conflict over codetermination was for from settled after the reforms of the early 1950s. 
For the next three decades the unions tried to undo the 1952 defeat and extend parity 
codetermination to the whole of industry. Industrial employers, in turn, were committed to 
prevent such an extension.131 While employers and unions maintained their original positions, 
the arguments they marshaled in favor of their position changed substantially over time. 
Neither the fears of employers nor the hopes of unions had materialized with the practice of 
codetermination. Clearly, the introduction of parity codetermination in the late 1940s had led 
neither to the breakdown of the heavy industry nor did it herald the advent of a socialist 
                                                
131 Some heavy industry firms (e.g. Mannesmann, Rheinstahl) ried to evade codetermination, for instance, by 
restructuring their firms or changing their legal form in such a way that they would not anymore be subject to the 
rules of the Montan Codetermination Law (Katzenstein 1987: 1309; Müller 1991: 269; Teuteberg 1981: 59).
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planned economy in West Germany, as industrialists had suspected. The socialisation fears of 
employers had turned out as unfounded.  
At the same time, the labor movement had changed its ideological orientation over 
time. During the 1950s the labor movement eventually abandoned its Marxist ideology and 
socialisation goals and instead came to accept the social market economy and free market 
competition as the organizing principles of West Germany’s political-economic order. The 
last elements of Marxist theory and ideology were eliminated by the SPD in its Bad 
Godesberg platform (1959) and by the DGB in its Düsseldorf platform (1963) (Katzenstein 
1987: 125; Höpner 2005). Socialisation was now no longer seen as a defining principle of 
socialism but merely as one of several means for controlling economic power (Berman 2006: 
190). Nevertheless, although codetermination had now finally lost its original ideological 
justification as an intermediary step towards socialisation, the extension of codetermination 
remained a core demand of the labor movement. The unions now argued that codetermination 
would be an important complement to political democracy, a way “of mitigating as far as 
possible [the worker’s] oppressive feeling of helplssness and dependence” (DGB 1966: 31-
2). Despite these changes in its meaning, codetermination remained a highly contentious issue 
also over the following decades, as this section shw . 
Employers’ continued opposition to codetermination 
After the unions reinvigorated their campaign for extending parity codetermination in the 
1960s, employers focused their agenda on preventing its extension. In response to the union 
campaign, the BDA formed a committee on the issue of codetermination, made up of 
representatives of the BDA as well as the other peak-l vel business federations. The 
committee was headed by the future BDA president, Hans-Martin Schleyer. It had the 
mandate to develop a common response by the business federations to the union demands for 
the extension of codetermination. The establishment of such a committee shows how much 
importance employers attached to that issue. The committee issued a report in October 1965 
(BDA 1965; Erdmann 1966b: 308-11). In short, the BDA argued that:  
an extension of codetermination would increase trade unions' power and immediately raise the 
question of their role and functions in a free economy. It would also entail a fundamental 
change in our property structure and thereby endanger the very basis of our free socio-
economic order and its future development. 
German employers are, therefore, opposed to trade union demands for an extension of the 
codetermination system (Balke 1966: 3). 
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 While employers continued their opposition to parity codetermination, they had now 
changed their arguments. As the labor unions had abndoned their socialisation goals, the 
original argument that codetermination would herald the transformation of the German 
economy to a socialist system had lost its credibility. Instead, employers now argued that 
codetermination would be an obstacle to effective business management. BDA president 
Siegfried Balke summarized this argument in a speech:  
We did not think that the Supervisory Board lends itself to a composition of heterogeneous 
groups. Management of a company has to be responsible to the owners and it cannot be 
effective ... if important decisions can be subject to compromises between groups which have 
very different interests and, in some cases, even political concepts. (…) 
Modern and enlightened management of industry does n t require trade union control and 
participation in management in order to strive for g od and sound relations at the work place 
(Balke 1966: 10-1). 
 At the same time, the employer federation maintained its established argument that 
codetermination would lead to an excessive concentration of union power and thereby 
endanger the balance of power between the two sides that is necessary for a true social 
partnership to function properly:  
The spreading of this system [parity codetermination, TP] over the entire economy would 
indeed mean creating a network of centrally steered t a e union control over the entire 
economy, and thus constitute an amalgamation of power in the hands of the trade union 
movement which would be without precedent (Balke 1966: 13). 
 In addition, employers responded to the union demands by arguing that parity 
codetermination would offer no added value to employees compared to the weaker forms of 
employee participation enshrined in the Works Constitution Law of 1952. Employers over 
time began to cherish the Works Constitution Law with its weaker provisions as an alternative 
to full parity codetermination. In particular, employers began to embrace the works councils, 
which they came to see as an important institution for the improvement of communication 
between employer and workforce (Erdmann 1966a). Employers abandoned their objections to 
the works councils, which they held during the Weimar Republic, and began to praise them as 
an alternative to the extension of parity codetermination. In his speech against the extension 
of parity codetermination, Siegfried Balke emphasized:  
The application of the [1952 Works Constitution] Act in general has stood its test. It has 
contributed much to better understanding of mutual problems of employers and workers, and 
thus promoted industrial peace at the work place. W as employers support this Act and shall 
do our best to assure its still better application (Balke 1966: 8). 
The Biedenkopf Commission: taking stock of codetermination 
As a response to the reinvigoration of the codetermination campaign by the unions, the Grand 
Coalition government, consisting of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, established 
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an expert commission in 1967. The commission was chaired by the Christian Democratic 
politician Kurt Biedenkopf. This commission was mandated to take stock of the effects of 
codetermination and to make recommendations for possible modifications and extensions of 
codetermination. Expert commissions are sometimes us d in Germany as a delaying device, 
when the government tries to avoid making a decision on an issue that appears as politically 
unwelcome. The Codetermination Commission did not submit its report before January 1970, 
after the change in government to a coalition betwen SPD and FDP.  
 The findings of the report by the Biedenkopf Commission in general tended to 
vindicate codetermination. The report argued that codetermination ‘is not only politically 
requisite and historically appropriate but is a factu l necessity’ (Mitbestimmungskommission 
1970). The report found that codetermination had improved the flow of communication and 
information within firms and had instituted compulsory cooperation and deliberation between 
employer and employees. The report also found that codetermination was not used by the 
unions as an instrument for implementing their own independent economic policy or for 
exercising centralized control over the economy. The suspicion that union headquarters would 
try to use codetermination as a tool to ‘remote control’ decision making by firms had been 
one of the arguments used by employers against codeermination, as shown above. The report 
thus generally tended to dismiss employer suspicions as unfounded or exaggerated 
(Mitbestimmungskommission 1970; Cullingford 1976: 68; Wood 1997). 
Despite this generally positive assessment, the recommendations of the report fell short 
of endorsing the unions’ demand for an extension of parity codetermination. The report 
recommended an increase in the number of labor repres ntatives in firms subject to one-third 
codetermination, but, at the same time, the retention of a majority of owner representatives. 
The unions were disappointed by the report’s recommendations. However, in a strategic 
move, the unions announced that they were prepared to accept the recommendations of the 
report as a first step towards the improvement of the 1952 Works Constitution Law. Parity 
codetermination would still remain their ultimate goal. At the same time, however, a proposal 
was circulated by the DGB in the national parliament that included its pervious demands for 
full parity, possibly with the purpose of winning over the labor wing of the opposition 
Christian Democrats.  
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The 1972 reform: avoiding the codetermination issue 
After the change in government in 1969, the union campaign for codetermination gained fresh 
impetus. The grand coalition by the CDU/CSU and the SPD had been replaced by a coalition 
between the SPD and the FDP. The CDU/CSU and the FDP opposed an extension of parity 
codetermination. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (CDU) was a staunch opponent of 
codetermination and opposed its extension on ‘legal, economic and political grounds’ (quoted 
in Erdmann 1966b: 311). The change in government in 1969 shifted the balance of power in 
government in favor of the supporters of parity codetermination, as the SPD became now the 
dominant coalition partner. The labor unions had long pinned their hopes for an extension of 
parity codetermination on the SPD. The shift to a SPD-led government had thus raised the 
expectations of the labor unions. The new Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) was a strong 
supporter of codetermination. In his government declaration of 1973, Chancellor Brandt 
stated that ‘Codetermination belongs to the substance of the process of the democratization of 
society’ (government declaration on January 18th, 1973, quoted in Monissen 1878: 57.) The 
new government was thus expected to be much more susceptible to union demands than 
previous governments. 
Like the previous government, the social-liberal government was internally split on the 
issue of codetermination. While the SPD supported parity codetermination, the pro-business 
Free Democrats (FDP) were adamantly opposed. In October 1970, the Minister for Labor and 
Social Affairs, Walter Arendt,132 presented a first draft for an amendment of the Works 
Constitution Law of 1952. The draft was based on the recommendations of the Biedenkopf 
Commission and recommended a relative increase in the number of labor representatives, but 
falling short of full parity. The draft encountered the staunch resistance from employers and 
the FDP. The FDP made clear that it would not accept an extension of parity codetermination. 
The Social Democrats were thus faced with a dilemma. They were confronted with strong 
pressure from the unions to extend parity codetermination, but at the same time wanted to 
prevent a collapse of the coalition with the pro-business FDP. 
After six weeks of internal discussions behind closed doors, the government came up 
with a new bill for an amendment of the Works Constitution Law, which had the approval of 
the full cabinet. The law was passed with the votes f both governing parties and against the 
votes of the opposition CDU/ in January 1972 (Katzenst in 1987: 138). The revised bill had 
little resemblance with the previous one and merely extended works council competencies, 
while not touching on the issue of codetermination at the firm level. Works councils received 
                                                
132 Before becoming minister, Arendt had been head of the German Mineworkers’ Union. 
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additional rights to information and consultation o a number of issues, including hiring and 
firing and workplace design. The codetermination comp nent of the 1952 Works Constitution 
Law remained however unchanged (Jürgensen 1981: 75; Peltzer 1972: 11-9). The unions 
were disappointed and decided to continue their campaign for the extension of parity 
codetermination. 
The 1976 Codetermination Law 
The following years were characterized by a protracted debate between the two coalition 
partners. The two governing parties, SPD and FDP, both gained strength in the 1972 elections 
and decided to continue their coalition. Like his predecessor Willy Brandt, also the new 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was a strong supporter of codetermination (Schmidt 1976). In 
response to strong union pressure, the SPD made a renewed effort to convince its smaller 
coalition partner that an extension of codeterminatio  was unavoidable. After several years of 
debate and several drafts and proposals, the two coalition partners finally agreed on a 
compromise in 1976. The bill was passed by parliament in April 1976, with the support of not 
only the governing parties but also the opposition CDU/CSU (Katzenstein 1987: 138).  
 The compromise was characterized by the concessions made by the SPD to the FDP. 
The SPD accepted to abandon the goal of full parity codetermination by accepting an 
arrangement called ‘under-parity codetermination’ (“unterparitätische Mitbestimmung”). This 
arrangement was defined as follows: In all firms with more than 2000 employees not subject 
to the Montan Codetermination Law, labor and capital appoint an equal number of 
representatives to the supervisory board.133. The principle of parity representation is, however, 
impaired by two important qualifications, thus the term ‘under-parity’. The first concerns the 
role of the chairperson. The chairperson is elected by a two thirds majority from among the 
supervisory board members. If no two thirds majority can be achieved, the capital 
representatives elect the chairperson. In effect, this means that the chairperson is generally 
appointed by the capital representatives. More importantly, the chairperson has the right to 
cast two votes, if necessary to break a tie. The Codetermination Law of 1976 thus in effect 
secures a majority of votes for the capital representatives, though only a narrow one 
(Jürgensen 1981: 77; Schweitzer 1984: 275-6). 
The second qualification concerns the role of manageri l staff in codetermination. The 
labor representatives had to include a certain number of representatives of the managerial 
                                                
133 In firms with less than 10,000 employees, the supervisory board consists of 12 members, 6 representing labor 
and the other six capital. In larger firms, the supervisory board is enlarged. 
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staff, the so-called ‘senior white-collar employees’ (“leitende Angestellte”). The unions 
perceived this rule as undermining the parity principle, because the managerial representatives 
are likely to side with capital owners rather than with workers. This rule thus makes it more 
difficult for labor to form a uniform group. Blue-collar and white-collar employees elect their 
representatives in separate elections, whereby the number of representatives for each group is 
proportionate to its share of the workforce.134. The complex system of quotas for these three 
occupational groups; blue-collar employees, white-collar employees and senior white-collar 
employees; tends to produce an over-representation of the managerial employees in the 
supervisory board (Monissen 1878: 74-76, see also; Cullingford 1976). 
In short, the Codetermination Law of 1976 reflects a compromise between the two 
governing parties, SPD and FDP. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his SPD were faced with a 
dilemma. Schmidt was a supporter of codetermination (Schmidt 1976) and wanted to reward 
the labor unions for their tolerance of the governme t’s austerity programme and their wage 
moderation. The SPD’s junior partner, the FDP, however, was adamantly opposed to an 
extension of parity codetermination, which foiled the attainment of full parity 
codetermination. The result did not meet the expectations of the labor unions, which declared 
their intention to continue to strive for the extension of full parity codetermination to all 
sectors.  
Employers challenge codetermination in court 
The Codetermination Law of 1976 did not satisfy employers either. For the unions the law did 
not go far enough, for employers, in contrast, it went much too far. Despite its qualifications 
on parity representation, employers rejected the law. They questioned the constitutionality of 
the law by filing a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court in 
1977.135.Employers argued that the Codetermination Law of 1976 violates the constitutional 
rights of private property ownership. In 1979, the court decided to reject the complaint and 
confirmed the constitutionality of the Codeterminaton Law. The court based its decision on 
the argument that the constitution “does not prescribe or guarantee a particular economic 
order’ and instead ‘leaves ordering the economy to the legislature” Wiedemann, 1980 #2455: 
90}. The BDA accused the labor unions of having put illegitimate pressure on the court, but 
nevertheless accepted the court’s decision (BDA 1979: XV-XIX). 
                                                
134 External union representatives can be appointed if elected by the workforce. The unions have no right to 
appoint labor representatives, in contrast to the Montan Codetermination Law. 
135 The lawsuit to the Federal Constitutional Court was filed by 29 employer associations and nine individual 
firms (Wiedemann 1980) 
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The employers’ resort to the Constitutional Court was part of a wider offensive by 
employers against what they perceived as an excessive concentration of union power. In 
March 1974 the employer federation (BDA) started its so-called ‘union state’ campaign, 
which was intended to shift public opinion against the labor unions. As Andrei Markovits has 
put it: ‘Under the motto "market economy or union state," the employers initiated a massive 
attack designed to sway public opinion against the unions, who - in the employers' view - 
were beginning to dominate the country and threaten th  very fabric of liberal democracy’ 
(Markovits 1986: 125). The BDA argued that the unions had undergone an ideological 
radicalization since the early 1970s, which would jeopardize the foundations of the social 
market economy. Moreover, the BDA targeted its attack against the ‘entanglement’ 
(“Verfilzung”) of the unions with the SPD, which, in their view, threatened to lead to a so-
called ‘union state’ (Markovits 1986: 138). These con erns about an excessive concentration 
of power in the hands of the unions were certainly not new and had already played an 
important role in the codetermination conflict in the early 1950s. With the resurfacing of the 
codetermination conflict in the early 1970s, however, these arguments gained new 
momentum. 
The deterioration of relations between capital and l bor in the second half of the 1970s 
is not only reflected in the employers’ public campaigning against the ‘union state’ and their 
resort to the Constitutional Court, but also in an intensification of industrial conflicts. An 
intensified use of lockouts and strikes characterized the second half of the 1970s (Markovits 
1986: 142). As the unions supported locked-out workers, the intensified use of lock-outs by 
employers constituted a heavy burden on union finances. Moreover, the BDA had undergone 
an organizational restructuring during the 1970s, under its new leader, Hans Martin Schleyer. 
Schleyer transformed the previously weak umbrella federation into a centralized and well-
coordinated organization, which coordinates the strategies of its member associations in 
bargaining with unions. Characteristic of this new-gained strength of the BDA was the 
intensified use of the so-called ‘taboo catalogue’ by the federation, an enumeration of issues 
on which member associations were not allowed to make concessions to unions (Schroeder 
2000: 175-8; Thelen 1991: 119-20). The conflict over codetermination had contributed 
considerably to this deterioration of industrial relations in the 1970s. 
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SUMMARY: ARGUMENTS USED BY THE BDA AGAINST PARITY AND UNDER-PARITY 
CODETERMINATION 
- obstructs the effective functioning of enterprises in a market economy 
- is fundamentally incompatible with the economic system of a market economy 
- parity representation means, in fact, an over-repesentation of labor (‘over parity’)  
- involves a risk of stalemate situations and, as aresult, problematic concession bargaining  
- parity in the supervisory boards may induce parity in the executive boards 
- parity codetermination means more influence for the unions (concentration of power in the hands of the 
unions) 
- undermines wage bargaining autonomy, by making employers and their associations dependent on union 
support 
- undermines the balance of power between the social partners 
- curtails ownership rights (restricts owners’ dispositi n over private property) 
Source: BDA Annual Report 1974 (1974: 160-162).the list summarizes the arguments listed in the BDA opinion 
in response to the 1974 government bill for a new Codetermination Law. 
 
8. IV Codetermination Today 
Despite their massive resistance German industrialits could not prevent codetermination 
becoming a permanent and stable component of the German system of industrial relations. 
The past struggles between capital and labor have resulted in a fragmented system, consisting 
of three different types of codetermination (see table 8.2 below): full parity codetermination 
(Montan Codetermination Law of 1951), under-parity codetermination (Codetermination Law 
of 1976) and one-third codetermination (Works Constitution Law of 1952). Full parity 
codetermination has lost importance over time due to the structural decline of heavy industry 
(Parnell 1994). Hence, the under-parity variant (firms with more than 2000 employees) and 
one-third variant (between 500 and 2000 employees) are the most widespread variants of 
codetermination today.136 
 
                                                
136 The development of the institutional basis of codetermination since the 1976 reform has been characterized 
by incremental adjustments. Among other things, election rules have been simplified and rules have been 
extended to new legal types of firms (Kommission zur Modernisierung der deutschen 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung 2006: 81-4). 
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Table 8.1 Existing Variants of Codetermination in Germany  
Year Law Applies to  Workers covered (in 
% of all West 






Firms in coal mining 
and iron and steel 
production with more 
than 1000 employees 
2.6 
1952 
 (amended 1972 ) 
Works council 
component of the 
Works Constitution 
Law  
(only works councils, 
no codetermination) 
All firms with at least 






component of the 
Works Constitution 
Law 
(works councils + one 
third codetermination) 
Firms with at least 
500 and less than 
2,000 workers not 
subject to Montan 
Codetermination 
4.3 




incl. railroad and 
postal workers 
14.8 
1976 Codetermination Law 
(under-parity 
codetermination)  
Firms with more than 
2000 employees not 
subject to Montan 
Codetermination 
19.6 
- Not subject to Works 
Constitution Law 
Small firms (<5 
employees) 
13.9 
- - All Firms 100 
Source: Niedenhoff 1979: 20 . Percentage of employees r fers to the late 1970s 
 
Despite the staunch opposition by employers against the introduction and extension of 
codetermination, in practice of codetermination in German firms has turned out as largely 
cooperative. Codetermination has not turned out as an intermediary step towards the 
socialisation of industrial ownership, neither has it turned out as a tool for centralized 
economic planning in the hands of the unions. Instead, codetermination has developed into a 
pragmatic tool of employee participation in firm decision-making. Codetermination has not 
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led to a reorientation of business policies, away from pursuing pure profit motives to pursuing 
wider social goals, as the protagonists of economic democracy in the 1950s expected. Instead, 
the labor unions had come to accept that codetermination operates within the constraints of a 
market economy. They have come to understand codetermination as a goal in itself, rather 
than as a means towards socialism. In reality, the labor representatives see themselves as the 
representatives of the economic interests of the firm’s workforce, rather than of the interests 
of the working class at large or as protagonists of ome wider social movement or common 
good. In short, it appears that the practice of codetermination has made labor more pragmatic. 
At the same time, German firms have, by and large, managed to come to terms with 
codetermination. Academic studies find that codetermination tends to have positive effects on 
productivity and competitiveness or does, at least, not have negative effects (e.g. Vitols 2005). 
In particular, codetermination has facilitated workf ce restructuring and labor shedding in 
sectors undergoing structural decline, like coal mining (Parnell 1994). Employee 
representatives and management have negotiated innovative forms of personnel management 
that has facilitated the economic restructuring in these sectors, including early retirement 
schemes, retraining schemes, part-time work or flexib  working time (Jackson 2005: 246-9).  
Reports of several expert commissions have emphasized the positive economic effects 
of codetermination. For instance, the German federal government has recently mandated a 
commission to evaluate the economic effects of codetermination and make recommendations 
for a potential reform. Reviewing the econometric literature on this topic, the participating 
experts concluded cautiously that there is no evidence of any negative impact of 
codetermination on the profitability or productivity of codetermined firms, while there may 
potentially be positive effects (Kommission zur Modernisierung der deutschen 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung 2006. 14) A report by another expert commission in 1998, 
organized by the private think-tank Bertelsmann Foundation, emphasized the positive effects 
of codetermination on economic efficiency (Streeck and Kluge 1999; Bertelsmann Stiftung 
and Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 1998).  
In his analysis of the economic consequences of codetermination, Wolfgang Streeck 
has argued that codetermination has functioned as a ‘productive constraint’ on firms (Streeck 
1992). Firms have adjusted their production strategies to codetermination and have developed 
production strategies that benefit from codeterminatio . In particular, production strategies 
focusing on product diversification and product quality (‘diversified quality production’) have 
benefited from codetermination (Streeck and Kluge 1999: 12-15). According to Streeck, firms 
have changed the way they utilize labor in response to codetermination. Labor representatives 
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have partially taken over managerial responsibilities, which reinforced their interest in 
cooperation with management (Streeck 1992: 137). In effect, codetermination has, thus, made 
capital and labor more alike. Capital has internalized the interests of labor, while labor has 
internalized the interests of capital (Streeck and Kluge 1999; Streeck 1992). 
The official position of German employers towards codetermination stands in marked 
contrast to the findings of these studies. Even today, German employer associations, officially 
and publicly, oppose parity codetermination. Even though negative statements by individual 
managers or entrepreneurs are rare, the two top federations still call for the abolition of 
(under-) parity codetermination. In a joint press release in November 2006, for instance, the 
presidents of the BDA and the BDI, Dieter Hundt and Jürgen R. Thumann, declared that: ‘A 
large number of firms … see codetermination as a competitive disadvantage for Germany’ 
(BDI and BDA 2006: 1). These competitive disadvantages are:  
Decisions over investments are slowed down [by codetermination]. In cross-border 
mergers…codetermination is often seen as an obstacle by the firms involved…In comparison, 
the one-third codetermination of employees in the supervisory boards enjoys a significantly 
greater acceptance among the firms (BDI and BDA 2006: 1, own translation). 
There has thus been remarkable continuity in the official positions of German business 
associations since the 1950s, despite the apparently positive experiences with codetermination 
in many firms. Then and now, employers consistently opposed (under-) parity 
codetermination and advocated one-third codeterminatio  and works councils as more 
acceptable and beneficial alternatives of employee participation. These alternatives are just as 
well able to provide the merits of employee participat on, such as improving the flow of intra-
firm communication, securing social peace and improving employee motivation and 
productivity, while at the same time maintaining capit ls’ ultimate authority over decision-
making in the firm. In the same press release, BDA and BDI demand that under-parity 
codetermination be dismantled and replaced by one-third codetermination:  
One third codetermination of the employees in the supervisory board provides the right 
measure for making the optimal use out of the acknowledged advantages of codetermination. 
One third codetermination is also the most widespread form of codetermination in Europe 
(BDI and BDA 2006: 1, own translation). 
 In a similar way, as early as 1966 BDA president Balke promoted one-third 
codetermination as an alternative to parity codetermination:  
We consider it an indispensable principle that management is appointed by and responsible to 
the owners of the company. As long as two-thirds of the members of the Supervisory Board 
are actually representatives of the shareholders, thi  principle can be considered maintained 
(Balke 1966). 
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 While employers consistently maintained their oppositi n to parity codetermination 
from the early 1950s to today, the arguments they marshaled to back their position changed in 
remarkable ways over time. During the 1950s employers branded codetermination as a threat 
to the social market economy, as a disguised from of socialisation and a tool for union-
controlled economic planning, violating the private property rights that West German society 
would rest upon. When the fears of socialisation and economic planning waned due to 
political developments, employers in the 1960s and 1970s shifted their lines of argument. 
They now argued that codetermination created excessive union power, threatened the balance 
of power that social partnership was based upon and constituted an obstacle to effective 
business management, given the imperatives of a market economy. Today, they argue that 
codetermination is incompatible with the competitiveness requirements created by the 
internationalization of financial markets. Codetermination constitutes a competitive 
disadvantage for German firms in their competition f r international investment capital 
(statement by the employer representatives in Kommission zur Modernisierung der deutschen 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung 2006:56-8). In short, while the arguments have changed, the 
positions tend to remain the same. 
 The new interpretation of codetermination as a competitive disadvantage for German 
firms reflects the turn of many German firms to share older values since the 1990s. This new 
shareholder value-orientation is the result of changes in capital markets and corporate 
governance that have intensified the competition for international investors. This development 
involved a whole range of changes: the liberalization of domestic and international capital 
markets, the loosening of traditional bank ties and i ter-locking ownership relations, the 
growing importance of new institutional investors and equity-based finance, stock options for 
management and reforms of corporate governance rules that have strengthened shareholder 
rights (Jackson 2005: 246-7). Codetermination is today seen by employers as an obstacle to 
an effective shareholder value orientation. The shift to shareholder values has shortened time 
horizons and raised profitability benchmarks. Codetermination slows down decision-making 
and requires concessions to labor that are seen as i compatible with shareholder values. 
Codetermination is therefore seen by industry as a di dvantage in competing for international 





The case of codetermination constitutes a deviation fr m the politics of accommodation. In 
the social policy field employers have often endorsed pecific policy options as lesser evils. In 
regard to codetermination the scope for accommodatin was more limited due to the 
ideologically loaded nature of the conflict. Employers endorsed one-third codetermination 
and works councils as lesser evils compared to full parity codetermination, the goal of the 
labor movement. Nevertheless, the scope for a strategy of accommodating and pacifying the 
labor movement was much more limited in the case of codetermination, because German 
industrialists considered codetermination an infringement of essential property rights. They 
viewed codetermination as a Trojan horse, as part of a piecemeal strategy by labor to socialize 
industrial ownership. According to industry, codetermination would in effect expropriate 
capital owners, by shifting control over firm decision-making partly to labor. Codetermination 
did thus not offer itself as a concession to pacify a radicalized or discontent working class, 
because defending private capital ownership and entrepreneurial freedom were precisely the 
reasons why employers wanted to pacify the working class. Parity codetermination was not a 
suitable means to that end. 
 The case of codetermination testifies to the primacy of political interests over 
economic interests. Employers formed their preferences about codetermination on the basis of 
how they thought it would change the balance of power between capital and labor and how it 
would curtail their control over the use of capital. As the chapter has shown they did not form 
their preferences on the basis of considerations of how codetermination might support or 
undermine the kind of production strategies they intended to pursue. Arguments relating to 
labor productivity, worker motivation or the improvement of communication between 
management and workforce played little role in the conflicts over parity codetermination in 
the post-war period, neither for the unions nor for employers.137  
 Employers understood parity codetermination primarly from the perspective of how it 
might curtail entrepreneurial control and boost union power. Even after the labor unions had 
abandoned their more radical goals for economic reorganization, to which codetermination 
was linked to, did employers continue to oppose codetermination as fundamentally 
incompatible with the principles of a free market economy (see table 8.1). This confirms the 
proposition that in the formation of employer policy preferences, political interests take 
                                                
137 Such arguments did play a role in employers’ assessm nt of the works councils, though, which they came to 
cherish over time, but they did not shape employers’ perspective on the issue of parity codetermination. 
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priority over economic interests. Conflicts over the distribution of power and control over 
investment decisions obstructed the view on the potential economic efficiency effects of 
codetermination. Despite the positive effects on competitiveness that academic studies 
attribute to codetermination, employers have not been a driving force behind its introduction 
and extension. The introduction and extension of codetermination in Germany has been 





9 Employers and the German Model Today 
 
The consensus model is yesterday’s model. Everywhere in the world people are recognizing that 
the principle of subsidiarity should also apply within the economy. In Eastern Germany firms 
are violating collective agreements everywhere. Withou  these violations the situation in the 
East would be even worse. I consider these violations not as disastrous, but as exemplary… In 
Germany we have too many Round Tables and too few quick and hard-edged decisions. 
(Hans-Olaf Henkel, President of the Federation of German Industry [BDI] between 1994 and 
2000. In Der Spiegel 01/1998: 72-74) 
 
Although employers had not been a driving force in the development of the German model, as 
shown throughout this thesis, they did over time come to accept many of the policies and 
institutions that underpin this model. In particular during the post-war period, employers came 
to terms with political constraints, and, to some extent, discovered genuine advantages in 
policies and institutions whose introduction they had either opposed or endorsed only for 
strategic reasons.  In particular, employers in the post-war period came to endorse two key 
institutions they had earlier on opposed or accepted only with reluctance: works councils and 
sectoral collective bargaining. Employers came to see institutions of social compromise as 
being better suited for securing social peace than t e repressive means they had pursued 
during earlier times. In addition, they also develop d a genuine interest in certain social 
policies that facilitated peaceful labor shedding by encouraging early exit from the labor 
market. 
 Since the 1990s, though, employers’ support for institutions of social compromise 
gradually, but nevertheless decisively, eroded. Rather than relying on corporatist institutions 
of consensual policy-making, employers now turned to public campaigning to push for far-
reaching reforms. They campaigned for systematic retrenchment of welfare state programmes, 
including early retirement, and labor market liberalization. At the same time, an erosion of 
collective bargaining institutions occurred as a result of primarily smaller firms abandoning 
them. These changes amount to a shift from a strategy of political accommodation, 
characteristic for the post-war period, to a strategy characterized by conflict and 
confrontation, rather than by compromise.  
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This chapter tries to provide an explanation for this shift in employers’ political 
positions and strategies. Why did employers turn away from consensual policy-making and 
political accommodation? Why did they become protagnists of institutional change, rather 
than defending existing institutions against reform efforts? The explanation offered combines 
endogenous and exogenous developments. Domestically, the returns to social compromise 
declined as labor unions became more accommodationist ver time, thereby reducing the 
efforts needed to sustain social peace. At the same time, the usage of social policies for the 
purpose of peaceful labor shedding resulted in ever-rising non-wage labor costs (see section 
9.I below). As a result, reducing non-wage labor costs greatly gained in importance for 
employers. This new priority became increasingly difficult to reconcile with social 
compromise, given the existence of considerable political obstacles towards welfare 
retrenchment. 
In terms of the exogenous context, the accelerating globalization of the economy 
during the 1990s made employers face stiffer cost cmpetition, but also better opportunities 
for relocating investments abroad. As a result, employers became less dependent on domestic 
compromises, while at the same time these compromises had over time also become more 
costly. The combination of these two developments, I argue, motivated employers to turn 
away from social compromise and to push for far-reaching changes much more assertively 
than before. 
This re-orientation in employer politics takes three forms. First, employer 
organizations began to campaign much more aggressively for cost-cutting reforms compared 
to previous periods, often risking conflicts with other actors. Through media statements and 
public campaigns they began to forcefully articulate an increasing dissatisfaction with 
existing policies and institutions and a desire for de egulatory reforms. They initiated and 
funded several public campaigns that focused on conveyi g an urgent need for political 
reforms to reduce labor costs and tax burdens in order to keep the German economy 
competitive. The so-called “Initiative New Social Market Economy” (INSM) constitutes the 
probably most forceful and prominent of these campaigns. Through public campaigning 
employers tried to circumvent the limits of corporatist policy-making, by shifting the political 
constraints created by electoral politics. 
Second, employers’ readiness to compromise and to acc mmodate labor demands 
declined over time. Efforts to reach corporatist compromises on welfare state and labor 
market reforms, such as the “Alliance for Jobs” talks, have been half-hearted and have 
essentially come to naught, due to the unwillingness of both sides to make concessions. Third, 
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and in addition to changes at the collective actor level, also individual firms have moved away 
from institutions of social compromise, by taking steps to either evade or exit collective 
bargaining institutions. Smaller firms and firms in East Germany, in particular, tended to 
abandon sectoral bargaining institutions. Other firms remained in sectoral bargaining, but did 
not comply with agreements. These reflect important developments that indicate that the 
readiness by German employers to pay the price for social compromise has eroded since the 
early 1990s. Tyll Necker, a former president of theFederation of German Industry (BDI), 
remarked that:  
A point has been reached when a policy of compromise at any price can no longer be sustained. 
The decisive question is not “what will appease theunions” but “what will combat 
unemployment”…When necessary, one must be prepared for confrontation (Tyll Necker, 
former BDI president and, at that time, BDI vice-president, in Die Zeit, 22 March 1996). 
  The remaining sections of this chapter are structu ed as follows: after 
presenting the general argument briefly in the next section (I), the chapter turns to the 
empirical analysis. Section II analyzes the temporary eturn of cross-class consensus and 
social compromise in the wake of German unification. The subsequent sections analyze 
employers’ turn away from accommodation and compromise in the field of welfare state 
politics (III) and industrial relations (IV). The final section (V) discusses the factors 
explaining the changing politics of employer associations. 
9.I Erosion of Social Compromise: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors 
As shown in previous chapters, German employers often accommodated to political 
constraints, and have accepted compromise solutions. Political accommodation, i.e. the 
adjustment to political constraints, can be seen as a game of give and take. To what extent 
employers are likely to accommodate to political constraints depends on what they can expect 
to gain in return. Historically, political accommodation by employers was motivated by two 
goals: pacification and containment. Initially, the acceptance of the formation of welfare state 
policies and industrial relations institutions by employers was motivated by the goal of 
pacifying a potentially revolutionary working class. With the reformist transformation of the 
labor movement and the emergence of an affluent working class this goal subsequently 
became less relevant to employers. 
 The policies initially established as a means of social pacification had, however, in the 
meantime become a stable and well-entrenched element of the German political economy, 
and, with the democratization of the political system, could not be unilaterally dismantled by 
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employers, even if they would have wanted to. They n eded to accommodate. As previous 
chapters have shown, employers’ acceptance of welfare state expansion was neither the 
expression of an altruistic commitment, nor was it based on any economic self-interest in 
welfare state policies per se. Rather, it was based on the belief that political accommodation 
would be the most effective way of containing welfare state expansion. By cooperating with 
government policy-makers, business expected to be abl  to influence important details of 
planed policies with a view to containing the growth in non-wage labor costs. Political 
accommodation was aimed at containment of reform efforts within the limits of the politically 
feasible. 
 For several reasons, employers came to perceive this strategy as increasingly 
ineffective from about the early 1990s onwards. First, the rise in levels of social expenditure 
during the 1980s and 1990s, which employers wanted to stop, was not so much the result of 
deliberate government policy decisions, but, instead, resulted primarily from changes in 
socio-economic structures that led to a rise in benefit recipients. Higher levels of 
unemployment, demographic ageing and, most notably, the costs of reindustrialization in East 
Germany after unification were among the main factors behind rising social expenditures 
during this period (see sections 9.II and 9.III below). To counter this structurally induced rise 
in social expenditures required an active commitment by policy-makers to cost containment 
through benefit cutbacks. Employers had to try to promote such decisions. 
 At the same time, public opinion and electoral support for generous welfare state 
policies posed formidable obstacles towards any attemp  of radical welfare state retrenchment. 
Like in other advanced industrialized countries, welfar  state politics in Germany became 
shaped by the counter-veiling pressures of fiscal constraints on the one hand, and the electoral 
popularity of welfare state policies on the other, as Paul Pierson aptly pointed out (Pierson 
2001: 411-9). Electoral competition between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats led 
both parties to appeal to the pro-welfare attitudes among large parts of the electorate and to be 
reluctant with implementing welfare state cutbacks. The ‘new politics’ of the welfare state, 
characterized by the goal of cost containment, came to follow a different logic than the 
previous politics of welfare state expansion, one in which the room for maneuver by policy-
makers became more limited, due to the double constrai ts of electoral popularity and fiscal 
constraints. 
 In this context of the “new politics” of cost containment, employers now wanted not to 
contain reform efforts, as during the period of welfare state expansion, but to intensify them. 
In this changed context, trying to influence reform outcomes in employers’ interest by 
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accommodating to the goals and power resources of relevant actors turned out as an 
increasingly ineffective strategy, because the room f r maneuver of policy-makers themselves 
became more constrained. Electoral support for generous welfare state programmes was the 
main obstacle to the new politics of welfare state reform, an obstacle that was difficult to 
affect by way of accommodation. Unlike elite policy-makers, the electorate at large is 
unlikely to be responsive to statements by business r presentatives. Policy-makers are likely 
to listen to business proposals, because reforms that enjoy the acceptance of business appear 
more likely to be sustainable and promise higher levels of investments. During the period of 
welfare state expansion, trying to contain the ambitions of reformers by accommodating to 
their broader goals thus appeared as an effective srategy to employers. The shift from 
expansionary politics to cost containment meant thais strategy became less effective. 
Employers decided that they needed to take on public op nion, instead, if they wanted to 
achieve significant expenditure cuts. 
 At the same time, the accelerating of globalization in the 1990s amplified employers’ 
unwillingness to acquiesce to existing domestic politica  constraints.  Economic globalization, 
in terms of increasing trade and transnational capital flows, acts both as a constraint and as an 
opportunity for firms. Globalization intensified cost pressures on German firms, but also 
enhanced their opportunities to invest abroad and relocate production sites. According to one 
survey, conducted among German firms,138 60 per cent of respondents said that they faced 
“very severe” price competition and 34 per cent saythe faced “severe” price competition 
(quoted in Kinderman 2005: 458). While German industry tends to rely on quality production, 
this does by no means exempt it from cost competition, as there are also many other countries 
that are able to compete in terms of quality. Interational competition does not, thus, take 
place exclusively in terms of quality or in terms of price, but in terms of a combination of 
both. Intensifying international cost competition ad the simultaneous rise in domestic non-
wage labor costs (see table 9.2 below) made political a commodation increasingly difficult to 
afford for employers. 
 At the same time, better opportunities to invest abro d or to even relocate production 
to other countries are likely to have contributed to making German firms more reluctant to 
accommodate to domestic political constraints. From the 1990s onwards, German employer 
organizations consistently relied on the exit threat to push their case for welfare state 
retrenchment. They systematically promoted the so-called Standortdebatte, the political 
                                                
138 The survey was conducted by the Institute for the German Economy (DIW), which is funded by employer 
associations (Gesamtmetall 2003). 
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debate over the need for policy reforms to improve th  competitiveness of Germany as a 
location for investments (see section III). Employers used the threat of losses in jobs and 
investments to lower-cost countries to add authority to their demands for cost-cutting reforms. 
 The exit threat is not an empty threat. The assets h ld by German firms abroad 
(outward FDI stock) have multiplied in value since th early 1990s. The value of outward FDI 
equaled 8.7 per cent of GDP in 1991, and has since quadrupled to 34.9 per cent of GDP in 
2006 (table 9.1 below). German firms have thus massively intensified their international 
investment activities. The international expansion of German firms is in reality not the mere 
product of high labor costs at home, but is also driven by other motivations, such as achieving 
closer proximity to relevant consumer markets (see e.g. Traxler et al. 2001). Nevertheless, the 
soaring of international investments has given credibility to the political use of exit threats 
and has, thereby, shifted the balance of power to employers. Moreover, investments abroad 
also made it easier for employers to compare labor costs and production conditions at home 
with that in other countries, and thereby are likely to have contributed to employers’ 
increasing reluctance to accommodate to domestic political constraints. The international 
expansion of their activities has changed their geographical frame of reference, making them 
more reluctant to put up with domestic political constraints they had been ready to accept in 
the past. 
 To sum up, interacting domestic and international factors resulted in an erosion of 
employer support for institutions of social compromise and welfare state programmes. 
Domestically, the rewards to compromise in terms of ecuring social peace and influencing 
policy reforms declined. At the same time the costs f ocial peace went up. During the period 
of welfare state expansion, moderating their positins helped employers to more effectively 
influence reform output. During the new period of cst-containing reforms, strengthening, 
rather than limiting, reform ambitions became the nw goal. At the same time, the 
internationalization of production and investments has reduced the dependence of firms on 
Germany as a production site, and, thereby, has also made them more reluctant to 
accommodate to domestic political constraints. Endogen usly created problems, such as 
higher labor costs, met with a fiercer competitive environment. As a result, the costs of 
institutions of social compromise came to gradually outweigh the economic benefits they 
generate for firms. 
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Chart 9.1 German outward FDI stocks 1976 - 2006 
  
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2008). Note: chart shows assets held by German firms abroad 
(outward FDI stocks), including both direct and indirect holdings (via foreign holding companies) 
 
Table 9.1 German outward FDI in percentage of GDP 1991 - 2006 
Year 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 
% of 
GDP 
8.7 9.6 10.6 14.8 20.4 33.0 30.4 34.9 
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank (2008) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2008), own calculations. 
 
Employers: A force for stability or for change? 
The argument of this chapter casts doubts on arguments that employer interests are a force for 
institutional stability. Many accounts of the development of the German political economy 
during the 1990s emphasize the extent of institutional stability, the occurrence of limited and 
incremental changes and the country’s resiliency in the face of globalization challenges (Hall 























































VoC approach, some scholars have argued that this institutional stability is, in part, the result 
of employer interests. In this view, their economic interests motivate employers in CME’s to 
defend existing institutions against attempts at liberalizing reforms by other actors. 
Kathleen Thelen, for instance, has argued that the relative stability of the German 
model of industrial relations, compared to its equivalents in liberal market economies, rests in 
part on the vested interests of large manufacturing firms, which are “unwilling to abandon the 
German model” (Thelen 2001: 84). Employers’ interests in a cooperative workforce and 
“shop-floor peace” require them to support institutions for labor participation. Specifically, 
Thelen argues that in CME’s 
national-level bargaining institutions have been shored up not just by strong unions, but by 
employers who realize the extent to which the plant-level co-operation that they seek with labor 
is underwritten and sustained by the collective management of labor markets above the plant 
level (Thelen 2001: 73). 
 In a similar way, Peter Hall argues that the “stance taken by producer 
groups…explains some of the resilience of VoC….Firms were reluctant to endorse 
institutional reforms that threatened the viability of corporate strategies in which they had 
made major investments” (Hall 2007: 63). Hall points out that the production strategies of 
large German firms rest on a cooperative workforce and that, therefore, these firms will 
defend institutions fostering cooperation with labor against political challenges. Stewart 
Wood also emphasizes that the interests of German employers are a source of political 
continuity, rather than change. Analyzing labor market reforms in Germany, Sweden and the 
UK, he argues that German employers adjusted their production strategies to the existing 
institutional framework and, once having done so, became defenders of this institutional 
framework (Wood 2001: 376-9; s.a. Hassel 2007: 254 for a comparable argument). He argues 
that “German employers since the early 1980s have rep atedly failed to bite when offered the 
carrot of deregulation by the CDU-led government” (Wood 2001: 408).  
 These accounts are theoretically informed, in part, by the VoC approach by Hall and 
Soskice. The VoC approach expects that CME-type institutional frameworks will be backed 
by cross-class alliances consisting of dominant segments of capital and labor (Hancké et al. 
2007: 20). Reform projects will be shaped not so much by class conflicts, but by conflicts 
between segments of the economy, in particular between large and small firms. Intensified 
competition brought by economic internationalization and the adjustment of firms to 
institutional constraints will produce sectoral cross-class coalitions in defense of the existing 
institutional framework. Hall and Soskice aptly articulate this argument: 
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In coordinated market economies…governments should be less sympathetic to deregulation 
because it threatens the nation's comparative institutional advantages. Although there will be 
some calls for deregulation even in such settings, the business community is likely to provide 
less support for it, because many firms draw competitive advantages from systems of 
relational contracting that depend on the presence of supportive regulatory regimes. In these 
economies, firms and workers have common interests to defend because they have invested in 
many co-specific assets, such as industry-specific skills. Thus, the political dynamic inspired 
by globalization in these countries is likely to entail less class conflict and to center around the 
formation of cross-class coalitions, as firms and workers with intense interests in particular 
regulatory regimes align against those with interests in others (Hall and Soskice 2001: 58, 
emphasis added by TP). 
This analysis in this chapter takes issue with the VoC argument. If we follow the VoC 
perspective, we should expect that dominant employer groups will oppose deregulatory 
reforms, and that this is one reason for the failure of such reform initiatives. As Wood 
correctly notes: “If the Soskicean account of employer preferences is correct, the inability of 
parties to sustain a radical legislative attack on labor market structures is as likely to be the 
result of employer pressure as pressure from trade unions” (Wood 2001: 393).  
Empirically, however, there is little evidence of deregulatory reforms that would have 
been opposed by employers, or dominant segments among them, as the following sections try 
to show. To the contrary, employers have often pushed for deregulatory reforms. Though 
German employers do not demand the outright dismantling of institutions of social 
compromise and welfare state programmes, they have become much more assertive in 
pushing for liberalizing reforms, compared to the post-war period. Rather than defending 
existing policies and institutions against liberalizing reforms, they promote reforms that move 
Germany towards a less regulated and less costly type of market economy. 
Theoretically, the VoC perspective faces difficulties in capturing the changes in 
employer positions and strategies that have happened during the 1990s. While the VoC 
perspective does provide a plausible explanation for why German employers do not push for 
the outright dismantling of industrial relations and welfare state institutions, it has difficulties 
explaining employers’ turn away from social compromise at the political level, their 
campaigning for deregulation and welfare state retrenchment, as well as the erosion of 
bargaining institutions due to the exit by individual firms. The interpretation by the VoC 
perspective is at odds with the empirical observation hat German employers have often been 
protagonists, rather than opponents, of liberalizing reforms in labor market and social 
policies, even if these reform attempts may often have been modest. Its emphasis on employer 
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interests as a force of stability, rather than change, provides the VoC approach with 
difficulties in explaining the broader changes in employer positions and strategies.139 
 The remaining parts of this chapter try to show empirically that since the 1990s 
German employers have become a driving force for institutional reforms in industrial 
relations and social policies, rather than defenders of the status quo. The next section briefly 
discusses the effects of unification and economic transformation in the East on the politics of 
German employer associations, before turning to employers’ offensives for change in welfare 
state institutions (III) and industrial relations (IV).  
9.II German Unification and the Pacification of the East 
German unification resulted in a brief return to social compromise. It temporarily muted 
existing conflicts over the reform of the German political economy. The West German 
government responded to unification with the rapid transfer of West German political and 
economic institutions to the new, Eastern part of the country. Its declared goal was the rapid 
convergence of East German standards of living and economic conditions to the standards 
prevailing in the West in order to prevent social unrest. Chancellor Kohl promised East 
German citizens “flourishing landscapes,” a metaphor for economic prosperity. This policy of 
rapid economic convergence appears to have been motivated by normative and political 
considerations, rather than by any strict economic rationale (Hefeker and Wunner 2003). The 
ultimate goal was to ensure the political loyalty of East German citizens to their new state.140 
This policy was initially endorsed by all major political actors, including the employer 
associations. The political goal was to prevent the consolidation of a socio-economic east-
west cleavage, with the potential development of political instability and radicalism in the 
East if the high hopes of East Germans would be frustrated. 
 West Germany proceeded quickly with the full-scale extension of its political and 
economic institutions to its new Länder. This included also the extension of the West German 
framework of economic regulations, its institutions of industrial relations and welfare state 
programmes. A monetary union with a conversion rateof 1:1 extended the West German 
Mark to the East (Ritter 2007: 145). The West German natio l government had been the 
dominant actor in the process organizing unification, whereby labor unions and employer 
organizations had not been directly involved in thebipartite negotiations leading to the 
                                                
139 For a similar argument see Menz 2005 . 
140 This politically motivated use of social policies shows resemblance to the politics and policies of 
transformation in other East European countries. An in-depth study by Pieter Vanhuisse shows that governm nts 
in these countries used social policies for strategic reasons, to ensure the acquiescence of the population to 
economic transformation (Vanhuysse 2006). 
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unification of the two states. Nevertheless, both sides of industry initially supported the policy 
of institutional extension and rapid economic convergence (Ritter 2007: 223-230). The initial 
period of unification, up to the autumn of 1992, was characterized by political consensus and 
close cooperation among all actors, including also employers. 
 The national employer federation, BDA, agreed that West German institutions and 
policies should be transferred rapidly to the East, nd that transition periods should be kept as 
short as possible. This applied also to the field of industrial relations. The formal institutional 
framework of the dual system of industrial relations was extended to East German firms 
without modification. The transfer of the West German model to the East initially seemed to 
proceed quickly: labor unions and employer organizations were quickly founded in the East 
and started to conclude sectoral collective agreements. This was a top-down process 
orchestrated by the West German unions and employer associations, who controlled their 
affiliates in the East. As there had been basically no private capital in the GDR, Eastern 
German employer associations had to be established from scratch, relying on West German 
initiative. The decision by the state’s privatization agency (Treuhandanstalt) to oblige the 
firms it held in trust to join an employer association greatly facilitated their formation in the 
East (Ritter 2007: 246). 
 In the initial phase, labor unions and employer associations both agreed on the goal of 
rapid wage convergence between East and West. In March 1990, DGB and BDA issued a 
joint declaration supporting a currency union and the extension of the West German industrial 
relations model to the East, including the stepwise convergence of wages and social benefits, 
in line with productivity growth in the East (Ritter 2007: 225). In June 1990, employers and 
unions in the metalworking sector of the East German region of Berlin-Brandenburg reached 
an agreement on stepwise wage convergence (Stufenplan). This plan intended to equalize East 
German wage rates with West German standards by way of stepwise increases until full parity 
would finally be reached in April 1994 (French 2000: 2 3-8). This model was then extended 
to the remaining East German regions. As a result, hourly wage rates in East German 
metalworking increased by 68 per cent between 1991 and 1993 (French 2000: 206). 
 The BDA officially endorsed the unmodified transfer of the West German economic 
and social model to the East. Some voices in industry had proposed the establishment of a low 
wage or low tax production zone in the East (“Sondersteuergebiet DDR”), in particular voices 
from the BDI and the market liberal FDP party, but the BDA’s official position did not reflect 
these views (Schroeder 2000: 185). These dissenters i nded to use unification as a tool for 
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putting deregulatory pressure on the West German model by creating regulatory competition 
within the country. The official endorsement of a uniform regulatory environment by the 
BDA raises the question why the employer federation did not use unification as a window of 
opportunity to establish a low-wage/low-regulation production zone in the East, as some 
industry representatives had proposed? Prima facie, this appears to confirm the view that 
dominant groups of German employers genuinely prefer th  German high-wage/high-
regulation system.  
 Employers’ support for rapid wage convergence and a uniform regulatory environment 
was motivated by the political and economic considerations of West German employers. As 
no independent entrepreneurial class existed in the East in 1990, the West German employer 
associations could exercise great leverage in setting up the wage bargaining system there.  
Politically, their goal was the pacification of East German workers in order to ensure a 
smooth and successful integration of Eastern Germany into a capitalist economy and society. 
Employers acknowledged the need to accompany Eastern G rmany’s transition to a capitalist 
economy with social benefits and wage convergence to nsure the pacification of Eastern 
German citizens. In addition, employers also agreed with the widespread believes that 
productivity in the Eastern German economy would be likely to catch up quickly to Western 
standards and that the financial transfers needed would therefore only be of a temporary 
nature (Schroeder 2000: 187).  
 Economically, West German employers had an interest in preventing the emergence of 
domestic low-cost competition by firms which would not be subject to the same regulatory 
constraints than their competitors in the Western part of the country (French 2000: 204-5; 
Manow and Seils 2000: 286). This calculation clearly reflected the interests of West German 
employers, rather than those in the East. West German employer associations assumed that 
productivity in the Eastern economy would catch up rapidly, thus allowing firms in the East to 
be able soon to pay wages comparable to the West. This calculation, however, neglected the 
specific technological and economic conditions of East German plants, which prevented a 
rapid increase in labor productivity. The policy of wage convergence thus led to a rapid 
increase of unit labor costs in the East, as shown below. In short, the fear of low-cost 
competition from the East kept the upper hand over th  opportunity to exert deregulatory 
pressure on the West German system. 
 The policy of rapid wage convergence, together with the one-to-one currency 
conversion, contributed massively to the collapse of the East German industry. Growth of 
labor productivity in the East fell short of the hig  initial expectations and did not keep up 
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with the rate of wage growth. As a consequence, relativ  unit labor costs in East German 
industry stood at 191 per cent of the West German level in 1991 (Manow and Seils 2000: 
Table 6.1). Massive deindustrialization and labor shedding in East German plants occurred as 
a consequence. Between 1991 and 1993 total employment in the East fell by 15 per cent, 
manufacturing employment even fell by 45 per cent (Manow and Seils 2000: 286-7).  
 The initial period of political consensus after unification came to an end in the autumn 
of 1992, when the economic problems in the East and the high costs of unification became 
clearly apparent to all actors (Ritter 2007: 8). Many East German firms responded to the wage 
policy of their associations by non-compliance to collective agreements, often with the tacit 
consent of local works councils, or by leaving employer associations in order to avoid 
collective bargaining altogether, as is shown in more detail below (section IV). According to a 
survey of 700 East German firms conducted in 1996, 43 per cent of covered firms did not 
fully comply with sectoral agreements (Ritter 2007: 249). 
  When these problems became apparent, the employer associations decided to change 
course. In March 1993, the metalworking employer association declared an “extraordinary 
termination” of the wage convergence agreement with IG Metall and demanded its 
renegotiation. Metalworking employers proposed a 9 per cent increase for 1993, instead of the 
26 per cent originally agreed in the Stufenplan, plus an exemption clause for firms in serious 
economic difficulties (French 2000: 206-7). Unions reacted with “warning strikes” and 
declared the termination of the agreement illegal. In May 1993, a pilot compromise was 
reached in the district of Saxony, which was later extended to the rest of Eastern Germany. 
The compromise postponed full wage convergence for tw  years, until 1996, and introduced a 
special “hardship clause” for firms with serious problems. 
 According to this hardship clause, management and works councils of a firm could 
apply to the collective bargaining partners to be ex mpted from the terms of the collective 
agreement, if the firm faced serious economic problems. If accepted by the bargaining 
partners, the exemption allowed the firm to undercut the conditions of the collective 
agreement (Hassel 1999b: 497). To apply, firms needed to open their books and present a 
strategy for recovery. The renegotiation of the Stufenplan allowed thus a greater 
differentiation of wages and working conditions, although within the limits accepted by the 
collective bargaining partners. BDA president Klaus Murmann later admitted that the policy 
of rapid wage convergence had been a mistake. In response to the question “How big is the 
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responsibility of a mistaken wage policy for unemployment in Eastern Germany?” he 
answered: 
The employer associations bear great responsibility, and, if you like, complicity. Just as I 
admit that I belonged to those, who, during the turnaround of 1989/1990, expected that 
productivity and incomes in the East would converge quickly; so I also belonged to those who 
in 1992/93 tried tooth and nail to revise and dismantle these Stufenverträge of rapid wage 
convergence (Murmann 1997: 110). 
 To sum up, German unification in 1991 had triggered a brief period of class consensus 
and compromise, which was shaped by the joint commit ent to extend the West German 
economic model to the East. This short period came to a sudden end in late 1992, when 
employers realized the high costs of economic transformation in the East. The policies of 
unification and economic convergence exacerbated th economic woes of the East, by making 
East German firms uncompetitive, and thereby contributed to the erosion of collective 
bargaining institutions in the East in the subsequent y ars (see section IV). The social costs of 
deindustrialization in the East were shouldered by the West German welfare state, thereby 
contributing to the continued rise in non-wage labor c sts, one of the main reasons for 
employers rising dissatisfaction with existing policies and their turn away from social 
compromise. 
9.III Employers’ Offensive for Welfare Retrenchment 
The social consequences of deindustrialization in the East were cushioned by the West 
German welfare state. The political consensus during the early period of unification 
(1990/1991) included also the use of social benefits for cushioning economic transformation 
in the East. West German welfare state programmes were extended to the East and benefit 
levels there were raised to West German standards. Active labor market policy measures, in 
particular job-creation schemes, were expanded on a massive scale in the East during the early 
years after unification, but such measures were often perceived as ineffective and as intended 
merely to keep unemployed persons out of mischief. They were later cut back to reduce costs 
(Ritter 2007: 488). In addition, unemployment insurance and early retirement were used on a 
massive scale to cushion the effects of economic restructuring (Manow and Seils 2000: 292-
5). In 1992, social expenditures in the East amounted to 66 per cent of its GDP (Ritter 2007: 
485). In short, large-scale financial transfers from the West to the East cushioned the social 
consequences of economic transformation. 
 The costs of this policy of economic restructuring-cum-social pacification were 
financed by various revenue-raising measures: higher payroll taxes, additional state subsidies 
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to the social insurance funds, as well as several ad-hoc measures to raise tax revenues, such as 
a temporary “solidarity surcharge” on income tax. Together with high levels of 
unemployment and early retirement also in West Germany, the extension of the West German 
welfare state to the East had thus contributed to the long-term rise in non-wage labor costs in 
Germany (see table 9.2 below). Total payroll taxes increased from 35.5 per cent in 1990 to 42 
per cent in 2003, thereby continuing the sustained rise of payroll tax rates that occurred 
already during the previous decades. 
Table 9.2 Total payroll taxes in Germany (1949-2003) 
Year 1949 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 
% 20.0 20.0 24.4 25.0 26.5 28.9 32.4 34.9 35.9 37.2 42.1 42.0 
Source: Streeck and Trampusch 2005: Table 1  Note: payroll tax rates are as a percentage of gross wages and are 
paid in part by the employer, in part by the employee. 
Employers’ push for cost-cutting reforms 
Under pressure from international cost competition, employers became increasingly reluctant 
to put up with the sustained rise in labor costs. Reducing non-wage labor costs became the 
paramount political concern of German employers during the 1990s. They demanded a 
reorientation in social policy, including substantil cutbacks in social benefits, lower payroll 
taxes and more self-reliance by the individual. Thefederations representing smaller firms, like 
the Federation of German Artisans (ZDH), used to take a particularly aggressive stance. The 
ZDH demanded, for instance, a substantial reduction n social expenditures (e.g. 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 22/06/2005: 23; Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 25/04/2002: 24 ), an extension 
of the low-wage sector (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 24/12/2001: 5) and the abolition of dismissal 
protection (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 25/04/2004: 24).  
 Lobbying for welfare state retrenchment was, however, by no means limited to small 
firm associations, but also became a priority for the national employer federation, the BDA, 
which is dominated by larger firms. Due to the inter al division of labor among German 
business federations, the BDA is the federation that is in charge of social policy and labor 
market issues (Grote et al. 2007: 160-2). In addition o issuing opinions on specific pieces of 
legislation, the BDA also articulates more general and programmatic positions in media 
statements and through various publications and public relations campaigns. In the 1990s, the 
BDA has shifted from a responsive strategy, reacting to policy initiatives by other actors, to a 
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more proactive strategy, actively demanding reforms. This shift is visible, inter alia, in the 
fact that from 1994 on the BDA has regularly issued policy manifestos demanding 
comprehensive social policy reforms141(BDA 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005). 
 Rather than directly dismantling Bismarckian welfare state institutions, the policies 
proposed by the BDA aim at transforming the Bismarcki n welfare state from within. The 
manifesto of 1994, entitled “Reconstructing Social Security” (BDA 1994) envisaged the 
possibility of considerable cost reductions within the existing institutional framework of the 
Bismarckian welfare state, by abolishing those benefits and services considered as not 
essential and by encouraging more self-reliance, instead. In particular, the BDA demanded 
that financing of active labor market policies be shifted from payroll taxes to the general state 
budget (s.a. Murmann 1997: 159). Social insurance programmes should remain financed by 
payroll taxes but should be freed from financing so-called “non-insurance benefits,” which 
includes measures such as active labor market policies and various non-actuarial benefits. 
 Four years latter, in 1998, the BDA published another policy manifesto, entitled 
“Social Policy for more Competitiveness and Employment” (BDA 1998). The BDA demanded 
that the ambitions of the welfare state should be reduced from providing income maintenance 
benefits (“Lebenstandardsicherung”) to providing only a minimum standard of protection 
(“Basissicherung”), in order to reduce non-wage labor costs (14). Moreover, the BDA 
demanded deregulation in labor law and of wage policies (10-11). Wage bargaining functions 
should be decentralized, with more scope being given to bargaining at the plant level, with 
greater differentiation of wages to allow the growth of a low wage sector, and with sectoral 
agreements being transformed into a regulatory framework defining only minimum standards, 
rather than actual conditions (10-11). Another manifesto, published in 2002, “A New 
Departure in Social Security” (BDA 2002), repeated the known demands for a downsizi g of 
the welfare state by re-focusing social policies on their “core competencies” and combining 
public and private provisions (4-5).  
 Subsequent manifestos, entitled “Promoting Growth and Employment” (BDA 2005) 
and “Principles for a Reorientation of Social Insurance” (BDA 2006), again emphasized 
                                                
141 These policy manifestos are approved by the BDA’s Board of Directors and can thus be considered to 
represent lowest common denominator positions. Another indicator for the new pro-active stance is the c anging 
nature of the annual reports published by the BDA. Up to the early 1990s, these reports were often more than 
100 pages long and dealt in detail with the BDA’s positions on specific pieces of legislation. Since th n, the 
reports have become much shorter and focus, instead, on general programmatic statements, emphasising the need 
for radical welfare state reforms. This shows the new emphasis of the federation on shaping public opini n on 




demands for cost-cutting reforms in the welfare state to maintain international 
competitiveness. This time, a shift in the financing of health care and long-term care 
insurance away from payroll taxes is also advocated, unlike in the previous manifestos (BDA 
2002). Financing of these two programmes should be transferred to individual insurance 
premiums unrelated to earnings. Health care and long-term care insurance should only 
provide primary services, patient co-payments should be extended and market mechanisms of 
governance should be strengthened (BDA 2005: 7). The principle of mandatory coverage in 
social insurance should be maintained in order to avoid adverse selection problems (BDA 
2006: 3-4). Redistributive elements within the social nsurance system should be 
systematically eliminated (BDA 2006: 4-5). In pensions and unemployment insurance, payroll 
tax financing should be maintained, and benefits be kept strictly earnings-related (i.e. 
actuarial), in order to maintain work incentives (BDA 2005: 9, 13; 2006: 5). The duration of 
unemployment insurance benefits should be shortened further and the statutory retirement age 
should be raised to 67 (BDA 2005: 9). Dismissal protection should be made more flexible ( 
15).142  
 The BDA’s reform proposals amount to a substantial downsizing of the German 
welfare state. The BDA does not advocate a radical transformation to the model of a liberal-
residual welfare state, though. The proposals maintain the basic institutional framework of the 
Bismarckian welfare state. Payroll tax financing, earnings-related insurance benefits and 
mandatory insurance coverage, the defining institutional features of Germany’s conservative 
welfare state model shall, by and large, be maintained.143 However, the reform proposals of 
the BDA do in sum amount to a substantially less generous and less redistributive welfare 
state, a further decentralization and deregulation in industrial relations and greater income 
                                                
142 Positive effects of social policies on economic competitiveness are mentioned nowhere in the BDA 
documents. In contrast to what the skill formation thesis by Estevez-Abe et al (2001) predicts, the BDA expects 
that high non-wage labor costs, caused by high levels of social spending, have a negative effect on skill 
investments and work incentives because high non-wage labor costs reduce the relative net salary of employees. 
(BDA 2006: 5-6) (2001). 
143 The BDA’s preference for Bismarckian welfare state programmes results from its role in social insurance 
administration, which provides it with a vested organizational interest in this type of welfare state organization. 
Like the labor unions, employer associations participate in the administration of social insurance programmes 
and labor market policies (“social self-government”) and thereby have a certain, albeit very limited, influence 
over expenditures and payroll tax levels. Employer associations and labor unions are both determined to defend 
their organizational role in social policy administration and prevent direct state interventions in ths domain (e.g. 
Murmann 1997: 163-4). A shift away from payroll tax financing also undermines the legitimacy of their 
administrative involvement, as without a contribution to financing also the legitimacy of their involvement in 
administration would appear questionable. Moreover, employers’ reluctance to push for a shift away from 
payroll taxes appears to be motivated also by a scepticism about whether such a switch would actually result in a 
lowering of the total cost burden on firms. A rise n income tax, for instance, would potentially also be born by 
firms via compensatory wage demands and, possible, also an increase in industrial conflicts. 
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inequality. The BDA reform programme combines continui y in the formal institutional 
framework with substantial changes in socio-economic outcomes.144 
 The BDA positions presented above illustrate the more assertive and less 
accommodating stance by German employers. Unlike in the past, the federation is now 
actively trying to set the agenda for reforms, rather than merely responding to reform 
initiatives by other actors. While during the period f welfare state expansion employers had 
been in a passive and reactive position, trying to contain reform efforts made by other actors, 
they now became a driving force for reforms. The change in welfare state politics from 
expansion to containment made it more expedient for employers to take a more assertive 
stance and also to move away from consensual policy-making.  
Care insurance: a political waterloo for employers 
While the general focus of welfare state politics in the 1990s was on cost containment, some 
expansionary reforms still occurred. The most important expansionary reform during the 
1990s was the introduction of a pay-as-you-go financed programme for long-term care 
insurance in 1994. Employers were fighting unsuccessfully to prevent it. The reform was 
initiated by the Christian Democratic Minister of Labor, Norbert Blüm, a proponent of the 
party’s labor wing. The issue divided the Christian Democrats. Its labor wing and the 
churches favored public long-term care insurance. Social democrats and labor unions also 
favored it. The free market wing within the CDU, spearheaded by the party’s business groups, 
opposed care insurance. The issue was finally decided when Chancellor Kohl, who had 
initially been skeptical of care insurance, changed sides. Motivated by the electoral potential 
of the elderly, the government finally decided in June 1993 to go ahead with care insurance 
(Ritter 2007: 265). 
 The BDA and other business federations lobbied vehemently against a public and pay-
as-you-go financed care insurance, because of the anticipated rise in labor costs, but did not 
succeed.145 They presented an alternative model for care insurance, but only relatively late in 
the reform process (Murmann 1997: 165-6) (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 15/09/1993). This so-
                                                
144 Georg Menz has coined the phrase “old bottles with new wine” to describe this phenomenon(2005: 196). 
 
145 After the introduction of care insurance, the BDA shifted its demands towards cost-cutting measures in care 
insurance: benefits should become limited to severe typ s of care needs and provide only a basic level of 
protection, and private, pre-funded arrangements should be promoted by the state (BDA 2002: 11-13). Since 
2005, the BDA also demands a shift in the financing of care insurance from payroll taxes to individual premiums 
(BDA 2005: 7). 
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called “dual component model”146 consisted of mandatory private care insurance, based on 
pre-funding, for all Germans above the age of 25. In addition, a public transition fund should 
be established for those already to old to accumulate s vings (Ritter 2007: 693-5). BDA 
president Murmann had later called his failure to prevent public care insurance “the greatest 
fiasco of my term in office” (Murmann 1997: 165). 
 The example of long-term care insurance shows that when expansionary reforms 
appeared unstoppable, as in this case, employers still re orted to their old strategy of political 
accommodation, by presenting alternatives intended as compromise proposals. The case of 
long-term care insurance has, however, also shown t employers the ineffectiveness of their 
strategy of political accommodation. The failure of employers to prevent long-term care 
insurance is likely to have contributed to their subsequent turn away from political 
accommodation and towards a less conciliatory and more assertive strategy. Employers 
realized that, instead of only reacting to proposals brought on the agenda by other actors, they 
needed to try to proactively define the reform agenda. 
Alliance for Jobs: failure of reform by compromise 
Employers’ turn to political confrontation is also reflected in the failure of the so-called 
Alliances for Jobs talks to produce meaningful reform compromises. Two consecutive 
governments initiated these tripartite talks with a view to forge corporatist compromises on 
labor market and welfare state reform. The first Alliance (1996-98) was set up by the CDU-
FDP government led by Helmut Kohl. The talks were later revitalized by the SPD-Green 
government led by Gerhard Schröder (1998-2001). Both initiatives failed to produce 
substantial reform packages due to deadlocks between employers and unions and the 
unwillingness of both governments to override one of the two sides (Bruff 2008: 116-35; 
Schirm 2002: 229). 
 Employers and unions both rejected compromise packages, albeit for different reasons. 
Both sides wanted to exclude certain issues from the talks, leaving little room to forge an 
encompassing compromise (Hassel 1999a; Merkel et al. 2008: 82-3; Schroeder 2003a: 129; 
Streeck and Hassel 2003: 114-6). In particular, unions did not want to touch upon wage 
policy, insisting that this is the prerogative of the sectoral bargaining partners (FAZ, 
18/01/2002; FAZ, 15/03/2001). Employers insisted on significant reductions in non-wage 
labor costs and urged the unions to show wage moderation. They refused to agree to reform 
                                                
146 The dual component model was presented by the BDA, and supported by the other business federations, BDI, 
ZDH and DIHT 
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compromises and threatened to leave the talks, becaus  they thought that the discussed 
proposals did not go far enough in meeting their demands for lower labor costs (Der Spiegel 
01/03/1999: 26). 
 The failure of both Alliance initiatives to produce significant reforms also reflects the 
institutional weakness of corporatist concertation at the political level. While corporatist 
cooperation is well institutionalized in industrial re ations and social insurance administration, 
Germany never managed to establish corporatist institutions at the macro-political level, 
despite several attempts to establish such institutions. The tripartite Concerted Action talks 
from 1967 to 1977, intended to secure wage moderation, managed to produce concrete results 
only during their early years and remained largely a symbolic institution. Like the Alliance 
for Jobs, also the Concerted Action failed to develop into a st ble institutional form of 
corporatist concertation. 
 The Alliance for Jobs had to compete with other institutions as a decision-making 
forum. Important reform issues that might have been suitable for a corporatist reform 
compromise, such as pensions and tax reform, were dcided unilaterally by the national 
government, without involving the Alliance. In wage policy, the unions insisted on the 
autonomy of sectoral bargaining and wanted to keep wage policy issues off the Alliance 
agenda, as mentioned above. For employers, their ability to forge plant-level “employment 
pacts” with their workforce alleviated the pressure to accept a political compromise on the 
national level (see section IV). BDA president Dieter Hundt, for example, emphasized that “ 
‘Alliances for Jobs’ belong into the enterprises. Only there can we maintain employment and 
training places and create new ones” (FAZ, 02/12/1998). In short, the divergence of 
preferences and the lack of government intervention caused the talks to fail (s.a. Martin and 
Thelen 2007: 32). The failure of the Alliance talks appears to have strengthened the view 
among employers that political confrontation is needed to achieve the desired cost-cutting and 
market-oriented reforms. After the failure of the talks, employers intensified their public 
campaigning for reforms. 
The INSM: Taking On Public Opinion 
Over the course of the 1990s, public campaigning becam  employers’ main tool for 
promoting market-oriented reforms. By way of public campaigning employers tried to 
hammer the Standortdebatte [‘competitiveness debate’] into public opinion, and thereby 
shape the political agenda in favor of market-oriented reforms. The most prominent and 
influential of these campaigns is the so-called ‘Initiative New Social Market Economy’ 
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(INSM). The INSM was initiated in 1999 by the national employer federation for the 
metalworking sector, Gesamtmetall, which is also the campaign’s primary source of funding. 
The foundation thus occurred at about the time when it became evident that attempts to 
achieve big reforms through tripartite compromises were stalling. The declared aim of the 
campaign is to shift public opinion in favor of market-oriented reforms (Speth 2004: 36). The 
campaign is governed by an advisory board, which is dominated by representatives of 
Gesamtmetall and other business associations (Speth 2004: 39). 
 INSM combines think tank activities and public campaigning. Despite its dependence 
on business funding, it presents itself in public as  non-partisan and experts-based 
organization. With an annual budget of about 10 million Euros, INSM has financed a wide 
range of campaigning activities. The INSM launched advertising campaigns and newspaper 
articles, produced teaching material for schools, gave awards to market-oriented politicians, 
carried out policy studies, and established a network of affiliated academics and politicians, 
which are paid by the campaign to give public lectures and media interviews or to participate 
in TV talk shows. Its aggressive campaigning tactics, including for instance covert 
advertising, have resulted in public criticism of the initiative. 
 The messages of the campaign focus on the need for market-oriented reforms. The 
initiative’s understanding of the concept of “social market economy” is inspired by the 
thinking of German ordo-liberals of the post-war peiod (e.g. Müller-Armack 1948; Röpke 
1950), including the former CDU Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard, whom the INSM 
presents as a model of sound economic policy-making. As elaborated in chapter 6, the core 
doctrine of the “social market economy” school is the argument that free market competition 
is the best tool for achieving social justice. State regulation should serve to promote free 
market competition, not to constrain it (Friedrich 1955: 511; Haselbach 1991: 172; Mudge 
2008: 715). This doctrine was popularized in the 1950s by Erhard, who acted as the public 
relations spokesperson of this school (Friedrich 1955: 510). Although the social market 
economy has since remained a vaguely defined concept, meaning very different things to 
different people, it has become akin to a foundation l myth for Germany’s post-war political-
economic order and is frequently evoked in political discourse (e.g. Die Zeit, 03/05/2007: 27). 
The INSM tries to link its campaign to the positive normative connotations that this concept 
enjoys in public discourse.  
 In contrast to the way these concepts are commonly understood today, the INSM tends 
to use the two concepts ‘neo-liberalism’ and ‘social m rket economy’ in a synonymous way. 
 266 
On its website (www.insm.de), the initiative states hat “neo-liberalism is…a differentiated 
social science theory and the most important source of Ludwig Erhard’s policy of the Social 
Market Economy” (INSM 2007). The initiative defines neo-liberalism as follows:  
The central value of neo-liberalism is freedom. What is meant by that is not the untamed 
freedom of anarchy, but the ordered freedom of a state, where the common law stands above 
the interests of the individual. The fundamental insight of neo-liberalism is thus: freedom 
requires order (INSM 2007 ,translated by TP). 
 Gesamtmetall’s sponsoring of INSM shows that employers have identifi d public 
opinion as an obstacle to the kind of reforms they want. The decision to found and fund INSM 
was made after opinion polls had shown that large parts of the German population supported a 
generous welfare state and opposed market-oriented reforms (Speth 2004: 7). Gesamtmetall 
mandated the initiative to conduct public relations campaigns with a view to produce a long-
term change in public opinion in favor of market-oriented reforms. Gesamtmetall instructed 
INSM to focus on general programmatic statements, and not to develop specific policy 
proposals or to intervene in specific policy conflicts147 (Speth 2004: 36-7). The campaign 
shows that employer associations are expanding their strategic focus from a short-term 
strategy of influencing specific legislative projects to a long-term strategy of pro-actively 
trying to define the political agenda and shaping public opinion.  
Hartz reforms: abandoning social compromise 
After the failure of the Alliance for Jobs, the Schröder government de facto abandoned 
attempts to forge a corporatist compromise and decided to go ahead with reform measures 
unilaterally, instead. In February 2002, shortly befor  the national elections, the government 
decided to set up an expert commission mandated with making proposals for job-creating 
labor market reforms. The commission consisted of 15 members, including, inter alia, 
representatives of the social partners, individual enterprises and business consultancies. The 
commission was named after its chair, the personnel dir ctor at VW, Peter Hartz. With this 
                                                
147 The INSM avoids directly attacking other political actors and their positions. This holds also with respect to 
the unions. As the employer associations negotiate coll ctive agreements with the unions, they continue to have 
a strong interest in maintaining cooperative relations with the latter and thus avoid any anti-union rhetoric. As 
shown below, the employer associations have responded to increasing dissatisfaction with the existing collective 
bargaining system among their members by trying to negotiate reforms with the unions. Public agitation would 
be counter-productive for achieving a negotiated compromise. This aspect is evident in the fact that INSM is not 
allowed to address issues of wage bargaining (Speth 2004: 7-8, 41-2). Their commitment to negotiated 
compromises in the field of collective bargaining provides the employer associations with an interest in keeping 
wage policy out of public controversy. The neo-liberal approach is thus not followed through consequently i  the 
field of wage bargaining, the employer associations’ genuine policy domain, and aims instead primarily at a 
reduced role of the state. Generally speaking, thoug , the turn to public campaigning indicates a turn away from 




initiative the government intended to set a signal that it is determined to act against 
unemployment, whereby the setting up of the commission was facilitated by a report about 
mismanagement within the public job placement servic s, underlining the need for reform 
(Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006: 9). The initiative was lso intended to sideline unions as veto 
players by shifting decision-making to an apparently on-partisan expert group, where the 
unions would be in a minority within the committee. The commission’s proposals were in 
general in line with business preferences and were, in principle, endorsed by the business 
federations. They aimed at supply-side reforms of the labor market, in particular measures to 
improve labor market flexibility, to encourage the p rsonal initiative of the unemployed 
(“activation”), to tighten work obligations, as well as organizat onal reforms of the job 
placement services. 
 The report by the Hartz Commission inspired a bundle of government reform 
measures, which were translated into four laws passed by parliament in December 2002. The 
reform measures, included, for instance, start-up grants for self-employment (Ich-AG), the 
promotion of temporary work agencies and a reorganization of the public job placement 
services. The most controversial component of the reform package was a comprehensive 
reform of the system of passive labor market policy, intended to strengthen the work 
incentives of the unemployed (Hartz IV reform). This reform strengthened the work 
requirements of the unemployed, shortened the benefit duration in unemployment insurance, 
and strengthened means-tested elements in labor market policy by introducing a new 
programme of unemployment assistance (ALG II) for the long-term unemployed (Merkel et 
al. 2008: 84-7). 
 After its re-election in 2002, the Schröder governme t extended its new course of 
unilateral welfare state reform, without consulting first with the social partners, through the 
so-called Agenda 2010 program. This program consisted of a bundle of labor market and 
social policy reform measures, intended to reduce payroll taxes to a level below 40 per cent 
by cutting benefits, explicitly justified by the need to maintain Germany’s international 
competitiveness (Bundesregierung 2003; Hüther and Scharnagel 2005: 28). The Hartz 
reforms and the Agenda 2010, both fully supported by the business federations, reflect the 
new political agenda of improving competitiveness, which employers promoted throughout 
the 1990s with their Standortdebatte. The passing of these reforms appears to be due, in part, 
also to the success of employers to shape the political agenda by impressing the need for cost-
cutting reforms upon the public and thereby ensuring the public acceptance of these reforms. 
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9.IV Industrial Relations: Employers’ Offensive for Decentralization 
Developments in industrial relations parallel those in welfare state reform: An increasing 
dissatisfaction with existing institutional arrangem nts turned employers into protagonists of 
institutional change. Considerable tensions in the German model of industrial relations have 
emerged, with employers demanding more decentralization and flexibilisation in collective 
bargaining. Individual firms have tended to abandon sectoral bargaining, and, hence, 
employer associations tried to renegotiate collectiv  bargaining institutions with unions. 
Employers have either chosen “voice”, pushing for decentralization and flexibilisation within 
the existing institutional framework, or “exit”, dropping out of sectoral bargaining 
completely.148 As a result, the coverage of the German model of industrial relations has been 
shrinking and its character been transformed by changes going on within it. These changes 
have been driven primarily by the employer side andits dissatisfaction with the outcomes 
produced by the existing bargaining system. 
 A considerable share of German firms has lost confide ce in the German model of 
industrial relations and has left sectoral bargaining, thereby causing the coverage of the model 
to shrink and creating pressures for its reformation. Sectoral bargaining is a voluntary 
institution in Germany, whereby the agreements are legally binding only for those firms and 
employees that are organized in one of the signatory pa ties.149 Because in Germany the 
organizational strength of employers is much higher than that of unions, the ability of 
employer associations to retain their members defines to a large extent the bargaining 
coverage rate. The declining coverage rate is due to firms leaving their associations, rather 
than to declining union strength. 
Table 9.3 Organizational Strength of Gesamtmetall (employee density rate) 
Year Gesamtmetall Employee Density 
Rate – West Germany 
Gesamtmetall Employee Density 
Rate – East Germany 
1970 73.3 NA 
1980 72.7 NA 
1985 73.8 NA 
1989 70.3 NA 
1991  71.6 65.7 
                                                
148 The concepts of “exit”, “voice” and “loyalty” were first developed in Hirschman 1978  
149 An exception to this is where the state makes use of its powers to extend coverage of an agreement to all 
employees in the sector. Usually, firms offer collectively bargained conditions also to non-unionised workers. 
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1993  63.3 60.0 
1998 64.8 32.2 
2003 59.0 21.0 
2004 57.6 18.1 
Source: Hassel (1999b: Table 7) and Streeck (2003: Table 3) .Data for 2003 from Schnabel (2005 186) data for 
2004 from Silvia and Schroeder (2007: 1440-1). NA: not applicable. 
 
 Dissatisfaction with sectoral bargaining is the main reason why firms leave their 
association. In a survey among firms that had left their association, 75 per cent of the 
responding firms cited dissatisfaction with collective agreements as their main reason to 
resign150 (Schroeder and Ruppert 1996: 327). The organization l strength of employer 
associations is thus a good indicator of the extent of employer support for sectoral bargaining 
institutions. Precise membership data are only published by Gesamtmetall, the peak employer 
association for metalworking. With metalworking being the core of German manufacturing 
industry, Gesamtmetall is also the largest sectoral employer association and plays a leading 
role in the collective bargaining system, where the m talworking sector acts as a pattern-
setter151.  
The development of its employee density rate, the percentage of sectoral employees 
working in an organized firm, shows a substantial decline in organizational strength since the 
mid-1980s. At that time, employee density peaked at 74 per cent. Since then, employee 
density declined to 58 per cent in the West and 18 per cent the East (see table 9.3 below). 
Organizational density in West German metalworking has thus declined by 16 per cent within 
two decades. Organizational strength is much lower in Eastern Germany, where many firms 
left their associations after the first few years following unification, or, in the case of newly 
established firms, decided not to join an employer association from the outset. 
 The decline in employers’ willingness to participate in sectoral bargaining is evident in 
the development of bargaining coverage rates. According to a yearly survey among 16,000 
firms done by the IAB – the research institute of the National Employment Agency -  
                                                
150 34 per cent mentioned dissatisfaction with associati n services and 37 per cent mentioned high membership 
fees. Multiple answers were possible. 
151 It is estimated that Gesamtmetall alone contributes about 50 per cent to the budget of the national employer 
federation BDA (Grote et al. 2007: 168-70). Due to its financial strength it therefore also has a great say in the 
peak federation’s policymaking. 
 
 270 
coverage by sectoral agreements has declined by about 15 per cent in West Germany between 
1995 and 2006 (see chart 9.2 below). About 40 percent of all employees in the West, and bout 
60 per cent in the East, are not covered by sectoral c llective agreements anymore.152 This 
decline in bargaining coverage is the result of changes in employer strategies, increasingly 
unwilling to put up with the constraints of social compromise. The declining coverage rate 
shows that an increasing share of German firms is not backing the ‘German model’ anymore. 





65 63 63 63 62 61 59 57
53
49 49 48




















Employee Coverage West Workplace Coverage West
 
Note:  
Employee coverage: percentage of all employees covered by sectoral collective agreements 
Workplace coverage: percentage of all workplaces covered by sectoral agreements 
Source: Schnabel 2005: 190 (Fig.3) and Ellguth and Kohaut 2008: 515  based on data form the IAB 
establishment survey (IAB Betriebspanel). 
 
 The likelihood of firms abandoning sectoral bargaining is structured by firm size and 
union strength. Studies by Schnabel and Wagner and by Ruppert and Schroeder have shown 
that the likelihood of firms resigning from their association is disproportionately high among 
smaller firms, firms with a low level of workforce unionization and firms with low strike risks 
(Schnabel and Wagner 1996; Schnabel 2005; Schroeder an  Ruppert 1996: 316-8; Schroeder 
2002: 72). Larger firms and firms with a high unionization rate are those most likely to 
remain organized. One of the main reasons for firms to be a member of an employer 
                                                
152 In addition, also the representation of employees by works councils has declined over time. Whereas in 1981, 
50 per cent of all employees in the private sector were represented by a works council, this number has declined 




association is their interest in industrial peace, protected by the peace obligation of the 
signatory unions, and the protection against the costs f industrial conflict by the associations’ 
strike insurance funds. Firms need to balance these advantages of sectoral bargaining with the 
constraints imposed on them by sectoral agreements. The declining bargaining coverage rates 
indicate that the share of firms that sees the benefits as outweighing the costs is declining.  
Table 9.4 Coverage by collective agreements (2003) 




















% of firms 42.6 20.9 2.7 5.0 54.7 74.1 
% of 
employees 
62.1 42.6 7.6 11.4 30.3 46.0 
Source: Schnabel 2005: Table 2  
 The relationship between firm size and propensity towards collective bargaining has 
inverted over time. While during the late 19th century, sectors dominated by small firms were 
the first ones to accept collective bargaining, small firms are today those most likely to resign 
from collective bargaining. The larger propensity of smaller firms to stay out of sectoral 
collective bargaining is evident from comparing therates for employee density with those for 
firm density (see table 9.4 above). Small firms have become increasingly dissatisfied with the 
wage policies of their associations, which is shaped by the larger members, as voting rights in 
employer associations are linked to firm size. The differences between small and large firms 
in respect to collective bargaining appear to result from differential capacities to deal with 
intensified cost competition and rising labor costs.153 
 Large manufacturing firms have tended to respond t intensified cost competition by 
passing on the cost pressures to their supplier firms, as a study by Silvia and Schroeder shows 
(Silvia and Schroeder 2007: 1445-6). To illustrate th ir argument these authors cite a practice 
by Jose Ignacio Lopez, a leading purchasing manager in the car industry, who, with each 
renegotiation of a supplier contract demanded that t e supplier cut prices by at least 25 per 
cent, whereby non-compliant firms would lose the business (Silvia and Schroeder 2007: 1445; 
s.a. Streeck and Hassel 2003: 110). By shifting pressure to suppliers, large manufacturing 
                                                
153 The rising labor costs are not so much the result of radical wage demands by unions, or employer associati ns 
agreeing to overly generous wage agreements, but most of all the result of rising non-wage labor costs ( ee Table 
9.2 above). 
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firms managed to deal with intensifying cost competition and rising labor costs. Smaller 
supplier firms, however, had difficulties to keep uwith the rising cost pressures and saw 
abandoning collective bargaining as the only way to reduce labor costs (Thelen and 
Wijnbergen 2003: 870). Schroeder and Silvia thus conclude that “greatly intensified cost and 
quality pressures in the wake of globalization [are] the main explanation for the overall 
decline of membership in German employers associatins and the disproportionately large 
drop in SME density” (Silvia and Schroeder 2007: 1446). 
The Associations’ Responses to Bargaining Exit 
Employer associations responded to these new challenges in two ways. First, they tried to 
reform the bargaining system by decentralizing bargaining competencies and making 
regulations more flexible, in order to ease the constraints on individual firms. Second, they 
introduced new membership categories that allowed firms to stay out from sectoral bargaining 
altogether, without resigning from their association completely. Employers were the driving 
force behind reforms aimed at more decentralized and more flexible bargaining arrangements. 
So-called “hardship clauses” and “opening clauses” have been included in sectoral 
agreements, with the intention to provide more scope for plant-level deviations (Hassel 
1999b: 496-98). They allow local management and works councils to agree on deviations 
from sectoral standards. Hardship clauses were introduced in East Germany for use by firms 
in temporary economic difficulties. According to these clauses, firms can apply to the 
bargaining parties for permissions to deviate, whereby they need to obtain the consent of both 
bargaining parties to be allowed to deviate from standard conditions (see also section II 
above).  
 Opening clauses are not limited for use by firms in financial difficulties but are 
intended for more general and less conditional use.Th y often form the basis for plant-level 
“employment pacts” between management and workforce, wh reby deviations from sectoral 
standards are exchanged against job or investment guarantees (Rehder 2003). The intention of 
opening clauses is thus to introduce more plant-level flexibility into sectoral collective 
agreements and to ease regulatory constraints on individual firms. Typical measures 
introduced by way of opening clauses are greater woking time flexibility, lower 
compensation for overtime work or temporary undercutting of sectoral wage standards to 
prevent layoffs or a relocation of production (Silvia and Schroeder 2007: 1452). According to 
Bispinck and Schulten, about one third of all covered firms make use of some forms of 
bargained deviations from sectoral standards (Bispinck and Schulten 2003).  
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 The decentralization of bargaining through hardship and opening clauses, and the use 
of plant-level “employment pacts,” indicates a strengthening of the employer side. As 
economic globalization has made exit threats by firms more credible, management can now 
more effectively put pressure on labor to make concessions. This pressure can be exercised 
more effectively on the plant-level than on the sectoral level, because of the greater 
vulnerability of individual plants to job cuts or relocation of investments.154 Consequently, the 
decentralization of bargaining competencies is typically accompanied by “concession 
bargaining” between plant management and works councils. Promises by management 
concerning plant-specific investments or job guarantees are linked to concessions by the 
works council, such as wage cuts or more flexible working time. As a consequence of these 
plant-level employment pacts wages and working conditions are becoming more diverse 
across firms, and the capacity of sectoral agreements to set uniform wages and working 
conditions erodes. Employers do, however, tend to find the decentralizing measures 
introduced so far as insufficient and promote furthe  flexibility (Silvia and Schroeder 2007: 
1452). 
 Local concession bargaining means that concessions are now made by labor, and not 
to labor. Plant-level concession bargaining indicates a declining ability or willingness of 
individual firms to oblige with sectoral standards. An increasing number of firms appears to 
be unable or unwilling to cope with the institutional constraints of sectoral bargaining and is 
seeking plant-level deviations that take into account the specific circumstances of the plant. 
Even so, the decentralizing clauses that have been introduced appear to have been insufficient 
to stop bargaining exit. In East Germany many firms have decided to openly violate the terms 
and conditions of collective agreements in order to av id massive labor shedding, often with 
the tacit consent of the works council (Hassel 1999b: 4 8-90; Thelen 2001: 83). Not all of the 
decentralization is thus happening within the framework of existing bargaining institutions. It 
is also happening outside, by firms violating sectoral agreements or resigning from sectoral 
bargaining entirely. As the epigraph to this chapter shows, this practice was even explicitly 
approved by BDI president Henkel in a press interview. The intensifying demands from firms 
for more plant-level flexibility in wage setting and working time arrangements puts the 
employer associations under pressure to strive for even greater decentralization of collective 
bargaining, if they want to avoid a further erosion of bargaining coverage. 
                                                
154 See Menz 2005 and Raess 2006  for similar arguments 
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 In addition to decentralizing collective bargaining, employer associations have also 
tried to stop the erosion of organizational strength by developing new categories of 
membership that do not oblige firms to stick to sectoral agreements. Firms can now normally 
be a member in an employer association without having to accept collective bargaining. These 
“opted out-members,” or so-called “OT members” (“ ohne Tarifbindung”), enjoy access to the 
various services offered by associations to their members, such as legal advice, but are not 
bound to obey the sectoral agreements signed by the association. In turn, they are also not 
covered by the association’s strike insurance funds and have to bear the costs of industrial 
conflicts in their plants on their own.  
 The employer associations developed OT membership categories in response to rising 
dissatisfaction among members with the results of sector-level bargaining (Haipeter and 
Schilling 2005: 176-7). They tend to be used, in particular, by firms that are under severe cost 
pressure and where the strike threat is low. In metalworking about one quarter of all firms are 
OT members, whereby these firms employ about 10 per cent of all employees (Silvia and 
Schroeder 2007: 1453). The East German employer associ tions, confronted with particularly 
strong member losses (see Table 9.3), have been the pion ers of OT memberships. In many 
associations in East Germany a majority of members has opted out of sectoral bargaining.  
Some associations are even actively encouraging their m mbers to opt out from 
sectoral bargaining, such as, for instance, the Association of Saxon Metal Employers155 
(VSME), the largest employer association in East Germany (Raess 2006: 462). According to 
the VSME, only about 4 per cent of the metalworking firms in its region are covered by 
sectoral agreements, whereby these firms employ 17 per cent of the sectoral workforce 
(VSME 2007: 1). VSME president Bodo Finger declared in 2007 that “[a]bout 93 per cent of 
our firms live in a world without sectoral collective agreements and are very successful by 
doing so, as the growth in turnover, exports and jobs proves” (VSME 2007: 1).  
 In addition to stopping member exits, employer associations are using bargaining opt-
outs also as a tool to put pressure on the unions to moderate their demands, by threatening the 
unions with a further decline in bargaining coverag in the case of an unsatisfactory 
agreement. In short, the introduction of OT membership categories is a response by employer 
associations to growing opposition among some of their members to sectoral bargaining. OT 
membership has led to a partial decoupling of the organizational self-interests of employer 
associations from collective bargaining institutions. With the help of OT memberships 
                                                
155 According to the VSME, the share of Saxon metalworking and electro-technical firms still covered by the 
sectoral agreement with the IG Metall was about 4 per cent in 2006, whereby these firms employed about 17 per 
cent of all sectoral employees (VSME 2007: 1). 
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employer associations can kill two birds with one stone: they can arrest the hemorrhage of 
members and, at the same time, increase pressure on nions to make concessions. 
9.V Discussion 
During the 1990s, German employers became a driving force for institutional transformation. 
Rather than defending existing institutions and policies against radical reform initiatives, as 
some arguments predict, they became one of the mainprotagonists of institutional change in 
welfare state politics and industrial relations. Dissatisfied with the slow progress of welfare 
state reform, the priority of employers shifted from participation in consensus-oriented 
corporatist policy-making towards public campaigning and opinion formation, aimed at 
welfare state retrenchment and reductions in non-wage l bor costs and tax burdens. This 
constitutes a remarkable change compared to previous decades, when employers to a large 
extent accepted social policies as an important conribution to social peace. Moreover, large 
firms often used social policies to facilitate the peaceful shedding of older workers, like long-
term unemployment insurance or disability pensions. This practice provided them also with 
an economic interest in the continuation of this policies. Over time, however, the resulting 
rise in non-wage labor costs made employers increasingly skeptical towards this practice and 
contributed to a paradigm shift towards welfare state cost containment. Today, employers’ 
demands for cost-cutting measures include also the systematic closing down of pathways to 
early retirement (BDA 2009: 13).  
Employers did not strive for the outright abolition f the institutions of the German 
model, the Bismarckian welfare state and the dual system of industrial relations. Instead, they 
tried to transform the German model form within, a tr nsformation that aimed at outcomes 
that were more market-oriented and less costly for employers. In contrast to what the VoC 
approach predicts, the business federations, together with the free market-oriented Free 
Democrats (FDP), belonged to the most forceful protag nists of market-liberalizing 
institutional change. There is little empirical evidence of labor market liberalizing or welfare 
retrenching reform initiatives that employers had opp sed. In general, employers welcomed 
liberalizing reform initiatives, such as the Hartz reforms, but insisted on the need for further-
going reform efforts. 
Throughout the 1990s, employers’ political efforts were single-mindedly focused on 
reducing non-wage labor costs and tax burdens on business by way of welfare cuts and the 
general downsizing of public expenditures. These demands imply also greater scope for 
 276 
market solutions, such as, for instance, the BDA’s proposal for mandatory private care 
insurance and proposals for a greater role of private pensions (see section III above), as well 
as measures to re-commodify the unemployed by way of making unemployment benefit 
entitlements more restrictive and tightening the work bligations of the unemployed. In 
industrial relations, employers pushed for decentralization and deregulation within the 
existing institutional framework of the dual model. While these demands do clearly not 
amount to an outright abolition of the institutions of the German model, they nevertheless aim 
at a substantially more market-oriented political-economic order, with greater divergence in 
wages and working conditions and a less redistributive welfare state. 
 The radicalization of employers’ reform demands was accompanied by a turn away 
from the post-war model of social compromise at the political level. While in industrial 
relations employer associations still tried to achieve reforms by way of negotiations with 
labor unions and works councils, at the political level they moved away from compromise-
oriented policy making. Attempts to forge corporatist compromises on welfare state and labor 
market reforms through the Alliance for Jobs talks that the government initiated were half-
hearted and essentially came to naught. Employers wlcomed the subsequent shift by the 
government to unilateral reforms through the Hartz committee and the Agenda 2010 reform 
program, which intended to neutralize the unions as veto players. The fact that no 
compromise between unions and employers in the Alliance for Jobs could be found indicates 
that employers are not content anymore with incremental adjustments to existing policies and 
institutions, but are instead aiming at more far-reaching reforms. Employers came to realize 
that these type of reforms could not be achieved by wa  of social compromise. Instead, they 
realized that they needed to take more assertive stances and seek political confrontation 
through public campaigning. 
 The turn to political confrontation aimed ultimately at changing public opinion and the 
thinking of elite policy-makers by impressing the importance of market-oriented reforms on 
them. Through public campaigning and media statements mployers consistently pushed the 
Standortdebatte, often relying on exit threats and the challenges of international competition 
to make their case for market-oriented and cost-cutting reforms. This reflects a new political 
strategy, one which differs from the strategy of political accommodation of the post-war 
period. Rather than relying solely on negotiations a d participation in corporatist decision-
making, employers increasingly tried to shape public debate in order to ease political 
constraints in the electoral arena. Employers came to realize that electoral support for ‘big 
government’ constituted a major constraint on the kind of market-oriented reforms they were 
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aiming at. Easing these constraints could not be achieved by way of seeking political 
compromises with other actors, but required an effort to change public opinion.  
  The radicalization in employer positions and strategies was fuelled by conflicts 
between small and large firms. Smaller firms typically have fewer capacities to deal with 
rising competitive pressures and do, therefore, consider the constraints imposed by collective 
bargaining and welfare state programmes more of a burden than larger firms. Moreover, they 
have also fewer opportunities to make use of social policies to facilitate peaceful labor 
shedding. While in the past big industry tended to dominate decision-making within the 
employer associations,  the increasing dissatisfacton of smaller firms required the 
associations also to pay more attention to their smaller members. This is most evident in the 
field of collective bargaining. During the 1990s, small firms tended to leave sectoral 
bargaining institutions. Large firms, in contrast, tended to remain loyal to sectoral bargaining 
and push for decentralization and flexibilization within the existing institutional framework. 
Under pressure from dissatisfied smaller members, the employer associations decided to 
introduce bargaining opt-outs, which, in effect, facilitated the further erosion of sectoral 
bargaining. Rather than defending sectoral bargaining institutions, in which they clearly have 
an organizational self-interest, the employer associati ns had thus to accept their erosion.  
Conclusions 
During the 1990s, German employers became increasingly dissatisfied with important 
components of the German model, in particular the siz  of the welfare state and the regulatory 
constraints created by sectoral bargaining. Rather t an defending existing institutions and 
policies against deregulatory reform initiatives, they turned into protagonists of such reforms. 
This change in employer politics took several forms. First, it took the form of an 
intensification of opinion formation efforts and public campaigning in favor of market-
liberalizing and cost-cutting reforms, underpinned by the so-called Standortdebatte. Second, 
employers tended to withdraw from institutions of scial compromise at the political level. 
Government attempts to forge corporatist reform compro ises through the Alliance for Jobs, 
for instance, come to naught, in part because employers’ confidence in social compromise had 
eroded and negotiations had therefore been half-hearted.  
Third, in industrial relations, employer associations still relied on institutions of social 
compromise, but many smaller firms tended to defect rom it, either by leaving sectoral 
bargaining or by not complying with agreements, leading to the shrinking of the German 
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model of industrial relations. The emergence of inter al differences between small and large 
firms contributed to the associations’ turn away from political accommodation and forced 
them to pay closer attention to member interests. Under pressure in particular from smaller 
members the employer associations introduced bargainin  opt-outs and tried to decentralize 
collective bargaining functions. Both measures did,in effect, contribute to an erosion of the 
sectoral bargaining model, rather than bolstering it. These changes do clearly not aim at the 
outright dismantling of the existing welfare state and industrial relations institutions, but 
nevertheless at a considerably more liberal politica -economic order, with a less redistributive 
welfare state and less restrictive regulations of wages and working conditions. 
 I have argued that this change in employer politics resulted from the interaction of 
international and domestic changes. Intensified competitive pressures, caused by 
globalization, met with a domestic reform deadlock, aused by the electoral popularity of 
existing policies. Global competition made employers p ioritize labor cost reductions more 
than in the past, while at the same time paths to cost- utting welfare retrenchment appeared to 
be blocked for political reasons. The concessions that social compromise required from 
employers came, therefore, to be increasingly at odds with what they thought to be able to 
afford in the context of global competition. At the same time, and different from the post-war 
period, employers could now afford to subordinate th ir interest in social peace to their 
interest in lower labor costs. Their heightened ability n a globalized economy to rely on 
credible exit threats resulted in a more accommodati nis  approach by labor and meant that 
employers had to rely less on political accommodatin themselves. Through plant-level 
“employment pacts”, for instance, employers could gain concessions from labor, without 
jeopardizing social peace. 
The findings in this chapter put into question arguments that see German employers as 
active defenders of the existing labor market and welfare state institutions. Rather than 
fighting against reform initiatives by other actors, employers have themselves become 
protagonists of reform. To the extent that German firms perceive institutions and polices to be 
in their genuine interest, we should expect them to oppose reforms that retrench or transform 
these policies and institutions. However, there is little evidence of market-oriented or 
deregulatory reform initiatives that employers had opposed. In general, employers have 
become protagonists of market-oriented reforms, rathe  than defenders of the existing system. 
This constitutes a remarkable change to the post-war period, during which employers largely 
accepted existing institutions and policies as a necessary contribution to social peace. The 
interaction of domestic and international changes resulted in a change in employer priorities: 
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Social peace became much easier to maintain in a globalized economy, while the rise in labor 
costs, which was created in part by past policies to upport social peace and their intensified 
usage, raised the price employers had to pay.  Consequently, their priorities shifted from 






In capitalist societies capital possesses structural power due to its control over investments 
and production. How did capitalist societies manage to construct institutions that constrain 
capital’s control over economic outcomes given capital’s structural power? There are in 
principle two possible basic answers to this question. The conventional balance of class 
power argument explains this fact with the political strength of the labor movement and its 
parliamentary allies and its capacity to mobilize enough political power resources to 
compensate for the structural power of capital (Korpi 1983; Huber and Stephens 2001). While 
this has for some time been the dominant explanatory approach to welfare state development, 
since the 1990s it has been increasingly challenged by a new approach that agues that the 
successful construction of market-correcting policies and institutions was not so much the 
result of labor power subduing capital power, but was, instead, promoted by capital itself, thus 
questioning the explanatory relevance of the labor power argument. This later argument has 
become known as the cross-class coalition thesis. Isabela Mares, one of the protagonists of 
this new argument, claims that “[u]nder some conditions, firms support the enactment of a 
new social policy, not out of altruism or generosity, but out of self-interest” (Mares 2003a: 
250). In this view, market-correcting policies reflect not the weakness, but the strength of 
capital interests. 
 The argument put forward in thesis has challenged th  cross-class coalition thesis on 
empirical and theoretical grounds. The cross-class coalition argument has some prima facie 
plausibility given that employer associations, the representatives of capital interests in the 
domain of social and labor market policies, have histor cally often consented to specific social 
policies. As this thesis has shown, employers have in general neither actively advocated 
market-correcting social and labor market policies nor adamantly opposed them. Instead, they 
have often accepted specific reform proposals that have been put on the agenda by other 
actors. The cross-class coalition argument, however, misspecifies the preferences of 
employers, that is, it misinterprets the reasons why employers have consented to these 
reforms and thereby misunderstands the causal role of employer behavior in welfare state 
development. This concluding chapter highlights the main findings and themes of this thesis 
and tries to strengthen the argument that employer’s consent to welfare state expansion 
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reflects an accommodation to political constraints rather than a genuine preference for social 
policies rooted in economic interests. 
 The cross-class coalition thesis suggests that employers’ consent to the formation of 
welfare state policies reflected genuine economic interests. In her study, Mares, for instance, 
identifies the interests of firms in skill formation and the redistribution of social risks across 
different categories of firms as the most important f ctors explaining the support of specific 
groups of employers for social and labor market policies (Mares 2003a: 249-255). This thesis 
has put forward an alternative explanation, which highlights political motivations and political 
context as crucial factors explaining employers’ consent to welfare state policies. Employers 
have consented to welfare state policies not becaus they wanted to design an institutional and 
policy framework that is beneficial to economic production and labor productivity but 
because they realized that the alternatives on the ag nda would have constrained 
entrepreneurial freedom even more. This fact has important theoretical implications because it 
puts into question the independent causal role of employers as promoters of welfare state 
development. Consequently, the role of employers in welfare state development cannot be 
understood appropriately without taking into account the historical political context within 
which they have made their choices. 
 The thesis has highlighted, in particular, two types of motivations for employers to 
consent to welfare state and industrial relations policies. First, a political interest in defeating 
challenges to the existing capitalist order and industrialists’ control over production, which 
led to a politics of pacification that involved concessions to labor on social and lbor market 
policy issues. Second, an interest in maintaining influence on government elites in the policy-
making process has compelled employers to cooperate in the planning of reforms, when they 
perceived the chances of stopping a reform project entirely as weak. This is what I call the 
politics of containment. Politics of containment aims at limiting the negative impact of new 
social policies on firms, most notably in terms of labor costs. In contrast to outright 
opposition to a planned policy, cooperation promised the prospect of influencing important 
details of planned reform projects in the interest of employers. Cooperation presupposes  the 
acceptance of the basic political goals of reformers. The importance of these two goals and 
strategies, pacification and containment, made the formation of cross-class alliances difficult, 




Table 10.1 Summary of Employer Goals in Key Reform Projects 
Bismarck’s social reforms - social pacification to s abilize the existing political-economic order 
- suppressing labor unions and social democracy 
- overcoming a disliked policy legacy (employers’ liability legislation) 
- limiting cost impact of planned reforms on industry 
Collective bargaining before World War I - preventing strikes where suppressing organized labor not possible 
- limiting wage competition 
Stinnes-Legien agreement - social pacification to prevent social revolution and collectivization * 
ensure orderly economic demobilization 
- retraction of concessions once political situation stabilized 
1927 Unemployment Insurance - improving work incentives by overcoming unfavorable policy legacy 
(unemployment assistance) 
- influencing relevant details of an unstoppable reform by cooperating in 
the policy-making process 
- ensuring employer influence in the governance of the new programme 
1945/1948 social insurance reforms - opposition to a shift from a Bismarckian to a universal social insurance 
system 
- no “politics of containment” necessary as no political majority for this 
reform 
1950/1951 Codetermination Laws - strong opposition to parity codetermination  
- reluctant cooperation in policy-making under pressure by Adenauer 
- no politics of containment / employers lost 
1957 Pension reform - cost containment 
- drafting of alternative plan to limit cost effects  
- politics of containment unsuccessful / employers lost 
1990s social policy - Cost containment through public campaigning 
- Turn away from social compromise and accommodation  
1990s industrial relations - Decentralization and flexibilisation through negotiations with unions 
- Collective bargaining exit by smaller firms 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The thesis has linked these two types of motivations, pacification and accommodation, 
to historical periodisation, whereby the goals of employers changed with the changes in the 
political challenges they faced. The thesis has found that, initially, in the Wilhelmine Empire 
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and in the aftermath of World War I, social pacificat on had been the dominant motivation for 
industrial employers to consent to social and labor ma ket policies. With the transformation of 
the labor movement from a revolutionary to a reformist force, containing planned reform 
initiatives became the dominant goal of employers. Social pacification receded into the 
background, but remained a relevant consideration. The table below summarizes the main 
goals pursued by industrial employers in the individual reform projects analyzed in this thesis. 
 
10.I Employers’ Politics of Pacification 
Bismarck’s social reforms in the 1880s and the Stinnes-Legien agreement, signed in 1918, are 
the two reforms that were shaped most clearly by the politics of pacification. In both cases, 
industry used social pacification as a tool to try to maintain its powerful position in society. 
The introduction of social insurance by Bismarck resulted from an alliance between the state 
elites and the politically influential heavy industry. Both perceived the emerging social 
democratic labor movement as a revolutionary threat. The authoritarian “master in my own 
house” standpoint dominated within heavy industry, which was the dominant sector of 
industry during the Wilhelmine Empire (1871-1918). The heavy industry was opposed to 
granting workers any participation rights, whether within the firm or in politics, and resorted 
to occupational social benefits to pacify workers. It is thus no coincidence that support for 
social insurance was strongest in that sector of industry that was also most hostile to the 
emerging socialist labor movement. Support for social insurance appears to have been more 
fragmented in the manufacturing industries, which mere more willing to recognize labor 
unions, but these sectors were still very small during the 1880s.  
 The salience of social pacification to heavy industry was amplified by the existing 
employers’ liability legislation for work injuries. This liability legislation contributed to the 
aggravation of class conflicts and had fuelled the labor movement because it required injured 
workers to go to court against their employer to gain compensation for injuries. Heavy 
industry, were the incidence of work injuries was high, had a particular interest in replacing 
employers’ liability obligations with a public work injury insurance scheme, which promised 
to eliminate an important source of class conflict and union agitation by shifting responsibility 
for compensation to the state. Political lobbying by the heavy industry focused thus also 
primarily on the issue of work injury insurance, and much less on the other programmes 
initiated by the government (health insurance and disability and old-age pensions).  
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 Work injury insurance was, in fact, one of the very few social policy programmes in 
the history of German welfare state development whose introduction was actively promoted 
by industrial employers, rather than merely accepted. In a highly exceptional way, industry 
had acted as an agenda-setter in the case of work injury insurance. All other major reforms 
had been put on the agenda by other political actors, and not by industry. This “outlier” 
position is explained by the problematic effects of the existing liability law for industrial 
employers. This law was generally considered inadequate by all major political actors. The 
alternative to work injury insurance that was on the political agenda, advocated by the social 
democrats and part of the state elites, consisted of a tightening of liability laws and new rules 
concerning worker protection. This alternative programme, though also informed by a 
strategy of social pacification, was adamantly opposed by the heavy industry as an 
unacceptable interference in the internal organization of firms. Industry’s strong opposition to 
worker protection laws also indicates that its support for work injury insurance was not 
motivated by a concern for labor productivity, which is clearly harmed by work injuries, but 
by the conflict-ridden practice of liability lawsuits that resulted from the existing liability law. 
 Bismarck’s social reforms are neither well explained by the labor power thesis nor by 
the cross-class coalition thesis. The political strength of the labor movement during the 1880s 
was still relatively weak, compared to later periods. Anti-socialist laws kept the social 
democrats weak. In 1887, the SPD gained only 10 per cent of the votes and held 2.8 per cent 
of the seats in the national parliament (DHM 2008). Social democrats and labor unions were 
not involved in the policy-making process. The heavy industry was politically powerful and 
formed a close alliance with Bismarck and the state elites. Industrialists controlled labor 
relations in their firms unrestrained by state regulations or unions. The government’s turn to 
trade protectionism in 1979 shielded the German heavy industry from international 
competition. Domestically, the formation of large cartels and production syndicates prevented 
competition. The political and economic power of the heavy industry was arguably at an all-
time high in the 1880s. Bismarck’s social reforms were thus neither the result of objective 
changes in the balance of class power, nor were they the straightforward result of the material 
interests of capitalists.  
 Instead, the introduction of social insurance was the product of conservative social 
reformers within the government bureaucracy, who were supported by dominant groups of 
industrialists. Their paramount motivation was to defend the existing power structure and 
prevent a social revolution by suppressing the socialist labor movement. What motivated the 
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Bismarckian social reforms was not so much the objectiv  political strength of the labor 
movement, but rather its perceived threat to the existing political-economic order. The 
granting of social rights to workers was intended to prevent them from claiming political 
rights. The cross-class coalition thesis is thus right when claiming that dominant groups of 
German industrialists had supported the introduction of social insurance, but it misrepresents 
the preferences behind their support. Social pacificat on and consolidation of power, rather 
than managerial interests in skill formation and labor productivity, were the underlying 
preferences. 
 Social pacification again motivated concessions by industry to labor after World War 
I. Defeated in the war, the Wilhelmine Empire collapsed in November 1918 and industrialists 
were confronted with the threat of an imminent social revolution by a worker movement that 
was inspired by the Soviet revolution in Russia one year before. An agreement signed 
between major industrialists and moderate labor union leaders in November 1918 included 
far-reaching concessions to labor, such as the eight-hour working day, recognition of labor 
unions, sectoral collective bargaining, works councils and parity-based arbitration bodies. 
This agreement became known as the Stinnes-Legien ar ement. 
 The character of social pacification in the Stinnes-L gien agreement differed from the 
introduction of social insurance in the 1880s. While during the 1880s, social pacification was 
directed against the socialist labor movement as such, the Stinnes-Legien agreement was 
directed more narrowly against revolutionary elements within it. Under the impression of the 
revolutionary threat, industrialists now, for the first time, cooperated politically with union 
leaders, including both social democratic and Christian democratic union leaders. At the same 
time, the role of the state had changed fundamentally. While during the 1880s, social 
pacification was the result of an alliance between a conservative state elite and industry, now, 
as the old regime had collapsed, industry could not rely on its old ally anymore. Instead, 
industry now turned to moderate labor union leaders fo  help against radicalized elements 
within the labor movement. The kind of concessions ffered to labor now had to be different: 
to gain the cooperation of the labor unions, social benefits were not enough. What were now 
needed, instead, were participation rights for the labor unions (Reichert 1919).  
 The shift in the types of concessions offered in tur  for social pacification also reflects 
the changes in the sectoral composition of German industry. The rise of the more liberal 
manufacturing industries since the late 19th century onwards had begun to challenge the 
political leadership role of the conservative heavy industry. For the heavy industrialists any 
form of cooperation with labor unions had always been an absolute no-no. In contrast, some 
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other sectors (construction, printing and timber, in particular) had already started to bargain 
with unions before World War I. As shown in chapter 2, these differences resulted primarily 
from sectoral differences in union strength and vulnerability to strike action. The leading 
protagonists behind the Stinnes-Legien agreement came from the manufacturing industries, 
rather than from the heavy industry. Significant opp sition to the Stinnes-Legien agreement 
existed within industry and contributed to the collapse of cross-class cooperation a few years 
later, when the political situation had stabilized. It is also noteworthy that the agreement was 
initiated by a group of individual industrialists, and not by their associations. The two peak-
level industry federations (CDI and BdI) opposed the agreement (Feldman 1976: 339). 
 The establishment of institutions of social compromise and cooperation by the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement was not the result of far-sighted employers trying to design policies 
and institutions more attuned to the needs of industrial production. It was, instead, an d hoc 
response to the political uncertainty that characteized that historical moment. Some scholars 
have emphasized the dependence of German industry on specific skills as a reason for 
German industry’s support for the introduction of inst tutions of social compromise during 
this period. Gerald Feldman, for instance, has argued that the revolutionary situation in 1918 
merely brought about institutional changes that would have been unavoidable anyway given 
the structural shift in the German business community to the more progressive manufacturing 
sectors (Feldman 1976: 393-40). Cusack, Iversen and Soskice156 use the Stinnes-Legien 
agreement as an example to illustrate their argument that inclusionary institutions were 
adopted to protect investments in so-called co-specific skills (Cusack et al. 2007: 380). While 
it is correct that the manufacturing industries relied more on skilled labor than the heavy 
industry, the archival evidence does not provide any indications that the issue of  skill 
formation played a significant role in industry’s deliberations leading to the agreement (see 
chapter 4). Moreover, the collapse of class cooperation only a few years later speaks against 
the hypothesis of far-sighted industrialists trying to modernize the production regime. 
 The Stinnes-Legien agreement is one of the rare cas s of a cross-class alliance in the 
development of the German political economy.  It was an alliance between moderate forces 
on both sides of the class divide and was directed against revolutionary forces within the 
working class.  It was united by the joint goal of preventing a Soviet-type revolution under the 
control of the so-called “worker councilor movement” (Rätebewegung).157 Employers made 
far-reaching concessions to the labor unions to ensur  their cooperation in an orderly 
                                                
156 Building on work by Kathleen Thelen (Thelen 2004) 
157 This movement should not be confused with the institution of works councils within firms. 
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transition to a new political-economic order. This alliance was a historically contingent event 
that resulted from the extraordinary political and economic uncertainty that characterized the 
aftermath to World War I. Through collaboration with organized labor, industrialists expected 
to be able to reduce the uncertainty over the future development of Germany and prevent the 
collectivization of industry. The revolutionary situation had changed the options available to 
industry. Before the war, industry could rely on the state to secure a non-interventionist 
regime and had thus little need for political collaboration with labor. The revolutionary 
situation had changed that. The alliance was the result of a strategic accommodation of 
industrialists to a highly unfavorable context. Their acceptance of labor-inclusionary 
institutions, including works councils and parity-based arbitration committees, did not reflect 
genuine preferences for these institutions but was part of the strategic accommodation.  
10.II Employers’ Politics of Containment 
A second reason why employers accepted specific socal policies, in addition to their genuine 
preference for social pacification, is strategic: to support specific proposals in order to prevent 
other proposals that were also on the agenda from being chosen. Support for such proposals 
reflects lower-order preferences, that is, preferences for “lesser evil” outcomes. These 
preferences become the positions taken when the first order preference is realistically not 
available. Employers have often consented to specific re orms relatively late in the policy-
making process, when it became clear that the passing of the policy could not be prevented 
entirely. If this situation occurred, employers often decided to support the policy and 
cooperate in the drafting of the legislation in order to be able to influence important details in 
the interest of industry.  
 The process leading to the introduction of unemployment insurance is a clear case in 
point. The national employer federation (VDA) had consented to the introduction of 
unemployment insurance in 1927. This decision did not, however, result from a genuine 
preference for unemployment insurance, but was an adjustment to a changing political 
context. Employers’ support for unemployment insurance had not been clear-cut and 
consistent but had instead been wavering. In the Wilhelmine empire, when there was a clear 
parliamentary majority against unemployment insurance, employers had also been strongly 
opposed to unemployment insurance. Their key concern had been the suspected effects of 
unemployment insurance on work incentives. Unemployment insurance creates a reservation 
wage and was, for this reason, expected by industry to harm work incentives and reward the 
idle “work shirkers”.  
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 After the war the situation had changed in two respects. First, a political majority in 
favor of unemployment insurance had begun to materialize in the Weimar Republic. 
Continued opposition by employers threatened to undermine their influence in the policy-
making process. Participation in policy deliberations and negotiations allowed them to voice 
preferences over details they were particularly concer ed about in a way that fundamental 
opposition would not have allowed to. Second, the introduction of the programme of 
unemployment assistance in 1918 had changed the policy status quo in an unfavorable way. 
Unemployment assistance was a means-tested and flat-rate benefit, and was administrated by 
the municipalities. Employers had no control over who would receive unemployment 
assistance benefits and due to its universal, flat-rate character the programme harmed work 
incentives even more than unemployment insurance. Un mployment insurance, in contrast, 
was perceived as less harmful in terms of work incentiv s, because it is based on previous 
employment and earnings-related benefits, and does thus not threaten to benefit the so-called 
“work shirkers.” In addition, unemployment insurance gave employers a greater say over the 
usage of funds, as employers would be involved in the administration of the programme. 
 Strategic accommodation played a role in most instances of reform analyzed in this 
thesis, as employers were hardly ever able to get things their way completely. Even in the 
case of Bismarck’s social reforms strategic motivations played an important role. As 
mentioned above, dominant groups of industry did genuinely believe that the social insurance 
project would be necessary to pacify the working class. Thus, their support for social 
insurance was based on a genuine interest in social pacification. Nevertheless, industry’s 
decision to cooperate in the drafting of the social insurance legislation was also, in addition, 
motivated by strategic concerns of being able to influe ce important details of the planned 
reforms. One industry representative candidly remarked about a specific policy aspect that 
“resistance by industry would be to no avail, because the current general mood is now against 
industry, one would simply decide by ignoring industry” (Beutner in Baare 1880: 55, 
translated by TP). The overall goal of industry’s cooperation was to thereby make sure that 
benefit levels would be kept as low as possible and to limit increases in labor costs. Industry 
did however perceive its strategy of influence via cooperation as not sufficiently effective and 
did, over time, become more reluctant to go along with Bismarck’s plans (see also chapter 
3.III).  
 Industry also sought to contain social policy expansion by presenting alternative 
proposals, in situations where the political debate moved into a direction unfavorable to 
 290 
industry. Such proposals often had the character of a compromise between industry’s own 
preferences and other proposals on the agenda. A characteristic case in point is the so-called 
“dynamisation” of pension benefits in 1957. This refo m included the automatic indexation of 
pensions to gross wage development, something that was firmly opposed by industry. The 
BDA presented an alternative proposal that was based on discretionary pension increases 
based on decisions by an expert committee. This proposal did not, however, succeed (see 
chapter 7, section III). 
  A similar example is provided by the introduction f public long-term care insurance 
in 1994. This reform was also strongly opposed by industry because of its effects on labor 
costs. Relatively late in the policy-making process, the BDA came up with its own alternative 
proposal for long-term care insurance. This proposal consisted of mandatory private insurance 
on a pre-funded basis for most of the population. The BDA model did not succeed in this case 
either. These examples show that proposals launched by employer associations often do not 
reflect their genuine preferences, but their strategic calculations of which policy option has 
the highest chances of success in a given situation. Employers’ support for specific policy 
options cannot be taken as evidence for the proposition that employers had been active 
supporters of social policy expansion. Even when their policy proposals had been 
expansionary, as in the two examples mentioned above, their intention had been to limit social 
policy expansion. When they made such expansionary social policy proposals, they often did 
so in the face of proposals of other actors that were even more expansionary, and not because 
of a genuine preference for expansion. 
 In addition to accommodating to the policy choices on the agenda, German employers 
have also often changed their policy positions in response to the introduction of new policies. 
New policies alter the policy status quo, the set of existing policies, against which employers 
need to evaluate the value of any alternative policy option. The case of unemployment 
insurance discussed above illustrates this point. Before the introduction of unemployment 
assistance industry did strongly oppose unemployment insurance. The introduction of 
unemployment assistance had weakened resistance among employers to unemployment 
insurance, because unemployment assistance turned the policy status quo more unfavorable to 
employers. Similarly, industry’s promotion of work injury insurance in 1880/81 resulted 
primarily from the problems created by the old liability legislation, introduced in 1871, and 
the aggravation of class conflicts that it was perceived to have fuelled. Changes in the policy 
status quo can thus also change the policy goals pursued by political actors. 
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 Employers’ choice for strategic accommodation to the political situation results from 
the necessity of their associations to strike a balance between the preferences of their 
members and their interest in gaining and cultivating political influence, most importantly 
through contacts to the government bureaucracy. Their publicly taken positions can thus not 
be taken as an accurate representation of their underlying genuine preferences, but need to be 
seen in the political context. Philip Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck have coined the concepts 
logic of membership and logic of influence to capture this tension between representing 
member interests and exercising influence (Schmitter and Streeck 1981). As these two authors 
argue, business interest groups need to take into acc unt both logics in order to be effective 
mediators between their members and the political system. Influence requires cooperation 
with interlocutors, which requires a certain accommodation to the interlocutor’s goals. For 
this reason it is important to be cautious about inferring genuine preferences from observable 
political behavior. If an actor’s support for a specific policy is strategic than the support is 
endogenous to the policy-making process and can thus not serve as the principal component 
of a causal explanation of that policy.  
10.III Codetermination: The Limits to Pacification and Accommodation 
In all but one of the policy cases analyzed in thisesis did employers accommodate their 
policy demands to the political context. This one exception is co-determination. It is therefore 
important to compare this case with the other cases nd look what made codetermination 
different.  
Employers had adamantly opposed the introduction of parity co-determination in the 
early post-war period, even at the clear risk of being defeated. They did not offer concessions, 
as the strategic accommodation thesis allows us to predict, but did instead decide to openly 
fight the introduction of codetermination. Only reluctantly, and under strong pressure from 
Chancellor Adenauer, did employer representatives in 1950/51 consent to take part in 
negotiations leading to the institutionalization of parity codetermination in the heavy industry. 
Industry and its parliamentary allies managed to prevent the extension of parity 
codetermination to sectors outside the heavy industry, which became instead governed by a 
weaker form of codetermination that was acceptable to industry. Even after the passing of the 
codetermination laws (1951/52) industry continued to campaign strongly against 
codetermination, though, in practice, most firms did comply with the laws and did not 
obstruct their implementation. In the 1970s, the BDA challenged the constitutionality of 
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codetermination in court, indicating the continued salience of the issue to industry (see 
Chapter 8.II). 
 The case of codetermination indicates the limits of social pacification and strategic 
accommodation. As shown in chapter eight, industrial employers considered labor union 
demands for parity co-determination as an attack on private capital ownership. For 
industrialists, ‘economic democracy’ constituted a piecemeal programme intended to lead to 
collectivization and a centrally planned economy under the control of union functionaries. 
Co-determination was perceived as communism in disguise, so to speak. In particular, 
industry feared to lose control over investments and  shift in the balance of power to the 
labor unions, as unionists would also function as labor representatives in supervisory boards. 
Through their centralized organization, unions would be able to use codetermination as a tool 
for centralized economic planning, effectively disenfranchising the individual industrialist of 
his ownership rights, so the suspicion. For these rasons, the issue of co-determination was 
not amenable to a strategy of social pacification. I deed, defeating challenges to 
entrepreneurial freedom and private capital ownership were precisely the goals of social 
pacification. Social policies were the means, the protection of entrepreneurial freedom and 
private capital ownership the ends. Industry’s willingness towards compromise and 
pacification ended, where entrepreneurial freedom and private capital ownership themselves 
appeared to be at stake.  
 The case of codetermination provides us with important information concerning the 
ultimate motives that informed employers’ consent to social policies, that is, the genuine 
preferences that underlay their behavior. Why did employers often consent to compromises 
on social policy issues, while they were reluctant to do so with respect to codetermination? 
Clearly, compromise is not an end in itself. Actors will only consent to a compromise if 
thereby they can satisfy their genuine preferences in a better way than otherwise. If the 
essence of a proposal is in direct opposition to an actor’s genuine preferences no compromise 
will be possible.  
 In the field of social policy, employers consented o compromises, where this appeared 
to further their ultimate goals, to defend private capital ownership and entrepreneurial 
freedom. Social policies and collective bargaining may raise labor costs, but they do not 
intervene with capital ownership rights, the rights of capital to decide unilaterally over 
investments and the use of profits. Social policies w re thus, in principle, an appropriate tool 
of social pacification during those historical moments when capital ownership rights appeared 
to be at risk. Co-determination, in contrast, infringes capital ownership rights by partially 
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shifting these rights to the representatives of labor. Therefore, there was no point for 
employers to make concessions on codetermination to lab r, as this would not have helped 
them to further their ultimate goals. Moreover, there was also little risk of a more radical 
solution through unilateral government action, as the CDU-led coalition government was 
generally skeptical about codetermination.158 Open confrontation against labor was thus the 
best option available to employers. 
 German industry’s alternative to co-determination and economic planning was the 
“social market economy”. The social market economy was an ideological template for the 
organization of the economy that was intended to give political legitimacy to an economic 
order based on free markets and private capital ownership. Although the content of the 
concept had been defined only vaguely by its protagonists, an emphasis on free market 
competition had always been put at the center by its protagonists. As shown in chapter six, the 
concept was developed and used by its protagonists, including business, as an ideological tool 
to emphasize the normative superiority of economic liberalism over its main rivals, which 
were understood to be communism in the East and “economic democracy” in West Germany. 
The concept of social market economy was thus marshaled against codetermination, which 
further indicates the strength of industry’s prefernces against codetermination. 
10.IV Employers and the Conservative Welfare State 
It would be easy to conclude from the fact that employers had often accommodated their 
positions to the political context that employers had little causal impact on welfare state 
development. As shown in this thesis, they have very rarely been part of alliances promoting 
the expansion of social policies. Neither have they b en fighting adamantly against social 
policies per se. They have, by and large, responded to policy initiatives coming from other 
actors by trying to influence policy details in the direction they preferred. This raises the 
question in what way and in which direction employers have shaped German welfare state 
development. Did employers leave an imprint on German welfare state development? In 
which direction did they influence the policies and institutions of the welfare state and 
industrial relations? What types of social policies did employers support and which ones did 
they try to prevent? 
 I have argued in this thesis that employers have supported social policies not because 
they thought that they would be in their economic interest, but because constraints created by 
                                                
158 An exception to this was the CDU labor wing, which did support co-determination. 
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the political environment often turned these policies nto the lesser of several evils. Most 
likely, in the absence of challenges to private capital ownership and strong pro-welfare forces 
employers would not have supported any social policies at all. This argument, however, is not 
intended to imply that employers did not care about the characteristics of the policies they 
supported, as long as the supported policy served its purpose of preventing the “greater evil”. 
Employers genuinely preferred social policies over others.159 For employers, not all social 
policies were of equal value, despite the fact thatey did not necessarily hold a genuine 
preference for any of them. Hence, once consideration of the political context had convinced 
employers that supporting a specific policy is the best of the choices available, they tried to 
shape the details of that policy in line with their more specific policy preferences. 
 The findings in this thesis show that German employers have consistently favored 
those types of social policies that follow the characteristics of what Titmuss termed the 
“industrial achievement” model (1958) or what Esping-Andersen termed conservative social 
policy (Esping-Andersen 1990: 58-69). Titmuss distinguished between three different welfare 
state models, the industrial achievement model, the residual welfare model and the 
institutional-redistributive model. Building on Titmuss, Esping-Andersen typologises social 
policies into conservative, liberal and social democratic (or universalistic) policies. Of these 
three types of social policies, employers’ support f cused on those policies that followed the 
conservative or industrial achievement model. This means that they have consistently 
preferred policy programmes based on earnings-related benefits to programmes based on 
universal benefit entitlements or means-testing. They preferred programmes that provided 
benefits based on employment and past earnings, financed by contributions from employers 
and employees and with some control by employers over the administration of these 
programmes. They opposed programmes providing universal benefits, independent of 
previous employment, or administered directly by the state without any participation by 
employers.160 
 Employers’ support for the conservative social policy model appears to have been 
motivated by a set of preferences. Most importantly, social insurance appeared to provide 
advantages compared to other types of social policy in terms of work incentives. By work 
incentives I mean incentives for individuals to accept work as well as to perform well at work 
(work effort). Work incentives and worker motivation were important concerns that shaped 
                                                
159 In this respect, this thesis is in line with the cross-class coalition thesis, as shown below. 
160 To clarify, employers’ positions were not the principal reason why Germany embarked on the path of 
conservative welfare state development. Other actors, such as the bourgeois social reform movement in 
academia, government officials and the Christian Democratic labor movement also made important contributions 
to set Germany on the path of a conservative welfare state. 
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employers’ positions on social policy issues. In short, employers were concerned that social 
benefits will make workers independent from work, will thus undermine work incentives and, 
consequently, reduce labor supply and work effort. As shown in chapters three and five, the 
issue of work incentives played a key role, in particular, in the introduction of old-age and 
disability pensions in 1889 and the introduction of unemployment insurance in 1927. Social 
insurance schemes offered some advantages in this respect compared to other types of social 
policy programmes, because they provide benefit entitl ments on the basis of previous 
earnings. The decommodifying character of social insurance programmes is thus more limited 
compared to universal or residual benefit programmes (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23). By 
linking benefits to past earnings and past employment they make sure that workers remain 
dependent on employment and work incentives are not liminated.  
 Work incentives also explain the variation in employers’ support for the various social 
insurance schemes. The intensity of employers’ support was strongest in the case of work 
injury insurance, followed by health insurance, then disability and old-age pension insurance, 
and finally, unemployment insurance, the programme most reluctantly endorsed by employers 
(see chapters 3 and 5). This variation is due to the differences in the extent that these four 
programmes offer opportunities for benefit abuse by “work shirkers.” Work injury insurance 
did not give rise to concerns over benefit abuse because the occurrence of the risk can be 
easily monitored. The issue of benefit abuse also did not play a major role in the case of 
health insurance. Employers were more reluctant to go along with Bismarck’s plans for a 
public disability pension system and justified their skepticism with the argument that 
disability insurance would be prone to abuse by work shirkers (see chapter 3.III). 
 Unemployment insurance was the last of the four social insurance schemes introduced 
and was also the one that met with the greatest opposition from employers. Unlike the other 
social insurance schemes, unemployment insurance provides benefits to persons that are 
assumed to be, in principle, capable and available to work. Employers perceived 
unemployment insurance to be particularly prone to benefit abuse because the status of 
unemployment is not linked to any easily observable characteristic, such as age, injury or 
sickness. Thus the problem of undermining work incentiv s and promoting work dodging was 
greatest in the case of unemployment insurance. Employers’ evaluation of unemployment 
insurance changed, once the introduction of the universal unemployment assistance 
programme led to a policy status quo that appeared to undermine work incentives even more. 
 296 
 By linking benefits to past earnings, social insurance programmes consolidate the 
market outcome of wages. Employers could thus present ocial insurance benefits as a 
deferred wage, something the worker has earned an entitlement to due to his work effort. 
Earnings-related benefits provide an additional reward to the worker that, presumably, is 
proportional to his performance at work and thus may benefit his motivation at work. For the 
same reason, employers have always strongly opposed redistributive elements in social 
policies. To gain the comparative advantages of the social insurance model employers were 
ready to contribute to the financing of social insurance. Financing of social insurance 
programmes by contributions from employers and employees was always in principle 
accepted by employers.  
 Employers did, over time, become more concerned about the increases in labor costs 
caused by the growth in social expenditures. Through a politics of containment they tried to 
limit the further growth in social expenditures. They lobbied for benefit levels and entitlement 
criteria to be defined as restrictive as possible and tried to prevent the further expansion of 
social insurance programmes, for instance by trying to prevent the inclusion of additional 
social groups. This behavior can be discerned already as early as in the 1890s (see e.g. Büren 
1934). The participation of employers in the drafting of unemployment insurance in the 
1920s, for instance, was motivated, inter alia, also by the intention to make sure that an 
increase in labor costs would not occur. Similarly, employers’ opposition to the so-called 
“dynamisation” of pension benefits in the 1950s was also motivated by fears of rising social 
expenditures.  
 From the 1990s onwards, the importance of the labor cost issue to employers increased 
considerably. A secular rise of social expenditures in recent decades made employers 
increasingly reluctant to go along with a  politics of social compromise, like they did in the 
post-war decades, and contributed to a turn to public campaigning by employers. A key 
conflict in this respect was the introduction of long-term care insurance in 1994, which 
employers strongly lobbied against, though they failed to prevent it. Employers have also 
funded several public campaign initiatives to promote welfare retrenchments, such as the 
Initiative New Social Market Economy. In all their campaigning for cost containment, 
German employers did throughout history remain loyal to the conservative/industrial 
achievement model, with payroll tax financing and earnings-related benefits. They focused 
their demands on cuts in benefit generosity, rather t an on changes in the mode of financing. 
They did also not advocate a wholesale shift to a residual/liberal welfare state model. 
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Employers continued support for a payroll tax-financed conservative social policy model 
indicates that the issue of work incentives is of continued relevance to employers. 
10.V Political vs. Economic Interests in Explaining Employers’ Choices 
If the political accommodation thesis is correct that political constraints, rather than economic 
interests, motivated employers to accept social policies, how is it then possible that employers 
have over such a prolonged period of time consistently preferred conservative social policies 
to liberal or social democratic policies? How does their interest in securing work incentives 
relate to the political goals that motivated their acceptance of social policies? 
 To understand this issue it is important to distingu sh analytically between (a) the 
reasons why employers accepted the formation of social policies from (b) their preferences 
over specific types of social policies. The latter is secondary to the former. The reasons why 
employers had accepted social protection need to beseen as distinct from the sources of their 
preference rankings over specific social policy options. Social pacification and political 
accommodation were the ultimate motivations for employers to accept the formation of the 
welfare state and industrial relations institutions. Only after employers had decided that the 
political circumstances required social pacification r political accommodation, preferences 
over specific policy options came into play. 
 To illustrate the importance of distinguishing analytically between these two distinct 
processes of preference formation, take a simple example: Assume we ask a prison inmate to 
tell us in which prison he would like to serve his prison sentence. The inmate informs us that 
he prefers prison P1 to prison P2, and prison P2 to prison P3. Let us assume that the inmate 
does indeed serve his sentence in prison P1. We can then infer that he does so because he has 
stated a preference for this specific prison. However, the fact that we know in which specific 
prison he prefers to serve his sentence does not allow us to make any inferences about why he 
is in prison. It would clearly be a logical fallacy to infer that he is in prison because he has 
stated a preference for being in prison (…or, in prison P1, just for the sake of empirical 
accuracy).  
 This example intends to illustrate two related points. First, the question of why the 
inmate is in prison and why he is in a specific prison are analytically distinct questions. The 
two questions require different explanations. Similarly, the question why a political actor 
supported social protection and why it supported a specific type of social protection should be 
treated as analytically distinct. Second, if external constraints are ignored a stated preference 
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can easily appear as a genuine preference and thus, by inference, as the principal ausal factor 
for the outcome to be explained. In reality, though, the stated preference may as well be a 
strategic accommodation to political constraints. 
 The example above helps to demonstrate the differenc s between the cross-class 
coalition thesis and the political accommodation thesis. As shown in the introduction chapter 
(chapter 1), the cross-class coalition thesis rests on an economic-functionalist logic, while the 
political accommodation thesis rests on a political-strategic logic. Research by proponents of 
the cross-class coalition thesis (e.g. Mares 2003b; Swenson 2002) tends to assume that 
employers’ support for specific policies reflected their genuinely held preferences, rooted in 
objective economic interests, such as interests in skill investments (Mares 2003a: 29). Thus, 
the cross-class coalition thesis suggests, employers’ st uctural power and pro-welfare 
preferences were an important causal force behind welfare state formation and expansion. In 
contrast, the political accommodation thesis suggests that employers’ acceptance of welfare 
state formation reflects a choice for a lesser evil, resulting from the accommodation to an 
unfavorable political context. In theoretical terms this difference can be expressed in the form 
of two alternative preference rankings, which are shown in table 10.2 below. The table 
presents assumed rankings of employer preferences, whereby the first position shows the 
assumed genuine preference (first-order preference) of mployers and the other positions (2 to 
4) show strategic preferences (lower-order preferences). 
Table 10.2 Employer Preference Rankings 
Employer preference rankings  
Cross-class coalition thesis 
(Economic interests) 
Political accommodation thesis 
(Political interests) 
1. Conservative social policies 1. No social policies 
2. Liberal social policies 2. Conservative social policies 
3. Social democratic social policies 3. Liberal social policies 




 It may be argued that the importance of work incentiv s for motivating employers to 
support conservative social policies disconfirms the political accommodation thesis. 
Employers’ interest in work incentives is rooted in genuine economic requirements of 
industrial production, and independent of the political context. It is thus an objective 
economic interest. However, its translation into a preference for conservative social policies, I 
argue, was shaped by the political context. An absence of social policy is the best way of 
securing work incentives, conservative social policy the second-best way. Conservative social 
policies constituted a lesser evil, less evil than liberal and social democratic policies.  
 This claim is supported by empirical observations a d by theoretical considerations. 
First, several empirical observations are consistent with the claim that conservative social 
policies represented a lesser evil to employers. It is remarkable that, with the exception of 
work injury insurance, employers have not actively promoted the formation and expansion of 
conservative social policies. Instead, they tended to take stances only after other actors have 
brought social policy issues on the political agenda. Employers have thus, in general, 
consented to, but not actively pushed for social policies. This is also acknowledged by 
scholars relying on the cross-class alliance thesis: I abela Mares, in particular, states that 
“[e]mployers were not ‘agenda setters’. They were not responsible for introducing a social 
policy proposal on the broad agenda of reform” (Mares 2003a: 259). Taking this observation 
seriously, one can infer that employers did not hold a first-order preference for conservative 
social policies, because if they would have, they would have brought such policies on the 
agenda on their own initiative, rather than waiting for others to take the initiative. 
 Second, the importance of work incentives is indicated by comparing conservative 
with liberal social policies with respect to labor costs. Conservative social policies will, in 
general, be more costly than liberal social policies, because they rely on earnings-related 
benefits, rather than on means-tested benefits. Employers have, however, in general preferred 
the earnings-related programmes of social insurance to means tested assistance programmes, 
which would have been likely to be less costly. This indicates that labor costs where not the 
only relevant issue to employers. Instead, the issue of work incentives trumped over the issue 
of labor costs. 
 Third, interests in work incentives do not provide a plausible theoretical basis for 
arguing that employers held a first-order preference for conservative social policies. The two 
theoretical arguments (see table 10.2) concur that employers will prefer conservative social 
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policies to liberal and social democratic ones161 (see table 10.2 above). This assumption is 
based also on robust empirical findings and, I believ , is compatible with both arguments. 
However, in order to show that employers’ acceptance of conservative social policies 
reflected their first-order preference and not a second-order preference motivated by political 
accommodation, we would need a theoretical justification for why employers should have 
preferred conservative social policy to no social policy (the assumed first-order preference in 
the political accommodation thesis).  
 Employers’ interest in work incentives is, however, better served by the absence of 
social policy than by conservative social policy. As mentioned, employers’ support for 
conservative social policies resulted from the factthat they assumed that such policies would 
have less detrimental effects on work incentives compared to the two other types of social 
policy. Conservative social policies are less decomm difying than the two other types of 
social policy, because they tie benefits to previous earnings. As the existence of work 
incentives derives to a large extent from the fact tha the worker would not be able to make a 
living without work, social policies, conservative or other, do necessarily reduce work 
incentives. In the absence of any social policy (conservative or other), employers would thus 
have no reason to worry about the issue of work incentives. The issue of work incentives 
becomes relevant to employers only once the existence of some form of social protection 
threatens to reduce labor supply (and thereby also to strengthen the bargaining power of 
unions and to push up the price of labor). In the absence of any type of social policy, there is 
thus no reason for employers to support conservative social policy. 
 In addition, one has to take into consideration that employers can also rely on 
occupational social benefits, instead of public social policies, to promote desired behavior 
among workers, such as higher work effort, loyalty nd skill investments. In the absence of 
political constraints, occupational social benefits, sponsored by the firm itself, are likely to be 
the first-order preference of employers to satisfy their needs for a motivated and productive 
workforce. There is, therefore, a solid theoretical b sis for assuming that work incentives 
were secondary to social pacification and political accommodation as the principle reasons for 
employers’ acceptance of the introduction of welfar state and industrial relations institutions. 
 The distinction made here between (a) the motivations of employers for accepting the 
introduction of social policies and (b) their reason  for them preferring certain social policy 
                                                
161 This result that employers preferred conservative social policies to other types is in line with the results 
presented by Mares: “The peak associations dominated by large firms have supported either private-type or 
contributor insurance policies. These associations have favoured these policies over alternative means-tested or 
universalistic social policies.” (Mares 2003a: 252) 
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options over others demonstrates the difference between the cross-class coalition thesis and 
the political accommodation thesis. The cross-class coalition thesis focuses on explaining b 
and does so by reference to economic interests, implic tly suggesting that b also explains a. In 
contrast, the political accommodation thesis contends that political interests explain a, while 
economic interests come to play a role only in explaining b. 
  The introduction of work injury insurance provides a useful illustration of this 
distinction (see chapter 3.II). In the policy-making process, the heavy industry pushed for the 
inclusion in the new programme of as many sectors as possible. This stance was motivated by 
a preference for widening the risk pool, and for redistributing the costs across sectors. As the 
heavy industry was among the sectors with the highest incidence of work injuries, it thus had 
a clear economic interest in extending the risk pool, as argued convincingly also by Mares162 
(Mares 2003a: 105). However, this observation tells us little about why the heavy industry 
decided to support the introduction of work injury insurance as such. In the absence of a 
programme for injury compensation there would have be n no reason for the heavy industry 
to think about the whole issue of injury compensation.  
As shown in chapter 3, the main reason why employers supported the programme was 
that the pre-existing liability legislation had turned work injuries into a source of class 
conflicts, fuelling class antagonizing propaganda by the unions.  While different sectors may 
have held different preferences concerning the issue of risk pooling, this issue is logically 
secondary to the issue of whether a compensation programme shall be introduced at all or not. 
To know why employers preferred a specific option concerning the financing of the new 
policy tells us little about why they supported, or accepted, the policy as such. To understand 
the latter we need to look at the political constrain s. 
10. VI The VoC Thesis: Production Strategies and Preference Changes 
A specific argument concerning the continued viabilty of welfare state and industrial 
relations institutions has been put forward by  some proponents of the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) perspective (2001). This argument constitutes a modified version of the cross-class 
coalition thesis, and I call it the “VoC thesis”. In, short, the VoC thesis suggests that, while 
institutions benefiting employers today may originally not have been designed or promoted by 
them, firms have over time managed to make positive use of these policies and, thereby, have 
                                                
162 Mares argues that „employers’ concerns centred around the distribution of responsibilities in the 
administration of social insurance and the ‘redistribution of risks’ across different occupations” (Mares 2003a: 
105) 
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developed also a genuine preference for their continua on (Hall and Soskice 2001: 58; 
Hancké et al. 2007: 20-3; Hassel 2007: 253-5; Thelen 2001: 70-76; Wood 2001: 376-9). This 
argument is aptly summarized by Anke Hassel: 
The institutional settlement and firms’ competitive strategies are … complementary: institutions 
give incentives to firms to follow certain business strategies. The resulting practice by firms 
leads to investments that are dependent on the capacity that derives from the institutions. This, 
in turn, gives firms an interest in the maintenance of these institutions. (Hassel 2007: 254) 
 In the VoC thesis, economic interests come in not as a cause but as a consequence of 
the institutional setting, and are expected to contribute to a process of institutional self-
reinforcement. According to the VoC thesis, the accommodation of firms to their institutional 
environment may give rise also to cross-class coaliti ns in defense of these institutions. In this 
perspective, cross-class coalitions serve thus not as an explanation of institutional origins, but 
as an explanation of the sustainability over time. Rhodes, Hancké and Thatcher, for instance, 
argue that 
[c]ross-class coalitions in CMEs can be understood as the point where the strategies of labor and 
capital meet: both have strong preferences for thick, nclusive and well-institutionalised 
frameworks. Because both benefit, they will therefor  fight for their survival. (Hancké et al. 
2007: 20). 
In principle, the VoC thesis is compatible with both of the two arguments that this 
thesis has dealt with: the cross-class coalition thesis and the political accommodation thesis, 
as it relates to a different temporal stage in institutional development. The cross-class 
coalition thesis and the political accommodation thesis are concerned with institutional 
origins, the VoC thesis is concerned with the subsequent adjustment of firms to the extant 
institutional framework. As shown in the introduction chapter, some proponents of the VoC 
approach endorse the political accommodation thesis on institutional origins (e.g. Hall and 
Thelen 2009: 14), while others argue in favor of an economic-functionalist explanation of 
institutional origins (e.g. Cusack et al. 2007: 388). In terms of its theoretical logic, though, the 
VoC thesis rests on an economic-functionalist perspective, rather than a political strategic 
one. Supporting the VoC thesis, Hall and Thelen, for instance, argue that “the support that 
groups provide for an institution is motivated, to some extent, by the benefits the institutions 
provides, flowing from the functions it performs” (Hall and Thelen 2009: 14).  
 This thesis has dealt with the VoC argument only at the margins. This is because the 
question that the thesis tried to answer concerned th  role of employers in the historical 
formation of welfare state and industrial relations i titutions. Therefore, the focus of the 
analysis was put on those historical moments when tose policies and institutions that later 
came to define the German model were created. A systematic analysis of how German 
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employers subsequently accommodated their production s rategies to various institutions and 
how this changed their perception of their interests would, for this reason, have been beyond 
the scope of the thesis. Nevertheless, some tentative statements on that issue are possible on 
the basis of the empirical analysis presented in this thesis, in particular in chapter 9, which 
analyzed changes in employer positions in industrial rel tions and welfare state reform during 
the 1990s. 
Empirically, the evidence concerning the VoC thesis appears to be mixed. Some 
policies tend to confirm the development of more positive employer positions in response to 
their ability to use existing institutions in their own interests, others tend to disconfirm it. 
Moreover, we see changes in employer preferences in both directions, becoming more as well 
as less favorable towards existing institutions, depending on the historical period that we look 
at. The following paragraphs give a brief summary about the development of employer 
positions on the welfare state and industrial relations institutions analyzed in this thesis. 
 Works councils. The case of works councils confirms the VoC thesis. The importance 
of works councils in facilitating industrial restruct ring in recent decades has been analyzed 
in depth by Kathleen Thelen (1991). Thelen’s work indicates that works councils provided 
economic benefits to German firms, in particular by contributing to cooperative workplace 
relations and better communication between management and workforce. Today, German 
industry generally supports works councils and acknowledges their positive effects in terms of 
social peace and cooperative workplace relations.163 
Initially, though, industry had been adamantly opposed to the institutionalization of 
works councils. Mandatory Works councils were first ntroduced during World War I, as part 
of the Auxiliary Services Act of 1916, a decision intended by the government to pacify a 
discontent working class. At that time, industrial employers accepted mandatory works 
councils only as a temporary institution limited to the period of the war. After World War I, 
however, industrialists changed their position and ccepted the permanent establishment of 
mandatory works councils in return for the unions’ cooperation against revolutionary forces 
(see chapter 4). After the revolutionary threat hadw ned, employers revoked their concession 
and opposed the passing of the Works Councils Law in 1919. Employers suspected that the 
works councils would provide a hotbed of radical union agitation. 
                                                
163 The share of workers covered by works councils did, however, went down somewhat in recent years, from 50 
per cent in 1996 to 46 per cent in 2005 (Ellguth 2007: 157). 
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  The practical experiences with works councils made by German firms during the 
Weimar Republic appear to have been mixed. While some firms refused to establish works 
councils, despite the legal requirement to do so, other firms reported positive experiences with 
their works councils (Erdmann 1966b: 145). After World War II, works councils became 
generally accepted and endorsed by industrial employers. In the 1950s, the employer 
federation (BDA) advocated works councils as a strategic alternative to co-determination in 
the supervisory board, but later on support for works councils came to rest also on a genuine 
believe that they constitute an expedient tool to facilitate communication between 
management and workforce (see e.g. Balke 1966: 6). 
 Collective bargaining. Sectoral wage bargaining provides a good case for testing the 
VoC thesis, because bargaining coverage rests on volu tary membership by firms. Sectoral 
wage bargaining is thus not a mandatory institution and participation by firms in wage 
bargaining can be seen as indicating genuine support. In the Wilhelmine Empire (1871-1918), 
most sectors had refused to recognize unions and to bargain with them.164 They tried to 
undermine unions by repressive means, such as blacklisting (see chapter 2.II). Some small-
firm sectors started to bargain with unions from about the turn of the century on, most notably 
construction and timber, but the large heavy industry ector continued to refuse to recognize 
labor unions. Sectoral bargaining was extended to all sectors in 1918 by the Stinnes-Legien 
agreement, covering now also those sectors that until then had refused to even recognize 
unions. Collective bargaining institutions remained contested by employers throughout the 
Weimar Republic, in particular the role of binding state arbitration in settling wage conflicts. 
Wage bargaining in the Weimar Republic was conflictual and often resulted in an impasse 
that had to be solved by state intervention. 
 Like in the case of works councils, employers changed their attitude towards collective 
bargaining after World War II, a change that was part of their broader paradigm shift towards 
social partnership and social compromise (see chapter 6). Industrial employers came to see 
sectoral bargaining as a tool expedient for securing social peace and keeping wage conflicts 
away from the workplace (see e.g. Müller-Jentsch 1993: 496-7). Collective bargaining 
became thus genuinely supported by employers. Starting in the mid-1980s, though, bargaining 
coverage declined considerably due to individual firms deciding to leave sectoral bargaining 
(see chapter 9.IV). This trend is caused in particular by the exit of smaller firms, which 
increasingly find collective agreements as too burdensome and too costly. Large firms do in 
                                                
164 An exception to this was the printing sector, where collective bargaining occurred already from the 1870s 
onwards (see chapter 2). The example of the printing sector was however initially not followed by other s ctors. 
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general tend to stay within the sectoral bargaining institutions. They tend to perceive sectoral 
bargaining as providing genuine economic advantages, mo t importantly in terms of securing 
social peace and facilitating the peaceful restructuring of production. The exit by smaller 
firms has resulted in a significant shrinking of the German model in terms of the share of the 
economy it covers. With respect to collective bargaining, evidence for the VoC thesis thus 
tends to concentrate on the post-war period. The more recent period, since the mid-1980s, 
shows a more ambivalent attitude by employers, characte ized by the emergence of internal 
differences that remained muted in the post-war period. We will return to this issue further 
below. 
 Codetermination. As shown in chapter 8, employers opposed the introduction and 
extension of codetermination at the firm-level (i.e. power-sharing in supervisory boards) in 
the post-war period, though they did over time come to accept it. Up to the 1970s, employers 
campaigned fiercely against parity representation in the supervisory board, and in particular 
against the extension of its coverage by the Codetermination Law of 1976. After they had 
failed to bring down the law through a constitutional complaint in 1977, employers decided to 
put up with codetermination and since then toned down their campaigning against 
codetermination. They continue to push for restricting codetermination rights and argue that 
codetermination constitutes a competitive disadvantage for attracting investors on 
international financial markets (BDI and BDA 2006; Kommission zur Modernisierung der 
deutschen Unternehmensmitbestimmung 2006: 55-66). In contrast, the more limited form of 
codetermination established by the Workplace Constitution Law of 1952 and applied in 
smaller firms (“one-third codetermination”) is generally accepted by employers today. The 
decision by employers to put up with parity codetermination appears to be largely the result of 
political accommodation, rather than of the perception of genuine economic benefits. 
 Welfare state programmes. The social policy field provides mixed evidence for the 
VoC thesis. Throughout most of history the focus of employers was to limit welfare state 
expansion (politics of containment), rather than to defend existing policies against 
retrenchment. In the 1880s, employers supported Bismarck’s reforms as an instrument for the 
social pacification of a discontent and politically radicalized working class. Later, the waning 
of revolutionary fears and the sustained rise in social expenditures resulted in a shift in 
employers’ attitudes. Arresting the further expansio  of the welfare state became the 
paramount goal of employers. To achieve this goal they often acted strategically and 
presented alternative policy proposals.  
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From the 1990s onwards, employers greatly intensified their calls for welfare state 
retrenchment and cost containment. At the same time, they moved away from political 
accommodation and social compromise, as shown in chapter nine. They intensified public 
campaigning for welfare state retrenchment and market-oriented reforms and began to take 
more radical policy positions. This constitutes a significant change compared to previous 
decades, when employers did in principle accept the German model of consensual policy-
making. During the post-war period two types of interests underpinned employers’ acceptance 
of the basic institutional elements of the German welfare state: The role of social policies in 
industrial restructuring, and organizational self-interests of the employer associations 
themselves. 
The role of social policy for peaceful industrial restructuring 
From the 1970s onwards, firms often made use of social policy programmes to facilitate 
peaceful labor shedding, when the structural declin of the heavy industry and the 
restructuring of production in other sectors made large-scale lay-offs unavoidable. They made 
use of programmes like unemployment insurance, disability pensions or other provisions for 
early exit from the labor market to shed older workers (se e.g. Jacobs et al. 1991: 198-205). 
This practice provided them with a genuine economic interest in certain social policy 
programmes, as they allowed firms to reduce and restructure their labor force, while at the 
same time maintain social peace and cooperative relations with their workforce (see e.g. 
Ebbinghaus 2006: 43-49). Over time, however, the resulting rise in non-wage labor costs 
came to outweigh the advantages of this practice to firms. From about the mid-1990s 
onwards, employers became increasingly critical towards this practice of labor shedding-cum-
social pacification. Today, the national employer fderation officially demands a systematic 
closing down of possibilities for early retirement (BDA 2009: 19). The congruence of 
employer interests and generous social policy provisi ns appears thus as a temporary 
phenomenon, as characteristic for a specific historical phase that seems to be coming to an 
end. 
With some simplification, we can interpret the general pattern that emerges from the 
four sectoral trajectories above as a U-shaped curve. During the post-war period employers 
developed genuine preferences for certain aspects of welfare state and industrial relations 
institutions whose formation they had originally opp sed. More recently, especially since the 
1990s, we see a backlash, a turn away by employers from certain policies and institutions they 
accepted or endorsed during the post-war decades. Th  employer associations turned against 
early retirement provisions, event though many firms did in the past make extensive use of 
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such provisions. They turned away from consensual policy-making and towards public 
campaigning and opinion formation. Moreover, smaller firms tended to abandon collective 
bargaining, a process which the associations did not try to stop and, in effect, even supported 
by creating bargaining opt-outs for their members (“OT memberships”).  
Organizational interests in corporatist governance 
While employers today campaign strongly for welfare state retrenchment, including the 
closing down of programmes for early retirement, they continue to defend the corporatist 
governance of social policies, known in Germany as “p rity self-government” (BDA 2008: 2-
3). Already during the Weimar Republic, employers consistently supported corporatist forms 
of social policy administration, instead of unilater l administration by the governmental 
bureaucracy. They pushed for the corporatist administrat on of unemployment insurance in 
the 1920s and for the re-instatement of corporatist dministration after World War II (see 
sections 5.II and 7.II). As pointed out by Philip Manow, their participation in corporatist 
social policy administration contributed to the formation of cooperative and trust-based 
relations between unions and employer associations (Manow 2001: 119-20), and thereby also 
to the institutional underpinnings of social compromise in the post-war period.  
 In addition to facilitating cooperative relations with unions, the employer associations 
also have a strong organizational self-interest in corporatist governance. Their participation in 
social policy administration provides unions and employer associations with organizational 
legitimacy and resources. It strengthens their standing in politics and helps them to justify a 
large staff vis-à-vis their members. While the employer associations defend their role in 
corporatist governance on the grounds that thereby the  can ensure the efficient use of social 
insurance funds, and thereby help to prevent higher labor costs, their scope to influence social 
expenditure levels is in reality extremely limited, as benefit entitlements are determined 
entirely by the legislator, with virtually no discretion for the administration (Trampusch 2006: 
347-8). The reasons for employers’ support for corporatist “self-government” are, thus, to a 
large extent rooted in the organizational interests of their associations, rather than in the 
economic interests of individual firms.  
Internal conflicts and interest aggregation 
The turn by employer associations towards more radical and less accommodating stances is to 
a considerable extent fuelled by the emergence of internal conflicts, conflicts that had been 
largely muted during the post-war period.  As we have seen in the introductory chapter 
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(section 1.II), the social policy interests of different types of firms are aggregated by the 
national employer federation (BDA), which formulates a common standpoint, taking into 
account also strategic considerations. Because of this, internal differences within the business 
community do not normally come to have an impact in the field of welfare state politics. A 
specific division of labor among business interest associations, characteristic for corporatist 
systems of interest representation, serves to mute interest pluralism. This division of labor has 
two dimensions: 
First, business interest associations divide up reson ibility for policy fields among 
each other, and tend not to compete with each other in defining policy positions. As a result, 
the national employer federation BDA enjoys a near-monopoly position in formulating and 
representing the social policy positions of industrial firms in national politics. It represents the 
social policy interests of its members vis-à-vis the government, the legislature, other political 
actors and the public in general. Other peak-level business federations have an equivalent role 
in representing the product market interests of firms (BDI, DIHT and ZDH). These 
federations tend not to have their own positions on cial policy issues, but do instead tend to 
back the BDA’s social policy positions. Their social policy statements tend to be of a very 
general nature and are intended mainly to add strength to the BDA and its stances, rather than 
to compete with the latter. 
Second, a clear division of labor between peak-level and sector-level employer 
associations contributes to muting internal differences. The main task of sector-level 
employer associations is to bargain with unions. They do not normally engage a lot in welfare 
state politics. Instead, as mentioned above, the political representation of employers’ social 
policy interests is done by their peak-level federation, the BDA (see e.g. Grote et al. 2007: 
160-2). While the BDA enjoys a de facto monopoly in representing the social policy interests 
of industrial employers, this does not necessarily mean that its positions are always 
representative for the business community at large, but potential dissenters are weakly 
organized and have no strong means to make their voice heard in national politics.165 This 
holds in particular for conflicts between small and large firms, which have surfaced during the 
1990s, in particular on the issue of early retirement and in collective bargaining. Big industry 
dominates decision-making within the BDA, as membership fees and voting rights are linked 
to firm size. At the same time, smaller firms do not command strong independent 
                                                
165 An example of a dissenting group is the ASU (“Working Group of Independent Entrepreneurs”). The ASU 
represents smaller, family-run enterprises and pursues an unabashedly neo-liberal line. The ASU sees the welfare 
state as Germany’s main competitive disadvantage and c lls for a privatization of welfare state programs (ASU 
2005: 32). Even today, the ASU presents codetermination in its various forms as a disguised form of socialism 
and as an unacceptable infringement on private property rights (ASU 2006: 1). 
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organizational means for representing their positions. As a result, intra-business conflicts are 
played out predominantly within the associations and do usually not surface in the making of 
public policies. 
Internal conflicts between small and large firms have pushed the employer 
associations to radicalize their positions during the 1990s, though. In the past, the existence of 
a common opponent, such as a reformist government or the labor movement, often united the 
employer side and helped the associations to contain internal conflicts where they existed. 
Warding off revolutionary or reformist threats had priority over internal differences over 
policy details. During the 1990s the associations’ ability to contain internal conflicts declined 
as a result of increasing dissatisfaction among smaller firms in several fields. This required 
the associations to pay closer attention to the preferences of their smaller members and 
limited their capacity to accept political compromises. Thus, using the conceptual terms 
offered by Schmitter and Streeck, they had to shift from a “logic of influence” to a “logic of 
membership” (Schmitter and Streeck 1981). 
In the field of collective bargaining, differential capacities to deal with intensified 
competitive pressures and rising non-wage labor costs re ulted in conflicts between small and 
large firms. Large firms tried to deal with competitive pressures and the need for industrial 
restructuring by pushing for decentralizing and flexibilising arrangements within collective 
agreements. Smaller firms tended to leave collectiv bargaining institutions entirely, because 
they had fewer opportunities to make use of flexibilising arrangements, and came to see 
collective agreements increasingly as a burden, rathe  than as a contribution to social peace. 
As a result, collective bargaining coverage eroded considerably (see chart 9.2). In response, 
the associations decided to allow members to opt-out from collective bargaining, which 
contributed further to the erosion of collective bargaining institutions. Some employer 
associations in eastern Germany even actively encouraged their members to leave collective 
bargaining (VSME 2007). Similarly, the BDA’s turn against early retirement is a response to 
intensified dissatisfaction among smaller firms, as e rly retirement was primarily used by 
larger firms. In short, while larger firms may still remain comparatively content with existing 
institutions, the official stances of employer associations became increasingly shaped by the 
concerns of smaller firms, contributing to their tun towards market liberalization and welfare 
retrenchment. 
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The continued relevance of strategic accommodation 
Event though a radicalization of employer positions took place during the 1990s, strategic 
accommodation continues to play an important role even today. In specific reform processes, 
employer associations often decide to put forward rather moderate proposals in order to 
increase their chances of making an impact. Employer associations rely on good contacts with 
government officials to make their voice heard and try to cultivate these contacts by putting 
forward politically and technically feasible reform proposals. As shown in chapter 9, also 
today the BDA’s reform proposals are pitched towards the politically feasible, while at the 
same time aiming for considerable cost reductions. Like in the past, this moderation of 
positions reflects strategic considerations. For insta ce, the shift by the BDI towards a more 
unabashedly neo-liberal stance in the 1990s was contested within industry because of fears 
that this would undermine industry’s political credibility and influence. Moreover, the 
inability of capital and labor to reach a compromise n the Alliance for Jobs talks indicates 
that employers are not content with small-scale, incremental reforms but want far-reaching 
reforms, pushing for labor market liberalization and welfare state retrenchment.  
 The funding by employers of public campaigns that promote market-liberalizing 
reforms, such as the INSM, supports the view that teir moderation of official positions on 
social policy issues reflects strategic considerations, rather than a genuine economic 
preference. Since the early 1990s, the continued rise in non-wage labor costs, and the slow 
progress of cost containing reform, made employers increasingly critical of the effectiveness 
of political accommodation as a political strategy. Employers came to identify public opinion 
as a major obstacle for the reforms they desired. Political accommodation helped employers 
to influence the decisions of elite policy-makers, but it did, at the same time, also limit their 
ability to influence public opinion. 
  As long as political accommodation worked reasonably well for them, they did not 
consider this as a major problem and had no particular rge to shape public opinion. In 
particular from the 1980s onwards, however, political accommodation became less effective, 
because the reasons for the rise in non-wage labor costs shifted from deliberate political 
decisions to expand social policies to structural cuses, like higher unemployment and 
demographic ageing. These structural causes were difficult to combat by way of political 
accommodation and compromise, and required employers to make more forceful political 
interventions instead. The desired structural reforms of the welfare state required employers 
to try to coax government into making far-reaching, but unpopular, decisions. In the context 
of fiscal austerity, employers now had to convince governments to make more far-reaching 
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reform efforts, in order to reduce labor costs, rather than to contain reform efforts, as in the 
post-war period of welfare state expansion. Towards this end, public campaigning appeared 
more effective than political compromise. Through public campaigning they tried to change 
public opinion on broad political issues concerning the role of the state and markets in 
society, and thereby to weaken electoral resistance gainst market-liberalizing reforms.  
 To conclude, the empirical development confirms the VoC thesis in parts, but 
disconfirms it in other parts, depending on the histor cal time frame we focus on. The 
historical pattern approximates roughly a U-shaped curve. Developments in the post-war 
period tend to be broadly in line with what the VoC thesis predicts, as employers did over 
time become genuinely supportive of institutions and policies they had initially either 
opposed, or accepted only as lesser evils.  This holds in particular for collective bargaining 
and the works councils. This development appears to have been in part the result of a genuine 
change in economic preferences, rather than only a str tegic adjustment to political 
constraints, like what was the case in the preceding political regimes. 
Developments in the more recent period tend to disconfirm the VoC thesis, however. 
Employers have become a driving force for liberalizing reforms, rather than defenders of the 
status quo. This is most evident in the erosion of collective bargaining institutions and in 
public campaigning for labor market liberalization a d welfare state retrenchment. As argued 
in chapter nine, this second shift in employer positi ns appears to be explained by a 
combination of endogenous problems created by existing institutions, most importantly the 
unremitting rise in non-wage labor costs, and the int nsification of cost competition due to 
globalization. In addition, internal differences betw en large and small firms, with the later 
being under greater competitive pressures, have further fuelled the radicalization of employer 
positions. This second shift suggests that, while firms may try to adjust their production 
strategies to existing institutional constraints, and to the extent that they succeed in doing so 
also develop more favorable preferences, their actual apacity to do so successfully may be 
eroding. During the post-war period, the adjustment of production strategies and high levels 
of economic growth allowed employers to reconcile political accommodation and economic 
competitiveness, and thereby to safeguard social peace. Over time, however, the  sustained 
rise in non-wage labor costs eroded employers’ capacity to reconcile their own economic 





To conclude, this thesis has put forward the argument that German employers accepted the 
formation of social policies and industrial relations institutions as a lesser evil. German 
employers have consistently tried to shape social policies in line with their preferences, but 
what they wanted was decisively shaped by the political context. Their acceptance of the 
introduction of social policies and institutions ofsocial compromise did not reflect any 
objective economic necessities of profit-seeking firms, but resulted from political constraints 
that shaped what employers thought would be the policies worth fighting for. Politically 
generated challenges, the “greater evils,” compelled employers to put their weight behind 
policies that otherwise would have been of no value to them. 
 The nature of the greater evils employers wanted to prevent changed over time and so 
did the lesser evils that they thought would be most effective in fighting the first. Originally, 
fears of a social revolution, the collectivization f industry and loss of political power, 
constituted the greater evils that employers tried to fight off. The pacification of the working 
class, or politically radicalized segments within it, constituted the means for doing so. 
Thereby, employers reluctantly came to accept those same social policies and institutions of 
class cooperation that they had previously opposed. With the waning of revolutionary dangers 
and the reformist transformation of the labor movement also the kinds of challenges faced by 
business shifted. Now, universalistic policies that were seen as undermining work incentives 
and welfare state expansion became the new “greater vils.” Strategically motivated and more 
moderate alternative proposals were the lesser evils. In short, the formation of the modern 
welfare state may not have been fundamentally opposed by capitalists, but it is unlikely that 




Appendix: Time Line 
 
1869 Deutscher Buchrdruckerverein founded (first permanent national employer 
association) 
1871 Freedom of association enshrined by law 
1872 Verein für Socialpolitik founded 
1873 Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists (VDESI) founded 
1876 Central Association of German Industrialists (CDI) founded as the first 
national industry federation 
1875 German Social Democratic Party founded 
1878 anti-socialist legislation enacted 
1878   Verein anhaltischer Arbeitgeberverbände founded by Oechelshäuser 
1879 protectionist tariffs policy introduced 
1881 ‘Social peace message’ by Emperor Wilhelm I. announces plans to introduce 
social insurance 
1883 national health insurance law passed 
1884 national work injury insurance law passed 
1889 old-age and disability pensions law passed 
1890 anti-socialist legislation discontinued 
1890 Gesamtverband Deutscher Metallindustrieller founded (nationwide metal 
employer federation) 
1895  Bund der Industrie (Federation of Industry) founded 
1901 Verein für Sozialreform founded 
1903/04 Large strike by textile workers in Crimmitschau 
1904 first national peak-level employer federations founded (Hauptstelle and 
Verein) 
1909 Hansabund founded, as a political business organization 
1910 Large strike by construction workers  
1913  merger of Hauptstelle and Verein into VDA (Association of German  
  Employer Associations) 
1914  Begin of World War I  
1916  War Auxiliary Services Law (HDG) passed (participatory rights to unions) 
1918 November: end of World War I, November Revolution, Stinnes-Legien 
Agreement 
1919  winter 1918/19 large strikes in mining 
1919 Weimar Republic founded 
1919 BdI and CDI merge into RDI (Federation of German Industry) 
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1920 January: Works councils law passed 
1920 June: Central Committee (Zentralausschuss) of German Business Associations 
founded 
1920 Kapp-Putsch (attempted putsch by right-wing paramilitaries) 
1924  Ruhr occupation by French and Belgian troops 
1924 employers unilaterally abandon the agreement on the eight hour working day 
1924  collapse of the ZAG 
1924  Ernst von Borsig new VDA president (until 1932) 
1927  Unemployment Insurance Law (AVAVG law) introduced 
1929 ‘Ruhr iron conflict’ (largest industrial conflict during the Weimar period) 
1929 outbreak of the world economic crisis 
1930 government Müller-Franken resigns over unemployment insurance conflict 
1932  Carl Köttgen new BDA president (until 1933) 
1933 Nazis come into power: unions and employer associati ns banned. Formation 
of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) as a joint organization for capital and 
labor 
1936  Formation of the Reichswirtschaftskammer [national economic chamber] by 
  the Nazis 
1939 Begin of World War II 
1945 End of World War II, defeat of the Nazi regime, begin of Allied occupation 
1949 currency reform 
1948  June: formation of a national committee of employer associations 
1950 Social Insurance Adjustment Law passed by the Economic Council 
1949 Constitution of the new Federal Republic passed 
1949 August: First national elections, formation of a CDU-led government 
(Chancellor: Konrad Adenauer, in power until 1963) 
1949  October: formation of a national, non-partisan, union federation (DGB) 
1951 BDA (Federation of German Employer Associations) founded.  
First BDA president: Raymound (until 1953) 
1950 January: Hattenheim talks between capital and labor ove  co-determination 
conflict 
1950 October: Law re the re-establishment of self-government in social insurance 
passed 
1951 May: Co-determination Law for the heavy industry passed (Montan 
Codetermination Law) 
1951 August: Dismissal Protection Law 
1952 November: Workplace Constitution Law passed 
 1953  Hans Constantin Paulssen new president of the BDA (until 1964) 
1957 pension reform introducing wage indexation (“dynamic pension”) passed 
1961 Construction of the Berlin Wall 
1963  new CDU-led government (until 1966, chancellor: Ludwig Erhard) 
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1963  Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat) established 
1964  Siegfried Balke new BDA president (until 1969) 
1964 Chancellor Erhard initiates expert group for scial policy reform (‘Sozial-
Enquete’) 
1966 Grand Coalition between SPD and CDU (Chancellor: Kurt Kiesinger, until 
1969) 
1967 Start of the Concerted Action talks (tripartite body on macro-economic policy 
concertation), until 1977 
1967 Biedenkopf commission on reform of codetermination established (reports 
1970) 
1969 Otto Friedrich new BDA president (until 1973) 
1969 Social-liberal coalition (until 1982, Chancellors: Willy Brandt, followed by 
Helmut Schmidt) 
1972 Reform of the Works Constitution Law (extends works councils rights) 
1973 Hans-Martin Schleyer new BDA president (until 1977) 
1976 Special Codetermination Law (extends codetermination rights in large firms), 
employers file a constitutional complaint against the law 
1977 July: unions leave Concerted Action talks in protest against employers 
challenging the 1976 codetermination law in court 
1977 October: BDA president Schleyer assassinated by RAF 
1978  Otto Esser: new BDA president (until 1986) 
1979 Federal Constitutional Court confirms constitutionality of parity 
codetermination 
1982 CDU-led (conservative-liberal) coalition (until 1998, Chancellor: Helmut 
Kohl) 
1984 large strikes in metalworking on the issue of a shorter working week, results in 
a flexibilisation of working time rules and a gradul reduction of weekly 
working time 
1986 Klaus Murmann new BDA president (until 1966) 
1989  November: Berlin Wall falls 
1990 German unification:  
 March 9th:  joint declaration by BDA and DGB on the extension of the West 
German industrial relations model to the East and a policy of rapid wage 
convergence 
 October 3rd: Reunification 
1991 First wage convergence agreements signed in many sector  
1993  February: Metal employers unilaterally cancel wage convergence agreements, 
1994 Introduction of long-term care insurance against the resistance of employers 
1996  Dieter Hundt new BDA president 
1998  red-green coalition (until 2005, Chancellor: Gerhard Schröder) 
2002  Hartz committee on labor market policy reforms (several reform measures 
  later implemented) 
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2005  Grand Coalition between CDU and SPD (Chancellor: Angela Merkel) 
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